HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT

SOMALIA 1998
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**Preface**

Human development has been a concern of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990, when it first published a report introducing the concept. Since that date, annual global reports have been produced, each with a substantial statistical annex covering social and economic phenomena for just about all the countries of the world. Somalia does not appear in the statistical appendix of the recent global Human Development Reports because reliable statistical information on the country is not available. In recent years, UNDP has encouraged the production of Human Development Reports covering individual countries, to complement the global Human Development Reports. These have proved to be very popular since they provide an opportunity to focus on issues of specific relevance to individual countries. An innovative feature of the UNDP reports has been that they are reports to UNDP by independent teams, not reports either of UNDP or of the government itself. This has enabled the reports to adopt a fresh outlook on development issues that might not necessarily have been raised within a narrower institutional and intellectual framework of governments and UNDP.

This is the first report on human development in Somalia. It takes its lead from the series of UNDP annual global Human Development Reports that started in 1990. Since then, over 100 reports have been published for particular countries with UNDP taking a “caretaker” role for their production. Human development in Somalia is difficult to assess, since reliable data on basic development indicators are scarce, and independent field research constrained by ongoing insecurity. This is the only Human Development Report written without the benefit of government counterparts to supply data; Somalia in 1998 remains a Stateless country.

The initial research for and partial drafting of this report was prepared by Michael Hopkins and Jawahir Yusuf Adam (MHC International). Subsequently, the project was handed over to a team under UNDOS (United Nations Development Office for Somalia, a UNDP/multidonor project). Of this team, Ken Menkhaus and Roland Marchal served as joint lead authors of the final draft. They assume responsibility for the analysis, as well as any errors of fact or interpretation.

Dominik Langenbacher
Resident Representative and
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia

*Human Development Report - 1998*
GOGOLDHIG

Barnaamijka Horumarinta ee Jamciyadda Quruumahaa Ka Dhexeeya waxaa waalwal ku ahaa Horumarinta Aadanaha tan iyo sannaadki 1990, oo aheyd markii ugu horreysay ee ay fikraddaas soo bandhigtay. Laga bilaabo waqiggaas, warbixinno sanadeed ee ku wajahan dundoodan dhan ayaa la soo saaraay, warbixinnaaduussa oo mid waliba lahayd tirs koobyo ifdaa u ah ee la xiriiriga arrimaha dhowashada iyo bulshada ee wadamada dundii oo dhan. Soomaaliya kama muuqato tirokoobyadaas lagu soo daabacay warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha ee guud ee ugu dambeeyeey sababtoo ah laanta xog tirakooobeed ee ku saabsan waddanka. Sanooyinkii ugu dambeeyay, heyeeda UNDP da waxay dhiriigay soo saaridda warbixinno la xiriira Horumarinta Aadanaha ee ku saabsan waddan kasta si loogu kabo warbixinnaaduun weynaha ee horumarinta aadanaha. Kuwaasuu waxay noqdeen kuwa caan ah maadaama ay suurta gelinayeen fursad diirada lagu saaro arrimahaa waddankasta u leh u muhim dad ka ah. Arratida cusub ee warbixinnaada UNDP waxaa weeye in ay yihiin warbixinno ay diyaariyeen kooxo madax bannaan, balse ayan aheyn kuwo ay diyaansay UNDP da ama dowladala naftigooda. Arrintani waxay suurta gelisay in warbixinnaaduuna qoonta wajahaad cusub oo la xiriira arrimaha horumarinta taasoo aan lagu soo jeedin kari laheyn habka arratida urursan ee ay adeegsadaa dowladaha iyo UNDPada.

Warbixintani waa tii ugu horreysay ee laga sameeyo Horumarinta Aadanaha ee la xiriira Soomaaliya. Waxeynaha ka shidaa qaadaneyyaa warbixinno sanadeediyadii addunweynaha ee la xiriiray Horumarinta Aadanaha ee biliibayyaa sannadku 1990-kii. Tan iyo waqiggaas in ka badan bogol warbixinno ahaan la dhashay oo khusheenaya waddamo gaar ah iyadoo UNDP duna ka qaadanaysay door ah 'gacaan ku heyn' (caretaker) soo saaridda warbixinnaaduuna. Horumarinta Aadamaha ee Soomaaliya waa mid adag si loo qiimeeyo, maadaama xog lagu kalsoo yahay ee ku saabsan tusayaasha horumarinedeed ee Aussaasiga ah ay yar tahay iyo cilmi baarish madaxbannaan oo laga sameeyo goobtana ay caqabadaysay nabadgelyo darrada jiirta. Warbixintani waa midda keli ah ee la xiriira Horumarinta Aadanaha oo la qoray ayadoo ayan jirin dawlad ka qeybqadan yagga siinta xogta Soomaaliya waa waxyay tahay dal dawlad la'ah ah ayadoo lagu jiro sannaadka 1998.

Cilmii baaristii ugu horreysay iyo qeeb ahaan qoralka koowaad ee warbixintan waxaa wada diyaariiyeey Michael Hopins iyo Jawahir Yusuf Aadan oo ka tirsan hayadda (MHC International). Ka dib, mashruucu waxaa lagu wareijeeyey kook ka tirsan hayadda UNDOS (Xabiiska Horumarinta Soomaaliya u Qaabilsan Jamciyadda Quruumaha ka Dhexeeya) oo ah mashruuc hoose yimaad UNDP ayna maalgeliyaan dowlado fara badan. Kooydaan dambe, Ken Menkhaus iyo Roland Marchal ayaa si wadajir ah waxay u ahayeen hormuudka qoralkan kama dambeysta ah. Iyaga ayaana qaadadaya masuuliyadda la xiriirta falangeeya, iyo sidoo kale wixii khalad ah ee ku yimaada xaqiijada ama ka turjumideeda.
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This report owes much to a large number of people who shared their time and thoughts on both developing the contents of the report and in comments on an earlier draft. The entire UNDOS team, in particular Michel Del Buono, KNS Nair, Gian Paolo Alois, Maxine Atkinson, Abdullahi Sheikh Ali, Abdullahi Sheikh Mohamed, Abdullahi Wadere, Abdullahi Gaal, Abdinomar Yalsanu, Mariam Alwi, Fatini Adegbuyi, Farha Dar, Faisal Abdullah, Elizabeth Wandera, Teresa Aluku, Mumina Aden and Betty Mweya provided important contributions. Laila Shamji, Deborah Nittingale and Jan Kalina provided editorial services.

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A thanks is also due to the extensive comments and inputs we have received from staff members of the following United Nations organisations: FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNPO, WHO, WFP, SRP/UNDP, UNCTAD/UNDP and WSP/UNDP.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND TRANSCRIPTION

The spelling of Somali place names and personal names have been anglicised for the benefit of non-Somali readers.

In 1991, the Northwestern portion of Somalia declared unilateral secession as the independent “Republic of Somaliland.” That political entity has subsequently developed many of the features of a sovereign state, but has not received any international recognition to date. Its status is the source of considerable political sensitivity. This study uses the name “Somaliland” to describe the polity in Somalia’s Northwest, but takes no position on the juridical status of that administration or its borders.
MAHADCELIN


Sidoo kale waxa loo fidinayaay mahadnaaj la xiriirta gaacantii ay ka geysteen iyo doodihii ay nagala qeybqaateen, dadka kala ah:

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Dad badan oo kale ayaa xataa waqtigoodii qaaliga ahaa u huray warbixintan ayagoo fikradahoodii iyo faafooyinkoodii ku soo gudbiyey qoraal ahaan annagoo annagaan wax ku qaadanay. Kuwasi waxay yihiin: Imanol Berakoexa iyo Tania Pfaffenholz (EC Somalia), Owen Calvert, Christine Cambrezi, Jane Macaskell iyo Erminio Sacco oo dhampaantoold ka tirsan (FSAU), iyo Alle Dorhout (Safaaradda Netherlands).


XUSUUSIN KU SAABSAN EREYADA LA ISTICMAALAY IYO QORAALKA LA SOO GUURIYEY

Hinggaadda magacyo Soomaalida goobaha iyo magacyada dadka waxa laa qorey qaabka ingiriisinga ayadoo loogu daneynaya akhrisayasha aan Soomaalida ahayn. Sannadku markuu ahaa 1991 qeybta waqsiyo galbeed ee Soomaaliya waxay ku dhawadiyey si go'aan gaar ahnaad ah inay ka go'day dalka inuu nakhor download siyaasadeed ee adduunweynaha ilaa iyo waqtigoo hadda la joogo. Xaaladda ay ku sugan tahay waa mid leh xasaasiyad siyaasadeed oo lixdaan leh. Darasaadaddi waxay u isticmaalaysaa magaca "Soomaaliland" si ay ugu tilmaan siyaasadda ka jirta dhinaca Waqsiyo Galbeed ee Soomaaliya, haseyeeshe, ma faragselinayo xaalad sharciyeedka maamulkaas iyo xududhihiisaba.

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KHULASSO SARE (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)
XAALADDA HORUMARINTA ADAHAMAA EE SOOMAALIYAAY JOOGTO WAKHTIGAN XAADIRKAASH

Markaa eegno hab-xisaabeedka lagu Tusmeeyo Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee Af-Inagarisiga loogu yaqano (Human Development Index) oo sannad walsa ay soo saarto Hay adda Qarankaasay Midoobay u gaabilsan Barnaamijyada Horumarinta, waxan aar aknaya in Soomaaliya ay ka mid tahay waddamada addunanka ugu hooqeyaa. Dhibaatoyin ku xiriira sidii loo heli lahaa wararr sax ah oo lagu ogaado Tuseyninta Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee Soomaaliya ayaa ka dhigay wax aan suurta-gal ahayn in la sameyso, laakiin Tuseyninta Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee Soomaaliya waxaa lagu qiyaaasaa inta u dhexeyso 0.184 ilaa 0.159. Xataa qeybta sare ee qiyastaasi waxay ay Soomaaliya gelinayaasha halka ugu hooqeyso ee Tuseyninta Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee adduniinka, iyadoo waddanka Sierra Leone uun ku xigta. Da’da qofka Soomaaliga ah uu gaari karo markii la isku cel-celsho waxa la qiyaaqay inta u dhexeyso 41 sano ilaa 43 sano; dhimashada caruurta da’doodooyah ugu u qaray 5 sano waxa ay gaartay boqolkiiba 25 (25%); dadka waaweyn ee wax qori kara waxna akhrin kara waxa lagu qiyaaqay in ay tiraddoodu u dhexeyso boqolkiiba 14 ilaa 17; caruurta dugsiyada hoose la galsho waa boqolkiiba 13 ilaa 16, sanadkiiba; wax soo saarka dalka ee qofka dakhliisad wuxu waa $176-200 iyadoo la isticmaalo isku cel-celiska sarifka laacaan mujudi ee dhexeyseey 1996-1997. Wakhtigaan oo wax soo saarka qofka ee dhaba ah uu ahu $600-700 (awooda wax iibsasho ee lacigtu).

Markdaa eegto waddan kasta oo addunaka ku yaalla oo lagu arko tushayaasha aan kor ku soo xusnay waxa loo qaadan karaa in qaranmaa uu ku jirro xaalad deg deg ah oo u baahan wax ka qabasho. Dhibaatoyinku Aadamimino ee Soomaaliya oo si dhheeraaday, ayaa xalka si xumeeyey oo gaarsiisiiyaay xaalad deg deg ah. Xaaladda abaareed iyo cudurada faaf ee dilaaga ah kaliyaa ayaa gurmad Aadamimino Soomaaliya u soo jiido karay. Iyada taasi jirto, ayaa heerka hoos-ahaansho ee Horumarinta Aadamimino ee Soomaaliya ku daba dheeraatay, ay bulshada Soomaalida u soo jiido doontaa xaalada deg deg deg oo wakhiid u dhexar qaadda, iyaddo taas ay bulshada caalamku ay si dadban ula wadaagi doonto.

Mowduucu Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee Soomaaliya waxa si xad-dhaaf u soo sarey cadaadiska ku xiriira heshiba Aadamimino ee ka jirayt waddanka ilaa 1991kii, markii dowladnimadii Soomaaliya ay ku bur burtay dagaaladdii sokeeye iyo koxsihiid dheeko谨 ka dirirnayey. Intii lagu jirey sanoooyinkii 90 meeyada, koonfurta Soomaaliya waxa ay ku jirayt xaalad adag oo deg deg ah oo leh abbaar, cudurada la iska qaado ee faafa, qaxooti badan oo yaacaya iyo dagaalo hubeyso. Dhibaatoyin inugu jira daadad xun-xun, abbaar, nabad gelyo la’aanta si darsaneyso iyo cayayaan dhib badan ayay qeybo ka mid ah koonfurta Soomaaliya khatar ugu jiraan in xaalad abbarsiin ay dib ugu laabtaan dhamaadka 1989 ka iyo 1999 ka. Dhibaatoyinka soo noq-noqonaya ee qeyla dhaanta leh ayaa Soomaalida iyo 1Hey’adaaha Caalamka aan u suurta galinaynin in ay ahmiyad iyo mudnaanta ku habboon siyaan himilooyinku Horumarinta Aadamahaa ee mudada dheer.

Qeybaha wax soo saarka Soomaaliya ugu muhiimsan (Xoolda iyo Beeraah) oo dagaalada-sokeeye ka horba wax soo xarkoodu liitey, ayaa si dhawacmay tobankii sano oo lagu jirey khilaafadka hubeyso iyo qaranmadii duntey; wax soo saarka qaraameed ee Soomaaliya waa 66%, markii loo eegno heerkuu joogay dagaalada ka hor. Hoos u dhaca ku yimid wax soo saarka dhaqaale ee Soomaaliya wax uu hoos u dhiigay dakhliisad qeyksa iyo cashuurihiid dowladda hoose.
Saameyni heerka hooseeya ee Horumarinta Aadamaha si aaniyey ayaa daaffaha waddanka looga dareemay dadyowga ku nool "Deegaanka oo kabanaya" ee Waqooyi Bari iyo Waqooyi Galbeed waxay ay ku raaxeysanayaan caafimaad, waxbarasho iyo malaha dakhli ka sameeyo kan ay helaa Soomaalida ku nool Godolada Dhexe iyo Koonfurta; sidoo kale, farqii si cad u muqda ayaa beelaha gudahaada kal galay. Kooyaha aani waxa uu wanaagis lahayn uu kuwa dayacan (sida, masaakinta magaalooynika, qoysaask aya haweenku madaxa ka yihiin, kuwa guryahoodii kasoore barakacay, kuwo miyojoog, xoolo dhaqadada liidatada, beelaha dheeraha u qota ku noolaasho ahaan iyo.jinsi-yada (dadka laga badan yahay) ayaa dhibaatooyinku ugu dhaqaan si aani isla-ekeyn. Dhinaca kale, kooxo yar oo baayacmusharka iyo ganacsadaha magaalooynka, taqirininta xoolo dhaqadada, kuwa beerehaha leh, shaqalaha kuwa kontaraada qata ama la shaqeeyo hay'adha caalamiga ayaa reerahooda u suga adeeg caafimaad iyo waxbarasho oo gaar ahaneed. Qoysaask lacagta ka qerta qaraabadda dibadda ka shaqeeeya iyaguna si fican ayay u helaa nolol maalmeed kooda.


Dhalin-yarada aad tachiinta laheyn waxa ay galaan ciidanka malishiyada ah, oo noqotay shaqada kaliyaa ee ay heli karaan. Waxa intaas dheer, dadkii tababaranaa ee xirfadaha lahaa adduunka ayay ku kala lumeen iyadaa waxqas oo faraynta akoonaad u kala baxna oo yahay warbixin ko mid ah ayaan ogol in ay reerhoo ku dhaqaan meel aar daryeel caafimaad iyo biyo nadiif ah laga heli karin); wax soo-saarkii xoogaga shaqaalaha waxaa si daran hoos u wixiyay jirrooyin iyo dhimasho badan.
MACNAHA GUUD EE HORUMARINTA AADAMAHA EE SOOMAALIYA

Beelaha Soomaalidu waxa ay raadinayaan sidii ay horukac ugu sameyn lahaayeey Horumarinta Aadamaaha, iyagoo isla markaana buuxiynaa baahida dariuriga ah, iyagoo si aan qeyra caad ahayn uga dagaalay duruufa adag-sida dowlad la'aan. Inta la xususan yahay, ma jiru mujiirriic adduunkan casrii ah ka tirsan oo ay la soo qabato, inta ay la tacalaan dowlad la'aan sidaan u dheer, taasoo waddanka wiidday tan iyo 1991 dii. Bulshada Soomaalidu waxa ay ku jirtaa xaalad aanay horay u soo marin, waxayna isku dayyaan in ay la yima'daan tabo ay ku dabooleen baahida asasiga ee horumarintaan. Quurka mid ah wajiyada ay keebyaha Horumarinta Aadamuhu, sida dalkhii abuurista ganacsiga waddanka gudahiisa ayaa waxay muujisey ad-deekeysi iyadoo ay lagu jiro xaalad dowlad la'aneed oo waalba ka si fa'a'deysanaayaa cashuurtaa oon la bixin. Sidoo kale waxaa awood loo yeeshay isticmaalka telefoonada oo muhiim u ah ganacsiga iyo xawaadaa lacagaha oo si weyn loo horumarshay tan iyo 1990 kii. Si kastaba ha noqtoone, kaabayaasha horumarintaan: daryeelka caa'maadka, biyaha galiinta, bulshada nadaafadeeda iyo waxbarashada hoohe, waxa si ba'an u wiqiye dowlad la'aanta. Maamulkii dowladda ee muhiimka ahaa (Sharciga iyo Kaladanbeynka), kuwaas oo ay ka mid yihiin hay'adhiinti dowladda ee bixinayaha shaahadooyinka iyo Baasabooraada, iyo taageerada safaraduuhu baxshaan iyo nidaamka gaarkaarka intuha waxay noqday kuwa la waayay ama kooxan garaa ah ay ku fushadaa danahooda gararka ah, halkii danta garanka loogu fahmiyey lahaa. Sidaas darteed, khidmado var oo salthihihiya ah la siyaan bulshada Soomaalida. Adeegga bulshada howl-qabadka Horumarinta Aadamaaha a waxa gabi ahaan xilkoodee la wareegyo Hey'adaha Caalamiya. Inkastoo wakhtiga gaaban ay muhiim tahay, heeray ku tirsanaanashada dibadda ee adeegga bulshada ma ahin mid si waraysad.

