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1. Introduction

Few places in the world exemplify the interconnected nature of the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental) more explicitly than Somalia. However, Somalia faces additional levels of complexity: political fragility, weak state capacity, ongoing conflict, climate change and related recurrent humanitarian crises, and weak resilience. These factors have been further compounded by the current COVID-19 pandemic afflicting the country, which threatens the fragile gains made over the past years. These realities have broad implications for both fundamental human rights and sustainable development in Somalia.

Following Cabinet approval in September, the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, launched the Ninth Somalia National Development Plan (NDP-9) on 23 December 2019. The Plan lays out Somalia’s peace and development priorities for the period 2020 to 2024 and serves as the key overarching planning framework for the Government and international partners.

At the beginning of 2020, the United Nations in Somalia initiated the process of formulating a Common Country Analysis (CCA), an independent, impartial and collective assessment of the situation in Somalia. Anchored in and framed around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the CCA draws from and adds to existing analysis and resources across the UN system and beyond in Somalia.

The CCA represents integrated, cross-pillar thinking that demonstrates the interconnected nature of the SDGs and the multidimensional factors spanning the development, humanitarian and peace-building spectrum. As such, this document represents the first time the UN in Somalia has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the country through the prism of the SDGs, examining their interlinkages and the root causes that inhibit progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The CCA also identifies those most at risk of being left behind in Somalia’s journey to sustainable development.
A central function of the CCA is to guide and inform the UN system, with its partners, in the development of a new, integrated United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNCF). The UNCF (2021–2025) will represent the UN’s response to the newly articulated Somali peace and development priorities outlined in the NDP-9. The UNCF will further serve as the Integrated Strategic Framework for an integrated UN presence and therefore incorporates the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

The CCA will facilitate the formulation of priorities and outcomes for the UNCF by helping to pinpoint trigger areas or levers that have the potential to accelerate progress across multiple SDGs in a manner that puts the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized at its core.

It is realized that it is only with peace, reconciliation, stability and the rule of law that sustainable development can take root. And only with sustainable development will it be possible to break the cycle of recurrent humanitarian crises. It is only with resilient households, communities and institutions that the likelihood of conflict and radicalization will dissipate. Only when Somalia is a stable state capable of caring for all its citizens will it be seen as truly legitimate.

Progress in Somalia’s peace- and state-building enterprise will be based on a coordinated and holistic approach to security, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding agendas. Without comprehensively addressing the multiplicity of issues facing the country, collective gains towards sustainable peace and development will remain fragile and reversible. This CCA aims to provide a solid foundation of information and analysis to enable the UN system in Somalia and its partners to meet these multidimensional challenges head-on in a comprehensive and integrated manner in the coming years.
2. Executive Summary

Somalia has made significant strides over the past years on its journey towards peace, security and sustainable development. However, three decades of state collapse, environmental degradation, conflict and political instability have severely curtailed progress, meaning that the country effectively had to be rebuilt from the ground up. Progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals is slow and uneven.

The increasing occurrence of climatic crises, environmental degradation and dwindling natural resources further compound the fragile humanitarian situation, which impacts lives and livelihoods, increases food insecurity, and drives large-scale displacement and irregular migration. This in turn puts further strain on the state’s already limited capacity to provide services. Levels of resilience are low.

Reliance on vulnerable productive sectors, a weak financial sector, low levels of industrialization and overall poor economic performance mean unemployment remains stubbornly high, particularly for women and youth, thereby posing risks to peace and stability.

The limited capacities at all levels of government to provide for the security, social, environmental and economic needs of the population pose an additional challenge to the legitimacy of the state. This is further aggravated by a fragile political environment and pervasive corruption.

The interconnected nature of these elements means that progress or regression in one area can have significant knock-on implications in other areas. As such, in seeking to address the underlying causes of poverty and instability in Somalia in a sustainable manner, it will be necessary to take a multidimensional approach that accelerates progress across multiple SDGs.

Vulnerability and weak resilience in Somalia are almost universal. However, certain segments of Somali society face additional impediments to participation in the country’s path to sustainable development, putting them at risk of being left behind. Indeed, the exclusion of the most vulnerable means that development
cannot be considered truly sustainable. This CCA identifies the following groups as the most marginalized: women and girls; children; youth; internally displaced persons (IDPs), migrants, refugees and refugee returnees; rural and nomadic communities; minority communities; and persons with disabilities.

While significant challenges remain in accelerating progress on the SDGs in this “Decade of Action”, there is reason for optimism. The NDP-9 provides an overarching planning framework for the Government of Somalia and international partners, and is based on a comprehensive, multidimensional poverty reduction strategy based on sustainable, inclusive and green growth and economic diversification. Somalia’s move towards debt relief and the prospect of access to concessional financing is a further positive development.

However, real progress can only be achieved through the concerted efforts of the Government of Somalia at all levels, civil society, the private sector, international development partners and other stakeholders to comprehensively work across the humanitarian, development and peace nexus to ensure that peace and development are truly sustainable, and leaves no one behind.
According to the Population Estimation Survey, Somalia’s population in 2014 was 12.3 million and is estimated to have increased to over 15 million by the end of 2018. Its people are extremely young. An estimated 46 per cent of the Somali population are children (aged 0–14), and 27 per cent are adolescents and youth (aged 15–29). Together they make up almost three-quarters of the Somali population.\(^1\) Forty-two per cent of the population are urban dwellers, 23 per cent are rural, 26 per cent are classified as nomadic, and 9 per cent are IDPs.\(^2\) The Somali diaspora forms an important part of the larger Somali population and can be found all around the world.

Political Analysis

As Somalia continues its long recovery from decades of conflict, underdevelopment and instability, the country has achieved significant progress in several areas, such as state and institution building at the national and Federal Member State (FMS) level, military gains against Al-Shabaab, increased economic growth, and improved public sector management.

An important development in recent years has been the establishment of a nascent federal state structure, with the formation of FMS administrations, while the Somaliland issue remains unresolved. However, the recent opening of talks between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somaliland in Djibouti in June 2020 represents a positive development. Some of these FMSs have demonstrated potential and the political will to provide security, good governance, protection and basic services to their populations.

However, while cooperation and interaction at the technical level have continued, political disagreements between the FGS and FMSs, as well as between the executive and legislative branches, have affected the implementation of an ambitious political and security agenda, as FGS and FMS leaders failed to meet in a decision-making forum.

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during the initial two-year period from June 2018 to June 2020.

Despite the protracted and damaging political stalemate, some positive developments were registered. With the Transition Plan agreed and the gradual transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces about to start, the FGS and FMSs embarked on institutional capacity-building reforms of the security sector aimed at increasing civil oversight, transparency and accountability in line with the National Security Architecture Agreement.

Lack of clarity on various issues in the legal and constitutional framework – including allocation of powers, resource sharing, the status of Banadir/Mogadishu, and the absence of institutionalized mechanisms to define the relationship between the FGS and FMSs – have further rendered relations between the centre and the periphery more vulnerable to internal and external pressures. In this regard, the completion of the review of the Federal Constitution will be key for outlining the distribution of roles and responsibilities.

Although the Electoral Law was enacted in February 2020 to hold one-person, one-vote elections in 2020/2021, it lacked adequate buy-in from FMSs. Both domestic and international advocacy for consensus-building ushered in the resumption of dialogue between FGS and FMS leaders which led to an agreement on the holding of another indirect electoral process with some adjustments from the 2016 model. As a result of the ousting of the Prime Minister by the House of the People in July 2020, a replacement was appointed in September 2020 at a time when the term of the administration is close to an end. Focused efforts in implementing an agreed electoral model and sustaining the ongoing reform agenda will be essential.

While Somalia’s international partners continue to play a pivotal role in the country’s political, security and economic progress, competing interests among Somalia’s neighbours and some Gulf States remain a source of concern, as they tend to fuel division, local conflicts and corruption, and could undermine Somalia’s ability to hold credible elections. Strengthening Somalia’s institutions would enable the country to withstand the shocks of negative external interference.

Despite progress over recent years, the participation and representation of women and youth in leadership and decision making, including within the clan-based political structure, remains low, further perpetuating gender inequalities.

* See SDG 5 section of Chapter 5 for additional information on women’s political participation.

**Conflict Dynamics**

Development, humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts take place in conditions of extreme poverty and vulnerability for most of Somalia’s population. Recurrent droughts and floods, large-scale displacement, poor socioeconomic conditions, high unemployment rates, political instability, environmental degradation and violent conflict are among the factors complicating conflict dynamics in the country.

Significant efforts have been made by the FGS, in cooperation with international partners, to strengthen security in Somalia.

Effort is being made to extend state control and authority through capture-and-hold operations targeting Al-Shabaab–held territory, coupled with the Transition Plan, which envisages vesting more responsibility for security in national security institutions and forces.

Despite limited resources, government efforts to combat terrorism have been commendable, but Al-Shabaab, groups affiliated with ISIL, and simmering local conflicts continue to threaten the country’s security and long-term stability.

The impact of Al-Shabaab’s operations in Mogadishu remains significant. At the same time,
the group continues to influence other parts of Somalia through its military activities, extensive extortion and illegal taxation, intimidation, and propaganda, as well as through its extrajudicial "courts". Perceived and real political and socio-economic marginalization of communities creates a conducive environment for both inter-clan conflicts and violent extremism.

Furthermore, the planned drawdown and eventual withdrawal of AMISOM forces present a cause for concern. The capability and capacity of Somali security forces is not yet at the level required to mitigate AMISOM drawdown, which would pose existential threats to FGS and FMS administrations in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement or alternative military support.

Meanwhile, clan identity – a central pillar of Somali society – is a major driver of conflict and instability in many parts of the country due to several factors, including a struggle for power and limited resources, and is spurred by a culture of revenge nested in deep-seated grievances and long-running cleavages between the sub-clans. Intercommunal conflicts over access to land and water have re-emerged in some parts of Somalia, further exacerbated by recurring climatic shocks and the impact of unmanaged rapid urbanization.

Perceptions of FGS interference in the affairs of the FMSs, particularly in the conduct of state-level elections, which have been accompanied by the disproportionate deployment of FGS security forces, have also created divisions – and in some cases the use of force has resulted in civilian casualties.

While there remains a wariness of the state-building process and its implications for taxation and regulation among elements of the business community, there is a growing recognition that Somalia is approaching an important tipping point where security with government regulation may prove more profitable than insecurity without government involvement. Entrenched oligopolies in many sectors present significant obstacles to new businesses and pro-poor economic growth more broadly.

Despite Somalia’s overall positive trajectory, the country remains vulnerable to the repercussions of regional rivalries and disagreements. However, the political reconfiguration of the Horn of Africa and the thaw in diplomatic relations present an opportunity to transform the region, notwithstanding the maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya.

**Human Rights**

Somalia’s nearly three decades of conflict have had a devastating impact on the security, political and human rights situation. Human rights violations include arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial executions, abductions, and sexual violence, including rape. Such violations remain largely uninvestigated due to impunity and weak institutions that have broken down from years of conflict.

Human rights violations disproportionately affect sections of the population at the margins of society, including minorities, persons with disabilities, IDPs, and especially women and children, due to the lack of preventive measures, limited access to justice, and weak clan protection.

Armed conflicts between government forces and non-state armed groups and their allies and clan-based violence continue to endanger the safety of many people. In 2019, UNSOM recorded 1,459 civilian casualties (591 killed and 868 injured), of which 69 per cent were attributed to Al-Shabaab, 8 per cent to clan militias, 4 per cent to the Somali National Army, 3 per cent to the Somali Police Force, and 2 per cent to AMISOM.3

In 2019, the UN verified cases in which 2,959 children were victims of grave violations, which was a

3 UNSOM/OHCHR was unable to ascertain the specific alleged perpetrator for 14 per cent of the total number of civilian casualties, as their identity was either not determined with specificity or more than one alleged perpetrator was involved, blurring the lines of culpability.
sharp decrease from 5,656 in 2018. In 2019, children were victims of recruitment and use (1,495), abduction (1,158), killing and maiming (703), and rape and other sexual violence such as forced marriage and attempted rape (227).

Furthermore, it is estimated that 23 per cent of the 2,600 identified women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab were abducted and forced into marriage with its fighters. In 2018, UNSOM verified 270 cases of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated against women, girls and boys by non-state armed groups, including Al-Shabaab and clan militias.

People with disabilities are at heightened risk of violence and abuse, a situation that is worsened by the social stigma associated with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities.

Notable progress has been made in the engagement with key international human rights instruments and processes, including the implementation of the recommendations of the 2012 and 2016 Universal Periodic Reviews. As part of the progress on this front, on 6 August 2019, Somalia became the 180th State Party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities following its ratification. In 2019, Somalia submitted its first two reports to UN human rights treaty bodies: the report on the Convention against Torture on 10 December 2019, overdue by 29 years, and the initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 16 September 2019. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women is yet to be ratified. The establishment of a national Human Rights Commission, one of the consistent Universal Periodic Review recommendations, has stalled since January 2018. The Commission, a key protection institution, is a constitutional requirement and has existing legislation, enacted in 2016.

* See the chapter titled Leave No One Behind for further information.

Humanitarian Situation

Somalia remains one of the most complex and protracted humanitarian crises in the world. Climatic shocks, combined with other persistent drivers of needs such as armed conflict and protracted/continued displacement, have left over 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of whom 49 per cent are males and 51 per cent are females, while 63 per cent are children under the age of 17.

Climate-related events, mainly drought and flooding, have increased in frequency and intensity, compounding humanitarian needs in the last three decades and undermining community resilience. The operational environment remains challenging, with security incidents hindering the delivery of aid, especially in hard-to-reach rural areas.

Since 1990, Somalia has experienced 30 climate-related hazards: 12 droughts and 18 floods, three times the number of climate-related hazards experienced between 1970 and 1990. The severe drought that left the country on the verge of famine in 2017 was only abated by an above-average Gu rainy season (April–June) in 2018, coupled with a sustained aid operation. In 2019, a delayed and erratic Gu rainy season resulted in the poorest harvest since the 2011 famine and flooding. The spike in incidents of severe drought and flooding is a reminder that Somalia has become increasingly vulnerable to climate change.

Displacement caused by floods increased in 2019, but on a positive note displacement caused by drought and conflict/insecurity decreased compared to 2018. However, drought and conflict/insecurity aggravate the protracted displacement crisis, leaving an increasing number of IDPs without prospects for durable solutions.

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4 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview.
Macroeconomic Overview

Multiple concurrent crises – COVID-19, locusts, flooding, droughts – have disrupted Somalia’s economic recovery trajectory. As the direct impact of COVID-19 on the health of the Somali people becomes clearer, so will the secondary consequences and the required mitigating and response measures. Early estimates during the onset of the pandemic suggested the COVID-19 induced economic fallout would lead to a sharp contraction in the GDP, a fall in export revenue, severely reduced employment and livelihood opportunities – including a reduction in human mobility intra- and inter-regionally – and reduced remittances. Federal, state and local governments expected shortfalls in domestic revenue, greatly hindering their ability to respond to the increased needs of Somalis. However, the latest estimates from the World Bank indicate that the economy proved more resilient than expected. As economic activities resume across the country, current trends suggest that most sectors including remittances will stabilize, and the domestic revenue shortfalls may not be as large as expected (around 90 per cent of the original 2020 budget).

Even without the current crises, Somalia’s economic growth would have remained too low to improve the lives of most Somalis and help alleviate poverty. Pre-COVID-19 macroeconomic projections indicated that growth in agricultural production and expansion in transport, construction and telecommunications would continue to boost investment spending and create job opportunities.

According to the latest World Bank estimates, GDP is projected to decline by 2.5 per cent in 2020 to US$ 4.6 billion, compared with a pre-crisis forecast of 3.2 per cent growth. The global recession and COVID-19 containment measures, including limits on numbers undertaking the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia in particular, hit livestock and travel-related services the hardest. A second wave of locust infestation is expected to reduce crop and livestock production. Food insecurity is expected to rise due to loss of income and disrupted food supply chains. Whereas the urban poor, displacement-affected communities and the elderly are hardest hit by the impact of COVID-19, agriculturists and pastoralists are most threatened by flooding and locusts.

Somalia remains highly dependent on aid and remittances. The country received about US$ 1.9 billion in official development assistance (ODA) in 2019, comprised of roughly equal volumes of humanitarian and development aid. While total aid to Somalia is not expected to decline, it is unlikely to increase enough to meet the increased needs on the ground. Somalia’s large diaspora community sends home approximately US$ 1.4 billion per year. World Bank data derived from the Central Bank of Somalia indicate that whilst household remittance inflows declined during the month of April, they are stabilizing both for households and businesses. June 2020 remittances were actually higher than in June 2019, which could reflect a ‘catch up’ from earlier months.

Somalia reached the Decision Point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative on 25 March 2020, thereby restoring its access to regular concessional financing and being one step closer to debt relief. Through clearance of arrears owed to the three international financial institutions, Somalia’s external debt was reduced to US$ 3.9 billion from US$ 5.3 billion.

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6 Based on government projections shared with the World Bank.
8 World Bank estimates as of 3 June 2020 – still under assessment as the situation evolves.
Social Dimension of Sustainable Development

It is estimated that nearly seven out of ten Somalis live in poverty, making Somalia one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and this rate is higher among children below 14 years of age, at 73 per cent.13 About 69 per cent of the population live on under US$ 1.90 a day14, and per capita GDP is estimated at US$ 314.5.15 Around one-fifth of Somali households depend on overseas remittances.16

In 2019 the World Bank estimated that with the current annual urban population growth rate of around 4 per cent, the majority of Somali people will be living in urban areas by 2040. The fast rate of urbanization has put significant pressure on urban centres to provide public services. The majority of IDPs live in approximately 2,000 IDP sites, which are mostly in urban centres, as these offer more opportunities for obtaining humanitarian assistance and earning a living.

Somalia has some of the worst education indicators in the world, with low educational outcomes, particularly for girls, and knock-on implications for meeting labour market needs. Similarly, Somalia’s health system has been decimated following decades of conflict, instability, lack of capacity, weak governance and underinvestment. Access to health care remains very limited, particularly in rural areas, resulting in some of the worst health outcomes in the world. Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates and the highest under-5 mortality rate in the world. Contributing to the bleak health outlook in the country is the limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation services.

Environmental Challenges

Somalia is one of the states in Africa with extreme vulnerability to climate change and variability, combined with a limited capacity to effectively mitigate or respond to the impending impacts. Climate change poses risks to livestock, agriculture, forest ecosystems, water resources, energy resources, transport, public health and human settlements.

Affected populations are forced to seek alternative coping strategies during droughts, which include but are not limited to clan-based support, migration to nearby urban centres, and conscription into armed groups. Migration creates further competition over already overstretched resources and services, which can result in tensions between migrants and host communities. There is also evidence that exposure to climate change stressors increases civil unrest among the Somali clans due to competition over limited natural resources. Flooding risks meanwhile exist along the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers, which have densely populated agricultural areas.

The impacts of climate change–induced hazards and disasters are amplified inadequate coping mechanisms to shocks and insufficient social safety nets, especially for the most vulnerable.

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14 Ibid.

* See Chapter 5 for further information on health, education and WASH.
Following Cabinet approval in September, President Farmajo launched the Ninth Somalia National Development Plan on 23 December 2019. The Plan lays out Somalia’s development priorities for the period 2020 to 2024 and serves as the key overarching planning framework for the Government of Somalia and international partners. The NDP-9 replaces the previous NDP (2017–2019), the first Somalia National Development Plan in 30 years.

The NDP-9 also serves as an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP), a critical step in enabling Somalia to progress towards debt relief as part of the HIPC Initiative. To be considered iPRSP compliant, the NDP-9 was required to be: 1) Somalia driven and based on broad participation; 2) a medium- to long-term perspective in terms of its developmental vision and strategic interventions; 3) built on a comprehensive multidimensional poverty reduction strategy based on sustainable inclusive growth and economic diversification; and 4) results focused, with a feasible and clear monitoring and evaluation framework.

Cross-cutting policies (imperatives) are integrated into each pillar of the NDP-9, representing an important strategy for both targeting and prioritizing interventions:

- Strengthen gender, human rights and other kinds of social equity.
- Build the resilience of households, communities and the government.
- Better manage Somalia’s environment and its natural resources.
- Prioritize durable solutions to long-term displacement.
- Strengthen the interface between humanitarian and development planning.
- Make governance improvements a priority in each pillar.

Development and poverty reduction in Somalia are dependent on making progress on four causes of poverty and underdevelopment: political
fragility (inclusive politics), conflict (security and rule of law), weak economy (economic growth and employment), and community vulnerability (social development), all requiring a framework of strengthened governance. The NDP-9 is also fully committed to the provisions of the Somalia Women’s Charter, which emphasizes the important role women can and should play in sustaining peace and promoting sustainable development.

Pillar 1: Inclusive and Accountable Politics and Reconciliation

The NDP-9’s analysis of poverty and security-related issues confirms that effective and inclusive politics is a prerequisite for reducing insecurity, strengthening the rule of law, improving governance, and accelerating economic and social development.

This pillar’s desired outcome is to make substantial progress towards a stable and peaceful federal Somalia with an effectively decentralized, functional democratic system based on inclusive political processes. In order to make progress towards this vision, and to address the pillar’s challenges, the following strategies and interventions have been highlighted in the NDP-9: 1) deepening the federalization process; 2) stabilization and establishment of local governance; 3) finalization, ratification and implementation of the Constitution; 4) preparation and conduct of fair and credible elections in 2020/2021 and 2024; and 5) implementation of the National Reconciliation Framework. One of the major underpinnings of this pillar is ensuring and promoting the meaningful participation of all stakeholders and citizens, including women and marginalized groups, in the processes, as well as in leadership positions and political roles.

Pillar 2: Improved Security and the Rule of Law

The desired outcome for the security component of the NDP-9 is the foundation of security institutions that serve the expectations of citizens by respecting, protecting and promoting their fundamental rights regarding ensuring security and stability. The desired outcome for the rule of law and the justice sector reform is progress towards secure and equitable access to affordable justice, and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary. In order to make progress towards this vision, and to address the pillar’s challenges, the following strategies have been highlighted in the NDP-9.

Reforming and strengthening the security sector will be undertaken by 1) enhancing the ongoing integration of the Somali National Armed Forces; 2) implementing the Security Sector Reform Plan; 3) implementing the Somali Transitional Plan and the National Security Architecture; 4) strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Armed Forces; 5) enhancing maritime security; and 6) developing cross-ministerial responses to emerging threats.

Strengthening the rule of law will be done through 1) improving the corrections system; 2) reforming the judicial system; 3) reforming the judiciary; 4) strengthening the security service delivery capacity of the Somali Police Force; and 5) improving equitable access to justice and protecting the most vulnerable.

Pillar 3: Economic Development

Though all pillars, working together, are required to make substantial progress in poverty reduction, the NDP-9 states that it is within the economic pillar where the earliest and most promising impacts can be realized. Government will improve the business environment through effective reforms that positively affect the policy, institutional, regulatory, infrastructure and cultural conditions that govern formal and informal business activities.

The NDP-9 sees the FGS playing an increasing role in improving the functioning of markets through creating
an enabling business environment and market regulation. Investment in the traditional economic strengths of the country will be prioritized in order to promote sustainable production, employment and food security. Oversight of and investment in water and electricity utilities will also be increased, while diversification of the economy will be advanced through the development of industry-specific legislation and investment, creating an enabling environment for investment, increasing skills training, and formalizing the informal sector.

Pillar 4: Social Development

The NDP-9 recognizes that the sustainable provision by the Government of quality public services is central to Somalia’s poverty reduction strategy and crucial for building the resilience of Somali citizens to economic, conflict-related and environmental shocks. As such, Pillar 4 focuses on improving access to essential services for all, including education, health care, clean water, sanitation, nutrition and social protection, along with improved disaster risk management. It is further recognized that, in addition to alleviating poverty, the provision of basic services and social protection strengthens the trust between communities and government.

The overall objective of this pillar is to reduce poverty and increase the resilience of individuals and households through improved essential services: 1) improved health, including clean water; 2) improved education; 3) improved social protection for marginalized groups, including urban planning, social benefits and food security; and 4) strengthened governance, including disaster risk management, local governance and decentralized service delivery. The planning and execution of investments will adopt a multidimensional approach to poverty alleviation, targeting the poorest and most disadvantaged social groups.

Recovery and Resilience Framework

In August 2017, the FGS initiated a joint exercise to assess the losses and damages arising from the drought and to develop a strategy for immediate recovery and longer-term resilience building. This exercise resulted in the Drought Impact and Needs Assessment.

With World Bank and European Union partners, the United Nations supported the development of a Somalia-specific methodology to prioritize and sequence Drought Impact and Needs Assessment interventions, which together will form the basis of a Recovery and Resilience Framework.

The framework will help to ensure that available resources are being used effectively to address needs in both the short and medium term. This approach also seeks to undertake longer-term development interventions that address the underlying causes of recurrent humanitarian crises. This is accompanied by a financing framework that extends beyond official development assistance and government financing.

The Recovery and Resilience Framework approach has largely been integrated into the NDP-9, where it is further elaborated.
5. Progress towards the 2030 Agenda

Comprehensively assessing Somalia’s progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the SDGs is a near impossible task due to the complexity and fragility of the context and the general lack of SDG and related data in the country. While the Global Goals have been largely mainstreamed into the NDP-9, at least in terms of alignment, SDG-specific baselines, targets and indicators are largely absent from its results framework due to the aforementioned reasons.

As such, while this chapter draws on SDG-specific data, where available, it is largely reliant on alternative but related information that contributes to a solid overview of the situation in the country. The chapter is structured under the five key elements of sustainable development (the “5 Ps”): People, Prosperity, Planet, Peace and Partnerships. A comprehensive assessment of the individual 17 SDGs and their respective targets can be found in the accompanying document “Progress Towards the 2030 Agenda: A Companion to the UN Somalia Common Country Analysis” (link).

People

Goal 1: End Poverty in All Its Forms Everywhere

Almost 90 per cent of Somali households are deprived in at least one dimension – monetary, electricity, education, or water and sanitation – with nearly 70 per cent of households deprived in two or more dimensions. Nomadic populations experience the most deprivations, while urban dwellers
experience the fewest. Rural households, IDPs and the nomadic populations have significantly higher levels of exposure to deprivations in multiple dimensions.17

Nearly 70 per cent of Somalis live on less than US$ 1.90 per day, the sixth highest poverty rate in the region. While figures have been increasing each year since 2015, GDP per capita in 2018 stood at only US$ 314.5.18

Goal 2: Zero Hunger

In Somalia, a significant portion of the household income is spent on food, while millions face the threat of hunger. In addition, a recent study showed that a nutritious diet (US$ 6.90) is almost four times more expensive than the energy-only diet (US$ 1.90).21 From 2012 to 2019, an average of 3 million Somalis faced moderate food insecurity, and 1.6 million people faced severe food insecurity.22 Food security is on the decline in 2020 as a result of persistent threats. A widespread increase in the number of people in crisis is anticipated in the absence of humanitarian assistance.

Malnutrition likewise remains widespread. By the end of 2019, the national prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition23 or wasting was at 13.1 per cent,24 and urgent treatment and nutrition support were needed for approximately 963,000 children below the age of 5 years.25 The level of Severe Acute Malnutrition stood at 1.8 per cent at the end of 2019, however, prevalence is increasing, particularly among IDP children. Twenty-eight per cent of children under 5 years are stunted (short for their age).26 However, there was a slight decreasing trend in the prevalence of wasting in So-

21 Fill the Nutrient Gap and Cost of the Diet study conducted by the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement, the Federal Government of Somalia and WFP.
22 The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a tool for improving food security analysis and decision making. It is a standardized scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information into a statement about the nature and severity of a crisis and implications for strategic response. IPC ratings are: 1) Minimal; 2) Stressed; 3) Crisis; 4) Emergency; and 5) Catastrophe/Famine.
23 Global Acute Malnutrition is a measure of acute malnutrition in children aged 6 to 59 months.
24 FSNAU seasonal food security and nutrition assessment, Deyr 2019.
Somalia over the past decade. Among non-pregnant women, overweight and obesity is at 39.4 per cent and is gradually emerging as a public health issue that requires attention.27

Malnutrition is driven by a combination of factors, including food insecurity and socio-political insecurity, but also child illnesses, high morbidity, low immunization and vitamin-A supplementation, and poor care practices.28 Negative maternal and community perceptions and beliefs are barriers to exclusive breastfeeding.29 While 60 per cent of children were breastfed within the first hour of their birth, and 90 per cent have breastfed at some point, only 34 per cent of children under 6 months are exclusively breastfed.30

Agriculture is an important source of livelihoods and employment in Somalia, representing 72 per cent of employment in 2019 (a proportion that has barely changed over nearly 30 years), and plays a key role in meeting the food needs of the Somali people. An estimated 60 per cent of the Somali population depends on agriculture, either directly or indirectly, and agriculture accounts for 80 per cent of rural employment.31 Despite the importance of the country’s agricultural sector, it is hampered by low levels of productivity, high-level post-harvest losses, low product quality and high vulnerability to climate change.

The ability to respond to increasing climate variation and soil degradation is limited and increases the food insecurity risk of populations who often do not have the reserves (financial or food stocks) to compensate for a poor season, let alone consecutive poor seasons. Poor accessibility in some locations of Somalia is disrupting food security, and market failures erode the efficiency of cash-based transfers targeted at food-insecure households. Somalia imports a significant proportion of its food; at the same time, it has the capacity to produce enough to meet domestic needs (and ex-

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27 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=SO,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.MA.ZS?locations=SO,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.FE.ZS?locations=SO.
port surplus), should the necessary physical infrastructure be restored.

The overlap of climate variations and protracted conflict reinforces the food insecurity situation in Somalia. The presence of violent conflict limits access to productive activities, negatively affects transportation of goods and services, and forces many to leave behind their homes, land and belongings in search of safer environments.

**Goal 3: Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Well-being for All at All Ages**

Over 3 million people in Somalia need urgent action to ensure their equitable access to health-care and nutrition services and to maintain the right to health care. Factors contributing to the country’s poor health outcomes are a fragile health system and the numerous displaced families living in poor housing without adequate access to water and sanitation. This situation is compounded by the scarce availability of skilled health professionals, along with dilapidated public health infrastructure. The infrastructure often has been damaged, faces water, electricity and sanitation challenges, and lacks essential equipment. Access constraints aggravate the situation: poor road infrastructure, lack of transportation, weak coordination systems and volatile security.

In 2019, the crude death rate was estimated to be 11 deaths per 1,000 people (approximately 145,000 deaths); 56.2 per cent of all deaths were in the reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health and communicable disease group, while non-communicable diseases contributed 31.9 per cent of total deaths and the share of injuries was 11.9 per cent. Life expectancy at birth for both sexes is still very low, but improved gradually to a level of 55.7 years (54.4 years for males and 57 years for females) in 2018. However, around a quarter of women and men who have reached the age of 15 are likely to die before the age of 50.

The maternal mortality ratio was estimated to be 692 (399–832) maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2019. A lifetime risk of maternal death was equivalent to 1 in 20. The decline in the maternal mortality ratio indicates that the figure may go below 450 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030, conditional to sustained and enhanced efforts. However, achieving the SDG target of 70 will be extremely challenging.

One of the factors for the decline in the maternal mortality ratio is an increase in the skilled birth attendance rate, as over the last decade midwifery institutions and the availability of midwives have increased significantly. The 2019 reported rate of skilled birth attendants at delivery was 31.9 per cent, with a target set at 55 per cent for 2021.

The fertility rate is very high in Somalia, which leads to high-risk pregnancies. On average, a woman has 6.9 children during her lifetime. Fourteen per

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34 Ibid.  
cent of Somali girls aged 15–19 are mothers or are pregnant with their first child. By the age of 19, 39 per cent of women have had a child or were pregnant with their first child.38

The country has a low contraceptive prevalence (less than 6.9 per cent), with only 1 per cent of married women using modern methods of family planning and 36.6 per cent of women having unmet needs for birth spacing.39 Family planning continues to be a highly sensitive topic.

Reproductive health has been progressively integrated into national strategies and programmes. Most notably, the Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal, Child and Adolescent Health Strategy 2019–2023 was finalized and validated in 2019.

Ranked 192 out of 195 countries, the under-5 mortality rate for Somalia was estimated to be 122 child deaths per 100,000 live births in 2018. Low immunization coverage also results in a high burden of vaccine-preventable infections.

Tuberculosis (TB) is the third major cause of death and fifth highest burden of disease in Somalia. Somalia also has a high prevalence of hepatitis B (18.9 per cent), while the prevalence of hepatitis C was estimated at 4.84 per cent.40 In 2017, the incidence of malaria in Somalia was estimated to be 3,828 new cases per 100,000 people. Somalia confirmed its first case of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Mogadishu on 16 March 2020.

The burden of non-communicable diseases is comparatively low in Somalia, mainly because of low life expectancy and lifestyle. The probability of dying from cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory disease between the age of 30 and 70 was estimated to be 20.2 per cent in 2015.

Prolonged conflict and instability have significantly impacted the mental and psychological well-being of the country’s people. It is estimated that one in three Somalis has been affected by a mental health problem. In 2016, the suicide mortality rate per 100,000 people in Somalia was reported to be 4.7, with the rate for males (6.3) being higher than that for females (3.1).41

The universal health coverage index for Somalia is only 25 per cent, the lowest in the world, indicating poor coverage of essential health services. Somalia aims to progress on achieving universal health coverage through the development of national- and state-level plans that are integrated with the Somali Health Policy 2015 and health sector strategic plans. The Federal Ministry of Health has also developed the first Road Map towards Universal Health Coverage for the period 2019–2023.

Somalia has an estimated 11,000 people living with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), out of which 48 per cent are women, 38 per cent are men, and 14 per cent are children less than 14 years of age.

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
41 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.SUIC.
P57end=2016&locations=SO&start=2000&view=chart.
Goal 4: Ensure Inclusive and Equitable Quality Education and Promote Lifelong Learning Opportunities for All

Somalia is heavily affected by attacks on education and the military use of educational infrastructure. Between 2013 and 2017, combined actions by non-state armed groups and local clan conflicts led to more than 600 attacks on education, including attacks on schools, targeted killings, abductions, abuse of students and educators, and the military use of schools.\(^{42}\) In 2018, 64 schools were attacked and 21 were forced to close. Grave violations affected 4,880 children (4,100 boys and 780 girls) in 2018.\(^{43}\)

Almost half of Somali children and adults have never received formal education. Among boys and men, 45 per cent have never joined formal schooling, while among girls and women the figure is 48 per cent. Among nomadic populations, the figures are as high as 78 per cent among boys and men and 84 per cent among girls and women.\(^{44}\) Even among those who have had an opportunity to attend school, few were successful in completing primary school: only 4 per cent of boys and men and 5 per cent of girls and women. The figures are again lower among rural and nomadic populations, with less than 1 per cent of the latter group having completed primary school.