Nabad galyo la'aanta iyo maaawinooyinka oo sii yaraanaya awgood ayaa gargaarkii caalanku uusan gaarayin dad-weynaha intooda badan. Mashaariicda adeegga bulshada ay maalgalayaan Hey'adaha Caalamiga sida caafiimadka, waxbarashada iyo biyo galinta wax ay u muuqdaan in ay iskuugu tagayaan goobaha xisallooniida leh (Waaqooyi Galbeed iyo Waaqooyi Bar) iyo magaaloyinka waaweyn.

Jiritaan la'aanta adeegga bulshada ee dowladdaay waxa ay dhalisey in ganacsato gaar ah ay la wareegaan qeyybaaah. Markii laga reeko qoyysaa yar oo awood u leh in ay hetaa adeegga bulshada ee caalamku baxsho, caafiimadka iyo waxbarashada waxa kaliyaa oo heli kara kuwa iska bixin kara, dawwooyinka iyo lacagta duuguayda lagu dhiigtu. Adeegyada noocaas ah waxa kaliyaa oo laga helo xarumo yar oo magaaloyinka ku yaal, gar ahaan Muqdishe iyo Hargeyysa.


Xasilooni la'aanta ka jira qeybo ka mid ah Koonfurta Soomaaliga ayaa waxay hor-istagat in kaalmooyinkii horumarinta la gaarsiyo qeyybaahaa. Hey'adaha Caalamigu waxa ay Soomaaliga kala kulmaan dhbaatooyinka ah: dhaca, adhuubka, dhiika iyo xurguuta faaftey ee xookaaha ka dhaxseysa oo xookaaha hubeysan ay ugu tartamaynaan ciddii maamulii laheyd gar-gaarka caalamiga, taas oo keeney in gar-gaarku


Baahida Horumarinta Aadamuhu waa in wax laga qabto iyadoo waliba lagu eegayo xaalladda khilaafadka siyaasadeed ee dhextaal ma’suulyiinta wakhtig sanadka dowlad la’aanta ah. Iyadoo dagaalada teel-teelka ah ee dhex maray jilibyada iyo kooxaha Soomaalida ay soo jidfanayan warbaahinta, ayaa waxaa hoo ca socda dagaalo asaasi ah oo loogu jiro awood-qabsho oo dhex maray buulshada. Madaxda koox, nimanka malishiyada ah, duqowda, golyaasha degmoomiyinka, xirfadlaayasha, culamada diinta, ganacsada iyo madax beeleeed kale, dharm,mum waxa ay sheeganayaan in ay awood ku leeyihiin arimaha heesha. Dadaalkii waddanka gudahiisa lacagta looga ururin lahaa ama dhaqaale looga keeni lahaa hay’ada gar-gaarka ee caalamiiga si gacan looga geesto qeybaha Horumarinta Aadamaha ee Soomaaliga, ayaa waxay si aan is bedel lahayn u abuuray khilaafka ugu dhaihsho cidda xaqo u leh in ay agaginta baahida jirta, shaqooyinka qooneeyo lacagtanu ammuuso. Beelaha qaarkood heshiiis ayaa laqeej ugu barii qeybinta shaqalaaha iyo sida ay u kala sameeyaa, meelaha kale weli awooddaas loolan ayaa ka taagan.

Iyadoo ay sahlan tahay in dhibaatoyinka Soomaaliga ka jira dhexa Horumarinta Aadamaha dusha laga saaro dowladnimada bur-burtay iyo dagaalada kooxuhi isku hayaan, gunaanadka noocaa ah ma

Dhan kale haddii laga eego, dowladnamidii Soomaaliya waxay u "durnay" wakhtii ka horeeyey 1990kii, waana marka aan ka eego awooddii ay dowldadda lahayd in ay gacan ka geyso Horumarinta Aadamaha. Dhibaatooyinka Soomaalida ka hortagaan Horumarinta Aadinimo waxay ku saleysan tahay mushkilado qoto dheer oo ay ka mid yihiin fakhiriga iyo horumar la'aanta. In la xalixo mushkiladaaha siyaasaddeed ee socda waa lagama-maar aan, laakiin ma dhinalnayo xaalad keenta horumarin joogta ah oo lagu gaaro Horumarinta Aadamaha.

Heerka saboonimo ee qotada dheer iyo wax la'aanta Soomaaliya ka jirta ayaa qoysaska iyo bulshada Soomaalida ku qasabteey in ay sameeytaa xeelada lagu helo nolol maalmeedka, kuwaas oo u saamayninh in ay isku hawlaan maalgelinta muddada dheer, uma arkaan in ay tahay raax ahaan la gaar Karin. Mar mar waxay ay doori bidan in ilmaha lagu shaqeeyo oo xoolo raacista iyo beereha loo adeegsado halkii iskuul iyo aqwoon hororsi laga jeey lahaa; dawada xoolaha ayay ahmiyad siyaan halkii haweenka uruka leh looga sameyn lahaa daryeelka dhalmadka ka horeeya; waxaad arxeyysaa macaliiminta mushaariyinka aan la siin oo dib-u ibinaya qalabki dugsiyado ay deega ku heleen, lacagta soo gasha oo loo qeybinyo qaraabada qoyska si markii loo isciimaha, halkii keydinti iyo maalgelin wax soo saar leh looga qoondeyn lahaa. Sidaas darteed, Horumarinta Aadinimo ee Soomaaliya xiligaan waxa hortagaan iyadoo qoyska iyo beeshu ay doornaynaa hilmuoyinka waqtiyada dhow iyo in lagu nasibiso fursadaha mudad dheer, sidaas awgeed Horumarinta Aadamuhu waa loo baalati yahay in ay dablooto badlida deg degta ah ee nolosho leedahay.

Dhammaan doorashada Horumarinta Aadinimo ee ay sameeynaa qoysaska iyo beelaah Soomaalidu ma muujiyaa tabaah lagu sugo heereka u hooceysa nolosha; qaaroodda ma muujiyaa aqool xumoda dakhliga qoyska ama adeegga bulshada. Meelaha qaarood ee waddanka ka tirsan kharashka qa’tka (jaadka) ee maalin kasta ay isticmaalaan ragga madaxda qoyska ah ayaa dakhligii waraa je qoyska ka weeciyaa waxyaabhi muhiimka ah sida waxbarashada, caafimaadka, iyo nafaqadii reerku u baashaan. Soomaaliya guud ahaan waxa jirta in lagaca laga urursho cashuuraha iyo khidmada waddooyinka in ay malishiyadu jeebka ku shubato halkii looga qoondeyn lahaa horumarinta bulshada. Eedeymaha ay ka midka yihiin dadka xogga iyo qasabka loogu shaqeysto, miraaxa beerahooda oo ivagoon raali ahayn lala wadaago iyo dadka barakacay oo loo didey in ay guryahoodii ku laabtaan meelo ka mid ah Soomaaliya waxay na turisayso in bulshada Soomaalida qaar ka mid ah si ahaa waa leh ay kuwa kale uga horjoogsanayaan xusuudka asasiga ee dadku waxay doonaan ay ku xushaan oo saalih u ah Horumarinta Aadamaha. Waxa wajib ah in la fahmo in ay jirayn heedar ballan-qaadyo oo kala duwam oo loogalay hilmuoyinka asasiga ee Horumarinta Aadamaha sida ku xusan hab-xisabbeedka lagu tusmeeyo Horumarinta Aadamaha ee ay soo saarto Hay’adda Qaramada Midoobey u qaabilsan Banaamisijyada Horumarinta.

Horumarinta Aadamaha ee Soomaaliya lama fahmi karo iyadoo aan tixraac lagu sameeyn xiriirka qabyaaladda. Aqoonsiga abtirisintu waa xogga dhexe ee isku-duwa bulshada Soomaalida, waxaana lagu doodi karaa in wakhtiga cusub ee dowlad la'aanta Soomaaliya ka jirta ay qabyaaladda ku muujiyaa tobankii sanno ee hore. Intii doowladamadu duntay, abtirisii isticmaalkii waxa caddaatay in ay keentey kala qeyb sanaan ba'an iyo in ay tahay aad wax lagu baab'iyo oo hogaamiya koox weerayda adeegsadaan, dhinaca wanaagga, waxay noqoteey shay muhiim ah oo dadkoo koox-koox iskuugu tagaan oo
danahooda ku ilaashadaan, isku badbaadshah oo ka helaan sugnaanta beesha kuna isticmaalaan xeer dhagameedka oo buuxushay halkii dowladdu ka maqneyd. Qorshaynta iyo qiimeyniin dadaala Horumarinta Aadamaha ma ahin in ay caambarayso ama muunadeysyo qabyaaladda, caawaqibka ay ku leedahay bulshada Soomaalida waa waxaad isku bed-bedela isla markaasna faahmiisdeed ay adagtahay. Inkastoo Soomaalida wakhtigaan u quniqisiga jilib-jilibku (Qabiilku) uu swood xoog badan ku yahay bulshada, waxay garab scootsa is-bahaysii kale sida xirfad yaqaanno, goboleys, dabaqad, koox-koox iyo diiiniyo, (markii lagu daro ururka Al-rixaad ee Islaamiga ah) garoonka Siyaaasideed ee Soomaaliya ee sida weyn isku bed-bedelaya. Qonqora qabiilka lafuuska ayaa is-bedelaya, xiriirka abtirsinta dib ayaa loo badeli kara, waa la cusbooneyn kuwa kara ama heer kale oo abtirsiiimood ayaa lagu dabaqji karaa iyadoo duruutfu xaaliga lala beegsanayo, dadka cusub ee gobol yimaad, qabiilkaa kale intey iska ilaabaan ayey qaadanayaan qabiilka dadka ay u yimaadeen oo qabiilka xoogga leh ee qofka la dhaqamo ayuu sheeganayaa kuna ab-tirsanayaa.

Horumarinta Aadamaha iyo dib u dhiska dhaqalaha waxaa kale ee oo wixiyo Soomaalida tirada badan ee caaraan ka soo bar-kacay guryahoodii, caara ay xerxay qaxoootuu ku jiraan, caara kalena dibadaha ay deegen. Qeybka mi dib ah Koonfurta Soomaaliya, dib u soo nooleeyntii waaxda beeraaha waxaa hor-taagaan dadkuu beeraaha lahaa oo ilaa 40% ay ka maqan yihiin beerhooodii.

Horumarinta Aadamaha ee Soomaaliya waxa waajib ah in iyadaan la fahmo doorka soo koreeya ee dumarka ka qaadanayaa wax soo saarakiin gaansida, iyo buuxinta baabha qoyska. Guryo badan oo Soomaaliyeed ayaa dorumarku ay madax ka yihiin, xaaladaha noocoos ah, ragga ama wey is fureen dumarka (Mar-marriin kaqood raggi ayaa dumarkii ku guurey) xasaskoodina way shaqeeyaan ama shaqo la'aan ayey iska fadhiyyaan. Sidaas darteed dumarka ayaa garabka ku qaataay mas'uuliyaddii reer dhaqista ku xiriirtay (biiyo iyo xabaan keenis, cunto diyaarin iwm) isla markaas waa in ay lacag ka shaqeeyaan gaansci yar ama beero tacbide. Intii dowladnimadu dunyey, doorka dumarku ay gaansiga kaga jiraan ayaa si muuqata u kordhays.

Halganku ay Soomaalidu ugu jirto Horumarinta Aadamaha waxa kale oo ay u kulumsaya waxkhti ay baayo addsu badbaadda. Dowlad ka sameeyahay raadkii karaa qofka dalka ugu jirto hanka dalka qofka dalka dhaqaale xumoo aweegyey ayaa jeedhii u gubeexay iyo guuf si ahaan u dhaqanaysid. Madaxda kooxaha Soomaaliyo oo raadinaaya lacag adag si ay ugu raali geliyaan taageerayaashooda, ayee loo goobadaan kambaniyaha caalamiga in ay xeesahooda ku soo daadkhaan qashin sun ah. Waddakan daciikha ah ee saxraa in uu noqdo qarka u saaran, markastoo beyadda la dulleeyo, waxa uu khatar ugu jiraa in uu naboaddu gurud oo nooddivi ah u dhiyelo, lahaa wax soo saarka ay is dhinto.

Ugu dambeyn, halganka loogu jiro in lagu sugo wajiyaada Horumarinta Aadamimino ee Soomaalida waxay ay u dhaqaday si fiir-addeego ku jira oo ool aheyn mid taagan. Taasi waxa ay tahay, iyo wuxuu leedahay iyo qoyska Soomaalidaa aan loo qofka ku jiraan lahaa oo dhaccanaan qoyska in yimaadeen waddakhaanay uyo noolaha kula qabtaan. Tusaale haddii aas oo qaaddone, meelo ka mid ah waddanka waxaa damaray iyo caruurtay la dhiisyey xerxay qaxoosta, halkaasi oo ay ka helayaan waxbarasho, caafaadka iyo nabadgelyaddii ay u baahnaa, iyo wuxuu raggaano ayaa dib ugu laabteen in ay dib u ururshaan xoolahaas oo noolaa in ay dhaqandaan dhiib badbaaddii. Magaalado iyo ugu muumukalaa fiican, dugsiyaddii hoo loo isbitaaladdiiba wuxuu lagu soo nooleeyay barnaamijii loo ugu nooleeyey danbeeyo oo ay soo dirayn dadka meesha deggan xigtadooba bannaanka waddanka.
ugu maqan. Waxay sameeyeen oo kale, mashruuc lacag deymin ah, nidaam dhacaameed shaqo wadaag ah, meelo dadka cunto karsan laga siyo, masaajiyadii xaaftada iyo hawyado kale oo bulshada ka tirsan ayaan isku dayaa in ay xoogaha kaalma ah siyaan caafimaadka iyo waxbaarshadhooose ee bulshada. Qoysad badan oo awood dhaqaale leh, doonayeyna in ay buuxiyyayn baahida asasaiga ayaan dibadda u dhoofoyo. Qiyaaq aana la hubin ayaan qoraya in inta u dhaxeyso 15% ha 20% siiraad ah Soomaaliya dagaalada ka hor ay hadda qurbaana ku nool yihiin, kuwaas oo kala jooga Waaqooyiga Amerika, Yurub, Afrikada Bari, Aasiya iyo Bariga Dhexe.

**Dulcda Waxbaarshada**

Durnustii nidaamku waxbarasho ee Soomaaliya waxa uu abuuray xaaxad u baahan in deg deg loogu soo gurmado, taas oo dib u dhig doonita tobonaan sano horumarkii waddanku gaarii lahaa, sidaas ayaan waxbarashada loogu soo xushay in ay ka mid noqoto, laba qeyb oo dulcudooda lagu eegay warkixintan. Soomaaliya hadda waxa ay la kulmeeyaan in ay laba jil ay lumis iyagoo waxbarasho iyo tababar yar leh, kaasoo laga sugayo in ay doo fiican ka ciyaaro wax soo saarka iyo hogaan qabashada musuqaqalka. Nidaamku waxbarasho ee Soomaaliya waxa uu si dhab ah hawlgab u noqday dabayaaqad si 1980 kii, jiil labaad oo dad da’ yar ah ayaan luunshay fursadhii waxbarasho tobankii sano ee dowladnimadu duntay inta aan ku jirnay sanooqinkii 1990 dii. Qiyaaqta ugu deeqisna waxa ay ku talaa bixisay in boqolkiiba 14%-17%, oo wada ah caruurta dugsiyyada u baahan (Da’oodu u dhaxeyso 6-14) ay dugsiyyada ku jiray, intooba badani ay fasalada bilowga dhigtaan. Tani waa dugsi cartuur qorista midda ugu hoseeyo adduunka. Lumista nooco aan ee la luunshay “Raasaamalkii Aadamaha” qimna weyn ayey ugu fadhiidha qoysaya iyo bulshada iyo deeynaas iyo dib u dhisto dhaqaaliihi iyo dowladdii bur-burtay. Waxa kale ooy culeys dheerad ah saareeyaa bulshada si ay hubka uga dhigaan dhalin-yarad malisliiyada oo aqoon la’aantooyu ay ku adkeyneso in ay la qabsadaan dhaqalalaha xilliga nabadda imaana kara, waxayna ay taasi carqalad ku tahay dhismaha la hirgeli karoo iyo kuwa ka qeybgalaya nidaamka siyaasadda ee Soomaaliya. Waxa nasib darro ah in boqolkaan kun oo dhaliin yaro Soomaaliyeed ah loo diiday xuquuqda salsalhigga u ahayd in ay helaa waxbarasho iyo fursadiihi shakhsiyadeed iyo korintii ay ka heli lahaayeen waxbarashada.