Approximately 3 million out of 5 million children aged 6–18 years are out of school in Somalia.\(^{45}\) The country has one of the world’s lowest overall enrolment rates for primary school-aged children. Only 30 per cent of children at the primary education level (for children aged 6–13 years) and 26 per cent at the secondary education level (for children aged 14–17 years) are enrolled in school.

Only 20 per cent of children in rural households attend school. IDP children are also more likely to be at risk of not accessing education compared to non-displaced children.\(^{46}\) This is a critical issue for intergenerational transmission of poverty and exclusion from social and political life and from access to livelihood opportunities.

Early childhood education and pre-school learning are neglected sectors across the education systems in Somalia. While many young children attend Koranic schools, learning in these institutions typically focuses on religious teaching.

Despite an increasing number of students going to school in the last ten years, a fraction of youth ever attend university, estimated at 8 per cent among men and 4 per cent among women. Females represent only 34 per cent of all higher education students.\(^{47}\) Furthermore, the decades-long conflict in Somalia has affected opportunities for educational exchanges and scholarships.

Only 45 per cent of youth can read and write (49 per cent male, 41 per cent female), while the overall adult literacy rate is 40 per cent. A recent study found that the percentage of women aged 15 to 24 who are literate has increased significantly, from only 25 per cent in 2006 to 44.4 per cent today. Younger girls and women are on average more literate than their older peers.\(^{48}\)


\(^{45}\) 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview

\(^{46}\) Annual Report 2018, UNICEF.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
The levels of teacher training and qualification are low, and teacher-training institutions do not provide teachers the training they need. Despite lacking the requisite qualifications, many are currently teaching. In addition, gender inequities among teachers are high: between 9 and 14 per cent of primary school teachers are female, and between 2 and 4 per cent of secondary teachers are female.

Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower all Women and Girls

Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a prerequisite for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Somalia. However, as a traditionally patriarchal Islamic society, Somali culture is considered socially conservative, with women’s lives restricted to the “private domain”, leading to their constrained role in decision making and limited access to assets and resources.

Over the past decade, both attitudes and narratives regarding gender equality and women’s representation and participation have been improving in the public sphere, with the FGS developing several key frameworks, including the Provisional Constitution, the National Gender Policy, the Somalia Women’s Charter and the NDP-9. However, the Women’s Charter has not received Parliamentary approval and is therefore not yet legally binding. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) has been signed but not yet ratified, while the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has neither been signed nor ratified.

There have been legislative efforts to enact a human rights-based legislation on sexual offenses aimed at filling critical legal gaps in this area. However, these efforts have been resisted by various groups which has stalled progress. The enactment of sexual offenses legislation is needed to address various issues identified under SDG 5.

A lack of systematic efforts is observed in the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which is a key to promote and advance gender equality and women’s empowerment in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Despite these efforts, the incidence of violence and rape across Somalia has increased. From January to December 2019, gender-based violence (GBV) services (post-rape treatment as well as GBV trauma care) under the Somalia Protection Cluster reached 46,070 individuals (96 per cent women and girls).49

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Recent data indicates that 11.9 per cent of ever-married women and girls aged 15 years or older were subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence in the 12 months prior to being questioned; the figure is 4.2 per cent for those suffering psychological violence alone. Women from urban areas reported greater incidence of spousal violence (20 per cent) than women in rural areas (14 per cent) and nomadic areas (11 per cent). Thirty-five per cent of ever-married women (15–49) who have experienced violent spousal abuse reported resultant injuries.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is still highly prevalent in Somalia, with an estimated 99.2 per cent of women (aged 15–49 years) having undergone the procedure, of whom 64 per cent have undergone the infibulation/pharaonic type of female circumcision, the most severe form, involving the removal of the entire clitoris and flesh. Prevailing attitudes, including among women, mean that elimination of FGM will remain a significant challenge in Somalia.

Early marriage (below 18 years) remains common, with girls often married below the age of 15, and even as low as 12 or 13. In some pastoralist communities, marriage typically follows the start of menstruation. Data from The Somali Health and Demographic Survey (SHDS) 2020 indicates that 16.8 per cent of women aged 20–24 were married by the time they turned 15, while 35.5 per cent were first married by the age of 18. Traditional attitudes persist, with almost half of urban men and over a third of urban women supporting child marriage (under 15 years) or believing it is socially acceptable.

Women in Somalia have generally encountered serious difficulties securing a place in decision-making processes. However, the last two electoral cycles of 2012 and 2016 witnessed a positive sea change in the role of women.

While women’s representation did fall below the 30 per cent quota in the 2016 electoral process, the proportion of women elected was a 47–per cent increase from 2012, with 80 women MPs out of 329 MPs (24.5 per cent), this is in line with the global average of 25 per cent.

50 SDG indicator 5.2.1 (a) and (c). (Directorate of National Statistics, Federal Government of Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020.)
54 SDG indicator 5.3.1 (a) and (b). (Directorate of National Statistics, Federal Government of Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020.)
56 Parliamentary elections were held in Somalia in October and November 2016, resulting in 66 women being elected to the House of the People out of 275, and 13 women being elected out of 54 seats in the Upper House (East Africa Research Fund, Somali Women’s Political Participation, June 2017).
While there have been significant gains in parliamentary representation at the national level, this has not been mirrored at the FMS level.

The Human Resource Audit of the FGS civil service indicated that around 25 per cent of the civil service are women; women’s proportional representation is highest in the lower salary scales and lowest in the highest, and women also have lower educational attainment levels. 57

There are also significant gendered disparities in the labour market participation of women in Somalia. The level of vulnerable employment among women is particularly high, standing at 88 per cent in 2019; this contrasts with 75 per cent for men. 58 This is due to the fact that women are more likely to work in a business operated by someone in their household rather than being employed themselves. Over 18 per cent of ever-married women aged 15–49 employed in the 12 months prior to being surveyed in 2019 were not paid for their work, with this number increasing to 42.8 per cent for those undertaking agricultural work. 59

Women also face challenges in accessing services and resources such as credit, insurance, finance, land rights and ownership, training and technology. At the domestic level, while 90 per cent of women decide how their cash earnings will be spent by themselves or with their husbands, just 67 per cent of women jointly or individually make decisions on the use of their husband’s earnings reflecting on the limited or poor control women maintain over personal as well as joint family income and resources.

Goal 6: Ensure Access to Water and Sanitation for All

Somalia is severely water stressed and water scarce. As a consequence, access to and use of safe water is low in Somalia, with 69.4 per cent of Somalis using safely managed drinking water services. 60 Just over half of Somalis have access to basic water services. In rural areas, only 28 per cent of the population have access to basic water services; about half of this population has limited access. 61 About 23 per cent are drinking unimproved/unprotected water, and 5 per cent are drinking purely surface water. 62

In urban areas, basic water services are available to about 83 per cent of the people, with 15 per

cent having access to a very limited quantity.\textsuperscript{63} About 30 per cent of the population covered are using unimproved/unprotected water, and 8 per cent are using surface water. Overall, 6.3 million people out of total of 12 million rely on non-piped water for drinking in domestic settings.

In households with no connection to a water supply, collecting water is often the responsibility of girls and women, putting them at risk of physical or sexual assault at water points, over exploiting their labour power and limiting their time and ability to go to school and work. In conflict-affected areas and IDP camps, access to safe water is often further compromised, with diseases and malnutrition spreading even faster.\textsuperscript{64}

Countrywide, only 38 per cent of the population have access to basic sanitation, and 28 per cent practise open defecation. Urban areas do not have functional sewerage and drainage systems, and use of household latrines is also weak. In urban Somalia, 61 per cent of people use basic sanitation facilities, 25 per cent use shared latrines, 13 per cent use unimproved sanitation facilities, and 1 per cent defecate in the open.\textsuperscript{65} The incidence of diarrhoea among children under five has remained high for the past 25 years at 23 per cent.\textsuperscript{66}

In the rural areas of Somalia in 2017, 20 per cent of people used basic sanitation facilities, 7 per cent used shared latrines, 24 per cent used unimproved latrines, and 49 per cent defecated in the open.

Overall, only 5.6 million people in Somalia are using basic or improved latrines, out of which only 1.6 million are connected to the sewerage systems.

Stresses and impacts of climate change on scarce water resources are already exacerbating resource conflicts within communities at the household and clan level. Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are common due to the lack of clear policies and enforcement mechanisms on water rights.

Institutions involved in the water sector are fragmented, with poor cooperation and no clear roles and responsibilities between and within the governmental institutions. In response, in 2019 the then Prime Minister launched the development of the National Water Resources Strategic Plan to monitor the total water potential in the country.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{access_to_sanitation.png}
\caption{Access to Sanitation Services}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Service & Proportion of Population & & \\
\hline
Basic & 38\% & & \\
Limited & 19\% & & \\
Unimproved & 15\% & & \\
Open Defecation & 28\% & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Access to Sanitation Services}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{63} \url{https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.BASW.ZS?locations=SO}.
\textsuperscript{64} \url{https://www.unicef.org/somalia/water-sanitation-and-hygiene}.
\textsuperscript{65} \url{https://washdata.org/data/household#!/dashboard/new}.
\textsuperscript{66} \url{https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.ODFC.ZS?locations=SO}.

\textsuperscript{66} 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview.
of the population rely primarily on clean fuels and technologies.\(^67\)

A kilowatt of electricity in the Somali capital can cost as much as US$ 1 an hour – five times more expensive than in neighbouring Kenya and ten times more than in the United States. On average, electricity consumption costs represent 30 per cent of incomes.

Charcoal production dominates the energy sector and is considered a strategic resource in Somalia. About 62 per cent and 25 per cent of urban households depend on charcoal and firewood respectively as their main source of energy. Among rural households, 64.8 per cent rely on firewood and 24.5 per cent rely on charcoal as their main source of energy. Nomadic communities mainly rely on firewood, with 93 per cent of households using it. Overall, the percentage of households using solid fuel for cooking is 92.8 per cent.\(^68\) The illegal exportation of charcoal from Somalia is estimated to be worth US$ 340–384 million and is a key contributor to insecurity in the country. As such, ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy not only has implications for socioeconomic development, but also can significantly impact peace and stability.

Women and youth play a key role in the wood fuel life cycle. For instance, women sometimes walk up to 10 kilometres to collect wood, returning with heavy loads. This has a huge impact on their health, labour time and power, and exposes them to violence or rape. The time spent collecting wood fuel could be used for other more productive economic activities or the pursuit of education.\(^69\)

Somalia’s geology indicates the potential existence of oil reserves. Until recently, however, the situation has not been conducive to exploration activities. Somalia relies heavily on imported petroleum for electricity production, and it is estimated that 97 per cent of electricity (34 kilotons of oil equivalent) is produced from oil. The FGS has passed the Petroleum and Mineral Law to manage the country’s petroleum and mineral resources sectors, especially concerning ownership and revenue sharing.

The share of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption has remained high over the years. In 1990, it was 100 per cent of the energy mix, declining to 94.3 per cent in 2012. However, traditional solid biofuels formed the biggest share of renewable sources, at 65.8 per cent of total final energy consumption in 2012, while modern solid biofuels contributed 28.6 per cent.\(^70\)

Renewable energy presents a great opportunity to improve the Somali energy situation. A long coastline with strong offshore winds provides high potential for the generation of wind energy. Solar energy is already being exploited in Somalia for off-grid supply of electricity in both public and private buildings. Only 2.85 per cent of total electricity is generated from hydropower.\(^71\)

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68 Ibid.
69 Njenga and Schenk, n.d.
71 Ibid.
The Somali energy sector faces numerous technical challenges, including poor transmission and distribution systems; the inability to monitor energy generation and usage; and social, financial and infrastructural obstacles to synchronizing generators and grids.

The FGS has established a Somalia power master plan with the assistance of the World Bank which sets priorities and sequences investment in generation, transmission and distribution for a period of 20 years. Somalia has also finalized the National Energy Policy to foster the creation of reliable, continuous and sustainable energy provision networks throughout Somalia in order to attract investment, promote industrialization, create business and increase quality of life, while tapping into cleaner energy sources and ensuring environmental protection and stewardship.

**Goal 8: Promote Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth, Employment and Decent Work for All**

Accelerating economic growth and increasing employment, particularly for young people, has long been a priority for the FGS and as such is reflected in the NDP-9. While GDP growth in the country has been rising over the past years, it is inadequate to lift poor and vulnerable Somalis out of poverty.72

While overall GDP growth in Somalia was initially projected at 3.2 per cent for 2020 and 3.5 per cent for 2021, these projections declined to -2.5 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively as a result of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.73

The most realistic approach to generate pro-poor growth will be government facilitation of a more business-enabling environment for the private sector, together with diversification – both within the traditional sectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and away from these historical sectors towards other promising sectors. Such emerging sectors include telecommunications, financial services, the urban and Internet economy, low carbon or green growth, and petroleum.

An “inclusive green economy” is based on sharing, circularity, collaboration, solidarity, resilience, opportunity and interdependence. The design principles for such an economy speak to these elements of a socio-ecological and economy-wide transition and call for economic and fiscal policy reforms, legislative changes, new technologies, 

73 https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/SOM
changes in financing, and strong institutions that are specifically geared to safeguarding social protection floors and ecological standards.

The mining sector of Somalia is still in its infancy, with activity predominantly artisanal in nature. However, Somalia has significant growth potential, and large portions of its landmass are yet to be explored.74

Financial institutions in Somalia encompass banks, hawala money transfer businesses, and microfinance institutions. As of January 2019, 8 banks and 11 money transfer businesses were licensed by the Central Bank of Somalia, but 3 banks are not yet operational. The total banking industry assets were US$ 351 million as of September 2018.75 To expand access to banking and financial services, legal financial frameworks and strategies need to be developed and implemented. However, this will have to consider the fact that many Somalis live in informal settlements in urban areas, meaning that they cannot use their land as collateral on a loan; in addition, they often lack a formal address they could use for a bank account or credit application.76

Despite an estimated 400,000 persons entering the labour market every year, labour force participation in Somalia is low, at just 48 per cent, with this proportion decreasing significantly for youth: 33 per cent for those aged 15 to 24 and 14 per cent for female youth.77

Similarly, unemployment remains stubbornly high in Somalia, with 14 per cent of the total labour force not working and with females having a higher jobless rate than males. An estimated 70 per cent of Somali youth are unemployed or underemployed, with rates even higher for female youth.78

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74 Known minerals in the country are: 1) precious/semi-precious stones (gold, diamonds, platinum and gemstones such as emeralds, rubies, sapphires, tourmaline and meteorites); 2) industrial minerals (phosphates, kaolin, bentonite, potash, lithium brines, sepiolites, talc, pegmatite and quartz); 3) target ores (iron, copper, zinc, rutile for titanium, tin and silver); ornamental stones for building materials (granite, limestone, marble, kaolin and lime); and 4) energy minerals (uranium, lignite, coal and hydrocarbons).


77 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS.

78 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=SO.
Because of the difficult economic conditions, a number of children skip school to support their families. Young girls are vulnerable and exploited for domestic chores, or face sexual and gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{79} While Somalia ratified the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 2014, effective measures are needed for its implementation.

Efforts to address these challenges have focused on supporting value chain development, particularly in the fisheries and renewable energy sectors and in skills development. While various short-term employment opportunities were cultivated in labour-intensive and apprenticeship initiatives, in the long term more productive employment was established through microenterprises or wage employment in construction, fishing, renewable energy (solar) and other green sectors. The promotion of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises is a major avenue for increasing productive employment and income opportunities in Somalia.

Development of the National Employment Policy for Somalia, finalized on 27 February 2019, demonstrates the commitment of the Government of Somalia to place employment at the centre of its development agenda.

Goal 9: Build Resilient Infrastructure, Promote Sustainable Industrialization and Foster Innovation

Decades of conflict in Somalia have had a devastating impact on socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure. The country has about 22,000 kilometres of roads, of which 4,124 kilometres are main roads.\textsuperscript{80} Out of these, 2,860 kilometres are paved, and 1,264 kilometres are unpaved. Overall, 13 per cent of roads are paved, 4 per cent are gravel and 83 per cent are earthen. While the potential of cross-border trade is significant, poor road infrastructure and insecurity is a significant constraint.

Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa, with several harbours and ports. Despite this, the GDP contribution of the fisheries sector in Somalia is very limited.\textsuperscript{81} Accessible and upgraded roads leading to ports would promote inland trade and even cross-border trade. Air travel is also underdeveloped.

The share of manufacturing in Somalia’s economic growth is relatively small.\textsuperscript{82} Manufactured goods accounted for only 15 per cent of exports in 2016, with high-tech goods accounting for just 5.3 per cent of the manufactured goods exported.

The weak manufacturing and high-tech sectors are primarily related to the volatile security situation, a lack of domestic and foreign investment in industrial development, the lack of skilled labour, and comparatively high costs for operations (water, energy, land prices, etc.). In addition, the lack of a conducive environment for investment limited the development of the productive and manufacturing sector, as Somalia is ranked at the bottom of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey (190 out of 190).\textsuperscript{83} Consequently, the propor-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Federal Government of Somalia, National Employment Policy, 2019.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} AfDB 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} World Bank, 2019.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/somalia.
tion of Somalis employed in the industrial sector has remained consistently low for almost two decades. In 2019, only 4.6 per cent of the population was employed in industry, with this figure falling to 3.7 per cent for women.84

However, according to the NDP-9 the demand for manufactured goods is expected to rise.

Existing productive sector value chains are mostly informal, with little or no value addition. Most raw materials are sold unprocessed or semi-processed, with marginal benefits for the producers.

Somalia’s telecommunications sector has advanced quickly in recent years. In contrast to neighbouring countries, Somalia offers competitive telecom and Internet services. According to International Telecommunication Union data, in 2018 there were 51 cellular subscriptions per 100 people in Somalia.85 The SHDS 2020 suggests that 74.4 per cent of households have a mobile phone, with 73 per cent of women owning one.86 The proportion of Somali women (15 years and older) with a mobile money account stands at 63.9 per cent.87

Despite its fragility and underdeveloped financial institutions, Somalia has one of the most active mobile money markets in the world, outpacing most other countries in Africa. Approximately 155 million transactions, worth US$ 2.7 billion, are recorded per month.88 In 2017, 70 per cent of Somalis with mobile phones regularly used mobile money.89 Also, development agencies use mobile money for cash transfers to urban-based beneficiaries. Some municipalities in Somaliland and Puntland have commenced mobile payment applications for tax collection and local services.

While mobile cellular penetration is relatively widespread, Internet access, while increasing, remains very limited, with only 11.9 per cent of households having an Internet connection. A mere 15.1 per cent of women and girls surveyed had used the Internet by any means in the 12 months prior to being questioned in 2019.90 Only 6.9 per cent of households have a computer.91

The Somalia Information and Communications Technology Policy and Strategy (2019–2024) aims to provide universal local access to affordable voice and Internet services by 2024, with a special focus on women, youth, disabled persons and marginalized groups.92

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84 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS?locations=SO.
87 SDG indicator 8.10.2 (b) (SHDS 2020).
89 World Bank, 2019.
90 SDG indicator 17.8.1 (SHDS 2020).
Goal 10: Reduce Inequality within and among Countries

Somalia has the sixth highest poverty rate in Africa after the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Burundi and South Sudan. The Gini index, which measures inequality as the dispersion in consumption expenditure in the population, is 37 for Somalia, compared to an average value of 42 in low-income sub-Saharan countries. While inequality is lower than in most low-income African countries, many non-poor are at risk of falling into poverty after an adverse shock to consumption.93

Furthermore, data from the World Inequality Lab indicates that 17 per cent of national income in Somalia in 2017 went to the top 1 per cent of earners, while the top 10 per cent received over 50 per cent of national income. The bottom 50 per cent made only around 14 per cent of national income.94

The World Bank further estimates that households in the top 60 per cent of the total consumption distribution consumed 2.8 times more than households in the bottom 40 per cent. The study adds that the bottom 40 per cent are less likely to have access to electricity and education; they also receive fewer remittances compared with the top 60 per cent. There are also significant differences in household wealth levels depending on location, with urban households being wealthier than those in rural areas. However, nomadic households are by far the poorest.95

While Somalia has seen a continuous upward trend in foreign direct investment since 2011, the level of investment remains relatively low when compared to the country’s needs.

Generally, diaspora remittances, estimated at US$ 1.5 billion in 2018, have contributed greatly to the development of the country, with amounts comparable to international aid flow and exceeding foreign direct investment. Remittances account for approximately 23 per cent of GDP, based on data reported by the IMF.

According to the Remittance Prices Worldwide database, the average cost of sending remittances to Somalia has increased – for example, from 6.3 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 7.1 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2017 from the UK, and from 9.06 per cent in the first quarter of 2016 to 11.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2018 from Australia. The increases are due to the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism regulations imposed on foreign banks holding Somali money transfer company accounts around the world.

* See Macro-economic Overview section of the Country Context chapter and the Financing Landscape and Opportunities chapter for information on ODA.

94 https://wid.world/country/somalia/.
SOMALIA

36

Planet

Goal 11: Make Cities Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable

Somalia is one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world. Its urban population is estimated at around 6.45 million people, making up 45 per cent of the national population and growing at an average rate of around 4.2 per cent per annum. The World Bank estimates that if the current trend continues, by 2030 Somalia will add another 4.5 million residents to its already constrained urban environment. The rapid urbanization is caused by significant forced displacements from rural areas into urban areas driven by conflicts, insecurity, and cyclical environmental adversities such as drought and famine. Increasing populations, as well as unplanned and unregulated city expansion, put additional stress on already strained key sectors: land and housing, health, education, water supply and sanitation, protection, and employment. Intense competition over land exacerbates forced evictions, particularly among IDPs and the urban poor.

Between 2013 and 2018, areas occupied by cities grew on average 1.17 times faster than their populations. Urban densities of cities have consequently been declining, causing sprawl. In areas that have seen a huge influx of IDPs and returnees, the overall density has substantially increased.

Urban policies can play an important role in achieving national environmental and green growth goals. For instance, they can lower the long-term costs to the economy of national environmental policies. Cities are responsible for a significant share of infrastructure investments, which if invested wisely can contribute to national efforts to combine economic growth with environmental performance.

Some effort has been made at state and district levels to improve urban management through policies and regulations. This is alongside progressive efforts by local governments in the issuing of titles and allocation of settlement sites for IDPs and communities at risk of evictions.

Urbanization is also a risk for historical centres, namely Mogadishu, Merca and Barawe. The increasing real estate market pressure may bring a permanent alteration of the historical fabric within these cities if areas of strategic protection are not defined. Most cities in Somalia also struggle to ensure that their populations have convenient access to open public spaces.

Goal 12: Ensure Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns

Any consideration of Somalia’s progress towards sustainable consumption and production needs to be placed in the context of its global economic and environmental footprint.

Somalia is one of the smallest economies in the world, with one of the poorest populations. While no data is available on material consumption and production, Somalia imports significantly more material goods than it produces. Somalia is also one of the lowest producers of greenhouse gases in the world in both aggregate and per capita terms.

Post-harvest losses in agriculture are substantial across Somalia. Average grain losses in southern Somalia are estimated at 20–30 per cent of the harvest. This is equivalent to approximately 50–80,000 tons of cereals per year, valued at US$15–20 million. No quantitative information is avail-

97 Based on actualized data from UN-Habitat’s urban profiles for Hargeisa, Garowe, Beletweyne, Jowhar, Balad, Baidoa, Hudur, Dolow and Kismayo, and population projections.
able on fish waste in Somalia, but post-harvest losses are also known to be high in the fisheries sector due to the lack of investment in cold chain infrastructure.

Somalia is party to various multilateral environmental agreements relating to hazardous wastes; however, capacity to monitor its commitments under these agreements is extremely limited.

*See Annex II Commitments under International Norms and Standards for more information.

Goal 13: Take Urgent Action to Combat Climate Change and Its Impacts

Somalia is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change, stemming from its social, economic and political conditions, as well as its geophysical characteristics. Climate change will continue to be a “risk multiplier”, causing displacement, conflict, exacerbation of water and food insecurity, and fragility unless it is effectively embedded into the country’s overall management of risk-reduction and resilience-building efforts.

After the FGS was established, the National Adaptation Programme of Action, the first climate strategy for Somalia, was finalized in line with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change guidelines. The programme focuses on water resources management, sustainable land management and disaster management. The NDPs (2017–2019 and 2020–2024) consider climate action as essential for economic and social development, as well to ensure peace and security in the country. In addition, the provisional Constitution of Somalia contains a number of environmental provisions.

In recent history, Somalia has experienced multiple drought events, with the 2011 drought being the worst in 60 years and resulting in 260,000 deaths in the country.99 Incidents of drought are increasing in frequency and severity. It is estimated that the 2016–2017 drought resulted in losses and damages of approximately US$ 3.25 billion, with the agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors feeling these losses most acutely (59 per cent).

Most urban centres along the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers suffer from flash floods and inundations, as drainage infrastructure is insufficient or non-existent. Somalia already has in place a countrywide Flood Risk and Response Information Management System, but this needs to be connected to a proper gendered disaster information and monitoring and evaluation system integrated into disaster risk management plans at country, state and local levels.

The FGS has approved the National Disaster Management Policy, which aims to improve community resilience and preparedness in the face of disaster and climate emergencies in order to significantly reduce the loss of lives and property. This policy recognizes the inherent synergies between disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

Putting a green growth strategy at the heart of the economic and financial recovery, as well as investing more in climate adaptation and mitigation measures, can help Somalia in achieving its NDP-9 goals.

Goal 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources

Somalia’s 3,333-kilometre coastline is the largest in mainland Africa and endows the country with substantial marine resources. Its maritime zone possesses one of the most important large marine upwelling ecosystems in the world, providing optimal conditions for both demersal and pelagic fish species. Detailed, reliable and up-to-date information on the Somali marine and coastal environment is extremely limited. Somalia’s waters remain largely uncharted, unsupervised and unmonitored.

99 IFRC, 2011.
Despite recent progress, weak or non-existent government over much of the last 30 years has led to overexploitation by illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) foreign fishing vessels, and pollution resulting from oil spillages and the dumping of toxic waste. Rising sea levels due to climate change, rapid urbanization and an increase in the coastal population have resulted in pollution and habitat destruction in both offshore and near-shore areas. The prospect of offshore oil and gas exploration poses further potential risks to Somalia’s marine environment. Somalia has no marine protected areas.

Since 2014, Somalia has made reasonable progress towards establishing institutional and regulatory infrastructure for the sustainable management of its marine and coastal resources. However, effective fisheries management – a precondition for unlocking and sustaining the sector’s potential for increased incomes, employment, nutrition and food security – is still in its infancy.

Under the 2014 Fisheries Law, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was declared, covering an area of approximately 1,165,500 km². In addition, the 2014 Fisheries Law banned trawling by domestic and foreign vessels (Article 33) and made all prior licenses – including those issued by regional authorities – null and void. Federal and regional ministers of fisheries have subsequently worked to find a consensus on roles and management responsibilities for their respective levels of government. In 2018, a licensing agreement was adopted, and 31 licenses were issued for Chinese-owned and operated longline vessels. A further provisional agreement on the sharing of license revenues was reached in March 2019.

According to FAO data, in 2016 the total fisheries production in Somalia was 30,000 metric tons. However, a recently published study suggests that 10 out of the 17 common fish species in Somalia’s offshore waters are exploited unsustainably.

The majority of overfishing in offshore waters is accounted for by foreign illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing vessels. It is conservatively estimated that between 1981 and 2014, IUU fishing by foreign vessels landed over three times the catch of domestic vessels, often targeting the same fish species. Estimates suggest that domestic fisheries contributed approximately US$ 135 million to aggregate GDP during 2015, compared to a value of US$ 306 million attributable to IUU fishing inside the EEZ. Widespread IUU fishing is also a source of ongoing tension in coastal communities and has recently given rise to fears of a resurgence in piracy activity.

The development of small-scale artisanal fisheries in Somalia is further constrained by a range of factors, including outdated boats and fishing equipment, skills shortages (particularly with respect to modern fishing techniques), limited landing infrastructure such as port facilities, jetties and piers, and poor or non-existent infrastructure for cold storage and road access to inland markets. In addition, domestic demand is weak, reflecting a strong cultural preference for the consumption of red meat. However, significant steps have been taken by several development partners in collaboration with federal and state governments to address these problems.
Goal 15: Protect, Restore and Promote Sustainable Use of Terrestrial Ecosystems, Sustainably Manage Forests, Combat Desertification, and Halt and Reverse Land Degradation and Halt Biodiversity Loss

In 1980, total forest resources were estimated to cover 39 million hectares or approximately 62 per cent of the country’s total land area. However, by 2014 this figure had reduced to only 6.4 million hectares or 10.3 per cent of the country’s total land area.

An estimated 8.2 million trees were cut down for charcoal in Somalia between 2011 and 2017, increasing land degradation, desertification, food insecurity and vulnerability to flooding and drought.

The principle causes of land degradation are overgrazing, unsustainable agriculture, the over-exploitation of forests and woodland, and resettlement and urbanization. It was estimated in 2011 that 31 per cent of the total land area of Somalia was degraded, with the largest shares attributable to reductions in tree cover and soil erosion due to water.


Since the 1970s, Somalia has signed a number of important conventions and multilateral agreements that relate to terrestrial biodiversity and the environment. While signalling Somalia’s aspirations with respect to halting biodiversity loss and preventing the extinction of threatened species, the impact of these conventions on the ground has arguably been limited.

The 2019 International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List identifies 218 threatened species in Somalia, of which 22 animal and plant species are listed as “critically endangered”, a further 58 as “endangered” and 138 as “vulnerable”.

To date there been few systematic attempts to assess the nature and scope of the illegal wildlife trade in Somalia, despite persistent evidence that the trade has been active since the 1970s and is ongoing. There is also evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab has been actively engaged in the trafficking of Kenyan ivory and rhino horn, mainly to markets in China, Thailand and the Middle East.

Peace

Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

The prevailing conflict in Somalia remains the main cause of violence and death, with human rights violations continuing to affect marginalized sections of the population to a greater extent. The lack of preventive measures, limited access to justice and weak clan protection, which render the population more vulnerable, need be addressed. The extension of state control and authority through the capture and holding of territory, as well as the simultaneous enhancement of over-
sight and accountability of state institutions and security forces, and the engagement of non-state actors, peace-activists, including civil society actors, women and youth groups, will continue to be critical in the efforts to reduce violence and violations and promote and sustain peace.

The Somalia Transition Plan, which vests more responsibility for security in the national security institutions as AMISOM draws down, requires vigorous support to further reduce violence and civilian casualties in the context of military operations. The ongoing efforts to support these operations in compliance with human rights standards – including the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, where UN support is provided – is expected to address violations and violence.

Countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism is one of the highest public policy priorities of the FGS, along with reforms critical to financial inclusion, effective payments and security, including the ability to implement targeted financial sanctions.

In 2012, the United Nations Security Council imposed a ban on the direct and indirect importing of Somali charcoal, contributing to a reduced income for Al-Shabaab from charcoal from US$ 35 million in 2011 to less than US$ 8 million per year today. The FGS has drafted the National Charcoal Policy of Somalia to regulate charcoal production, transportation, and trade for domestic consumption, and to totally ban charcoal exports.

To counter the threat of Al Shabaab, the last two Presidents of Somalia declared amnesty for low-risk Al-Shabaab fighters who voluntarily defect from Al-Shabaab. To operationalize this presidential directive, the FGS developed the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in 2013. In parallel with this Programme, President Farmajo has given amnesty to those who renounce violence, offering an opportunity for lower-level combatants to disengage from Al-Shabaab. Research shows that the Presidential amnesty has been a key driver of defection.

The development of formal justice institutions remains in its infancy and has been stalled, not only due to conflict with Al-Shabaab, but also because of elite power bargaining and infighting over the resources associated with foreign aid and development. Because of these security and political challenges, the development of a formal legal system has been slow, and basic government presence is limited to a few of the country’s larger cities. Most people therefore still rely for protection on kinship networks within Somalia’s five major clan families.

Traditional mechanisms remain the main vehicle for most of the population to address disputes. Access to justice in these mechanisms remains particularly difficult for marginalized groups. Inclusion of women in positions of authority across justice mechanisms remains generally low due to discrimination, harassment, cultural perceptions around the roles or women, and a lack of educational opportunities. Additionally, traditional mechanisms tend to focus on clan relationships, often overlooking the protection of individual rights.

Major improvements have been made on the progressive expansion of police services through implementing the New Policing Model and training and equipping police services, in particular in the FMSs.

According to Transparency International, corruption is both a major cause and a major consequence of endemic political instability in Somalia, which has been ranked at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index every year since 2006. In addition, Somalia scored last place out of 200 countries measured by TRACE International for its Bribery Risk Matrix in 2019, with an overall risk score of 94 out of 100. Corruption occurs at all levels in both the public and private sectors.

103 https://www.traceinternational.org/trace-matrix#200.
President Farmajo signed the Anti-Corruption Commission Bill into law on 21 September 2019, while Somalia’s first National Anti-Corruption Strategy received cabinet endorsement on 4 June 2020. However, to date Somalia remains one of ten countries in the world, and one of two on the African continent, to not have signed or ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

Public financial management and audit functions have improved over the past years. However, while passed in the Upper House in February 2020, the Audit Law is still awaiting presidential assent.

Regarding the freedom of expression, challenges remain and more needs to be done to strengthen the enjoyment the freedoms and end violations – including killings, beatings, harassment, arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, lack of due process or fair trial, and the closure of media outlets. While the law provides for freedom of speech, including of the press, this is often not upheld or respected. Freedom of expression and press freedom are not referenced in the NDP-9.

In 2019, 43 journalists were arrested and eight media outlets were closed or suspended. In 2019, Somalia ranked 164 out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index (lower is better).

The Council of Ministers approved the Draft Media Law of Somalia in July 2017, which received criticism from NGOs for being quite control oriented. There has been no progress on the draft bill since 2017.

Freedom from discrimination and unequal treatment is enshrined in virtually all legal instruments, and is generally developed in line with Sharia law. However, sociocultural and customary features, such as clan association, the position of women in society, the status of elders, and stigma related to certain personal characteristics, introduce certain levels of differentiation and at times outright discrimination.


More recently, in November 2019, the FGS Council of Ministers adopted the Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, and adopted National Eviction Guidelines to prevent the forced evictions faced by IDPs.

Homosexuality is illegal in Somalia. Article 409 of the 1964 Penal Code states that homosexuality (same-sex intercourse) is punishable “by imprisonment from three months to three years and an act of lust other than sexual intercourse is punishable by imprisonment from two months to two years”.

* See Human Rights section of the Country Context chapter and the chapter titled Commitments under International Norms and Standards for more information on human rights.

Partnerships

Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals

A successful sustainable development agenda requires partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society. Somalia has been steadily rebuilding its institutions, especially in key functions related to revenue mobilization, planning, monitoring and evaluation, partnership building, and aid coordination management. As in many other conflict-affected countries, the state-building process is a long-term effort that requires continued support and national leadership, with inclusivity at its heart.