Taageero dibadda ah ahaa la siyay Soomaalida iyadoo la isku dayayo in la soo nooleeyo lana taageero dugsiyyada hoose ee ka jiray waddanka, natijdii laga garayeyna ay noqtoey mid aan la isku-raacsaneyn. Ururka isku-duwista kaalmada Soomaaliya guddigooda waxbarasho ahaan isku-duwey gar-gaar loo fidiyey dugsiyyada, kaalmadaha waxaa ka mid ah dib u cusbooneyisii dugsiyyada, buugta waxa laga bartoon, sameynka manhajka, tababbarista macalimiinta iyo lacag la siinayey macalimiinta si loogu dhiiri geliyo shaqoodoada. Markii la gaaray 1994 tii waxaa la soo warriyay in 165,000 oo caruur ah ay wax ka dhigaynayey 465 dugsiyo-hoose oo dalka ku baahsan. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, runta markii loo hadlo dugsiyyadisa intoooda badan ma shaqeyneyn sababtoo ah macalimiinta aqoon leh naadina ku aha mushaabo aad u hooseeyaa oon jirin iyo waalidiinta oon caruurtooda dugsiyyada ku heyneyn, doonayana in ay caruurto u shaqeyso qoyska. Mararka qarkood dugsiyyada waxa la “furraa” oo kalya markii ay ergooeyn gargaarka caalamiga ah ay soo boqoadaan beelaha iyagoo kaalmo sida. Tayaada waxbarashaduna aad bay isku bedbedelayn, markii la isku dheeli-tirana aad bay u hooseyeyn.

Qoyska Soomaalida ee lacagta fiican haysta, dugsiyyada gaarka ah iyo macalimiini caruurtooda guryaha wax ugu dhigta ayaan u badishay nidaamku dugsiyyada doowladda ee dunay. Dugsiyyada gaarka ah intooda badan waxa ay ku urursan yihiin magaalooynkii waaweyn, gaar ahaan Muqdisho iyo I Larguus. Qaar yar oo ka mid ah dugsiyyadaas ayaan soo saara curuur aad u diyaarsan. Farjigaan ku yimid waxbarashada caruurta ee ku saleysan dakhliga waxa
uu ballaarinh doonaan saanooyinka soo socda farqiga u dhaxeeya qoysaska hantida leh iyo kuwa aan wax hayesan.

Helitaanka tashhiilaad waxbarasho oo tayo leh ayaa ugu horreeya sababaha qoysaska Soomaalida ku riiyey in ay dhib u deegen Kenya iyo waddamado kale. Carurunta qalbaha ku koreysa waxa ay jilloodada u noqon doonaan saanooyinka soo socda dabaqaddii waxbartay ee xirfadaha xabiyay. Awoodda Soomaalida u lahaan doonto in ay dhib u dhisto dhaqaalahaaleedaa iyo shaqaalaha dowladda waxa ay ku xirnaan doontaa in caruruntaa ay waddanka dib ugu soo laabtaaa iyo in ay qurbahooda sii joogaa.

Waxa uu kowthaya in dugsigayada horreey ay qoysaska ilmahay dhalay ay weydisanayeen lacag yar oo ay ku baxshaan mushaarootayinkaa macalimiinta, mar haddii ay meesha ka maqantahay dakhliyo caafimaad, habka kheidmad bixinta si loo meelmariyo waxbarashada wa xeelad la fahmi karo. Si kastaba ha noqotee arintani waxa ay mugdi galsey leynkiin u dhaxeeyay dugsigaya dowladda iyo kuwa gaarkaa ah ee ka jira Soomaaliga, malaha, waxa waxa waliya suurtowda in si aana kac ahayn ay tira weyn oo caruurah ay waxbarashadii ka horjoogado.

Tirada yar ee caruurthaa waxbarashada hela, waxaa ku jira farqii halis ah oo xagga jinsiiga ah (Wiilasha oo gabdhaha ka badan) iyadoo gabdhaha dugsigada leh xirfadaha la xirfadooyay ay nus ka tahay tirada wiilasha dugsigayada la xirfado. Marka hore tira ikuu mid ah oo xillal iyo gabdhuhu ah ayaa la wada dhiisayi sheeg, laakiin tirada gabdhaha lagu hayo dugsigadaha ayaa aad u hoo saadaan, miiriinka woa waga yaabin ugu ka soo jeedoo xeelad xisaabtoo oo qoysaska qaar ay ku go'aansadeen in wiilka la maal galsho iyadoo laga fikiray in gabadhuhu amar hore reerka ka guurayso markii la gursado ooy la tagayso qoyska ninkeed. Kala badnaasheeda ku jira jinsiiga waxaa uu cabsi weyn gelinayaa jiil dhan oo dumar ah (Toobanka sannoo ee soo socda), taasina ay qalibto guulihii wanaagsanaa ee dumarka Soomaalida ee waxbartay ay ka gaareen dheenaca ganacsiga iyo nolosha ku xirriinta mutacalinimmadii xirfadesan ee soddonkii sanno ee la soo dhaafay ay soo hoojeeyen.

Qoysaska Soomaalidu waxa ay u badnaayeen in caruurtooda ay dugsi qur'aan u diraad ama ay dugsiga hoose waxbarasho ay geyn lahayeen. Dugsigayada qur'aanka oo leeyahay in toodii badan waa haysid hal macalin leh, kaasoo carurtaa barqur'aan. Waxa lagu soo warameey in wayyadan dambe ee dowlad la'aanta jirto meel yar oo waddanka ku tirsan laga sameeyey dugsigay qur'aan u sameeyn siddii madrasad oo kale. Waxa jirda in dugsidaa tirada yer qur'aan ka sokollu dagaal dheeg xoogaha xisab ah, far Soomaali aan siiduus ku buuneyn iyooni weliiba Af Carabiga oo gooni loo oggali dhego. Dugsigayada qur'aanka waxaa fa'aaladaa tahay in kharashkoodu hooxayso. Waxase looga fiican yahay in aanaa lahayn manhaj ballaar aan siidka iskuuudada kale, iyo in aanaa macalimiinta lahayn aqoonsi waxbarasho iyo tababar ku filan. Inkastoo waxbarashadaani ay dhaantaan wax la'aan; haddana ma ahin mid ku filan in ay ilmahay u gudhibu xirfadaha muhiimka ah ee caruurthaa mustaqbalka u baahan doono. Tira kooban oo dugsiyo sare ah ayaa jira, intooda badan waa dugsiyo gaar ah oo laqagdhusu dhiigto, waxaana ay ku yaalaan maagaloooyinka dhexdooda. Taasi waxa ay keentay in tira aad u yar ay ka soo qalaa jeeshaa dugsigadaha sare taasoo ka hooxayso inta waddanku u baahan yahay. Sidoo kale jaamacad la'aanta waddanka ka jirto waxa ay tahay macnaheeddu in aqooniitay iyo tababaraddii sare intaabo loo doonto wadamadda dibadda. Markii la eego fursadaaha shaqo ee fiican oo xirfadlayaasha Soomaalidu ay ka heli karaan dibadda, wax yar oo ka mid ah kuwa jaamacadaha ka qalin jabsay ayaa waddanka ku soo laabanaya, taasina waxay si dedejnaysaa amtuurtii loo yaqin "Maskayii la dhurraneey" (brain drain), taasoo xataa intii ka horeysay 1999kii Soomaaliga ku ahayd mushkilad halis ah.
DULUCDA IS-XUKUNKA
(THE THEME OF GOVERNANCE)


Inkastoo dowlad la'aani ka jiru Soomaaliya, haddana ma aha meel nidaam dowli laga diidan yahay (anarchic). Nidaam Is-xukun oo baalaaran oo isku taxan oo gaar yihiin kuwa rasmi ah kuwana ayaan rasmi ahayn ayaa ka jira heerka hooise, waxayna baxshaa ugu yaraan gaar ka mid ah adeeg bulshedee laga filayayee dowlad.

Dugowda qaliibku wili waxa ay wadaan in ay wax ku dhigaan sharciga dhaqameedka iyo xerkiib beeshaa si ay ugu maamulka xilaaftadka jilibyada dhex-mara, iyagoo Soomaaliya siinaya sharciga iyo kala dambeys. Maxkamadiihi Shareecada Islaamkuna meelo waddanka ka mid ah ayey holsheedi ka socota oo way shaqeyaan. Waxayna siisaa bulshada go'aamo gaarisaan xeer xukun maxkamaadood oo ku fidsan muqamacida hoose. Guddiyay ayaa caawiyaa maamulisa hantida daweynaha sida dekadaa, garoormada dayuuradaha, koowo jiranka ilaasha oo meelaha gaar siya adeeg bulsho oo tilo ah, degmoyooyinka qaarna waxa ay soo nooleeyeen golihii degmada kuwaas oo baxsha heerar kala duwan oo maamul hooseed ah. Guud ugu hanaan, markii la isku geysteen amarkhaan kala duwan, awodda isku soo laba laabantyo waxay keentay xilaaftaada qoto dheer oo la xiriirada ciddiisayaadda hoose ee gayiga hogaamin lahayd, hab- maamulced kaasina gaarsisna nidaam dowladeed, (conventional state), laakiin waa ka f og yahay meel ay ka jirto xukundiidnimo (anarchy).

Xoogag badan oo is-jiidanaaya, kuwa siyaasadeed, kuwo dhaqaale iyo kuwa bulsho ayaa wili u hor-taagan dadalada loogu jirow in dib loo dhiiso dowladdo dheexo. Mustaqbalka dhow ku sameeyo in Soomaaliya dib loogu soo celsho dowladnimo. Haba-ahaatee siyaasadda waddanka in teedaa badan waxaa xadid doono “Dowladdo hoose oo xag jira” (radical localisation), iyadoo siyaasadda awoodeeda iyo howlqabadkeeda macnaha lihi uu ka dhici hoone heerka twulo iyo degmo ama (Xarumaha magaaloooyinka waaweyn) heerka jiranka.


Hanaanka ugu wanaagsan ee ka soo bixi kara waxa uu yahay iyaddo goboladaasi ay saldhih u noqdaan dowlad federaali ah oo leh qaab-dhismeed ku saleysan kala-mudamaata iyo hab lagu gaaro dib u dhiis iyo horumar. Haba-ahaatee, haddii xataa la abuuro dowlad goboleedka noocaaah waxa ay dhaqalay dhaqaale dacif ah, waxaana suurtowda in ay yeeshaan maamul yar, iyo awodo fullheed tabar yar. Meelo kala duwan oo Soomaaliya ka tirsan ayaa Is-xukun kala hore ka la socda. Gobolada gaar, gaar ahaan deegaanka soo kabsanaya ee waqooyiga waddanka, shicibku waxa ay ku raaksanaysan dowlad u dhegna nugul, shicibkana kala qeyb qaadaneysa howlaha. Waana wax aan soo marin tobanki sano ee la soo dhiisayey. Dowlladda ickeex isku magaarowday ee “Somaliland”, haddii aat tusaale u soo qaado, maamulkeedu waxa uu dhiisey qaab dowladeed iska roon oo leh: ciidan booliis oo shaqeynaya, deegaan nabad ah oo sharci leh, dugsiyadii iyo xarumahaa daryeelka caafimaadka ee asaasiga aaah iyo ganacsigii dhaqaalaha oo la soo nooleeyay. Inkastoo ay ku furrin yihiin mushtikalado iyo muranno ka taagan awoodda,

La yaab malaha in degaanadaad ay yihiin meelaha dhibaatooyinka aadaminimo ay haatan ka jiraan. Meelo kale oo waddanka ka mid ah sida gabolada dhexeeyo iyo meelo ka mid ah koonfurta Soomaaliya, waxa ay iskuugu jiray qaar weli qul-quqatooyin jirin iyo kuwa ka soo kabsanayaa. Waxaana Qaramada Midoobay ay ku tilmaamteey in ay yihiin “goobii ku jiray xilligii kala guurka”. Goboladaasi khilaafad hubaysan kama jiray, laakiin waxa ay leeyihiin qabadhisme siyaasii oo heerkiisu hoooseeyo mana laga dhikhii cashhuureed oo lagu maamulka adeegga bulshada. Inkasta ooons jirin dowlad dhexe, haddana qeyba ka mid ah dalka Soomaaliya waxa ay ku nool-yiihiin xaaladaha fiican oo “Sharci iyo kala dadbeeyi” leh oo ka wanaagsan waddamada horumaraya gaarkood. Xataa meelaha dhibaatooyinku ka jiray ee koonfurta Soomaaliya, darooyinka xeer dheegsan ee lagu maamul maga lagu dhex-dhexaad iyo khilaafadka iyo iska hor-imadaad si la yaab leh ayey wax uga qabtaan hoos u dhigiidadda iyo la dagaalanka dambiyada. Isticmaalka diyo kala gaadhashada, waxa ay ku qasabta in kooxda qofkoodu dambi galo ay ka bixiyaan diyo. Xeerka oo isku keenay jilibaada ood-wadaaga ah in ay u hogaansamaan go’aamada lagu gaaro xalinta khilaafadka iyaga dhaxmara. Waxa ayjadaa aad u soo korbeeyo bulshada magaalayinka deggan oo si weyn ugu tiirsan Maxamadaha Islaamiga ah si ay nabad sugidda u ilaashaan, isla markaasna ay shareecada islaamka ku xukumaan kuwa gafaafka geysta. Guud ahaan, nidaamkii hab-sharciiyeeedka oo dhiigama waxa uu ka hortagaya dambiyada ka dhaca dalka Soomaaliya. Qaab maamuleedkaa aad soo xuleyn waa mad qarsar yar markii loo eego kharshka ku bixi kara ciidand loogu soo garsoor buuxa. Si kastaba ha noqoteey, mar haddii habka bulshado ay u ilaaliyo deegaankaada uu qaal badan uu leeyahay xuquuqaa dadkaaha, wax qabad-koodo waxa uu u xususinaysaa farciga u dhaxeeyo dhowriska “sharciga iyo kala dambeynta” iyo (firiim markii loo ahaan), kuwa ah farqii aan loo baahnaan in hogaamiyayasha Soomaalidaa iyo beesho caalamku midoodna halmaamo.

Xoogag muhiim ah oo ka soo horjeeda in aan la dhiisn awood siyaasaadeed oo horumarxan u oo ka jira qeybo ka mid ah waddanka ayaa loogu magac daray “Dadka khilaafadda u taagaa” (Conflict Constituencies) kuwaasi oo leh kooxsi iyo qof-qofba oo sababoo kala duwan dartood soo joogta ah uga fahmidhay khilaatka ka socda beelaha iyo sharci la’aanta. Dadkaas danta gaarka ah ku leh dowlad la’aanta oo khasaaraya xiligga dowlad la dhiiso. Dadkaas raba in ay dowladnimo la’aantu si jirto waxa ka mid ah: Hogaamiya-yasha Koocshaha oo awooddoodu ay salka ku hayso jiriaanka cabsida joogtaada ah, nabad iyo xasileeyo la’aanta, wilaasha malishiyada ah ee waxbaranin, kuwaas oo dheqaalaha imaanaa xiligga nabadda uu yaraanayo farraddii ay noolisha u arkenin in ay ka helaysan, rooga ganacsataada gaarkood oo ka faa’ideyaysaa cuntada gar-gaarka loo keeno oo la leexsado kana ganacsada hubka, kuwa ku jira darooyinku ka macaashkooda iyo howl kale oo sharci darro ah; waxaale kale oo ka mid ah dadka aan dowladnimada rabin, qabili dhan oo wakhtigan xaadirka ah dhul iyo magaaloyin aanay lahayn xoog ku qabsaday oo haddii nabad iyo dowladnimo laga hadlo ay ku qabbaannaayaan in ay hantida iyo dhuulka ay haysaan ay ka baxaan, taasin aay khasaabtoo u tahay iyaga.
In mar kale dowlad dib looga dhiso Soomaaliya waxa car-galadeena loolanka siyaasadeed ee ka dhaxeeya wadamada gobolka, mid kasta oo dowladahaas ka mid ah waxay kafsil ka tahay koox gaar ah iyo daruugooyin u gooniya oo la iskugu dayayo in lagu sameeyo dib-u-heshiisiiin qaran.

Maqaashaasha dowlad dhexe waxa ay Soomaalida ka marin hababisey geeddi socodkii umaddu ugu kuur gari lahayd xulashada danaha midnaanaha u leh waddankooda. Waxaa jira dadaalo kala duwan oo beesh caalamku ku dhaqaalday sidii Soomaalida dowladnimo madax bannaan loogu heli lahaa oo ay ka mid yiihin horumarin lagu sameeyo awodaha heerka gobol, laakiin guul xadidan ayaa arrintaas laga gaaray Waxaana ay taasi dhalisay, in ka qeyb-galkii Soomaalida uu dhibaatoyin keeno mararka qaarna ay ka maqsan yiihin goobhiin danahayda iyo horumarinteeda looga xajoonyayey. Deeq fidiyaaasha waaweyn ayaa la wareeg aywooday iyo mudnaantii loogu hadlayey qorshii lagu horumarin lahaa waddanka iyagoo ka wakiil ah Umadda Soomaalida.