As such, partnerships should not be defined in a narrow sense as mere formal agreements among institutions, be they national or international, but should be interpreted as inclusive compacts that enable wide social participation, reaching out to those left behind, allowing them space and voice and promoting and utilising their agencies.

With limited reach of the government and formal institutional across the country, the role of partnership with and empowerment of civil society become ever more critical to advance the national agenda and sustain peace and political stability in Somalia.

Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP increased from 3.9 per cent in 2018 to 4 per cent in 2019. The proportion of national budget funded by domestic taxes decreased from 42.8 per cent in 2018 to 39.2 per cent in 2019, as a result of a more than 10 per cent increase in the overall revised 2019 budget. Remittances are estimated at US$ 1.3 billion per year – three times more than the total foreign direct investment.

In 2018, Somalia exported US$ 1.2 billion in goods and services, representing approximately 0.0049 per cent of global exports in that year, ranking it 170th in the world. Exports in 2018 represented 26 per cent of GDP, up from 22 per cent in 2017.

In 2017, Somalia’s main export partners included Oman (31.7 per cent), Saudi Arabia (18.7 per cent), United Arab Emirates (16.3 per cent), Nigeria (5.1 per cent), Yemen (4.8 per cent) and Pakistan (4 per cent).

105 Ministry of Finance, 2019 Budget.
106 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD?locations=SO.
Somalia exports totalled US$ 675 million in goods in 2018, of which US$ 409 million was livestock, while imports amounted to almost US$ 3.5 billion.109 According to the World Bank, agriculture represents 93 per cent of total exports, mostly linked to robust livestock exports.

The Somalia Investment Promotion Agency (SOMINVEST) is in the final stages of approving a National Investment Promotion Strategy, which provides a framework to accelerate both foreign and domestic investment in sectors that have the potential to impact sustainable growth, revenues, jobs and poverty reduction.

In recent years the country has progressed in setting up mechanisms to enhance policy coherence on sustainable development, country-owned frameworks and planning tools for development, in support of the achievement of the SDGs and for the promotion of multi-stakeholder aid effectiveness. Somalia established in 2014 an aid architecture that brings together state and non-state actors, including donors and UN agencies, as well as FMSs and civil society. The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility has been focusing, at both the technical and political level, on development and reconstruction priorities. In this framework, a set of pooled funding mechanisms was established to implement national development priorities. At the apex of the aid coordination architecture, the Somalia Partnership Forum serves as a platform to bring together the FGS and its international partners to monitor progress and agree on collective priorities and commitments in the areas of political reforms, security, economic development, and recovery and humanitarian assistance, through the Mutual Accountability Framework.

Signed in 2017 between Somalia and international partners, the Security Pact meanwhile reflects an agreed vision of Somali-led security institutions and forces that are affordable, acceptable and accountable and have the ability to provide security and protection to the Somali people, as well as a commitment from the international community to support the achievement of this objective.

On 25 March 2020, the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank jointly determined that Somalia has taken the necessary steps to reach the HIPC Initiative Decision Point. The Decision Point stage is a major step forward for Somalia’s economic development, allowing the country to normalize its relations with international financial institutions and gain access to new financial resources to help deliver long-term inclusive growth and poverty reduction.

Somalia has not yet secured membership in the World Trade Organization. As an initial step in its application for accession, Somalia’s Working Party was established on 7 December 2016. Since then, Somalia has made significant progress through the efforts of its Chief Negotiator and the Accessions Division of the WTO Secretariat.

Somalia has very weak national statistical and data management capacity, which impacts the ability to identify resource gaps and to prioritize resource allocations in an informed manner so as to design interventions that maximize impact. This results in suboptimal outcomes and an imbalance in funding across sectors.

In 2017, Somalia scored 26.7 out of 100 in the World Bank’s Statistical Capacity Indicator, putting it in joint last place alongside Syria and Kosovo.110 However, progress has been made in instituting the necessary structures and frameworks to strengthen national statistical and data management capacity. The Directorate of National Statistics has made significant strides in the past few years.


Completed in August of 2017, the Directorate of National Statistics Strategic Plan (2018–2022) articulates a plan to strengthen the Directorate to transform it into an “authoritative source of accurate, reliable and timely official statistics on Somalia that satisfies the needs of different data users”.111

The last population census data that was publicly released was from 1975, which presented limited results. The results from another population census conducted from 1985 to 1986 were never released. Since then, development agencies have made several attempts to compile reliable data on population and socioeconomic statistics, but such efforts collected data limited to thematic data sets.

For better evidence-based decision making and for evidence-based programming and planning, high-quality data and information is expected to be generated from the UNFPA-led Somali Health and Demographic Survey data sets to inform the Government of Somalia and development partners’ future planning, strategies, interventions and programmes. The results of the survey were released on 30 April 2020.

Moving forward, the new National Bureau of Statistics plans to conduct a census within the lifetime of the NDP-9.112 The President has signed into law the Statistics Act, which aims to transform the institution into a semi-autonomous Bureau of Statistics with enhanced capacity to spearhead the collection and compilation of national statistics.

111 NDP-9.

112 Ibid.
6. Leave No One Behind

More than 20 years of internal conflict, insecurity, political uncertainty, forced displacement and governance failures have left the country in a situation where exploitation and violations of human rights are pervasive. Clan-based normative structures continue to hinder vulnerable and marginalized groups from participation in economic, social and cultural activities and peace and political processes. This situation exposes minorities and disadvantaged and marginalized groups to a state of vulnerability and human insecurity, with limited space and voice in humanitarian response, recovery and development processes.

The NDP-9 identifies women, minority groups, the elderly, IDPs, rural citizens, children, youth and persons with disabilities as the most vulnerable to inequality. The underlying causes include conflict, political instability, natural disasters, insecurity, limited rule of law, weak governance and systematic discrimination based on gender, age and clan. The country has made progress, with the Government of Somalia having implemented a number of highly inclusive policy development processes (e.g. the NDP-9), and a more inclusive dialogue structure (e.g. public–private dialogue) is emerging.

Women and Girls

Culture and norms, reinforced by partial and scant law enforcement, confer low social status to women and constrain access to productive resources (loans, land, inputs), jobs and social services (education, health, contraceptive) and intellectual resources. With pervasive misunderstandings, misinformation, and general distrust and fear of change, there is often resistance and opposition to gender equality and women’s rights. Interclan rivalry and the power structure, and political system and institutions perpetuate and ensure that gender equality is a matter of limited importance.
Most women are illiterate, and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world; women also are one of the groups at greatest risk of contracting epidemic diseases. Rural women are vulnerable to climate change impacts, and women and girl survivors of explosive hazard–related accidents face multiple challenges.

Early and child marriage is commonplace. Early marriage and early pregnancy deter adolescent girls from attaining education and subsequently limit their employability, and increase the risks of GBV and adverse maternal and child health outcomes. FGM is near universal. GBV persists in Somalia, and challenges accessing justice hinder individuals who experience sexual and gender-based violence from pursuing justice. Both formal and traditional systems favour men, and exclude and discriminate against women.

The Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776 (with 1 denoting complete inequality), placing Somalia in the fourth-worst position globally. Pre-existing formal and informal forums for political inclusion and peacebuilding in Somalia are male dominated. High levels of illiteracy, low income-earning capacity, time poverty, fear of negative branding and GBV also contribute to ensuring that adult women’s participation in political life is minimal. This situation is even more stark for young women.

As such, the participation and roles of women in politics and decision-making spheres are extremely limited, despite provisions in the Constitution for their inclusion. Women are underrepresented across the public sector in general and in policy and decisions-making in particular.

In a predominantly patriarchal, male biased society, women heads of households (40 per cent of all households) are doubly disadvantaged and tend to be left behind. Systemic gender inequalities increase vulnerability by curtailing women’s ability to access nutritious food. In 2009, the prevalence of anaemia among non-pregnant women (15–49 years) in Somalia was alarming, at 46.6 per cent. Women and girls who have to walk long distances for water and fuel are exposed to serious protection risks, including sexual and gender-based violence and exploitation.

Women continue to carry heavy and disproportional workloads in their homes and communities. There remains a large gender gap in the labour market, as evidenced by the exceptionally low ratio of female-to-male participation in the labour force (25 per cent to 75 per cent, respectively). Somali women also have unequal access to production inputs and technology for agriculture, livestock and fishing, as well as to land, water, credit, insurance and other financial services.

Children

Inequity in access to education remains a major issue, as it makes children, adolescents and young people more vulnerable, which further reinforces social exclusion, social and political risks, and a propensity for negative coping behaviours and the exploitation of children and adolescents.

Those most disadvantaged are socially excluded children, including the very poor. The primary school net attendance ratio was 39 per cent in urban areas, 11 per cent in rural areas, and only 4 per cent for the poorest wealth quintile.

School enrolment is lowest for socially excluded groups in rural areas. Children with disabilities are often unable to access learning institutions and

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114 Ibid.

Children from returnee, refugee and asylum-seeking households are also disadvantaged. Unaccompanied children, victims of harmful traditional practices such as FGM, domestic violence, forced marriage and early marriage, and child survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are some other vulnerable groups of children not accessing education. The inclusion of all such vulnerable children and youth in educational targets advances the priority of leaving no one behind and further promotes safe return as per the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia.

Children are also vulnerable to the threat and impact of explosive hazards. In 2019, children comprised 83 per cent of casualties resulting from explosive hazard accidents in Somalia.

Somalia is also one of the countries with the highest number of children recruited, used and abducted by parties to the conflicts. The UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting verified the recruitment and use of 6,143 children (149 girls, 5,994 boys) by armed forces and groups in Somalia. The main perpetrator was Al-Shabaab, with 80 per cent of verified cases, followed by the army, the police and clan militias.

Poverty and lack of proper nutrition make people, particularly children, more susceptible to disease.

Youth

The Population Estimation Survey for Somalia carried out between October 2013 and March 2014 found that 46 per cent of the Somali population was below the age of 15 and 81 per cent was below the age of 35. Illiteracy, low levels of education and lack of the financial resources required to participate in politics limit young people’s participation. Young women are even less likely to participate due to gender biases and sociocultural and religious norms.

A quarter of young people are unemployed, despite receiving a better education than their parents’ generation; although educational opportunities and skills training are improving, these are insufficient for the labour market, and political participation is weak. The risk of conflict increases, since the major structural drivers underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities.

With youth projected to reach 4 million by 2030, up from 3 million in 2015, the current generation of youth continue to be at risk of being left behind, with too few jobs and too few opportunities to learn. Female youth could turn to early marriage as a negative coping strategy, resulting in increased instances of GBV.

IDPs, Migrants, Refugees and Refugee Returnees

Somali migration patterns are complex: there are approximately 36,000 refugees and asylum seekers (mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen); 130,000 assisted and spontaneous refugee returnees from Kenya, Yemen and nearly a dozen other countries since December 2014; approximately 2.6 million IDPs; and Ethiopian and other migrants who do not fall under the aforementioned categories. IDP households are consistently identified as among the poorest and most vulnerable; IDP settlements have considerably higher poverty rates and generally larger household sizes.

Internal displacement affects approximately 20 per cent of Somalis; it is protracted, with large sections of this population having experienced displacement for more than one year; it is urban, with the vast majority (80 per cent) of the settle-

121 UNFPA, The Somali Adolescents and Youth: Boom or Gloom?, December 2019.
122 World Bank, 2019.
ments concentrated in urban and peri-urban areas; and it needs multidimensional and long-term approaches. Overcrowding, loss of traditional socioeconomic safety nets and extremely poor living conditions present significant protection challenges for IDPs living in formal and informal sites in Somalia, particularly for women and children.

The majority of IDPs are women and children under 18 years, and they face greater protection risks (including gender-based violence and trafficking). Among these, nomadic pastoralists who have lost all their livestock and displaced farmers face livelihood challenges and limited clan-based support.

IDPs’ residential status is precarious, due to a lack of appropriate tenure regulations, inadequate land registration and the absence of social housing arrangements, among other factors. In 2019, more than 268,800 people were forcibly evicted from their homes, including 156,000 in Mogadishu alone. Approximately 48,000 people were evicted between January and March 2020, including 33,400 in the capital. IDPs also lack access to basic services, shelter, food, and water and sanitation.

Refugees/asylum seekers and stranded economic migrants are highly vulnerable and often forgotten. With a sizeable dependency on humanitarian assistance among the former and a lack of any structured support among the latter, long-term solutions are crucial.

Rural and Nomadic Communities

An estimated 23 per cent of Somalia’s population live in rural areas, while 26 per cent are nomads. An overwhelming majority of the rural population is dependent on the availability of healthy range-land, woodland, access to water for livestock and crop irrigation, and soils that are rich in nutrients for the benefit of the livestock and agriculture sectors.

Agriculture and livestock are increasingly vulnerable sources of income due to climate change and have limited further growth potential. While the nomadic population has the highest proportion of population in employment for both men and women, drought often disproportionately affects nomadic pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities.

Many regions of the country have also been left behind due to government weakness and limited ability to serve those communities or due to lack of political affiliation with Federal Member States. The mobile nature of nomadic communities makes it difficult to plan and implement services, meaning they miss out on health care, education and safe water and become more vulnerable to diseases, ignorance and generalized poverty. In rural areas of Somalia, only 65 per cent of the population has access to basic water; only 34 per cent has access to basic sanitation. In nomadic areas, 94 per cent practice open defecation.

Youth from the highly mobile nomadic communities are the least likely to complete any level of education. Only 4.1 per cent of nomadic youth completed primary school, while 95 per cent had not completed any level of education. With health workers concentrated in urban areas, access to (especially preventive) health services is also very limited.

Gender inequities are greater in rural areas and among pastoral communities. Survival rates (as depicted by the sex ratios) for middle-aged women and older women are worse in rural and nomadic areas compared to urban areas. Literacy rates among urban women are about two times higher than those in rural areas and IDP camps.
Nomadic women have the lowest literacy rates.127

Minority Communities

Within the 4.5 political representation formula, the 0.5 share is allocated to several communities, including smaller Somali clans, those of Bantu and Arab descent, and the Sab people, who are defined by profession rather than clan or familial affiliation.

Theses groups are considered inferior, which results in systematic exclusion, stigma, social segregation, denial of rights, and low social, economic and political status. Minority representatives are generally excluded from executive positions and public service appointments. Some minorities, particularly the Bantu and Bajuni communities, have suffered persistent confiscation of land and property. Without the social safety net afforded by clan affiliation, members of minority communities are disproportionately vulnerable to conflict-driven displacement. Some sub-clans have one group of pastoral origin and another of Bantu origin. But the pastoral group tends to dominate. Additionally, intrinsic under-representation and persistent under-quantification can result in minorities being overlooked or neglected by international assistance programmes.

Persons with Disabilities

People with disabilities of all age groups have been identified as a particularly marginalized and at-risk group within Somali society as a result of the numerous attitudinal, environmental and institutional barriers they face, and the lack of concerted efforts to include them.

The number of people with disabilities in Somalia is likely to be higher than the global estimate of 15 per cent, as a result of the long period of conflict, poverty, malnutrition and lack of access to health care.

Persons with disabilities face major constraints (regarding transport, training, assistance, health and other needs) in pursuing an adequate livelihood.128 Forty-two per cent of disabled people in Somalia had not received any care or support for their disability during the 12 months prior to being surveyed in 2019 for the SHDS.129

With disability associated with physical impairments, persons with visual, speech, hearing, psychosocial issues and/or intellectual impairments become rather invisible.130 It is essential to assess the full spectrum of disabilities in Somalia.

Adults and children with disabilities in Somalia have been found to be subject to various forms of verbal, physical and sexual abuse at higher levels than their non-disabled peers. Women and girls with disabilities faced an increased risk of sexual violence, often with impunity.

Children with disabilities face many barriers to inclusion, including the inaccessible physical environment, lack of awareness in the communities, insufficient teaching skills, negative attitudes and stigma, abuse and discrimination, poverty, and a severe shortage of assistive devices and mobility aids. They also have limited access to education; girls with disabilities are disproportionally impacted, as boys with disabilities tend to get what few opportunities exist.

Limited resources, lack of adaptive assistive educational learning materials, weak teacher skills and capacity, insufficient funding, and environmental and attitudinal barriers make inclusive and special needs education a challenge.

There is no specific health care – such as early detection and rehabilitation centres or inclusive social protection support systems – for disabled

127 UNFPA, Gender Equity: Hit or Miss in the Somali Population, December 2019.
129 SHDS 2020.
130 Much of this section has been adapted from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a744dbded915d0e8bf188ec/Disability_in_Somalia.pdf.
people in Somalia, increasing their dependence on others and making independent life difficult. There are also significant barriers to their inclusion in political processes and their broader participation.

There is an active disability movement in Somalia which has advocated for the rights of persons with disabilities. A few local NGOs provide services for limited numbers of people with disabilities, but they have received negligible support.

Organizations of persons with disabilities face institutional barriers due to a lack of capacity. There is no meaningful consultation by authorities regarding policies and humanitarian programming, limiting opportunities for broader participation.

The Preamble of the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, signed by Somalia in 2018 and ratified in August 2019, recognizes that disability is an evolving concept that must be contextualized. This is particularly relevant to Somalia, which has a long history of violence and high prevalence of mental health issues and post-traumatic stress disorders.

Data Availability and Monitoring the SDGs

Data availability is essential to assess progress, or lack thereof, in ensuring those most marginalized and disempowered benefit from any development gains in a country. Despite the progress in passing a bill for the instatement of the National Statistics Commission, Somalia’s national statistical capacity remains very weak, and significant gaps in data persist, contributing to difficulty in monitoring the needs of vulnerable populations and the targets related to all SDGs.

While maintaining strict observance of the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, a sufficient level of data disaggregation should be maintained to ensure that marginalized groups are adequately reflected in the planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation processes of the Government and other development partners. This includes minimum requirements for sex- and age-disaggregation of person-related data, as well as tracking gender and inclusion indicators over time. The Bureau of Statistics can thus become the nucleus for gathering comprehensive, relevant, reliable and timely disaggregated data from all social sectors.

In working to promote and achieve the realization of the principle of “leave no one behind”, the UN will need to partner with a wide range of actors to develop the disaggregated data needed for evidence-based programming and to build the capacity of those partners, especially county governments and the vulnerable themselves, to apply the principles of evidence-based decision making.

* See SDG 16 section in the chapter titled Progress towards the 2030 Agenda for further information on statistical, data management, and monitoring and evaluation capacities in Somalia.
7. Commitments under International Norms and Standards

Somalia became a member of the United Nations on 20 September 1960 following its independence from Italy and Britain, bestowing upon it all obligations emanating from the United Nations Charter. Somalia is also bound by the International Bill of Human Rights, comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the latter two were acceded to in 1990). In more recent years, Somalia continued the process of ratifying international human rights instruments.

In October 2015, Somalia became the 196th nation to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child – the most widely ratified human rights treaty in history. Somalia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in August 2019, the 180th nation to do so.

Significant progress has also been made towards fulfilment of Somalia’s human rights reporting obligations, specifically in the submission of the State Party Report on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention against Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment. In January 2019, it submitted the first-ever mid-term report for the Universal Periodic Review. Somalia’s engagement with the international human rights mechanisms has increased significantly, not only in its reporting obligations, but also through its participation in the Human Rights Council’s 42nd Session in September 2019 and generally its active participation in the Universal Periodic Review process and the implementation of the recommendations.
of the review. The 2016 Universal Periodic Review recommendations reflect key national priorities and cut across the various SDGs and the “leaving no one behind” imperative.

However, despite movement towards ratification and implementation of international human rights commitments, challenges remain regarding moving forward on specific commitments to tackle discrimination against and marginalization of sections of the population. Somalia remains an outlier with regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which it has neither signed nor ratified. Ratified by 189 countries, Somalia is one of the six states globally not to have done so. At the regional level, Somalia has signed the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), but has not yet ratified the instruments.

In March 2017, a crucial milestone was achieved for the Somali refugee situation in the form of the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia (the “Nairobi Declaration”) and accompanying Plan of Action for Durable Solutions, on which progress continues to be made. More recently, in November 2019, Somalia also ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention). However, all these require a strong security and protection infrastructure for meaningful protection of the population to be realized in a situation where the conflict is yet to be resolved.

Furthermore, while progress has been made on acceding to international legal instruments on human rights, there has been little progress domestically towards instituting the necessary mechanisms to ensure the commitments are implemented, most notably the continued and long-standing delay in the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, which has been stalled at the Cabinet level due to political and financial constraints. In addition, the protection environment in the emerging security and rule of law architecture is still characterized by weak protection systems and insecurity among vulnerable populations.

Somalia remains a deeply conservative society, which prevents real and meaningful progress towards international human rights obligations. For instance, many traditional elders and some Islamic clerics oppose rights-based legislation such as the Child Rights Bill, Female Genital Mutilation Bill, Sexual Offences Bill, Juvenile Justice Bill and others, arguing that they are inconsistent with Somali and Islamic customs.

Somalia also remains one of only ten countries in the world not to have signed or ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, despite the Minister of Justice and Judiciary Affairs confirming at an event commemorating International Anti-Corruption Day in Mogadishu in December 2018 the intention of the FGS to do so.

Since the 1960s, Somalia has taken action on over 100 multilateral environmental agreements. Somalia is a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Accord. In addition, Somalia has signed all major environmental conventions and treaties that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the achievement of many of the SDGs. The FGS is committed to aligning national policies, strategies and plans towards the implementation of the climate change and environmental conventions. Somalia has also signed numerous international marine treaties and protocols in the last 30 years, but very few have been ratified during the life of the Federal Government.

Most recently, Somalia ratified the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the 1972 World Heritage Convention, and the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage during a visit of the UNESCO Direc-
tor-General on 11 February 2020, which provide the tools and resources for the promotion and protection of Somalia’s tangible and intangible cultural heritage.

Despite ongoing threats from Al-Shabaab or other terrorist groups, Somalia has not yet ratified any of the 19 legal instruments related to counter-terrorism that are part of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. If adopted, such instruments would not only facilitate international cooperation in the fight against Al-Shabaab, but also contribute to economic and social development.

While accession to and ratifying the international treaties and conventions are important indications of the commitment of the Government to international norms, standards and agreements, implementation of these commitments and their compliance arrangements – for instance, through legal, regulatory and policy development – is challenging given the still-limited public sector capacities and lack of effective control over much of the country. As such, the effective realization of those commitments and policy objectives in support of the 2030 Agenda will largely depend on the country’s ability to secure assistance in the form of funding, technical assistance, training and technology transfer.

* See Annex 2 for more information on the status of various relevant international and regional agreements.
8. Cross-boundary, Regional and Sub-regional Perspectives

The geographical location of Somalia places it in one of the most dynamic regions in the world, with significant potential as a market of approximately 400 million people and as a trading hub located along one of the busiest shipping routes globally. Political reconfiguration in the Horn of Africa presents an opportunity for closer regional cooperation that can accelerate progress towards achieving the SDGs and addressing the historical marginalization of communities in border areas. A new narrative of dialogue, cooperation and economic complementarity is emerging to address resource-based conflicts, particularly in border areas. However, new alliances might cause an increased scepticism of traditional rivals and harden existing discrepancies.

Projecting the present developments forward points to opportunities for investments in, for instance, joint spatial development initiatives for ports, dry ports, special economic zones, industrial zones, international transport corridors, intensified regional trade, and cross-boundary management of natural resources (e.g. water). In view of the recent past, the social impact of these investments is critical to contributing to lasting peace, ensuring the inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable communities, finding durable solutions for displaced populations in the Horn of Africa, mitigating the impact of climate change, and reducing the very high levels of poverty. However, for Somalia to fully benefit from regional cooperation, there is a need to address the long-running political stalemate between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. This will not
only unlock forward momentum on key national priorities, but also enhance the confidence of other regional governments in Somalia as the key to peaceful regional development.

Within this framework of opportunity, it is important to place specific emphasis on the border areas. The borderlands in the Horn of Africa have historically suffered structural marginalization. These areas are vast and unmanned, mostly arid or semi-arid, and sparsely populated by predominantly pastoral communities. Poverty levels are significantly higher here than in other areas, and access to basic services is generally low or non-existent. Insecurity is rife, fuelled by competition over scarce natural resources such as pasture and water. The borders are generally porous, creating an environment conducive to illicit activities and conflict, with ramifications far beyond the borderlands. Prevailing insecurity has made large-scale development support difficult. Similarly, historically tense relations between the countries in the Horn of Africa have prevented investment in the critical regional infrastructure necessary to realize the region’s full potential. Al-Shabaab is taking advantage of the lack of investment and cooperation, including in border security management, to expand their operational reach.

Under the Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa, the UN is increasing its engagement in recognition of the governments’ efforts towards enhanced cooperation to achieve prosperity, stability and peace. The Comprehensive Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa rests on four pillars: 1) regional peace and security; 2) resilience and socioeconomic development; 3) inclusive and responsive government; and 4) sustainable national resources management and climate resilience. Strengthened cross-border cooperation could also provide opportunities to improve the humanitarian response across the region by opening up cross-border supply chains, procurement and sharing of resources, enhancing the international community’s ability to assist the region to tackle recurring humanitarian shocks. New developments on the political front are creating opportunities for systemic change in virtually all areas, and the UN has a key role to play in realizing the opportunities and mitigating risks.

Stepping up the UN’s regional engagement and enhancing cross-border cooperation across the spectrum of the UN’s presence in the Horn of Africa countries can contribute to accelerating national progress towards achieving the SDGs. Most of the challenges facing these countries transcend international borders. By aligning its own programmatic efforts with the move towards greater regional cooperation, the UN can play a catalytic role in addressing many of the underlying factors for the region’s vulnerability, facilitated by a stronger programmatic approach across the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus. The Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa provides the overall framework for these efforts. However, enhancing cross-border cooperation has to be preceded or at least flanked by the establishment of standardized, international border management procedures, not only to prevent the well-known negative effects of a porous or uncontrolled border, but also to allow for the orderly execution of cooperation initiatives.
9. Financing Landscape and Opportunities

Multiple concurrent crises – COVID-19, locusts, flooding – have disrupted Somalia’s economic recovery trajectory. Federal, state and local governments expect shortfalls in domestic revenue, greatly hindering their ability to respond to the increased needs of Somalis. Export revenue, remittances and foreign direct investment are all expected to decline in 2020, increasing Somalia’s dependence on aid. The country received about US$ 1.9 billion in official development assistance in 2019, comprised of roughly equal volumes of humanitarian and development aid. The ODA to GDP ratio in 2019 was 37.5 per cent.

Faced with a global recession and increased needs, both domestically and abroad, donors will be under more pressure than ever to stretch every “aid dollar”. While total aid to Somalia is not expected to decline in the short term, it is unlikely to increase enough to meet the increased needs stemming from the ongoing crises or to achieve the SDGs. Donors will be faced with decisions and trade-offs regarding how to utilize existing envelopes in Somalia in this evolving context. A refined aid architecture was endorsed in June and is in the process of being operationalized. The revised aid architecture is expected to create a leaner system and incentivize the use of trust funds under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility administered by the United Nations, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Facility’s funds are designed to strengthen country ownership of decision making, improve alignment with national priorities, and enhance coordination with other partners.

Financing from international financial institutions is already on the rise. Having reached the Decision Point under the HIPC Initiative and cleared arrears to international financial institutions, Somalia has increased access to financing from these institutions. The World Bank has signed US$ 370.5 million in grants with International Development Association financing in 2020, which included budget support to help the government address shortfalls in revenue at both Federal Government and Federal Member State level.

In March 2020, the IMF Board approved a three-year financing package of US$ 395 million under the Extended Credit Facility and Extended Fund Facility that will support the implementation of the authorities’ National Development Plan and anchor reforms between the HIPC Initiative Decision and Completion Points.132

Diversifying financing for development and reconstruction and improving the effectiveness of aid and remittance delivery is a priority for the country. The economy – historically informal and focused on primary productive sectors – is slowly diversifying into new markets such as telecommunications, money transfer and infrastructure. Further diversification of the financing architecture is required to mobilize the financing for poverty reduction measures. At present, the financial sector in Somalia is not fully integrated into the global financial fabric and has not yet adopted the international legal framework related to anti-money laundering measures and countering the financing of terrorism. This means that it is extremely difficult to transfer funds in and out of the country. In order to attract foreign financing beyond ODA, it is crucial that the financial sector in Somalia is strengthened.

Gradually deepening analytics and understandings of the complexity of the development context in Somalia has led to a more granular response structure. This is exemplified, for instance, in the Recovery and Resilience Framework, which proposes a solid medium- and long-term approach to recovering lost productive capacity and investing in increased resilience (against shocks), accompanied by a financing architecture that goes beyond ODA and government financing. This approach is taken further in the NDP-9.

10. Analysis of Risks

Risks to sustainable development in Somalia are multiple, interlinked and mutually reinforcing. This CCA utilizes seven headings to ensure a focus on key vulnerabilities and risks to the country’s sustainable development (see Annex 1 for the CCA Risk Framework). An even sharper focus describes Somalia’s vulnerabilities to three dominant factors that hamper, and in some cases reverse, efforts towards all Sustainable Development Goals. These are outlined below. In addition to this analysis, challenges towards achieving the 2030 Agenda are further elaborated in the following chapter.

**Extremely weak democratic governance, undercutting both formal and informal justice systems and social services**

Contested notions of democracy perpetuate and aggravate political dysfunction and a lack of will, greatly prolonging the process of democratic maturation. Foreign influence and agendas further undermine the independence of the state to support and protect its populace. Weak civil and political rights perpetuate discrimination, exclusion and repression; undermine democracy; and threaten the federal system.

Elections tend to trigger conflict and instability in fragile states. In the case of Somalia, this is amplified by a context in which there is a weak and politicized judiciary, no constitutional court, nascent and fragile political parties, an incomplete Constitution, lack of clarity over the roles of the two levels of government, and insecurity.

The continued absence of law enforcement agencies, courts and correctional facilities pushes the populace to alternate forms of justice, while a lack of accountability undermines democratic governance and community processes to establish the
rule of law and justice for all. Courts lose their authority to mediate/arbitrate internal FGS/FMS disputes, as well as border- and resource-related disputes with regional states. The absence of rule of law further constrains foreign investment and increases donor fatigue.

The inability of the state to effectively respond to physical challenges such as recurring drought, flood and famine leads to suffering, death, livestock losses and infrastructural damage. This is compounded by an inability to provide basic social services, thereby lengthening state development processes and undermining the legitimacy of the state.

A militant insurgency, with resultant insecurity, displacement, intimidation and injustice

Numerous factions continue to vie for power and influence, especially in the capital and the southern parts of Somalia. This has created a still-existent haven for international and domestic terrorist organizations and various criminal groups. Violent crime, including kidnapping and robbery, is not uncommon in Mogadishu and the south.

Intrastate conflict and land disputes – such as armed clashes between FGS and FMS security forces or between Federal Member States – have the potential to set the country back.

Current insurgent activities are showing no signs of easing and are likely to continue to thwart development and humanitarian efforts. Such activities could conceivably increase through the direct targeting of UN/NGO and civil society organization activities, further hindering, or in some cases reversing, development efforts.

Insecurity and conflict are also key drivers of displacement, threatening the stability of the territory, exposing the population to human rights abuses and gender-based violence, and limiting essential services. Conflict also destroys physical infrastructure and restricts public sector expansion.

A fragile economic/environmental landscape that is resource challenged, demographically unequal, and suffering from both climate-induced degradation and regional competition

Various environmental challenges keep Somalia’s inhabitants under the constant threat of hunger and famine, while risks to lives and livelihoods further aggravate existing drivers of conflict. More broadly, the economic, financial and fiscal instability of the country impacts governance, social cohesion and people’s ability to satisfy their needs. Somalia’s economy is heavily dependent on livestock, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, which are significantly affected by climate change, threatening sustainability. Somalia’s troubled investment climate, which is due to poor governance, insecurity and weak rule of law, is likely to continue to deter foreign investment. Weaknesses in the public financial system – including poor collection of revenues, negligible disbursement of funds to states and sectors, and a paucity of financial institutions – further constrain Somalia’s social and economic development.

This lack of capital investment further limits access to physical infrastructure and basic social services such as health and education. Continued urbanization and dislocation will continue to increase pressures on existing strained infrastructure and services. This in turn leaves Somalis particularly exposed to recurring cycles of drought, food insecurity and water-borne diseases. Ultimately, these compounding economic issues create more conflict and expose vulnerable groups to human rights abuses. The situation has the potential to deteriorate, which could ultimately lead to civil disorder and increased foreign interference for geopolitical or resource-related intentions, thereby threatening the stability of the state.
11. Gaps and Challenges towards Achieving the 2030 Agenda

Somalia faces long-standing structural impediments to progressing on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Given the interdependent nature of the SDGs, gaps and challenges faced in an individual goal or in some goals can significantly affect progress against others.

The drivers of poverty, which are largely attributed to a 30-year-long state collapse, conflict, political instability, climate change and environmental degradation, and weak economic performance. These factors are compounded by entrenched marginalization and exclusion, weak governance and state capacity, systemic corruption, and low levels of resilience. As such, progress or regression in one area can have knock-on consequences for all others. While cause and effect in Somalia can be both simultaneously and are not straightforward or linear, these constraints can be interpreted as being the main impediments to Somalia’s progress towards peace and sustainable, inclusive development, each in turn with their own set of root causes. As such, this chapter will examine the gaps and challenges towards achieving the 2030 Agenda under these interrelated categories. Marginalization, exclusion, weak governance and state capacity are reflected in all thematic sections since they are traversal in nature

Political Fragility and Instability

The review process to develop the new Constitution of Somalia started in 2012, but has progressed slowly, impeded by a deficiency of political support and low institutional capacity. While the adoption of a new Constitution was envisaged for June 2020, this deadline was not met.

The dysfunctional relationship between the FGS and Jubaland and Puntland States, and unresolved ambiguities concerning Somaliland pre-
clude an inclusive process and undermine prospects for the finalization and acceptance of a new Constitution. Contested authority on the division of competencies in various areas remains a challenge to codifying agreed arrangements on federalism in a new Constitution.

The Government’s commitment to generate momentum in the review process, and to make that process genuinely inclusive, is critically important if the process is to be completed and successful. However, the protracted absence of FGS–FMS dialogue continues to constitute a major impediment to the review process.

Deep-seated grievances, including clan-based grievances, significantly contribute to political fragility and instability. While the National Reconciliation Framework exists, it has not yet been operationalized, and there is an absence of national reconciliation models and/or genuine community-based reconciliation models.

Challenges resulting from potential election-related conflicts and political violence underscore the importance of building institutions that balance competition with order, participation with stability, and contests with compromise and consensus.