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**Talo Bixin**

- **Waxaa haboon in la helo sidii loo soo wadi lehays looma soo balleer lehays looma xoojin lahaa lahaa Soomaalida loo adagay honomarinta nidaamka wax loo fulxeyd ee heer wadhi leh, inkasta oo ay dowlad dhexe eysan jirin.**

- **Ahaan hilda loo xukun rumaysan ugu waa in ka noogt daallada 12db-dhacdaade ah, ryo hilmadu dhaqaalka kazi oo niga horeeddu u weydiiso noqon karaa.**

- **Taan hajega caalamiga aad-geedka aadaminimo ee Soomaalida loo fudrane. Waa in lo helo bollen quaad mab u noqon qabto Soomaalida ku qalxyo in ayaa shaqeyn doonto honomarinta Aadaminimo. Kasta oo ay ka suurta gali karto.**

- **Ku caamada la simento waa yahay ahaayeen, oo mahaabalka Soomaalida u haddiiada madax-galín ka mid ah oo geeyeyn ka gaameeyo oo waa dhaqanka Soomaalida ku soo noqonayn dhibka ugu dhiirka ugu jiray ahayn u wanaa wax ka duwan ah oo mid ahaan aad ugu dhiirka ugu jiray ahayn waa in mid ahaan ugu dhiirka ugu jiray ahayn.**

- **Wixii loo baahan yahay ugaan dheer ah. Soomaalida ku jirto "Degganuunsix kala gurka " oo dhiirka ugu dhaqanka ugu dhisaynka ugu aadaminimo ku jirto."**

- **Waxaalmahay gaarka ugu (Private Sector) wuxuu ay isku muujiyey xoogay fi fiirraan oo maaroor oo xubaha u noqon karaa dhibka u nooleyniin dhaqadaha, waxaadnooyinka oo habajeeyaha dhiirka ugu waxaadihiin isku muuqdaan lahaa. Waxaan ugu shaqeeyay in la siyo mid ahaan dareem.**

- **Dhamarka ugu geedka ugu isku muujiyey waxaad ka qeybaha oo sidii dhiirka ugu dhaqanka ugu shaqeeyay in la siyo mid ahaan dareem.**

- **Nabaa ugu geedka ugu isku muujiyey waxaad ka mid ah Soomaalida ku haysa xubanka ugu tiimada honomarinta Aadaminimo mahaabalka dambate. Dadaab caalam ah oo ka mid ah mid ahaan dhiirgaal daag oo siyaasaysidab Soomaalida ugu shaqeeyay in la siyo mid ahaan dareem, waxaad ka mid ah noqon kara.**

- **Waa in la sameeyo dadaal lagu yeeramo isiqadda jadhaa, kaasoo dhababiga qaybka misaax badan dheeraadwey.**
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CURRENT STATE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA

Somalia ranks among the very lowest countries in the world on UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). Difficulties in securing accurate nation-wide data make precise calculations impossible, but Somalia’s estimated HDI ranges between 0.184 to 0.159. Even the high end of this estimate places Somalia at the very bottom of HDI rankings worldwide, just below Sierra Leone. Average life expectancy is estimated at 41-43 years; the mortality rate for children under five exceeds 25%; adult literacy rates range between 14-17%; primary school enrolment is 13-16%; and GNP/capita is between US$176-200 at the average exchange rate during 1996-1997 giving a real GNP/capita (Purchasing Power Parity) of US$600-700.

In almost any other country, any one of these indicators would be considered a national emergency. Yet, Somalia’s prolonged humanitarian crisis has raised the threshold for what is considered an emergency there - only outright famine conditions and deadly epidemics generate a humanitarian response. Nonetheless, the chronically low levels of human development in Somalia constitute a long-term emergency for the Somali society and, indirectly, for the international community.

Human development issues in Somalia have been overwhelmed by pressing humanitarian needs in the country since 1991, when the Somali State collapsed amidst civil war and factional fighting. Throughout the 1990s, Southern Somalia has periodically constituted a "complex emergency", with outbreaks of famine, epidemics, large-scale refugee flows, and armed conflict. A combination of devastating floods, drought, chronic insecurity and serious pest infestation threatens to return portions of Southern Somalia to famine conditions in late 1998 and 1999. Such recurrent "loud" emergencies in parts of Somalia make it difficult, and at times inappropriate, for local communities and international aid agencies to focus on longer-term human development goals.

Somalia’s main productive sectors (primarily livestock and agriculture), already weak before the civil war, have been damaged in the course of the country’s ten years of armed conflict and state collapse; Somalia’s national income is about 60% of pre-war levels. The decline of economic production in Somalia reduces both household income and local governmental tax revenues. Much of the capital city, Mogadishu, has been reduced to ruins. Nearly all the factories that sustained a fledgling industrial base have been dismantled and sold for scrap metal. Basic infrastructure - ports, airports, roads, bridges, piped water, irrigation and electricity - are either destroyed or in a state of serious deterioration, hampering commerce and production. Agricultural yields and output have declined sharply from pre-war levels, due to deteriorating canal and flood control systems, lack of agricultural inputs, poorly-timed food aid, and poor security. The livestock sector, historically the most productive part of the Somali economy, has survived reasonably well, due in part to its relative autonomy from government services and infrastructure. Still, the absence of government-sponsored certification for livestock and range management has negatively affected this sector as well. The 1998 Saudi ban on Somali livestock due to perceived disease risks (a Rift Valley fever outbreak in the Horn of Africa) damaged commercial activities linked to livestock exports.

In Somalia, the relationship between the ongoing political crisis and the very low levels of human development constitutes a vicious circle. State collapse and endemic conflict have shattered communal safety nets and social services, reversing past gains in human development. At the same time, lack of jobs and social services has fuelled conflict that has consequently prevented the emergence of a government. Young men with no access to education gravitate towards militias as the only viable source of “employment”. In addition, trained professionals are lost
to an international "brain-drain," (few Somalis with options abroad are willing to raise a family without access to health care and clean water); and the productivity of the labour force is dramatically reduced by high rates of chronic illnesses and morbidity.

The impact of the low level of human development is felt unevenly across the country. Populations in the "recovery zones" of the Northeast and Northwest, enjoy higher and more suitable levels of health, education, and perhaps, income than their compatriots in Central and Southern Somalia. Pronounced variations occur within communities as well. Within each region, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (e.g. urban poor, female-headed households, Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs), rural, nomadic and subsistence agricultural communities, and ethnic minorities) suffer disproportionately. On the other hand, a smaller group of urban merchants and traders, wealthy livestock and plantation owners, employees and contractors of international agencies, secure adequate health and education services for their families privately. Households receiving remittances from family members working abroad also fare better in securing basic needs.

**CONTEXT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA**

Somali communities seek to advance human development and meet basic needs in an unusually challenging environment - namely, a context of complete statelessness. No other society in the contemporary world has had to deal with such a prolonged period of State collapse, a condition that has gripped the country since 1991. Somali communities exist in unprecedented conditions as they develop coping mechanisms for meeting basic development needs. Some aspects of human development, such as income generation from interstate commerce, have proven resilient in the face of State collapse and have even benefited from low and easily evaded taxes in Somalia. Likewise, access to telecommunications - which is vital for commerce and money transfers - has dramatically improved since 1990. However, most basic components of development, such as public health care, clean water supplies, public sanitation, and primary education, and have been badly compromised by the absence of a Central State. Quintessential public goods ("law and order") such as government agencies producing records and travel documents, overseas assistance, as well as the judicial system have either disappeared or have been appropriated by private groups serving their own, rather than national interests.

Consequently, very few basic development services are provided to the Somali people. Provision of public social services and human development activities have thus become almost exclusively the domain of international aid agencies. Though essential in the short-term, this level of dependence on external social services is unsustainable. Due to problems of insecurity and resource constraints, international aid is also unable to reach more than a fraction of the population. Internationally funded social services in health, sanitation, education, and water supplies tend to be concentrated in more secure zones (the Northwest and Northeast) and in larger towns.

The unavailability of publicly provided social services has led to radical privatisation of these sectors. Except for a small percentage of families with access to internationally provided services, health and education are only available to those who can pay for private care, drugs, and tuition. Such services are mainly available in a few major urban centres, particularly Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

Human development activities in Somalia are also constrained by a context of growing "donor fatigue" and significantly reduced levels of post-Cold War international assistance. The failure and frustrations of the 1992-95 international intervention in Somalia (UNOSOM) led to a sharp reduction in aid. Efforts to enhance human development in Somalia in the next decade will probably take place in a context of modest levels of international aid.
Insecurity in large sections of Southern Somalia has prevented delivery of development assistance. Somalia has been a particularly challenging environment for aid agencies; problems of extortion, kidnappings, assassinations, and endemic communal disputes over control of development resources have often derailed relief and rehabilitation assistance and endangered both international and national staff. In response to this insecurity, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs were organised into the “Somalia Aid Coordination Body”. In 1995, it established a “Code of Conduct” insisting on the maintenance of peace and security by local authorities as a pre-condition for international rehabilitation and development assistance. Because local authorities in most of Southern Somalia have been unable to meet this condition, rehabilitation and development assistance has been suspended in many parts of this region. Most rehabilitation and development assistance is currently concentrated in the more stable regions of the Northwest (“Somaliland”) and Northeast (“Puntland”).

The ongoing crisis in governance in Somalia is not conducive to improvements in human development. With the exception of the role of clan elders in resolving communal disputes, which remains a central feature of Somali political life despite state collapse, political authority in Central and Southern Somalia is highly localised, weak, and unstable. Few local polities are able to collect taxes to fund even minimal community development. Most “taxes” collected in Somalia are collected and kept by local militias or distributed by faction leaders as patronage to supporters. Even in “Somaliland”, the self-declared independent State in the Northwest of Somalia, only a small percentage of the customs revenues earned at the Berbera port finds its way to ministries engaged in human development. Southern Somalia in particular is characterised by “warlord politics”, in which faction or militia leaders not only fail to address development needs in their area but in some instances actively block and subvert community attempts to build responsible local government. This problem is especially acute in zones where militias occupy towns and regions by conquest; the armed newcomers have little sense of obligation to the communities under occupation. Most factions devote their energies toward political bargaining and alliance building, not toward the development needs of areas they claim to represent.

Human development needs must also cope with a context of disputed political authority in the absence of a State. While sporadic conflicts between Somali clans and factions have attracted media attention, a more fundamental power struggle is occurring within these communities. Faction leaders, militiamen, elders, district councils, professionals, religious figures, businessmen, and other community leaders all lay claim to some authority over local affairs. Efforts to raise money locally or to provide funds via international aid agencies to promote aspects of human development in Somalia have invariably provoked disputes over who has the right to prioritise needs, allocate jobs, and manage funds. In some communities, an agreement has been reached on local division of labour and chain of command; in others, it remains a volatile point of contention.

While it is easy to lay the blame for Somalia’s crisis in human development on state collapse and factional fighting, such a conclusion would not be entirely accurate. In the 1970s and 1980s, before the collapse of its government, Somalia received one of the highest levels of per capita foreign aid in the world. Yet, its development indicators ranked among the lowest in the world. In some respects, the Somali State “collapsed” in terms of its capacity to promote human development years before 1990. Some of Somalia’s human development constraints are thus rooted in deep-seated problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Resolving Somalia’s ongoing political crisis will be a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable improvements in human development in the country.
Profound levels of poverty and scarcity in Somalia have led households and whole communities to embrace survival strategies that often jettison longer-term investments in human development as an unaffordable luxury. Preference is often placed on a child’s productive labour herding animals or farming, rather than on schooling and literacy; on veterinary medicine for the household herd, rather than pre-natal care for a pregnant wife; on the reselling of donated school supplies by unpaid teachers; on distribution of money to needy extended family members for immediate consumption, rather than into savings and productive investment. Human development in Somalia is thus currently framed by highly constrained communal and household choices focusing on short-term goals and risk-averse behaviour. In this context, investment in human development is needed to meet immediate survival needs.

Not all human development choices made by Somali communities and households reflect survival tactics; some also reflect serious misallocation of household or public goods. In some parts of the country, the daily consumption of qat (a mild narcotic leaf) by male heads of households diverts scarce family money away from essential educational, health, and nutritional needs. Throughout Somalia, customs fees and road tolls are routinely kept by or allocated to militias rather than channelled to community development. Allegations of coerced labour, involuntary sharecropping, and prevention of internally displaced populations from returning to their homes in parts of Southern Somalia also suggest that some elements of Somali society intentionally deny others the basic freedom of choice that undergird human development. It must be understood that there are variable levels of community commitment to the fundamental goals of human development as enshrined in UNDP’s “Human Development Index.”

The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clanism. Lineage identity is a central organising force in Somali society, and arguably is more significant in contemporary Stateless Somalia than in previous decades. In the period of State collapse, it has proven to be both a terribly divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders, as well as a vital source of group protection, social security, and customary law in the absence of the State. Planning and evaluation of human development initiatives should neither vilify nor glorify clanism; its impact on Somali society is too variable and complex. Although clan identity is a very powerful social force in contemporary Somalia, it co-exists with a range of other affiliations - professional, regional, class, factional, and religious (including the Islamist Al-Ittihad organisation) - in Somalia’s highly fluid political arena. Clan identity itself is fluid; lineage links can be re-aligned, rediscovered, or shifted to different levels of ancestry according to the situation at hand; newcomers to a region can give up their old clan identity and be “adopted” into a dominant clan (shegad status).

Human development and economic recovery is also constrained by the large numbers of Somalis who are either internally displaced, in refugee camps, or resettled abroad. In parts of Southern Somalia, revitalisation of the agricultural sector is constrained by the absence of up to 40% of the traditional farming community.

Human development in Somalia must also be understood in the context of the growing role of women in production, business and in meeting household needs. Many Somali households are headed by women; in those instances, husbands have either divorced (or occasionally abandoned) their wives, are working away from their families, or are unemployed and idle. Women are thus shouldering most of the burden of running the household (collection of wa-
ter and firewood, food preparation, etc) at the same time that they must generate family income through petty commerce or farming. Since the collapse of the State, women’s roles in commerce have grown markedly.

The Somali struggle for human development also takes place against a backdrop of environmental degradation and stress. The absence of State-sponsored range management has led to overgrazing and degradation of pastureland in some areas; communities desperate to generate income are destroying whole forests for charcoal production and export; and faction leaders seeking hard currency to fund their patron-client relations agree to the dumping of toxic waste in areas under their control by international companies. Each instance of environmental degradation in this fragile, semi-arid setting increases the risk of desertification and reduces the carrying capacity of the land.

Finally, the struggle to secure basic aspects of human development in Somalia has taken place in a dynamic, not static, social environment. That is, Somali communities and households have not been passive in the face of the country’s political and economic crisis, but have developed a range of adaptations and coping mechanisms. For instance, in some parts of the country households keep women and children in refugee camps, where educational, health, and security needs are met, while the men return to rebuild family herds or reclaim farmland. In some of the best-organised towns, local schools and hospitals have been revived through fund-raising schemes drawing on remittances from clan members residing abroad. Rotating credit schemes, traditional work-sharing systems, neighbourhood soup kitchens, local mosques, and other social institutions have attempted to provide modest assistance for community health and primary education. For many households with financial resources, the desire to secure basic development needs has prompted them to resettle abroad - very rough estimates suggest that between 15% and 20% of the pre-war population of Somalia now exists as a diaspora in North America, Europe, East Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

**The Theme of Education**

The collapse of Somalia’s educational system constitutes a societal emergency which will constrain development for decades, and has thus been chosen as one of the two sectoral themes for this report. Somalia now faces the prospect of not one but two “lost generations” with little education and training to buttress productive roles and leadership in the future. Somalia’s public education system had virtually ceased functioning by the late 1980s; a second generation of young people has lost access to education in the course of the decade of State collapse in the 1990s. The most generous estimates suggest that only between 14-17% of all school-age children (ages 6-14) are enrolled in school, most in the early grades. This is one of the lowest enrolment rates in the world. The loss of this “human capital” has enormous costs both to individual households and to a society attempting to rebuild a shattered economy and government. It also poses an enormous challenge to local efforts to demobilise young militiamen, whose lack of education makes them difficult to absorb into a peacetime economy. It is an impediment to the establishment of a viable, participatory political system in Somalia. It is tragic for hundreds of thousands of young Somalis who have been deprived of the right to basic education and the opportunities for personal growth that education affords.

External assistance has been provided in an attempt to revive and support public primary schools in the country, with mixed success. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) Education Sectoral Committee has co-ordinated aid to schools; this support has included school renovations, provision of textbooks, curriculum development, teacher training, and “incentive pay” to teachers. By 1994, 165,000 chil-
were reported to be attending 465 primary schools throughout the country. In reality, however, most of these schools are virtually non-functional, due to a scarcity of qualified teachers willing to work for extremely low pay, and a lack of family commitment to keep children in school when their labour is needed to support the household. In some cases, schools are “open” only when international aid missions visit with supplies. The quality of education is, moreover, highly variable and, on balance, very low.

For Somali households with adequate finances, private schools and the use of private tutors have come to replace the collapsed public school system. Most private schools are concentrated in a few major urban centres, especially Mogadishu and Hargeisa. A few of these schools are producing well-prepared students. This differential access to schooling based exclusively on income will widen the gap between poor and relatively affluent families in coming decades.

Access to quality educational facilities is one of the primary “pull” factors leading Somali families to resettle in Kenya or other countries. The children of the diaspora will thus be the core professional class of their generation in coming years. Somalia’s ability to rebuild its economy and civil service will depend on whether they repatriate, or remain abroad.

Increasingly, public primary schools are requesting small tuition fees from families in an attempt to meet teacher salaries. In the absence of local tax revenues, this “user fee” approach to public education is an understandable tactic. However, it blurs the line between public and private schooling in Somalia, and perhaps inadvertently deprives large numbers of children access to education.

Among the small number of children receiving education, a serious gender gap is emerging, with only about half as many girls enrolled in primary schools as boys. Initially, they enrol in equal numbers, but the retention rate of girls is far lower. This may reflect a calculated strategy on the part of cash-strapped families who opt to “invest” in a male child, a choice reinforced by the fact that female children, will at an early age, leave the family and move to a husband’s household. This gender imbalance threatens to marginalise a generation of women (in coming decades), and reverse important gains that educated Somali women have made in both commerce and professional life over the past thirty years.

Somali households have been more likely to send their children to Koranic, rather than to primary school. Traditional Koranic schools are usually single-teacher institutions, offering training in the Koran, Arabic and, in a few cases, some basic schooling in arithmetic and the Somali language. While this schooling is better than having none at all, it is not sufficient to impart essential life skills children will need in the future.