Without political agreement, FMS cooperation, the engagement of women and youth, and adequate space for the political opposition and an independent media, the electoral process could increase tensions between the FGS and the political opposition and further strain relations with certain FMS authorities and the population itself. Furthermore, widespread insecurity and constrained physical access will limit the number of voters, thereby reducing the level of inclusion and potentially the legitimacy of mandates.

Widespread corruption and impunity, as well as systemic exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable groups from political, reconciliation, and other decision-making processes and institutions, further contribute to the maintenance of embedded power systems. High levels of illiteracy, unequal access to services and dependency on clan protection make Somalis more vulnerable to manipulation by politicians exploiting clannism for political gain.

Weak legislative capacity at federal and state levels, as well as pervasive social, cultural and religious norms, result in discriminatory laws and policies as well as the inexistence of legal frameworks to regulate legal, political, security, judicial and socioeconomic matters. In addition, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and associated response have served to further slow progress on key political milestones.

*See the section on Political Analysis in the chapter titled Country Context for further information.*

**Conflict and Insecurity**

Political fragility and fractured relationships between the FGS and FMSs have impacted negatively on the establishment and functioning of Somalia’s security and justice institutions. Implementation of a federated policing model has commenced, although there are challenges in coordination between the FGS and FMSs at the ministerial level. There has been a suspension of meetings of the National Security Council and a lack of political engagement on the Comprehensive Approach to Security process, which has left coordination processes between the FGS and FMSs in the delivery of the National Security Architecture Agreement behind schedule. This in turn has impacted cooperation and coordination among national security institutions and has limited progress in reaching a final agreement on the Justice and Corrections Model, including establishing the Constitutional Court and rendering the Judicial Services Commission operational.

The delineation of responsibilities of Somalia’s security agencies and clarity on the justice system architecture and jurisdiction need to be clearly reflected in the new Constitution. Ongoing reshuffling of the judiciary outside of appropriate
procedures and interference in court proceedings continue to violate the independence of the judiciary and undermine the separation of powers. Provision of justice chain services to the population remains low, particularly outside urban areas, thereby negatively and disproportionately impacting the rights of women.

High rates of social and economic exclusion not only have consequences for poverty reduction efforts, but also for peace and stability, with those most destitute (particularly the youth within this category) being more susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by organized crime networks and armed groups. Interclan tensions and competition over dwindling pastures and water resources, which are exacerbated by climate change, further fuel insecurity and conflict. Limited arms control capacity, a proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the availability of materials to produce improvised explosive devices provide Al-Shabaab and other militant and criminal groups the means to fuel crime and conflict. While some progress has been made in the rehabilitation of disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants, there is still no national strategy to address issues of disarmament and reintegration.

Slow progress on security reforms and the re-establishment of rule of law institutions continues to negatively impact respect for and protection of human rights, accountability and compliance with standards. The continuing conflict with Al-Shabaab and conflicts among clans remain a major cause of violations and abuses. Despite a declining trend, Somali security forces still account for a significant number of violations. However, perpetrators’ accountability for human rights violations remains low, largely due to weak institutions, and this continues to pose challenges to efforts to tackle impunity for violations and abuses.

Weak Economic Performance

An overdependence on ODA and remittances, a low local resource base, a weak ability to mobilize resources, and very low foreign direct investment limit the Government’s ability to invest in key infrastructure, social services, safety nets, the security sector and rule of law and justice services, among others.

Productive sector productivity is low due to increasing climate variation and soil degradation, which is compounded by factors such as low human capital, limited use of innovative agricultural methods, lack of access to finance, and insecurity. The overdependence on vulnerable productive sectors, particularly on livestock exports, means that the economy and livelihoods will remain susceptible to increasingly frequent climatic and other shocks such as conflict and locust outbreaks. The is further exacerbated by the unsustainable exploitation of the natural resources on which rural livelihoods depend.

The capacity of the private sector to advance Somalia’s sustainable development agenda and to address short- and long-term employment challenges requires policies that address both labour market demand and supply bottlenecks. Beyond the usual challenges of access to capital, market infrastructure and institutions protecting property rights, there is also the challenge of basic literacy and numeracy among Somalis. Similar urgency is needed to address the gaps in basic education and vocational and technical training to render results in the labour market.

The informal economy and informal labour will remain the norm for most Somalis, both in urban and rural areas, due to the continued lack of policies and regulatory frameworks. With livelihoods and job opportunities in the formal and informal sectors remaining strongly associated with clan relations, the development of inclusive and representative tripartite institutions at FGS, FMS

* See the section titled Conflict Dynamics in the chapter titled Country Context for further information.
and district levels requires urgent attention. Limited livelihood opportunities and social services often mean that those who are better educated emigrate, while there is little incentive for those located outside of the country, such as former refugees and migrants, to return.

Accessing credit is very difficult for individuals, particularly those most marginalized, and private businesses. Existing commercial banks have terms and conditions that provide credit with a high mark-up or high collateral requirements, thereby limiting domestic investments. The lack of private sector investment, low levels of skilled human capital, poor education, and a lack of learning platforms for Somalia youth make it difficult for companies to start productive activities.

The implementation of investment promotion strategies will be central to the diversification of the economy and to reducing the dependence on remittances. Somalia will need to invest in business incubation and development services, as well as in social impact investment, in order to accelerate gains in technology and support the integration of the country into the digital economy, which remains very weak.

While important legislation has been passed in recent years, there remain significant gaps (related to, for example, conflict resolution, contract enforcement and public–private partnership arrangements) that will deter national and international investment. The financial sector is not fully integrated into the global system and has not yet developed assurances on and compliance with arrangements on money laundering and financing of terrorism. In the short to medium term, it is essential that the key legislation passed on public financial management systems, revenues and anti-corruption actions be enforced and financial resources be allocated to strengthen capacities related to planning, monitoring and evaluation, procurement, civil service management, statistics, and reporting.

The performance of Somalia in global markets and confidence in the Somali economy remain influenced by risks related to political tensions, climatic shocks and insecurity, with minimal effects on preferential tariff regimes. As such, foreign direct investment remains extremely low.

Somali exports need to be supported by a revitalization of key productive sectors beyond agriculture. While the fisheries sector has significant economic and employment potential, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, skills shortages, and a lack of infrastructure, equipment and facilities remain key challenges.

Somalia also lacks the necessary infrastructure to link producers to domestic and foreign markets and to help promote an enabling environment for sustainable industrialization. The absence of key infrastructure inhibits private sector investment, particularly manufacturing, as well as movement of perishable agricultural produce to domestic and foreign markets. Insecurity and lack of government resources mean that funding for key infrastructure remains very low.

In addition, the lack of regulatory policy frameworks for renewable energy, energy efficiency and private sector participation in the energy sector limits access to affordable electricity, which further constrains economic diversification and industrialization.

Green growth approaches should be advanced to maximize synergies between environmental, social and economic development outcomes while managing the costs, trade-offs and uncertainties of the transition. Approaches involving hydropower development, rural cooking technologies, livestock value chains and forestry development offer prospects of immediate economic growth and large carbon abatement potential.

* See the section titled Macroeconomic Overview in the chapter titled Country Context, as well as the Financial Landscape and Opportunities chapter, for further information.
Poor Progress on Social Development

Somalia is among the world’s poorest nations, and the state capacity to develop and implement redistributive policies and invest in public goods and social service delivery is very limited due to a low resource base underpinned by weak economic performance and inadequate prioritization on social services in state building processes. As a result, there is a severe shortage of health, education, WASH and waste management facilities, services and infrastructure. The lack of state capacity to provide social services and security increases the reliance on the clan system, thereby reinforcing clan affiliation over identification with the state.

Public sector capacities remain limited, and the sector cannot be expected to discharge all its functions, including implementing poverty reduction initiatives and social safety nets. In FMSs, newly established governments are struggling to build ministries and are faced with very limited access to resources.

Contested authority between political and administrative levels of government creates and perpetuates fragmented social service delivery systems. There is weak sector policy and strategy implementation and insufficient government quality assurance, supervision and monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, sectoral and cross-sectoral coordination is weak or non-existent at both federal and state levels. For instance, despite recent efforts, the integration of health and nutrition services remain a challenge. A significant risk is the non-recognition of the cross-sectoral importance of water and sanitation, which impacts the health, nutrition, education and overall social well-being of families and communities at all levels.

Optimal use of resources and capacity of civil society have been challenges due to the absence of accountability and inadequate coordination among state and non-state actors, perpetuating and contributing to the process of exclusionary politics, weak social service delivery, and inadequate and ineffective oversight and accountability mechanisms.

Quality of social service delivery is unregulated and poorly monitored. There are weak accountability and transparency mechanisms within ministries, high turnover of staff, and a lack of qualified personnel (due to a weak education system), resulting in an acute shortage of social sector workers across Somalia. Weak data management systems and the lack of data driven policy development inhibit effective planning and social service delivery across all sectors.

Services are generally concentrated in urban areas, leaving rural areas largely without access. Protracted conflict and a lack of adequate infrastructure also mean that service providers cannot access many areas. High rates of poverty create financial barriers for families wanting to access social services, while traditional gender biases impede access for women and girls. Ability to access social services is also at risk due to a high dependence on remittances, which, as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, is vulnerable to various factors.

The lack of coordination between neighbouring countries has resulted in ineffective water resource management across borders with negative impacts on sustainable access to water resources for both livelihoods and human consumption. At the same time, limited access to the dwindling water resources required for vulnerable productive sectors is a key driver of conflict, which in turn hampers efforts to improve water management systems and affects access for humanitarian partners. The lack of preventative health services and limited treatment services leads to poor health and nutrition outcomes, which in turn increase vulnerability to shocks and stresses, leading to increased mortality and morbidity. Poor health and nutrition services also result in lower school attendance and poor learning outcomes, perpetuating the ongoing cycle of poverty. Limited ac-
cess to quality education also means that Somalis, particularly the most vulnerable, do not have the necessary skills to match even the most basic labour market needs, which results in continued dependence on vulnerable productive sectors and high levels of unemployment– key drivers of displacement, exclusion and, in the worst cases, radicalization.

Finally, the lack of adequate nationally-led social protection systems, due to a lack of government resources and capacities, as well as impeded access to remote locations, means that those who are the most vulnerable remain at risk of being left further behind.

* See the sections on Goal 1, Goal 3, Goal 4 and Goal 6 in the chapter titled Progress Towards the 2030 Agenda for further information on social services.

Weak Resilience

Environmental degradation, climate change and climatic shocks result in recurrent humanitarian crises and undermine livelihoods, particularly in vulnerable productive sectors on which the economy and exports are overly dependent. Somalia also faces recurring cycles of humanitarian disasters that wipe out investments, push millions into poverty, and trigger displacement, further stressing urban infrastructure and services.

Somalia’s migration and mobility environment remains multifaceted and complex, with mass displacement. Rapid and unsustainable urbanization puts further strain on the Government’s capacity to provide services and safety nets, particularly to the most marginalized, while increasing the potential for tension between IDPs, returnees and host communities, posing additional security risks.

Competition around land and scarce resources contributes to conflicts, with intrastate, interstate and communal layers partially shaped by clan dimensions, which further drive conflict and displacement. Unclear rules and procedures, combined with land grabbing by powerful actors and a general lack of confidence in the judiciary, not only exclude most Somalis from formal access to land ownership, but also lead to urban sprawl, eviction, environmental degradation and the loss of livelihoods. Social and economic exclusion contributes to radicalization, conflict and insecurity.

The causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in Somalia are numerous and include climate-related shocks, low agricultural productivity, poverty, poor health infrastructure, high disease burden, gender disparities, conflict and displacement. In addition, a lack of nutritious food impacts learning capabilities (human capital) and productivity, thereby further compounding household poverty and overall economic performance of the country.

Violent conflict limits access to productive activities, negatively affects the transportation of goods and services, drives displacement, and disrupts rural livelihoods, meaning fewer people are engaged in the production of food, thereby increasing dependence on imported food and humanitarian assistance. The current approach to addressing food insecurity remains fragmented, and there is no national strategy on food security.

Institutional knowledge and capacities regarding climate-related resilience building, vulnerability assessments and disaster preparedness are weak across all levels. The predominance of climate-sensitive livelihoods and lack of preparedness result in widespread internal displacement and migration. There is an absence of transboundary partnerships for climate-related information sharing and cooperation, while capacity gaps exist for accessing climate finance to support adaptation and mitigation priorities.

Though improving, capacity and finances at federal and state levels to deliver nutrition services at scale remain limited. There is a lack of clarity on the division of roles and responsibilities between the two levels of government regarding nutrition and food security services. Somalia remains reliant on donor funding for services related to food security, nutrition, livelihoods and the majority of related government posts. Short-term humanitarian funds limit the ability to initiate broader resilience and preventative services; however, a shift towards longer-term objectives has been observed over recent years.
Relationship analysis of impediments to peace and sustainable, inclusive development in Somalia

- **Poor Progress on Social Development**: Forced evictions, Weak governance & state capacity, Marginalization & Exclusion.
- **Weak Economic Performance**: Marginalization & exclusion, Weak State/Govt legitimacy, Unable to provide security to population.
- **Political Fragility & Instability**: No state monopoly on legitimate use of force, Weak State/Govt legitimacy, National Reconciliation Framework not operational.
- **Conflict & Insecurity**: No state monopoly on legitimate use of force, Weak arms/ explosives control, Interclan conflict.

**Key Impediments**:
- Weak governance & state capacity: Weak rule of law & justice, Corruption & impunity, Weak social cohesion.
- Marginalization & Exclusion: Weak social cohesion, Marginalization & exclusion, High levels of household poverty.
- Political Fragility & Instability: Weak rule of law & justice, National Reconciliation Framework not operational, No agreement on federalism & role of local govs.

**Outcomes**:
- Peace & sustainable, inclusive development constrained.
- Marginalization & Exclusion: Marginalization & exclusion, Weak social cohesion, Marginalization & exclusion.
- Political Fragility & Instability: Weak rule of law & justice, National Reconciliation Framework not operational, No agreement on federalism & role of local govs.

**Challenges**:
- Weak governance & state capacity: Weak rule of law & justice, Corruption & impunity, Weak social cohesion.
- Marginalization & Exclusion: Marginalization & exclusion, Weak social cohesion, Marginalization & exclusion.
- Political Fragility & Instability: Weak rule of law & justice, National Reconciliation Framework not operational, No agreement on federalism & role of local govs.
Annex I – Risk Framework

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<th>SDGs</th>
<th>Risk Definition</th>
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| All SDGs | Risk of economic, financial and fiscal instability | According to the Financial Governance Committee 2019 report, Somalia has achieved significant progress towards financial governance reforms. Despite the tangible progress, Somalia’s economy has been negatively impacted by multiple factors:  
  - Internal and regional security deterioration/conflict.  
  - Environmental shocks (droughts and floods). Due to the drought of 2017, GDP growth dropped to 1.8 per cent from 2.4 percent in 2016.  
  - High external debt (over 5 billion USD).  
  - Exports are mainly in livestock to the Middle East.  
  - Economy is dollarized.  
  - The recent COVID-19 pandemic, according to World Bank estimates, is expected to have an overall impact on the GDP annual growth rate (2020) at -2.5 per cent, as a combined effect of declines in domestic revenue, fiscal support and health emergency response.  
  
  The financial sector is also facing strategic challenges, such as agreeing a coherent way forward on fiscal federalism, managing natural resources transparently and equitably, raising domestic revenues, strengthening the credibility of public procurement and concession, improving expenditure management, developing the financial sector, and increasing access to external resources.  
  
  On the other side, the IMF and the World Bank’s International Development Association have determined that Somalia has taken the necessary steps to begin receiving debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. | High | High |  
- Expert assessments on conflict trajectory  
- Drought/flooding prospects  
- WB/IMF/bilateral experts on remittances  
- IMF/WB experts on economic shocks  
- Incidence data on conflict, droughts, floods, economic shocks  
- Inflation data | • Unallocated funding buffer maintained in order to be responsive to emergency needs (environmental, economic, outbreaks)  
• Forecasting and scenario analysis for economic and environmental shocks  
• Coordination between aid partners to ensure adequate response |
| All SDGs | Weak governance, leading to state | Since the establishment of the FGS in 2012, Somalia has taken important steps towards establishing an effective governance system. | Medium | High |  
- Political disagreements between the FGS and FMSs, as well as | |
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| All SDGs   | Weak systems to provide health services and respond to | Somalia’s health system has been decimated following decades of conflict, instability, lack of capacity, weak governance and underinvestment.  
- Access to health care remains very limited. | High        | High   | • Outbreaks  
- Limited access to health services; malnutrition; high mortality; etc. | • Coordinated support provided to the Government of Somalia at federal/state level |
| instability and lack of trust | Despite the progress made, the weaknesses of democratic governance, political instability and human rights abuses undercut both formal and informal justice systems, making parts of Somalia particularly vulnerable to social upheaval, rebellion and societal disintegration, which could lead to the collapse of current democratic state architecture. Weak civil and political rights perpetuate discrimination, exclusion and repression, reinforcing inequality, undermining democracy, and threatening the federal system with conflict and anarchy.  
Unconstructive federal/state dynamics contribute to the Federal Government limiting access of states/regional administration to funds, and regional administrations seek to undermine fund interventions.  
Improving governance and helping Somalia escape the high-frequency fragility requires a range of actions to expand the capacity and reach of public institutions. In the absence of trusted institutions and inclusive economic opportunities, spoiler groups such as Al-Shabaab and other non-state actors retain the ability to extract natural resource and protection rents and destabilize the country. Breaking out of this trap requires the restoration of citizens’ trust in institutions and the creation of more inclusive opportunities via service delivery.  
Addressing matters related to democratic governance will have an impact towards a stable and peaceful federal Somalia with an effectively decentralized, functional democratic system based on inclusive political processes. | between the legislative and executive branches  
- Possible instability and political disturbance  
- Slow delivery and poor quality of services delivered  
- Corruption as a significant challenge to the viability and legitimacy of the state  
- Repression of journalists/civil society actors, government interference in judicial processes, human rights abuses/GBV, etc. | (a) Deepening the federalization process  
(b) Stabilization and establishment of local governance  
(c) Finalization, ratification and implementation of the Constitution  
(d) Preparation and conduct of fair and credible elections in 2020/2021 and 2024  
2) Government support to fulfil the obligations and implementation support  
3) Dialogue and special mechanisms for state confidence building |
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| None | pandemics/epidemics/outbreaks | • According to Directorate of National Statistics, the Federal Government of Somalia, and the Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world.  
• Malnutrition rates remain persistently high across many parts of the country.  
• Access to safe drinking water is poor, with 31 per cent not having access to a basic water supply.  
• Access to sanitation facilities is also very low in Somalia. The situation results in regular outbreaks of disease.  
• Limited budgeting and lack of enough infrastructure remains one of the drivers impacting the health sector.  
• Weak governance is unable to provide social services such as health, education, transportation, sanitation, housing, and protection and dignity.  
Somalia’s capacities to prevent, detect and respond to any global health security threat scored 6 out of 100, as measured by the Health Emergency Preparedness Index in 2016. Disease outbreaks such as cholera – with a current outbreak ongoing since December 2017 – strain the country’s health systems. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a shock to the Somali health sector and to its economy, and it is expected to have an impact on the country’s GDP. | Medium | High | • Overwhelmed health sector, which is unable to respond in a timely manner to immediate needs during outbreaks  
• No access or limited access among populations in the conflict-affected zones | • Development of a disaster preparedness and response plan  
• Funds allocation to support the health sector, with reserve funds in case of future disasters/outbreaks  
• Coordination between humanitarian and development activities, with immediate, medium- and long-term objectives.  
• Public and private investment to support health infrastructure and capacities  
• Government and partner support to enhance the regulatory framework  
• Improved data collection and disaggregation |
| All SDGs | Regionally (externally) driven state instability and failure | Military and politically driven threats occupy the heart of national security concerns, as they threaten all the components of the state. Somalia is a small, weak and fractured nation with contested borders and fractious neighbours, making it extremely vulnerable to regional threats. These include foreign-backed insurgency and foreign-orchestrated manipulation of government bureaucracy to influence the state’s decision-making processes and policies. While direct military conflict between Somalia and its neighbours is currently unlikely, there is current evidence of foreign influence in the affairs of | Medium | High | • Border incursions  
• Diplomatic deterioration  
• Political/military events of significance within Somalia (e.g. downing by Ethiopian military of aircraft in Somalia) | • Supporting the regional cohesiveness of Somalia’s diplomacy with its neighbours in East Africa and the wider region, through ongoing fora, including the UN-led dispute resolution processes such as the ICJ |
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<td>Somalia (as in many countries on the African continent), which is also known as a form of “state capture”.</td>
<td>This influence adversely affects stability of the state, conversely strengthening the bargaining power of its neighbours in disputes. These disputes are numerous, involving maritime boundaries, land borders, and control of water and other resources. For example, a current maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia is being heard before the ICJ, with a decision due in 2021. This matter has been deemed more a conflict than a dispute, and the ICJ ruling, as a win-lose situation, could possibly lead to deepened animosity between these two powers.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Attacks by Somali militants against Kenyan citizens</td>
<td>• Supporting the ongoing development of Somalia’s defence and security architecture to withstand and deter aggression and subversion</td>
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<td>Separately, regular attacks by Al-Shabaab against Kenyan military and civilian targets, most recently in Mandera township on the Kenya-Somalia border, have led to increasing tensions and have resulted in the Kenyan government developing ties directly with Jubaland, which Kenya sees as a buffer zone.</td>
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<td>• Supporting the creation of common purpose and consistency in the foreign policy and diplomacy of regional states</td>
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<td>There are also indications of competing foreign influence involving Ethiopia and Eritrea, and similarly allegations of two competing factions vying for influence within Somalia, with the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) one side and Turkey and Qatar on the other.</td>
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<td>• Continuing to focus on regional partnership approaches to development and humanitarian programmes</td>
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<td>The drivers of these various foreign influences are not only strategic and geopolitical, but also resource related. One example is UAE-financed port construction in Somaliland, which creates regional as well as intra-state tensions.</td>
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<td>• Diplomatic support to facilitate dialogue between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia</td>
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<p>| All SDGs | Internal state/non-state armed conflict | Threats to the existence of the state, and the security of its people and infrastructure, are readily apparent from within the state itself. Societal threats within Somalia are sufficiently powerful to maintain the existence of several militant groups, most notably Al-Shabaab. The sustainability of the emerging nation-state process is fragile, causes insecurity and displacement, degrades economic growth, challenges democratic governance and economic | Medium | High | • Breakdown of communication and/or mediation between Federal Member States or parties due to a divisive issue | • Supporting internal diplomacy and state-building mechanisms, with an emphasis on the inclusiveness of civil society groups |</p>
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<td>and fiscal reforms, and constantly threatens to halt the capacity of the state and the aid community to operate effectively.</td>
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<td>• Skirmishes between factions</td>
<td>• Supporting internal security and equitable justice systems</td>
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<td>A number of specific enablers can tip the balance of this threat to one that paralyses the state. These could manifest in new or existing interstate disputes, the further deterioration of the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, or, in conjunction with an AMISOM withdrawal, non-state armed groups successfully challenging the authority of the state and taking partial/full control of state functions.</td>
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<td>• Evidence of a strengthening insurgency</td>
<td>• Ending the marginalization of youth, women and certain groups</td>
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<td>There are several current internal conflicts of note. These include friction between Somaliland and Puntland, manifesting in sporadic armed clashes involving the Sool and Sanag regions. In addition, there is friction between Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia, and also between semi-autonomous Jubaland and the capital.</td>
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<td>• State security apparatus unable to respond to internal threats</td>
<td>• Focus of triple nexus on top-down and bottom-up programmes supportive of inclusive state-building</td>
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<td>• Skirmishes between factions</td>
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<td>• Mass demonstrations and civil disobedience</td>
<td>• International support to diplomacy between Somalia and Somaliland (e.g. Somali and Somaliland leaders resume talks in Djibouti in June 2020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Climate change: Given that greenhouse gas levels continue to increase, global warming will also continue accelerating/amplifying climate change, including extreme weather events and climate shocks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring weather/climate trends</td>
<td>• Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The likelihood of climate shocks impacting Somalia is considered high, given the accelerated frequency and severity of climate shocks and Somalia’s vulnerability to those shocks. Climate Shocks: Since 1990, Somalia has experienced 30 severe climate-related hazards: 12 droughts and 18 floods, three times the number of climate-related hazards experienced between 1970 and 1990 (CCA page 15, section 3.4, second paragraph). Vulnerability: Somalia is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world, stemming from its social, economic and political conditions, as well as its geo-physical characteristics. Somalia’s agricultural economy (on which Somalis are heavily dependent) is particularly vulnerable to droughts/floods, which is further amplified by inadequate mechanisms to cope with climate shocks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community survey and mapping for disaster risk management</td>
<td>• National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability: Somalia is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world, stemming from its social, economic and political conditions, as well as its geo-physical characteristics. Somalia’s agricultural economy (on which Somalis are heavily dependent) is particularly vulnerable to droughts/floods, which is further amplified by inadequate mechanisms to cope with climate shocks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental studies (global and country specific)</td>
<td>• National Disaster Management Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Climate Shocks: Since 1990, Somalia has experienced 30 severe climate-related hazards: 12 droughts and 18 floods, three times the number of climate-related hazards experienced between 1970 and 1990 (CCA page 15, section 3.4, second paragraph).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• NDP-9, which highlights climate change and natural disasters as critical concerns in the strategic development of Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SOMALIA

The impact of extreme climate shocks is also considered high, given the resulting threats to all SDGs. As an example, the total effect of the 2017 drought in Somalia was estimated to exceed US$ 874 million (CCA page 30, section 1.5, second paragraph, source World Bank 2017): (SDG 2) the productive sector (irrigated and rain-fed crops, livestock and fisheries) accounted for 65 per cent of effects (food insecurity); (SDG 6) the physical sector (water and sanitation, environment and transport) made up 32.7 per cent of effects (water insecurity); and (SDG 3, 4) social (health, nutrition and education) and cross-cutting sectors made up 1.5 per cent of effects.

The following additional effects of climate shocks are also worth noting: (SDG 1, 8) livestock and agricultural production accounts for 65 per cent of Somalia’s GDP/labour and therefore represents a significant threat in terms of livelihood loss and poverty; (SDG 16) dwindling resources and income-earning opportunities fuel conflicts/grievances at many levels; (SDG 9, 11, 5, 10) significant increases in climate-induced displacement threaten already struggling urban centres and efforts to protect the most vulnerable; (SDG 7) Somalia’s greenhouse gas concentration trajectory is expected to continue and lead in the long term to high energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions; and (SDGs 13, 12, 14, 15, 17) successive climate and other shocks have reduced Somalia’s resilience and capacity to combat climate change and progress in the remaining SDGs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDGs</th>
<th>Risk Definition</th>
<th>Risk Factors/Analysis</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Early Warning Indicators</th>
<th>Mitigation Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16</td>
<td>Permanent and massive displacement</td>
<td>The likelihood of permanent and massive displacement is considered high, given the combined pressure of the multitude and increasing frequency of factors which force displacement in Somalia: conflict/insecurity, climate shocks, food/water insecurity, insufficient employment and income, and lack of access to essential public services. The impact of permanent and massive displacement is also considered high, given the severe consequences not only for IDPs, but also for urban centres and peace/stability.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>The following factors drive and therefore represent early warning indicators of displacement: • Conflicts/insecurity • Natural disasters • Food/water insecurity</td>
<td>Durable IDP solutions, including: • In-depth understanding of dynamics that increase displacement • Support to the development and implementation of government policies and laws that foster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SOMALIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDGs Definition</th>
<th>Risk Factors/Analysis</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Early Warning Indicators</th>
<th>Mitigation Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPs often end up in overcrowded camps; have significantly higher levels of exposure to deprivations in multiple dimensions (monetary, electricity, education, water and sanitation); face repeated evictions induced by intense land competition; are disproportionately affected by human rights violations; and struggle to exercise rights to participate in economic, social and cultural activities and political processes. As a result, they are most likely to be “left behind” in progress towards the SDGs.</td>
<td>• Higher unemployment rates among IDPs  • Eviction trends  • Lack of infrastructure investments</td>
<td>protection of IDPs and safeguard their rights  • Holistic programmatic approaches across the humanitarian, development and peace nexus that seek to shift the fundamental dynamics underlying protracted displacement  • Reinforced inclusion of “do no harm” and conflict responsiveness in durable solutions programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Centres: The large and rising influx of IDPs has already contributed to the rapid unplanned growth of major cities, and has resulted in additional stress on already strained key sectors in urban areas: land and housing, health, education, water supply and sanitation, protection and employment. If left unchecked, this trend will accelerate and be amplified by decades-long infrastructure backlogs and neglect.</td>
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<td>Peace and stability: Unplanned and unregulated city expansion has led to arbitrary distribution of land and has aggravated contestation over land, housing and basic services. High rates of IDP exclusion also have consequences for peace and stability in Somalia, with those most destitute being more susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by organized crime networks and armed groups.</td>
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</table>
Annex II – Select List on the Status of Commitments under International Treaties and Agreements

### Human Rights Treaties and Procedures

#### Ratification status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty Description</th>
<th>Signature Date</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24 Jan 1990 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (CAT-OP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jan 1990 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (CCPR-OP2-DP)</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jan 1990 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Oct 1978 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Oct 1978 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons</td>
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#### Acceptance of individual complaints procedures for Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaints Procedure</th>
<th>Acceptance of Procedure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual complaints procedure under the Convention against Torture (CAT, Art. 22)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR-OP1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, Art. 31)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-OP)</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, Art. 14) | N/A
---|---
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR-OP) | No
Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW, Art. 77) | No
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-IC) | No
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD-OP) | No

**Acceptance of the inquiry procedure for Somalia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inquiry Procedure</th>
<th>Acceptance of Procedure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inquiry procedure under the Convention against Torture (CAT, Art. 20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inquiry procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, Art. 33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-OP, Art. 8-9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR-OP, Art. 11)</td>
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<td>Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-IC, Art. 13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inquiry procedure under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD-OP, Art. 6-7)</td>
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**Commitments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN - Universal Periodic Review recommendations/human rights commitments</th>
<th>1st Cycle</th>
<th>2nd Cycle</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>2015/2016</td>
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**Other Relevant UN Conventions**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty Description</th>
<th>Signature Date</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention against Discrimination in Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)</td>
<td>19 Dec 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 World Heritage Convention</td>
<td>11 Jan 2020</td>
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**International Humanitarian Law**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty Name</th>
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<td>Treaty Name</td>
<td>Signature Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949 Four Geneva Conventions</td>
<td>12 Jul 1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977 Two Protocols additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which strengthen the protection of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction</td>
<td>3 July 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction</td>
<td>16 Apr 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</td>
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### Regional Treaties and Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty Name</th>
<th>Signature Date</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child</td>
<td>1 Jul 1991</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)</td>
<td>23 Feb 2006</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to free movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment</td>
<td>21 Mar 2018</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mar 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Dec 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU Convention on Mercenaries (1977)</td>
<td>23 Feb 2006</td>
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### Multilateral Environmental Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>Ratification/Accession Date</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
<td>26 Jul 2010</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kyoto Protocol) (2005)</td>
<td>24 Oct 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Climate Accord (2016)</td>
<td>22 Apr 2016</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous</td>
<td>26 Jul 2010</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity (1993)</td>
<td>11 Sep 2009</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
<td>26 Jul 2010</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain</td>
<td>26 Jul 2010</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)</td>
<td>1 Aug 2001</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985)</td>
<td>1 Aug 2001</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna</td>
<td>Dec 1985</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Flora (CITES)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)</td>
<td>Nov 1985</td>
<td>In Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb 1986</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ILO Conventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced Labour Convention (1930)</td>
<td>18 Nov 1960</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957)</td>
<td>8 Dec 1961</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Remuneration Convention (1951)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not in Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958)</td>
<td>8 Dec 1961</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Age Convention (1973)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not in Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention</td>
<td>20 Mar 2014</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1948)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949)</td>
<td>20 Mar 2014</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trade Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Signature/Join Date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization (WTO)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Non-member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)</td>
<td>21 Mar 2018</td>
<td>Not Ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)</td>
<td>19 Jul 2018</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East African Community (EAC)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Non-member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Working party established on 7 December 2016.

Applied for membership in 2012 but application has remained frozen.
### International Maritime and Fisheries Conventions and Commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession Date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Convention of Load Line (1966)</td>
<td>21 Jul 1968</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention of Marine Pollution (MARPOL) (1973)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) (1978)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) (1972)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Labour Convention (2013)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2009)</td>
<td>9 Nov 2015</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995)</td>
<td>11 Dec 2001</td>
<td>In Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (1993)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relevant Regional Fisheries Management Commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Organizations</th>
<th>Signature/Join Date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)</td>
<td>Jul 2014</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC)</td>
<td>Nov 2004</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)</td>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA)</td>
<td>Sep 1995</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH-i Africa **</td>
<td>Dec 2015</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** http://www.iotc.org/


** http://www.iora.net/

** http://www.persga.org/

** https://fish-i-africa.org/
Annex III - Methodology

The development process for the Common Country Analysis commenced in early 2020 upon the request of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia.

Seventeen working groups were established, one for each of the SDGs, drawing on the expertise from across the UN system in the country and beyond. Mapping existing information and data sources, the working groups undertook an in-depth analysis on Somalia’s progress towards the 2030 Agenda as well on the gaps and challenges constraining progress towards the SDGs. The working groups drew from the extensive analysis undertaken for the NDP-9 and the later published the Somalia Health and Demographic Survey which for the first time provided SDG baseline data in across multiple sectoral areas. Analysis of the financing landscape was supported by World Bank partners.

The formulation of the CCA was undertaken in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic which reached Somalia in March 2020 and the subsequent significant reduction in the UN’s operational footprint in the country. This severely constrained the UN’s ability to engage various stakeholders in what is an already complex operational environment. To reduce the risk of consultation fatigue at a time when the attention of stakeholders was focused on tackling the pandemic, it was decided that the consultations for the CCA and for the UNCF would be combined into a single process. This provided an opportunity for stakeholders to review the CCA, provide feedback based on which adjustments were made, while also proving insights on how the UN should best support Somalia’s peace and development priorities into the future through the UNCF.

Multiple stakeholders were consulted in this process including, but not limited to, representatives of federal and state governments and institutions, civil society organizations and NGOs, the international donor community (both humanitarian and development), private sector groups and trade unions, and academia. Dedicated sessions were organised with representatives and representative organizations of marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women, youth, and internally displaced persons. Due to the prevailing operational challenges, consultations were undertaken through virtual meeting platforms. Online survey tools were utilized to capture contributions from those unable to join virtual meetings.

The outcomes of other recent processes undertaken by UN entities outside of the CCA/UNCF process were also drawn on for the analysis, such as individual agency sectoral consultations and interviews undertaken during the UN Strategic Framework final evaluation process.

The CCA was reviewed and validated by relevant government line ministries, including the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development as the coordinating entity of the Federal Government of Somalia.