Only a few secondary schools exist. Nearly all are private and found in large urban centres. This results in a low number of secondary school graduates, far fewer than the country will need in both the private and public sectors. Likewise, the absence of a university in the country means that advanced education and training must be sought abroad. Given the better employment opportunities that professional Somalis can enjoy abroad, few university graduates return to the country, thus accelerating a “brain-drain” that was already a serious problem even before 1990.

**The Theme of Governance**

The crisis of governance in Somalia is a root cause of crises in human development. Efforts to address human development needs must be coupled with support for good governance at the local and regional level. For this reason, governance has been chosen as a second sectoral theme of the report.

Though Stateless, Somalia is not anarchic. A wide range of both formal and informal systems of governance exist at the local level, and provide at least
some of the services that communities expect of government. Clan elders continue to draw on customary law/social contract (xeer), to manage local and inter-clan disputes, providing Somalia with a measure of law and order. Shari'a courts operate in parts of the country, providing an additional quasi-judicial function to local communities. Committees help to manage public assets like ports and airstrips; neighbourhood watch groups supply a rudimentary police service in some areas; and some districts have revived district councils, which provide varying levels of local administration. Collectively, this mosaic of fluid, overlapping authorities triggers endemic disputes over political control in local areas, and falls well short of a conventional state, but is also far from anarchy.

A powerful array of centrifugal forces - political, economic, and social - continue to work against efforts to re-establish a central state. In the near future, Somalia is unlikely to see the revival of a central state. Instead, most of the country's politics will be defined by "radical localisation", wherein most meaningful political authority and activity occurs at the village, district, or (in large urban centres) neighbourhood level.

Recent efforts to establish regional or multi-regional states in Somalia are a potentially significant development. "Puntland" has recently been established in the Northeast, a Benadir regional authority has been the subject of negotiations by Mogadishu factions, and proposals for the creation of "Hiranland" and "Jubbaland" have been raised as well. In a best-case scenario, these politics will serve as building blocks for a federal state and as responsive structures for the prioritisation and delivery of basic rehabilitation and development. However, even if such trans-regional States are established, they will inherit very weak economies and will likely possess modest administrative and enforcement capacities.

Different areas of Somalia are experiencing very divergent levels of governance. In some regions, especially in the "recovery zones" in northern parts of the country, communities are enjoying more responsive and participatory government than at any time in recent decades. In the self-declared secessionist State of Somaliland, for example, the administration has overseen the creation of a modest State structure, a functional police force, a safe environment, basic school and health care systems, and a revitalised commercial economy. Though it continues to be plagued by serious problems of disputed authority, corruption, and weak administrative capacity, Somaliland enjoys governance of higher quality than any other part of Somalia. Its administrative capacity is probably comparable to that of some of the poorest, weakest States in the developing world. Political development in the Northeast, where the non-secessionist State of Puntland has been established, is much less advanced, but has still provided local residents with a peaceful environment. To the South of the country, however, parts of the country remain "zones of crisis", where political authority is highly fragmented, disputed, and militarised. Not surprisingly, these zones are the sites of recurrent humanitarian crises. Other areas of the country - the Central regions and pockets of Southern Somalia - lie somewhere between crisis and recovery, and are classified by the UN as "transition zones". These regions are not plagued by endemic armed conflict, but possess only rudimentary, very localised political authorities, usually with little or no tax revenue to provide basic services.

One of the political paradoxes in Somalia is that, despite the absence of a central state, some parts of Somalia enjoy better conditions of "law and order" than do many developing countries. Even in the crisis zones of Southern Somalia, traditional methods of conflict management and dispute mediation are surprisingly effective in reducing and containing crime. The practice of blood-compensation, or diya, obliges groups to pay compensation for crimes committed by their diya group members; and xeer, or social contract, binds neighbouring clans into precedent-based rulings on disputes which arise between them. Increasingly, urban communities are relying as well on Islamic courts to maintain order and impose law.
on offenders. Collectively, these quasi-judicial practices help to deter crime in Somali communities. They are also low-cost mechanisms compared to the expense of police forces and a formal judiciary. However, to the extent that some of these community policing methods violate human rights, they serve as reminders of the difference between “law and order” and good governance, a distinction that should not be lost on either Somali leadership or the international community.

An important force working against the establishment of more developed political authority in parts of the country are “conflict constituencies” - that is, groups and individuals who, for different reasons, stand to benefit from continued communal tensions and lawlessness, and who stand to lose in a peacetime economy and government. This constituency includes warlords, whose power base rests on fear and insecurity; uneducated militiamen, for whom a peacetime economy might lead to marginalisation; some businessmen, who profit from diverted food aid, arms and drug trafficking, and other illegal activities; and even whole clans, who currently hold land and towns by conquest, and who risk having to return these assets to the pre-war owners in the event of a comprehensive peace.

Re-establishment of governmental authority in Somalia has also been complicated by destabilising political competition between some States in the region, each of which sponsors rival factions and processes of national reconciliation.

The absence of a central State deprives Somalis of a mechanism by which they can articulate national interests and priorities. Various efforts by the international community have been made to create a temporary “repository of Somali sovereignty”, such as regional development authorities, but with limited success. Consequently, Somali input is problematic or often missing in fora where Somali development needs are discussed. Major aid donors have come to assume some of the prerogatives of development planning on behalf of the Somali people.

**Recommendations**

- Ways must be found to continue and maximise Somali ownership of the development process at all levels, despite the absence of a Central State.
- Promotion of good governance must be a central theme and goal of all rehabilitation and development assistance. This should include support for capacity-building in local administrations and promotion of stronger civil society.
- International support for humanitarian relief in Somalia must be matched by an equally strong commitment to human development, wherever possible.
- Assistance to sectors which constitute essential investments in Somalia’s future capacity to recover and rebuild (especially the education sector) should be emphasised.
- A more coherent strategy is needed for promoting development in Somalia’s “transition zones” - areas falling between zones of humanitarian crisis and recovery.
- The private sector has proven to be a dynamic force and a potential engine of economic recovery; aid which facilitates constructive private sector activities and local job creation should be a high priority. Unemployment is a critical social and economic problem, which a stronger private sector can help to reduce.
- Women are shouldering an increasing responsibility for household management and income generation; their voice must be heard in fora where development priorities are set.
- Environmental degradation poses a serious long-term threat to human development in parts of Somalia; international efforts to support and encourage local conservation efforts should be explored.
- Local efforts to reduce goat consumption, which constitutes a major diversion of household income in the country, should be undertaken.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

RELEVANCE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOMALIA CONTEXT

Human Development Defined

Human development is defined as development that puts the welfare of human beings at the centre of development efforts. It is defined in UNDP's first Annual Human Development Report as "the process of enabling people to have wider choices". The report argues that human development should be the ultimate objective of economic development. Human development is also the means to achieving economic development since it enhances the skills, productivity and inventiveness of people through a process of human capital formation. The human dimension of development is crucial and must be the central theme in all development and policy planning. In the words of the late Mahbub Ul Haq, founder of the Human Development Report series in UNDP New York:

"...there is no harm in continuing to emphasize that it is people that matter, beyond the confusing maze of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) numbers, the curling smoke of industrial chimneys and the endless fascination with budget and balance of payments deficits. Often the purpose of development works to get lost as we struggle with economic concepts of growth, trade, interest rates, inflation, etc. This is the challenge to policy makers. Each time the rate of interest is changed, tax incentives are altered, or new loans negotiated the question arises: what is the impact on the human condition in terms of employment, incomes, and living standards?"

Thus, equally important to discussions of monetary policy, interest rate changes, the rate of price inflation etc. are the population's employment status, the distribution of its income, the levels of absolute and relative poverty, as well as the satisfaction of its basic needs.¹

Human development also looks at the demand side of the economic equation. This makes strong economic sense since attention to meeting people's human needs will have a strong positive effect on demand, leading to increased consumption, economic growth and employment. Human development encompasses human resource development since the latter is more narrowly focused upon developing human capital through appropriate education and training policies. As Jamsheed Dastoori has observed in the Somali context, "human development is not limited to social sectors (health, education and nutrition). While focusing upon developing the capabilities of people, it also places great importance on how these capabilities are employed, i.e., the economic role of development." Consequently, capacity development and how it is used to promote economic development is a key aspect of the literature on human development, which in practical terms means focusing upon the further development of existing capacities.

From the Human development perspective, humans are thus both the beneficiaries of development and the primary engine of development. Moreover, because each new generation eventually assumes the roles of chief producers, caretakers, political authorities, and civic leaders for their communities, human development is an ongoing process. Those societies that pursue policies which do not invest in human development initiatives, or which lose their human development programmes to destructive wars and state collapse, pay a heavy price decades later. Economic and political development cannot take hold where human development has been mortgaged.


**Human Development Measured**

UNDP has devised a measurement of human development, known as the Human Development Index, or HDI, based on three components: health, education and income. Four indicators measure progress in each of these components: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, average number of years of education and real per capita GDP. Essentially, a derived indicator purports to measure the stock or level of human development at a given point in time.

In Somalia a HDI has not been estimated for UNDP’s global report for several years because neither a government nor an economic institution exists that could provide reliable and comprehensive data. Furthermore, poor security conditions have precluded more systematic data collection by international agencies. Nonetheless, some reliable and recent statistical data is available from UN and other aid agencies, while some older data may still be relevant for Somalia today. Collectively, these sources serve as the basis for this report.

**Human Development Index for Somalia**

The underlying data for the calculation of Somalia’s HDI is presented in Appendix A. Since remittances form such a large part of some household budgets, they cannot be ignored in calculating the rough level of living index that is the HDI. Even then, the transformation into Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was based upon the same PPP as for Ethiopia. This may not be accurate given that sometimes as much as 50% of Somali food consumption is imported. Therefore, Somalia’s PPP could be lower than Ethiopia’s (i.e. a dollar in Somalia purchases less basic necessities than a dollar in Ethiopia). These data manipulations show that the Somali HDI for 1995-1997 is not based upon complete data, and must therefore be seen as roughly approximate, not precise, figures.

Consequently, the report presents a range of estimated figures rather than a single figure for each indicator. It is worth noting that such difficulties with securing firm data are common in other less developed countries as well, though few are as challenging as contemporary Somalia.

Based on available data, Somalia’s HDI ranges between 0.184 and 0.159. Ranked globally, this estimate places Somalia 173rd out of 175 states in its level of human development, just below Sierra Leone (0.185 in 1998), another country which has been the scene of a protracted “complex emergency”. These results, however approximate, confirm what any casual observer of world politics would conclude without the benefit of statistical data - namely, that protracted civil war and state collapse, accompanied by massive internal displacement and refugee flows, warlords, banditry, and destruction of the economic infrastructure of a country lead inexorably to steep reversals in human development.

Specific indicators from Somalia help to paint a more nuanced picture of the country’s urgent development crisis. Life expectancy, for instance, already at only 46 years in 1995, is now believed to be much lower (41-43 years), especially in regions hard-hit by the 1991-92 famine. Chronic malnutrition, inaccessibility of health facilities, and collapsed sanitation systems has rendered Somalis much more vulnerable to fatal infectious diseases, lowering life expectancy. The collapse of the public health sector, combined with widespread misuse of pharmaceutical drugs and unsanitary conditions has accelerated the spread, to other countries, of dangerous drug-resistant strains of TB and other infectious diseases. The mortality rate for children under five exceeds 25%; adult literacy rates have plummeted to between 14% and 17%; and primary school enrolment is between 13% and 16%. In almost any other country, any one of these indicators would be considered a national emergency. Yet Somalia’s prolonged humanitarian crisis...
has redefined what is considered an emergency there - only outright famine conditions and deadly epidemics generate an humanitarian response. Nonetheless, the chronically low levels of human development in Somalia constitute a long-term emergency for Somali society and, indirectly, for the international community at large.

Human development issues in Somalia have been overwhelmed by pressing humanitarian needs in the country since 1990, when the Somali State collapsed amidst civil war and factional fighting. Throughout the 1990s, Southern Somalia has periodically constituted a “complex emergency,” with outbreaks of famine, epidemics, large-scale refugee flows, and armed conflict. A combination of devastating floods, drought, chronic insecurity and serious pest infestation threaten to return portions of Southern Somalia to famine conditions in late 1998 and 1999. Such recurrent “hard” emergencies in parts of Somalia make it difficult, and at times, inappropriate for local communities and international aid agencies to focus on longer-term human development goals.

Many of Somalia’s productive sectors, already weak before the civil war, have been damaged in the course of the country’s ten years of armed conflict and State collapse. Much of the capital city, Mogadishu, has been reduced to ruins. Factories that sustained a fledgling industrial base have been dismantled and sold for scrap metal. The basic infrastructure - ports, airports, roads, bridges, piped water, and electricity have either been destroyed or are in a state of serious deterioration, thus hampering commerce and production. Agricultural yields have declined sharply from pre-war levels, due to deteriorating canal and flood control systems, lack of agricultural inputs, and poor security. The livestock sector, historically the most productive part of the Somali economy, has survived reasonably well, due in part to its relative autonomy from government services. Still, the absence of government-sponsored range management and certification for livestock has negatively affected this sector as well. The 1998 Saudi ban on Somali livestock due to perceived disease risks has damaged commercial activities linked to livestock exports. The overall decline of economic production in Somalia reduces both household income and local governmental tax revenues available for basic development needs.

**Overview of Somalia**

**Main Geographic Features**

Somalia is located in the eastern portion of the Horn of Africa, covering a total land area of some 637,340 square kilometres (roughly the area of France). Its relatively harsh semi-arid environment places real limits on “carrying capacity” of the land, and favours pastoral nomadism as the most effective use of the land in most parts of the country. Only about 13% of the land is cultivable and 45% suitable for raising livestock. The most valuable pasturage includes the Haud region in the high plateau of Northwest Somalia and into Ethiopia, and the grasslands of Southeastern Somalia west of the Jubba river. The coastline stretches for 3,025 kilometres from Djibouti in the North on the Gulf of Aden and to Kenya in the South on the Indian Ocean - one of the longest in Africa. Only along the Southern coast and in the high mountain ranges of the Northeast and Northwest are temperatures mild. Elsewhere, Somalia endures tropical desert heat. Water is a scarce and valued commodity in this context, and an environmental constraint that easily provokes communal conflict over wells. Rainfall is variable but sparse and few areas receive more than 500mm of rain annually. Nomads rely primarily on wells rather than surface water. Sweet water wells tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the country, often at great distances from the best pastureland,
thus shaping routine patterns of transhumance between grazing and pasture. Some areas in the South between the Shabelle and Juba rivers receive an average of up to 600-700mm annually, permitting extensive rain-fed cultivation of sorghum and maize, Somalia’s principal grain crops. Rains fall on an average of once every five years, leading to recurrent droughts and periods of hardship. High river levels, caused by biannual rainy seasons in the Ethiopian highlands, are used for gravity-fed irrigated agriculture along the Shabelle river, and flood recession agriculture along parts of the Juba river. Exceptionally heavy rains in Ethiopia periodically cause destructive flooding in Southern Somalia, most recently in the unprecedented “El Nino” floods of late 1997 and 1998. Before the civil war, irrigated crop production along these two rivers constituted an important part of the export economy.

There are four main seasons dictated by shifts in the wind patterns. Pastoral and agricultural life revolves around these seasons:

- **Jilkaal**, from January to March, is the harshest dry season of the year as dry North-Eastly winds sweep down from the Arabian Peninsula across Somalia. Herds are typically concentrated near water sources at this time.
- **Gu** is the main rainy season from April to June. A period when rain-fed agriculture is practised and when herds are pushed to pastures deep in the interior.
- **Xagaa**, from July to September, is the second dry season during which sea breezes from the Indian Ocean help cool the Southern parts of the country.
- **Deyr** is a shorter and less reliable rainy season, lasting from October to December. The rivers crest at their highest levels in this season, due to heavy rains in Ethiopia.

Despite the relatively harsh and demanding environment that is the setting for human development in Somalia, Somali society has adapted a range of strategies to make maximum use of the land. Rural Somalis also have devised a variety of coping mechanisms to ensure survival in case of environmental calamities. Still, Somalia is the scene of periodic droughts and floods, which can and do set back human development efforts. The countryside’s limited carrying capacity also makes parts of Somalia prone to severe environmental degradation. Parts of Somalia today—in the Northwest and the Kismayo areas in particular—are experiencing dangerous environmental degradation due to overgrazing and uncontrolled harvesting of trees for charcoal exports. Although these environmental constraints most directly affect the rural population (roughly 60% of the population), urban Somalis who rely heavily on rural production are indirectly affected.

**Key Historical Themes**

Much of the contemporary development crisis in Somalia can only be understood in the context of the country’s history. Historical claims and grievances by Somali clans play a powerful role in current political debates in Somalia. Not surprisingly, interpretation of Somali history is itself a contentious political issue. What follows are some of the most significant historical themes and events shaping contemporary Somali society and human development in the country. More detailed historical dates and events are listed in Appendix B.

**Precolonial Somalia**

Like most parts of the world, Somalia has a long history of migration, conquest, and assimilation, a pattern that was accelerated by the 1991-92 civil war. Before the spread of Somali pastoralists in the 10th or 11th centuries, the Somali interior was inhabited by Oromo and other pastoral tribes as well as hunter-
gather groups. Along the coast, several ancient trading cities were inhabited by a mix of Arab, Persian, and other communities who developed their own ethnic identities such as the Benadir and Bravan people. The Bajuni, a Swahili fishing people, also lived along the Southern coast. In addition, Bantu communities farmed along the river valleys. However, in the beginning of the 10th or 11th centuries, Somali clans pushed into the Eastern Horn, first northward from Southern Ethiopia, and then southward into the inter-riverine regions. In these regions, the Digil-Rahanweyn clan—composed primarily of other clans absorbed into the lineage as they settled—adopted a sedentary, agro-pastoral lifestyle. The Southward expansion of the Somalis accelerated again in the mid-19th century, when clans from the Central and North-Eastern regions, probably respond to population pressures in their marginal, arid lands, crossed the Jubba river (or in some instances, resettled along the coast by ship) and migrated all the way to the Tana River in what is today Kenya. At the same time, Somali populations along the Benadir coast imported slaves from East Africa to provide labour for a rising slave-based grain export economy along the lower Shabelle river. Descendants of those slaves, along with remnants of the original Bantu farming populations, constitute the Jerero or Bantu minorities which populate agricultural villages in much of the Shabelle and Jubba river valleys.

This history of movement, and often violent, migration leaves several important legacies to contemporary Somalia. First, it has produced a dominant Somali culture and lineage identity as well as universal adherence to Islam throughout the Eastern Horn of Africa, the product of Somali conquest of the land centuries ago. Yet, significant diversity exists beneath the surface of what appears to be a highly homogenous society. Ancient coastal populations, such as the Bravan, Reer Hamar, and Bajuni people retain distinct ethnic identities outside the Somali lineage. Bantu communities, though usually affiliated with Somali clans, are considered a low-status ethnic group and continue to endure racial prejudice. The more settled, agro-pastoral Rahanweyn clans of the inter-riverine areas are significantly different in culture, political organisation, and language from their nomadic cousins. In past decades, the predominant ideology of Somali nationalism tended to mute these differences. Since the collapse of the state, however, these ethnic distinctions have vigorously reasserted themselves, especially since the Rahanweyn, Bantu, and coastal populations were the main victims of a famine and civil war imposed on them by the dominant pastoral clans.

In addition, the history of pre-colonial migration and conquest explains the scattered, non-contiguous nature of clan settlement throughout the country. Though most clans have a "home region" where they are concentrated, Somali clans are found in pockets throughout the country, often in very confusing and complex patterns. Hence, the Herti clan, mostly located in the northeast of Somalia, is settled far to the South in the Kismayo area. The Ogadeni clan is concentrated in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, as well as in the trans-Jubba region and Northeastern Kenya. The Hawiye clan is concentrated in the central zones of Somalia, but can be found in pockets throughout Southern Somalia and Northern Kenya. This patchwork of clan settlements complicates proposals for clan-based federalism in Somalia. Significantly, historical claims to towns and pasture are important in inter-clan disputes over rights to political power and control of development assets. Not surprisingly, each clan has widely divergent interpretations of its historical presence in resource-rich zones of the country.

Another aspect of pre-colonial Somali history is that, with few exceptions, pre-colonial Somali society was stateless. Social conventions, which evolved to manage relations in this essentially anarchic environment,
have survived to the present day and serve vital roles in managing politics in the new era of statelessness into which the Somali society has plunged. Pre-colonial Somali society was organised around lineage identity which was, and is, a highly fluid situational identity. Radically decentralised political authority was invested in clan elders, whose principal responsibility was to negotiate disputes with other clans. For this task, the elders relied on xeer, or customary law, binding neighbouring clans into precedent-based rulings on how to address a range of grievances and disputes. Somali society also developed a blood compensation, or diya system to address and deter crimes. All Somalis were, and are, members of a diya-paying group which typically number several thousand kinsmen. In the event that a member committed a crime, compensation was negotiated in which members pooled resources (usually she-camels) to pay the aggrieved clan. This created strong group pressure on individuals to avoid committing crimes and reducing the number of blood feuds and revenge killings. While these social institutions by no means prevented communal conflict or criminality in pre-colonial times, it did serve to manage and contain lawlessness. The flourishing revival of these traditional practices has been an important reason for the re-establishment of law, order, and security in parts of the country.  

The Legacies of the Colonial Period

Colonialism in the Eastern Horn of Africa did not penetrate Somalia as deeply as it did other parts of Africa, but nonetheless, it had a profound effect. The colonial legacy in Somalia includes the division of the Somali people into five separate colonies; the imposition of a State in a historically stateless society; the birth of Somali national identity and nationalism; the expansion of Somalia’s integration into a regional and world economy, especially via the expansion of export-oriented plantation agriculture; the introduction of urban life to an almost exclusively rural society; and the uneven introduction of some of the social services that help to promote human development.  

During “the scramble for Africa” in the late 19th century, colonial powers drew borders in the Horn of Africa that separated the Somali people into five different polities - Djibouti (French), the Somaliland Protectorate (British), Somalia (Italy), Kenya (British), and Ethiopia (independent), which came to control the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden was perceived by Somalis as an “African colonialist”. A portion of the Somali-inhabited Kenya colony (the area west of the Juba river) was ceded to Italian Somaliland in 1924 by the British. This was done as part of a deal struck during World War I; and several efforts were made following World War II to consider uniting the Somali-inhabited portions of Ethiopia and Kenya with the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia, but to no avail. This legacy of division had profound effects on Somali foreign policy at independence, leading it into two failed irredentist wars with its neighbours and serving as a bitter grievance of Somali nationalists towards the outside world. At independence in 1960, British Somaliland (which gained independence one week before Italian Somalia) was united with the Trust Territory of Somalia via a referendum that was contested by some in Somaliland. The brief period (5 days) of internationally-recognised sovereignty enjoyed by Somaliland in 1960 is an important historical legacy, as it today serves as the principal legal justification for Somaliland’s right to secede.  

Colonialism imposed an alien political structure, the central state, on a society with a highly decentralised, stateless political tradition. Perhaps even more than in most places, the state in the Somali context was a very artificial structure. Moreover, Somali society’s introduction to the state was not a lesson in civic democracy; it was an authoritarian structure used by outsiders (European and Ethiopian) to tax, conscript  

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2Somaliland authorities specifically contend that the OAU’s principle of the sanctity of colonial borders is in accordance with Somaliland’s reassertion of colonial borders in the eastern Horn of Africa, and that as a result their claim to sovereignty cannot be compared to other secessionist movements in Africa.
the labour, and exploit the resources of others. This lesson spilled over into post-independence political behaviour in Somalia. Finally, the colonial States in Djibouti, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were never remotely self-sustainable - all required subsidies from the colonial powers, which were unable to generate significant tax revenues from the poor and evasive nomadic populations. The economic unsustainability of the State in Somalia remained a problem throughout the era of independence when Somalia relied heavily on foreign aid, and constitutes a significant challenge to those seeking to revive a central state in Somalia today.

Colonialism brought with it European notions of nationalism, fuelling a rise of Somali nationalism. Before the colonial era, Somali national identity was poorly developed, and politics was essentially localised. This put much stronger emphasis on clan and sub-clan, rather than on Somali identity. However, opportunities for formal education, urbanisation, and exposure to international developments and ideologies kindled a powerful movement of Somali nationalism among the new Somali urban elite and intelligentsia, a movement institutionalised in the Somali Youth League. It was a political ideology of dominant influence over Somali political rhetoric at independence, even as clanism remained a powerful undercurrent in the daily political wrangling over jobs and resources.

Somalia's integration into a global economy was accelerated. Somalia had historically been both a source of exports and a transit point for exports from the Ethiopian interior. However, the development of an irrigated plantation economy (based initially on cotton and later on bananas) in the lower Shabelle and lower Juba valleys transformed the economies of those areas.

The Colonial period catalysed the rapid growth of urban centres and urban life in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Though Somalia remains a predominantly rural society, Mogadishu grew from a small town of 40,000 people in 1940 to a major metropolitan area of over one million by the 1980s. These Somali cities were the centres of political life for aspiring politicians and provided opportunities for new forms of wealth accumulation. In the cities, the mandate of political leadership altered from regulating kin relationships, entitlements and pastoral resources to regulating access to the political and economic benefits of the State.

Finally, colonialism introduced very uneven access to basic education and health services in the country. In the Somaliland Protectorate, the British hardly invested in the economic infrastructure (except notably agricultural extension that successfully introduced rain-fed agriculture in the northwest). Conversely though, they did establish a few highly effective schools that produced much of the leadership of independent Somalia. In Italian Somalia, during the UN Trusteeship period of the 1950s efforts were made to increase access to education and health services and to build an economic infrastructure that could sustain an independent State. These services tended to be concentrated in the Benadir region.

**Independent Somalia, 1960-1990**

Somalia experienced three distinct political periods in three decades of independence before the civil war. Each had its own impact on human development. The first was the period of multi-party democracy and civilian rule from 1960-69, a period that witnessed the deterioration of politics into clanism and corruption. The second period, from 1970 to the mid-1970s, was a brief period of socialist social and development initiatives; and from the mid-1970s to 1990, Somalia's political and development climate featured a high level of repression, corruption, and decay. These latter two periods were presided over by President Mohamed Siyad Barre, who attained power after a successful coup d'état in 1969.11

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1Italy lost its Somali colony to the British in WWII. The British army imposed a minimalist military administration over the territory in the 1960s. Somalia became a Trusteeship of the UN from 1950-59, the UN oversaw Italian administration of its colony, with a mandate to prepare Somalia for independence in 10 years. The mandate is what spurred efforts to establish social services like schools and health posts, which were rare before 1950.

The developmental legacy of these three decades is mixed. On the one hand, the Somali State expanded the availability of social services like primary education, potable water, sanitation, and health care, leading to notable improvements in some basic development indicators. The nation-wide literacy campaign of 1973-74, which followed the decision to standardise written Somali in the Latin script (until that time, Somali was an oral language only), was lauded internationally for the dramatic increases in literacy it produced. In addition, productive sectors such as livestock, agriculture, crafts, fisheries, and light industry received much greater levels of government technical support and extension services. The National University of Somalia and other institutes of higher learning produced a generation of skilled and well-trained professionals for both the private and public sectors.

On the other hand, most of these development gains were offset by setbacks. Somalia, throughout its first three decades of independence, received one of the highest per capita levels of foreign aid in the world. Unfortunately, most of it was squandered on inappropriate projects or lost to massive corruption thus earning Somalia a reputation as a “graveyard of foreign aid.” Hence, despite the billions of dollars in aid it received, Somalia remained one of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world. The widespread misuse of international assistance had a corrosive effect on Somali political practices and perceptions of foreign aid, which soon became the central “prize” over which political struggles were waged, and the central asset used in patronage politics. Civil servants devoted most of their energies to positioning themselves in parts of the bureaucracy where foreign aid was channelled (and diverted). The actual delivery of aid projects and services was seen as secondary to the jobs, contracts, and possibilities for embezzlement that the foreign aid programmes provided. Even when aid was effectively delivered, its impact was often unwanted and unintended. Multi-million dollar agricultural projects often resulted in highly inefficient and wasteful exercises that expropriated thousands of hectares of land from villagers without compensation, and placed the country in international debt. This history of development and development assistance in Somalia is a reminder that the country’s current crisis cannot be blamed solely on warlordism and State collapse, or on the dwindling availability of post-Cold War foreign aid. Even when a functional government was in place and foreign aid flowed freely, Somalia ranked near the bottom of the world in human development.

The socialist experiment of the 1970s resulted in some policy choices that harmed rather than advanced the productive aspects of human development. Nationalisation schemes led to the collapse of the banana export sector, and price controls on grains and State marketing boards made agriculture unprofitable and drove some farmers out of business, worsening Somalia’s food deficit. In the 1980s, when Somalia switched alliances from the USSR to the US and renounced scientific socialism in favour of free market reforms, the State still maintained a heavily interventionist approach to the economy, not out of ideological conviction, but as part of the regime’s goal to appropriate maximum resources to its own private coffers.

Politically, each era of independent Somalia has a distinct legacy. The legacy of the 1960s period of multi-party democracy is a mixed one. While some Somalis recall the 1960s as a golden era of open democratic politics, others disparage it as a time of corrosive and paralysing clannism. The initial period of military rule and scientific socialism in the early 1970s is remembered by many as a time of real social and developmental advances, and as evidence that clannism can be overcome through nationalist mobilisation. Women’s rights were advanced, clannism was outlawed, and a range of development objectives achieved.
Initial successes the military regime of Siyad Barre achieved were quickly lost, as he came to rely increasingly on a highly repressive internal security apparatus, corrupt patronage politics, and a clannish strategy of divide-and-rule. This set Somali communities against one another rather than unifying them. Siyad Barre came to depend on an increasingly narrow coalition of clans (the “MOD” alliance of Marehan, Ogaden, and Dollbahante) to the exclusion of others. Ministries became bloated and dysfunctional, weighed down by redundant and underpaid staff. The disastrous decision to invade Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in 1977 led to a crushing defeat and diplomatic isolation. From then on, Somali politics was a downward spiral of repression, militarisation, and corruption. Siyad Barre faced insurrections immediately after the Ogaden war. By 1988, full-scale civil war broke out in the Northwest, where Siyad Barre’s forces attacked the city of Hargeisa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide. The West, which had become Siyad Barre’s international patron in the 1980s, froze assistance to the regime on humanitarian grounds—a move facilitated by the end of the Cold War and Somalia’s subsequent loss of value as a strategic ally. Within two years of the freezing of military and economic aid, the regime collapsed in the face of multiple clan-based armed fronts and a popular uprising in Mogadishu.

The impact of this 20-year reign of Siyad Barre cannot be underestimated. Firstly, it bequeathed to Somalia a highly militarised political environment; the destructive and very violent period of warfare and armed banditry in 1991-92 occurred partly because the country was awash in weaponry. Secondly, Siyad Barre’s manipulation of clans against one another left a legacy of deep inter-clan hostility and mistrust. Thirdly, the extremely repressive nature of his regime left a deep societal distrust of any central government. Each clan feared that the revival of a central state would enable one narrow coalition of clans to wield the power of the state as an instrument of domination over the rest. Finally, the extraordinary level of corruption (and accrual of personal fortunes) under Siyad Barre, fuelled by high levels of strategically-motivated foreign aid, continues to animate Somali faction leaders’ preoccupation with external assistance. Like a post-Cold War cargo cult, Somali political leaders continue to believe that if they can cobble together an internationally-recognised State, funds will again flow into the coffers. Few have fully grasped the changed nature of international politics since the end of the Cold War and the failed intervention in Somalia. Few understand that, for the first time in its history, the Somali state will have to rely primarily on resources generated internally.

Both before and during the Siyad Barre era, one feature of Somali politics remained constant—the centralised nature of administration. All political decision-making was concentrated in Mogadishu; all district commissioners were appointed by Mogadishu authorities, not by local communities; and funds used by local administrations were provided from the central government, not from tax revenues generated locally. As a result, contemporary efforts by Somali communities (with international prodding) to create functional local administrations which are selected by local constituencies, which tax local populations and which set local priorities, is not a “revival” of a pre-existing political institution. It is more akin to a revolution in Somali politics and represents the first time in living memory that some local communities have laid claim to control over their own affairs. The steep learning curve that Somali towns, districts, and regional authorities have faced in establishing a role for themselves must be viewed in light of this history.
Events since the collapse of the Somali State in January 1991 have transformed Somali politics, economics, and society. This turbulent era in Somali history can be broken down into three short periods - the “complex emergency” of 1991-92; the period of effective UN intervention (December 1992-early 1994); and the post-intervention period (early 1994). 12

The fall of Siyad Barre’s regime in January 1991 did not bring about the expected coalition government. Instead, it heralded a two-year period of marauding banditry, disputed claims of authority, factional warfare, and famine that eventually prompted a massive international intervention. What began as an episode of looting by retreating forces and incoming liberation militias quickly degenerated into systematic pillaging of government buildings, public utilities, and property owned by anyone lacking the firepower to protect it. Disputed claims of leadership between Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Madhi Mohamed, two figures in the Hawiye United Somali Congress (USC) faction that had occupied the capital, prevented the re-establishment of any authority within Mogadishu. Instead, anarchy characterised the politics of both Mogadishu and most of central and Southern Somalia. Roving militias plundered towns and villages and answered to no authority. They fought in the name of a faction only when prospects for looting captured towns looked promising. War-booty was their only pay. Though few Somalis were spared from this destructive violence, weak social groups such as the pastoral populations, Banu farmers, and the Digil-Rahanweyn were by far the hardest-hit. This fact was made clear by their role as principal victims in the 1992 famine. Furthermore, the warfare and looting affected both economic infrastructure and the agricultural heartland of Southern Somalia.

Factional fighting in 1991 and parts of 1992 centred on a sweeping armed conflict between the Darwood (Somali Patriotic Movement) 13 and Hawiye (USC) clan-militias. The war-front between these two factions moved quickly and frequently across a “shatter zone” from the Kenyan border to the outskirts of Mogadishu. Communities living in this area were looted both by departing and incoming militiamen. When the war-front shifted, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled as IDPs or refugees. This included a large number of urban Darwood who were forced to flee Mogadishu when Siyad Barre’s regime collapsed, fearing Hawiye retaliation, even though many Darwood had actively supported the overthrow of the regime.

By late 1991, however, the nature of the fighting began to change significantly. Most armed conflict from then on has taken place within, rather than between major clans, as the factions began to splinter over leadership and competing claims over control of major cities. In Mogadishu, rivalry between General Aideed and Ali Mahdi, who claimed to be interim president, based on a highly disputed selection process, spilled over into heavy fighting in November 1991. Mogadishu had already been badly damaged by the fight to oust Siyad Barre and subsequent looting. The initial Hawiye war reduced much of the central portions of the city to rubble, leaving the two leaders and their factions (Aideed then headed the Somali National Alliance (SNA), while Mahdi led a rival coalition, the Group of 12) presiding over a divided city. The Darwood clan repeated the same tragedy in the Southern port city of Kismayo, splitting along clan lines to form the SPM/SNA (the Ogadeni clan aligned with Aideed and led by Col. Omar Jess) and the SPM (an admixture of Harari, some Marabani, and some Absame clans, led by General Mohamed Said Harsi “Morgan”). The two factions fought over control of Kismayo beginning in 1992.

12 Technically, the UNOSOM intervention lasted until March 1995. By early 1994, however, the UN had withdrawn forces to secure ports, so that little peacekeeping was administered. Factions began fighting in the streets of Mogadishu again, and aid agencies began reducing their presence significantly.

By early 1992, a severe drought combined with a year of warfare and chaos provoked famine. International relief agencies sought to provide emergency food and medicine, but were stymied by extortionate militia demands for a cut of the food relief at the ports and looting of much of the food that was delivered to starving populations. Militia profited from lucrative jobs as security for these agencies as well, although they frequently colluded to loot the aid they were paid to protect. The food aid and the ports of entry for it became the principal items over which factions fought, and the principal asset used to fund their wars. The result was that the famine continued to rage, claiming an estimated 300,000 lives, and the food relief inadvertently fuelled the fighting that was causing the crisis. *The unspeakable situation received intensive media coverage in mid-1992, leading eventually to a surprise decision by the United States to lead an international humanitarian intervention into Somalia in December 1992. Though the UNITAF forces (later called UNOSOM, when nominal command was transferred from the US to UN) arrived after the peak of the famine, they nonetheless put a quick end to the famine, and temporarily froze factional fighting.*

Parts of Central and all of Northern Somalia were spared by this catastrophe. In the Northeast, only a brief episode of armed conflict between the Islamist group *Al-Ittihad* and the *Mijerten* faction, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), interrupted the region’s stability, which was maintained in large measure due to the region’s isolation, its clan homogeneity, and the strength of its traditional leaders. In the Northwest, more dramatic developments occurred. There, the Somali National Movement, embittered by the brutalities of the Siad Barre regime against the *Isaaq* clan, declared unilaterally the secession of the “Republic of Somaliland” from the rest of Somalia in May 1991. The then Chairman of the SNM, Abdirahman Tuur, was selected as the first President. However, *intra-Isaaq* fighting broke out in 1991, and little progress was made in establishing an effective State structure. Only in May 1993, when an assembly of elders (guurti) established a peace and selected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as the new President, did Somaliland begin to develop an administrative capacity. Renewed armed conflict and a protracted stand-off within the *Isaaq* clan between 1994 and 1996 slowed the Egal Administration’s progress, but since 1996 Somaliland has made advances in extending its authority in the Northwest.

The international peacekeeping intervention in Somalia, from December 1992 to March 1995, was a period of high expectations and deep disappointments. Most, but not all, Somali groups welcomed “Operation Restore Hope,” expecting that it would disarm the militias, end the famine, and promote national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the Somali State. The UNITAF operation did in fact quickly end the humanitarian crisis, and froze factional fighting, but it did not wish to risk possible casualties in a disarmament mission against the factions. Consequently, it embarked on a policy of arms cantonment rather than disarmament. Faction leaders who perceived the intervention to be counter to their interests could thus bide their time. As for national reconciliation and rebuilding of the Somali State, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II, which assumed control of the mission in May 1993 but it remained an essentially US led operation) was given the mandate to achieve these ambitious goals by the UN Security Council. UNOSOM convened a national peace conference in March 1993, comprising 15 Somali factions, which resulted in the Addis Ababa accord. Though this was to serve as the blueprint for both peace and a process of building a transitional national authority, the factions failed to implement the accord. Over the next three years, the international community convened dozens of peace conferences at the national and regional levels in an increasingly desperate attempt to broker lasting peace, but to no avail. Faction leaders were either unable
or unwilling (or both) to implement peace accords.\textsuperscript{16} Meanwhile, the UN (under US leadership) was drawn into armed hostilities against one of the most powerful militias, that of General Aideed, whose forces controlled the half of Mogadishu where UNOSOM headquarters were located. Following an incident in which 24 UNOSOM Pakistani forces were ambushed and killed by Aideed’s forces in June 1993, the UN (in particular US forces) engaged the SNA militia in the streets of Mogadishu, leading to a four-month period of intermittent urban guerrilla warfare. Aideed was never captured, and the UN suffered irreparable diplomatic damage as civilian casualties and international criticism mounted. When 18 US Special Forces soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, the US announced a phased withdrawal, and most other Western forces followed suit. A weakened UNOSOM stumbled through to the end of its mandate in March 1995, but left Somalia with neither a national peace nor a revived State.\textsuperscript{17}

Post-intervention Somalia has witnessed renewed but sporadic and localised factional fighting in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo. The international airport and seaport in Mogadishu have remained closed since 1995, due to inter-clan disputes over their control. Factions have splintered into ever-narrower sub-clans groupings, and in many instances are essentially defunct. The most powerful faction up to 1995, General Aideed’s SNA, divided into rival groups, and General Aideed died of gunshot wounds in a neighbourhood battle in 1996. Numerous efforts to pull together broad coalitions with a mandate to form an interim national government, including Aideed’s self-declared interim government, and Ali Mahdi’s Somali Salvation Alliance, failed. Political authority in the country is increasingly localised, with town, district, and (in urban settings) neighbourhood authorities exercising the greatest control. Islamic courts have partially filled the vacuum, setting up quasi-police and judicial functions based on shari’a throughout parts of Mogadishu and other areas.

Radical localisation of political authority in post-intervention Somalia appears to be the trend in the near future; it is very unlikely that a central state will be revived in the next few years. However, the recent efforts to establish regional or supra-regional states are a new political trend worth monitoring.\textsuperscript{18} The impetus for creating regional states was primarily external - regional actors such as the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and international donors stressed that they would work with authorities that established functional governance at the regional level. The most advanced of these initiatives (apart from Somaliland) is Puntland, located in the Northeast of Somalia. Puntland was announced following a meeting of over 400 delegates from the Northeast regions in July 1998. Garowe was chosen as the regional capital, and Abdullahi Yusuf was selected as President, though that selection is contested by several prominent Mijirt leaders. Puntland has announced ministerial appointments that have yet to become operational. Other regional authorities at various stages of discussion include a Benadir authority in Mogadishu, which if established, has been promised financial support from Arab States, but which is currently bogged down with intra-clan disputes, Hiranland, and Jubbaland. If these entities are established, they will likely be minimalist structures, given the resource constraints each will face. Their proponents hope that they will serve as building blocks for a national authority in the future.

As for human development initiatives, the post-intervention period has been one of scaled-down international assistance, due to a combination of insecurity and donor fatigue. At the same time, depressed local economies are generally unable to generate support for schools, health posts, sanitation and other development services. This has hit the Southern part


of Somalia especially hard; where development services are rare. In the Northeast (Puntland) and Northwest (Somaliland), international rehabilitation and development aid is concentrated, and in some instances, local economies could become strong enough to support basic social services themselves.

**Land Ownership**

Land ownership and land disputes are central in much of the conflict in contemporary Somalia. The pastoral lands have always been a common good; pasture is claimed by clans, not individuals, so land conflicts in the pastoral setting are usually matters of power struggles between two clans. In cases where one clan gains an upper hand, neighbouring clans can be pushed out of prime pastureland and lose access to their own wells.

By contrast, agricultural land has traditionally been allocated to households by village elders. Although technically not "owned," this land is passed from one generation to the next and could be rented or sold. Land ownership patterns and practices have changed dramatically since the 1970s. However, a modern land tenure law was passed decreeing that land titles be acquired from the State which "owned" all the land, in order to claim usufructuary rights. At the same time, riverine farmland which had been held by Bantu and other farming communities for over a century was rapidly rising in value, thanks to major irrigation projects and the revival of the banana export business in the 1980s. Consequently, an epidemic of "land-grabbing" began in the 1980s. Civil servants, well-connected businessmen and other Somalis with access to the Ministry of Agriculture began to register large tracts of land in their name, even though the land had been historically farmed by villagers. Few smallholder farmers could afford to register their land, as that required expensive trips to Mogadishu and bribes to civil servants. Even then, they discovered that individuals that were more powerful could obtain titles to the same tract of land and pay for the backing of police to insure that their title was seen as the legitimate one. At the same time, the state expropriated tens of thousands of hectares of prime riverine land from farming communities, offering them no compensation (since technically the unregistered land was "unclaimed"), for the establishment of internationally financed state farms. In a decade, many of Somalia's smallholders were transformed from subsistence farmers to landless or semi-landless sharecroppers and rural wage labourers. This episode of land-grabbing by both the state and private speculators sowed the seeds for endemic land conflicts in later years, and depressed many of the riverine agricultural communities.

The civil war and State collapse accelerated this struggle for land, replacing land deeds with semi-automatic weapons as the instrument of choice for appropriating land from weaker groups. As during the 1980s, land-grabbing in the 1990s has not involved militia and their kinsmen taking up agriculture themselves, which is seen as a low-status occupation. Instead, it has involved laying claims to the fruits of the harvest of the farmers. In parts of the riverine zones, smallholding farmers are subjected to coerced sharecropping by militia overlords, who may or may not provide security in return for 50% of the harvest. In other instances, militia are used by powerful landowners to force villagers to supply labour to their farms or plantations, with or without pay. On abandoned State farms, newcomers have staked claims to plots without regard for the fact that the land had been expropriated from the villagers. Clans that are more powerful are also pushing their herds into pastureland of weaker groups, and are grazing their livestock on villagers' ripening crops.

Not all relations between militia and local communities are so hostile. In some instances, armed newcomers have agreed to settle land disputes in order to secure better relations with residents. There is

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evidence that some militia are settling in and marrying into local communities, suggesting the possibility, in some areas, of gradual normalisation. In other cases, individuals who have lost valuable land or houses request relatives in other clans to look after property, sharing rent or harvest profits.

Land disputes in urban settings are also a significant problem. Houses abandoned by fleeing civilians in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and elsewhere have been occupied by squatters, who will only relinquish them if paid a substantial fee for "guarding and improving" the property. Members of weaker social groups cannot reclaim property in towns without the risk of death threats. In addition, municipalities wishing to renovate public buildings for use as schools or government offices find them occupied by squatters who consider the buildings to be theirs, and who will not relocate.

Unravelling the thousands of land and property disputes emanating from the collapse of the State is a major hurdle in reconciliation efforts, and has been at or near the centre of nearly every peace process since 1991. It has also created a powerful disincentive to negotiate on the part of some clans, which have, over the course of the crisis, found themselves in possession of the most valuable real estate - ports, cities, or farmland - in the country. Peace would require returning this property to the rightful owners or back to the public domain, and would represent a loss to these constituencies.

Infrastructure

Somalia before the civil war had four major ports (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bosasso and Berbera), a few smaller coastal ports, three international airports (Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Kismayo), and a road network of 21,000 km of which 5,500 were hard-surface all-weather roads. Eighty oil-fired and diesel power plants supplied electricity to cities and towns but foreign oil supplies were erratic throughout the 1980s and individual generators were used by those who could afford them in the late 1980s. Plans to construct a major dam on the Juba River at Bardhere to provide water for irrigation and generate power were never realised. Almost all of the existing infrastructure, including public administration buildings, prisons and urban service structures, either have been destroyed during the civil war or are in disrepair.

Ports

The ports of Berbera and Bosasso are again handling large volumes of cargo to and from all continents following both local efforts and international investment and technical assistance. Berbera now constitutes one Ethiopia's most important landlocked seaports. The main seaport in Mogadishu remains closed since October 1994, but substantial volumes are being shipped through the beach ports of Merka (100km South of Mogadishu) and through Eel Mahaan (15km to the North). The beach ports (and Bosasso port) are inoperable during the monsoon season (July to September), when seas are high. This gives commerce a seasonal rhythm throughout much of Somalia. To reopen, the Mogadishu port requires dredging. Kismayo port is functional and has seen increased but limited activity, poor port services and intermittent insecurity hamper the port.

Airports and air services

Most of Somalia's airports and airstrips are deteriorating due to lack of maintenance, at the same time that accessibility to private flight services has improved for most parts of the country. The Mogadishu international airport remains closed since the departure of UNOSOM II. Sections of the runway are claimed by four different militia, one of which has mined its portion to prevent planes from landing. In its place, there are three main airports/strips operating in the vicinity of Mogadishu: Iseley, around

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2Roland Marchal, Lower Shabelle Region, UNODS Studies on Governance, no. 1; November, 1997.
3Somali clans are generally exogamous. Many Somalis marry across clan lines, that creating an extended household with "kin" in a number of other clans. This provides some flexibility in conducting business across conflict lines.
10 kilometres North of Mogadishu, has been expanded during the civil war; the “K-50” airstrip is used mostly by small planes supplying qaat to Mogadishu and flying goods imported from Dubai to the Somali market of Eastleigh in Nairobi; and Baledogle, which is a former military base around 90 kilometres south of Mogadishu. Other airports or airstrips are also used by commercial planes in Belet Weyne, Galkayo, Kismayo, Bardhere, Baidoa, Bosasso, Hargeisa, Berbera, and Kalaabady (around 70 km west of Hargeisa). Rough airstrips are also available in major towns, built in the 1970s and 1980s, to allow access for humanitarian assistance to drought victims or displaced nomads.

“Management” of airports is usually assumed by a local militia, and can be the source of armed disputes. The militia charge “landing fees” from qaat and other private planes. This money is consumed by the militia, not reinvested in airport maintenance. In some locations, non-governmental organisations or responsible local councils manage airstrips.

Commercial airlines are operating and link the larger towns (Hargeisa, Bosasso, Galkayo, and Mogadishu) to Nairobi, Djibouti, and Dubai. As of the summer of 1998, the main airlines companies are Daallo, Damal, and InterSomal, which merged recently with Air Djibouti, Flying Dolphins and African Air. Many other aircrafts are chartered to transport cargo mostly to Kalaabadyh, Galkayo and Baledogle. Many Somalis use qaat flights to fly in and out of Nairobi. UN and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) flights service all areas of the country where EU or UN aid operations exist.

Roads

Before the civil war, the main North-South highway extended from Berbera in the North through Mogadishu to Kismayo. The only other paved highway linked Mogadishu to Baidoa. Only the largest cities possessed paved city streets. There were in 1990, 2,600 kilometres of paved road, 2,900 kilometres of gravel road, and 15,500 kilometres of improved earth roads. Many parts of the country were inaccessible during the rainy season due to poor road conditions. Most roads have deteriorated badly over the course of the civil war and State collapse, due to lack of maintenance and to intentional damage, especially to bridges. Mined roads were once a significant problem; today, some sections of roads are still mined in the Galgadud and Awal regions. Increasingly, transportation by land relies on impromptu tracks rather than roads, and creates significant maintenance expenses for trucks, raising the cost of commerce.

Post and telecommunications

One ironic aspect of the collapse of the State in Somalia is that telecommunications and money wiring services are now significantly better today than in the past. Pre-civil war postal and telecommunications facilities were mostly notional. International telephone communication could only be made at the Mogadishu Central Post, and at high costs and inconvenience. The old telephone lines were pulled down and sold off for scrap metal during the looting of Mogadishu. However, since 1994, local private-sector companies linked with international companies have started providing accessible and inexpensive telecommunications in the main cities (Kismayo, Merka, Mogadishu, Galkayo, Bosasso, Berbera, Hargeisa and Boroma), as well as in smaller towns (Qortooley, Afgoi, Balad, Jowhar, Yerowe). In small towns, High Frequency (HF) radios are linked to the telephone systems in order to allow Somalis the ability to communicate anywhere in the world. For both business reasons and as part of the extensive remittance system on which many Somali households rely, these advances in telecommunications are an important development.
Banks and financial services

No central bank, commercial banks, or financial subsidiaries currently exist in Somalia, despite several efforts to establish them. A Central bank has been established in Somaliland with the aim of helping with treasury functions and the economy. In Somalia, nothing akin to a federal reserve or central bank authority monitors money supply or replaces old notes. Control over the issuance of new shillings is a contentious political issue, as factions able to impose new money enjoy an enormous financial windfall ("seigneurage"). The exchange rate for the Somali shilling is set daily by the market, consisting essentially of the major money changers in Mogadishu’s Bakara market, who have sound knowledge about the supply and demand for dollars and shillings. Currency exchange rates vary somewhat regionally, due to varying availability of US dollars in different zones.

The Somali shilling circulates in Somalia and the Eastern part of Somaliland up to Burao. New shilling notes have been released by the faction via a deal with a Malaysian bank (these are known in parts of the country as "Sead Baler shillings"). In the North of Mogadishu and into parts of Central Somalia, a rival shilling distributed by Ali Mahdi’s faction, remains in limited circulation. The Somaliland shilling, created in late 1994, circulates in the Western part of Somaliland and marginally in its Eastern part, but has suffered sharp falls against the dollar. These Somali currencies are used for smaller purchases; all large transactions are carried out in US dollars. Savings are also kept in large US dollar denominations, which are easier to store and hide than bulky stacks of shillings. In addition, the Ethiopian birr and the Kenyan shilling are widely used in regions adjacent to those countries.

A major financial innovation, since the collapse of the State, has been the rise of hawalaad or remittance companies. There are several major remittance companies and innumerable small ones. The large companies handle remittances of funds sent by the Somali diaspora to relatives in country, charging a commission of 3% to 7% (depending on the level of competition and the size of the remittance). Using a mix of telephone, fax, and HP radio, and relying on a worldwide network of agents, the hawalaad companies can instantly transfer money from a Somali in Canada to his family in Bosaso. Increasingly, hawalaad companies also transfer money between businessmen both within Somalia and internationally, allowing merchants to make fast purchases of commodities growing scarce in the local market. Some are now issuing vouchers, which are the equivalent of travellers’ cheques, to allow merchants to travel safely from one region of the country to Mogadishu to make purchases there without carrying large sums of money. Hawalaad businessmen believe that they are moving in the direction of establishing banking capabilities in the near future.

The absence of a banking system places great constraints on the ability of businessmen to access loans, and on the ability of import-export dealers to secure letters of credit. Only the wealthiest businessmen have access to letters of credit from banks in neighbouring countries. The lack of access to credit remains a significant constraint on the economy.

Power Supplies

Privately owned diesel generators sell power, usually for five or six hours in the evenings, to local customers, who pay “per bulb.” Customers - mostly retail businesses and tea shops - typically must pay for the electric line to their establishment. This type of service is usually restricted to an immediate neighbourhood of the generator, but in some cases, one power company supplies an entire town. The service is available to all the larger towns, including Kismayo, Mogadishu, Borama, Bardhere, Hargeisa,
and Bosasso. The fee is either determined by a town board of elders acting as a regulatory commission to protect the interests of customers purchasing from a monopoly utility company, or by the market, in which case, the power companies gauge the cost of kerosene as their nearest competition.

Clan and Social Authority

In a Stateless policy, ranges of social and political forces vie to fill the political vacuum. In Somalia, the most important of these forces include clannism, factions, elders, militias, Islamic movements, businesspeople, and a loose collection of intellectuals, professional associations, and leaders of local non-governmental organisations best referred to collectively as “civil society.”

Understanding the various roles these social actors play and the variable relations between these actors is vital to comprehending how human development services are allocated. Care must be taken with these categories of “players” on the Somali political/social scene - Somalis can and do wear more than one hat, acting as businessmen in one setting, elders in another, and politicians in a third. Most importantly, care must be taken not to assume a fixed relationship (either collaborative or conflicting) between these forces and actors. Businessmen can be financial supporters of the militia, or can undermine them. Elders often jostle with faction leaders over authority, but can also join forces with them in common cause for the benefit of the clan. Intellectuals can be found both in the camps of warlords and peace groups. By any standard, Somali politics and social authority is highly fluid and shifting. This has direct impact on human development efforts, as carefully crafted development agreements can be subjected to continuous re-negotiation to accommodate new power relations and patronage networks.

The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clannism. Lineage identity is a central organising force in the Somali society, and arguably is more significant in contemporary Stateless Somalia than in previous decades. In the period of State collapse, clannism has proved to be both a terribly divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders, as well as a vital source of group protection, social security, and customary law in the absence of the State. Planning and evaluation of human development initiatives should neither vilify nor glorify clannism; its impact on Somali society is too variable and complex. Although clan identity is a very powerful social force in contemporary Somalia, it co-exists with a range of other, cross-cutting affiliations - professional association, region, class, faction, gender, and religious movements (including the Islamic Al-Ittihad organisation) - in Somalia’s highly fluid political arena.

One feature of Somali clan identity that is often poorly understood by outsiders is its fluidity. Firstly, each Somali can trace back his or her genealogy over thirty generations, giving Somalis membership in many sub-clans on their family tree. Which level in one’s lineage is mobilised as one’s “clan” depends entirely on the issue at hand. The past decade of Stateless conflict in Somalia serves as evidence - broad clan conflict between the Darood and Hawiye clans, has over time, devolved into much lower levels of sub-clan identity. Secondly, clan links can be shifted and rediscovered according to the situation at hand. Clans migrating out of their home area will often take on the identity of the dominant clan (shegod status). If the situation dictates, they will reconsider their old lineage. Maternal clan links often provide vital flexibility for individuals conducting business or seeking security across clan lines. Thus, while the Somali clan system is usually portrayed as a fixed fami-

The authors acknowledge that in some settings, the term “civil society” has a more precise meaning. Here, it is used as a term of convenience.
ily tree, it is a tree on which a good deal of grafting takes place. A breakdown of the main Somali clans is provided in Appendix C.

**Elders**

Although sometimes overshadowed by militia commanders, the council of clan elders is the dominant institution in most locales. They are expected to provide wisdom and build consensus among clan ranks in matters of clan interest, especially in time of crisis. During the Siyad Barre era, the role of elders was weakened in some communities by policies that actively sought to undermine their influence. In Somali society, all married men can claim to be elders and speak in clan assemblies (*shir*), earning Somalia a reputation as a "pastoral democracy." Whether the community recognises them as elders, depends on many factors: their wealth, their ability to speak out for the interests of the clan, the military or economic power of their lineage, and sometimes their education. Of course, commitment toward the clan does not always mean commitment toward the community. Moreover, the elders' councils are not institutionalised and often they react more than they act. If strong elders are committing themselves to the welfare of the community, one may expect a fair level of internal security in their neighbourhood. To foster law and order, the elders usually enforce a legal framework which is a combination of customary law (*xeer*), and sometimes Islamic law and the former Somali civil code.

In some communities, a fixed hierarchy of elders is recognised, in which a single *agaas, sultan, boqol* or *imran* is the first among equals among other clan elders (*nabadoon* and *samadoon*). In other places, there is no such consensus, and disputes arise over who is a “true” elder of the clan. Under Siyad Barre, the government-appointed sultans and imams were named, creating rivalries and disputed authority between traditional and appointed elders that last to this day. Skilled factional and militia leaders are quick to exploit these disputes, and can co-opt elders with bribes and other favours to do their bidding. Indeed, the relationship between elders and faction/militia leaders is very complex. At times, they stand together in pursuit of clan interests; at other times, they actively compete for authority over clan affairs. Elders are often sources of great wisdom and advice, but are also capable of venality and corruption.

**Factions**

The mushrooming number of factions in Somalia (over 30 signed the Cairo Accords in late 1997) are almost entirely defined by clan/sub-clan. Only a few factions have managed to hold together multi-clan alliances, and are typically under significant stress. More importantly, many of the factions now populating the Somali political landscape are more fictional than factional - some constitute a handful of ex-politicians living abroad with little or no constituency inside Somalia. Even the most powerful factions who devote most of their energy to coping with internal power struggles, are chronically short of funds. They are almost never able or willing to provide even the most rudimentary administration to the areas, they claim to control. Support that factions receive from their clan is situational, driven by security threats. When the clan is in danger of attack or lack of resources, the factions can rally clan support. In peace, the factions typically find clan support for them weak. Nonetheless, the most powerful factions exercise authority over standing militias and often constitute the most important political authority in a region. They have also, for better or worse, served as the main interlocutors between the Somali people and the international community.

In addition to the factions, two multi-factional coalitions are currently political actors of importance in the country. Their exclusive focus is on national-level political negotiations to reconstruct a central
State, but they play no role in sub-national administration. One, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), was formed by General Aideed in 1992. Though dominated by his clan and militia, the SNA includes a range of factions and representatives of other clans. It tried unsuccessfully to establish a national government led by General Aideed in 1995. The other, the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), was formed by a group of clans/factions opposed to Aideed. It convened a major conference in Somalia, Ethiopia, in late 1996, in the hopes of establishing a process leading to the creation of a national government. That, too, failed to bear fruit. Currently, both coalitions have lost momentum to the new emphasis on regional and trans-regional political authorities, and are very weak.

Finally, Somalia also features political movements not easily defined as faction or coalition. By far the most significant of these is Al-Ittihad, an Islamist movement with adherents in every region and clan. At different points of time, Al-Ittihad has established formal control of several seaports, several towns in Gede region, and numerous neighbourhood-based shari’a courts (more on this movement is provided under “Islam,” below).

A detailed summary of the main factions and political movements currently operating inside Somalia is provided in Appendix D.

Militia

The militia is the main coercive arm of the clan and acts independently under its commanders. This implies that they have often a significant degree of autonomy from the factional leaders - especially when they cannot get food or money from them. The militia draws its legitimacy from its force and the protection it provides against external hostilities. They are often called mooryaan, jiri or dayday. Many militia members are unpaid teenagers who lack other means of employment or survival. Quite often, militia commanders do not prevent their young conscripts from looting or terrorising neighbouring villages. War booty and extortion substitute for regular pay. Such incidents are frequent in the southern regions of Somalia where local elders have often failed to command strong influence among clan-ranks. For their part, many young militiamen feel betrayed by faction leaders and clan elders: having fought at their behest for years, they find themselves untrained, unemployed, sometimes ostracised, and with few prospects.23

Over the past seven years, some changes in the nature of the militias have occurred. The most important one is specialisation. There was a time when potentially all adult males could be militiamen. Today, most men do not pick up arms unless the community is under attack, as a sort of civil defence. Secondly, though predatory behaviour and abuse continue due to a lack of salary, many militiamen are settling down into civilian life. In Somaliland, and largely in Puntland, the government or the faction has been able to re-group them in camps and feed them. Consequently, local security has improved, as has the financial burden on the local authority. In North Mogadishu, the shari’a courts were able, at times, to pay the militias and keep them under control. In the future, the lack of education provided these young men would make them difficult to absorb into a civilian economy.

Islam

Islam has been the religion of the Somalis since the 9th or 10th centuries. More than 99% of the Somalis are today Sunni Muslims. Religious Sufi orders (tareeq (singular)/tariqa (plural) - way or path) have played a significant role in the development of Islam in Somalia, specially the Qadiriyah, the Ahmadiyya, the Shiriyah and the Salhiyyah. The Salhiyyah and the Ahmadiyya established numerous jamaat (religious community led by a sheikh) in the inter-riverine regions in the South.

The Siyad Barre regime took draconian measures to thwart the spread of political Islam especially in its latter years. Its actions, including the execution of militant sheikhs and imams, served to further embitter many young Muslims towards the regime and what they perceived as the foreign and anti-Islamic forces supporting it. This was fuelled in part by the growing number of young religious scholars who studied in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Muslim countries. Developments in Sudan, the Gulf, and North Africa have also fostered a growing tendency to look to Islam as the source of solutions to political or other problems.

As in other Muslim countries, two different trends should be distinguished. The first one is a major re-Islamisation process in the Somali society; this change has been deepened by the civil war and the chaos people had to endure. Islamic values provide hope and solidarity to cope with this very harsh situation. Moreover, Islam provides sociability and, like the tariqa in the 19th century, is used by traders to build trusted commercial networks; that explains the current influence of an association like Al-Islah in the main markets of South Central Somalia. The most visible sign of this trend is the growing visibility of Islamic courts in Somalia. They are widely appreciated by local communities (more out of desire for law and order than of support for re-Islamisation per se), and dispense justice based on shari’a in zones where customary law fails to maintain law and order.

A second trend is what is called radical Islam or fundamentalism, organised as Al-Ittihad in Somalia. Some Somalis express general support for the goals of Al-Ittihad, but do not join the movement; others are profoundly hostile to the movement. The movement itself tends to attract well-educated young men. Al-Ittihad established control over several towns in Southwest Somalia until driven out by Ethiopian forces in 1996. They have a presence throughout the country, though their specific power base is a matter of speculation. In general, their approach appears to be long-term in nature, preferring to invest in educating the population and building broad support. This agenda has not been without setbacks: even within the Al-Ittihad movement, clanism has been difficult to overcome and led to numerous internal splits along clan lines.

Civil Society

Throughout Somalia, intellectuals (locally understood to mean Somalis possessing university education), leaders of local NGOs, and professionals in education, health and other fields play an active role in the work of human development. In some cases, local NGOs operate with little or no outside support to provide basic needs to the community. In Boroma, for instance, a coalition of local NGOs raises funds from the Somali diaspora to help support the local hospital, establish a library, fund an eye clinic, and subsidise the local schools. In other places, health boards and education boards run by local professionals help to set community priorities in their respective fields. In a best-case scenario, these networks of functional, professional associations serve as bridges across clan and factional conflicts, promoting simultaneously human development, reconciliation, and good governance. On several occasions, women’s groups have successfully managed to place pressure on militias to release kidnapping victims or cease fighting.

However, intellectuals have also been at the forefront of hate crimes and mobilisation of clanism for armed conflict. Women’s groups have on occasion served as human shields in inter-clan fighting. Local NGOs also have a mixed legacy. Most of the hundreds of local NGOs which emerged in 1991-1995 were "pocket NGOs," fronts by factions or businessmen to secure lucrative grants and contracts from international aid agencies seeking "local counterparts" through which to work. As foreign
aid decreased in 1995, most of these local NGOs quickly disappeared. The few that remain are generally authentic and not entirely dependent on international aid agencies.

The Business Class

Stateless Somalia’s commercial economy has survived and in some sectors flourished since 1990, generating a class of merchants and businesspeople who are beginning to constitute a political and social force in their own right. In Mogadishu’s Bakara market, top currency traders make up the market and determine the exchange rate for the Somali shilling each day. In Hargeisa, a small group of major livestock exporters lends money to the Somali land administration. The major hawalaad or remittance companies possess nation-wide and international networks of Somali agents and offices, moving hundreds of thousands of dollars daily across clan and factional conflict lines. The political role of these merchants is variable. On the one hand, most benefit from open ports and commerce, have business partners in other clans, and have investments to protect, making them ideal forces for reconciliation and good governance. A recent example is the strike conducted by the Mogadishu transportation sector, demanding an end to militia roadblocks between Mogadishu and Afgoi.

On the other hand, all depend ultimately on their clan and their clan’s militia to protect their assets. Therefore, they will quickly contribute to the militia in case of a threat, and in some instances, actively undermine development and peace efforts if they threaten their business interests. A common example of this has occurred with the digging of new water wells by international agencies. Businesspeople who had been profiting from the sale of trucked water have contaminated their own community’s well in order to protect their business. The rise of illicit commercial activity in Somalia—illegal export of charcoal, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling—also illustrates how merchants can be part of the “conflict constituency” in Somalia.

It is increasingly recognised that Somalia’s business class has shown the greatest creativity in adapting to and overcoming the obstacles posed by the collapse of the state. Finding ways to tap into the dynamic commercial energies of Somalia to advance human development is a challenge the international community is only beginning to explore.

*Note: Roland Marchal, “The Post-Civil War Somali Business Class,” Nairobi, EC Somalia Unit, September 1996*
CHAPTER 2

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND TRENDS

Demography

Population numbers have always been uncertain in Somalia because of the nomadic life-style of the population, and the fact that ethnic Somalis are also present in areas that are now parts of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The nomads move throughout the region (the Horn of Africa), as they have done for centuries, depending on water and grazing conditions. More recently however, they move as whole families seeking refuge from war and drought, and relief wherever available.

As in other countries, estimates of population numbers have been contentious for reasons of political power and claims on government and external (donor) resources. Estimates of the numbers of refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia in the 1980s, and the numbers from Somalia in Ethiopia in the 1990s, were particularly problematic and contentious. The Siyad Barre government systematically inflated refugee figures to increase levels of aid. There is still today a strong tendency on the part of local authorities to exaggerate population figures in the expectation that high numbers will yield greater levels of assistance.

In the last few years, estimates for the population of Somalia, based on a review of and extrapolation from previous data, have been as high as 8.2 and 8.9 million in 1992, as and as low as 4.5 million in 1993, with 6.6 million in 1997. At the end of 1997, a UNFPA consultant, reviewing all previous estimates, concluded that the total population in Somalia in 1995 was probably 5.52 million (allowing for international migration), and would have been 5.76 million in 1997 increasing to 5.89 million in 1998, and 6.20 million in the year 2000. In the 1997 total, 52.3% of the population was male and 47.7% female. The preponderance of males over females is surprising since females generally live longer than males in most countries. Somalia’s population growth rate in 1997-98 was estimated at approximately 2.4% (this estimate included emigration).

Regional demographic information is scarce. The population data for 1997 as illustrated in MAP I. These estimates are not agreed upon by all aid bodies or existing Somali authorities, and probably do not account fully for internal displacement. Recently, the populations of Mogadishu and the Northeast have increased, while populations in the Southern and parts of the Central zones have decreased.

The population density for the country as a whole is less than 10 persons/km². If the urban population were excluded (about 25%), the overall rural population density would be about seven persons/km². Less than five persons/km² occur in the low-rainfall, nomadic areas.

NUTRITION AND FOOD SECURITY

Food Security

Food security is a central, ongoing problem in Somalia, contributing to recurrent humanitarian crises, causing widespread malnutrition, and diverting energy, resources, and hard currency away from other human development activities. Today, endemic insecurity and political instability are the main causes of depressed agricultural yields. However, even before the collapse of the State and the civil war, Somalia was confronted by a worsening food security situation.

Somalia faces many types of food security problems. Historically, Somalia’s ability to feed itself has steadily declined over the past four decades, rendering the overall economy increasingly dependent on food im-

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The World Bank published an estimate of 8.2 million; UNDP estimates 8.9 million.

*Fowler, UN Bureau of Census, 1997

Male and female population figures are surprising given the number of male deaths due to conflict. The discrepancy between this skewed sex ratio also appears in some surveys of children under the age of five, suggesting the possibility that different levels of care and nutrition provided to infants along gender lines may partially explain this demographic puzzle.
ports, and especially, food aid. Secondly, sharp fluctuations in annual food production in Somalia punctuate this steady decline in food security - the result of periodic drought and crop failures. In those years, food security is exceptionally poor and requires large-scale food aid. Thirdly, the prolonged period of statelessness and insecurity in Southern Somalia since 1990 has destroyed much of the agricultural infrastructure, deprived pastoralists of access to veterinary services, and weakened other productive sectors. Finally, uneven household access to remittances and other sources of funds has meant that food security problems vary significantly within Somali communities and households. Some groups face much greater vulnerability to problems of securing food than others.

The steady decline in per capita food production in Somalia has been noted for years, and has manifested itself in ever-higher levels of food imports and food aid. Food aid constituted 20.3% of all food imports in 1970-74 and 5.17 by 1980-84%. Meanwhile, the difference between food produced and total food consumption (the "food gap") changed from a surplus of 5% in 1970-74 to a deficit exceeding 30% in 1980-84. This decline in food self-sufficiency occurred between 1960 and 1990 despite massive international investments in the rural sector, and despite considerable untapped potential in the agricultural areas. Common reasons for this decline include:

* rapid population growth (which outstripped increases in food production in the 1980s)
* rapid urbanisation (which places a growing percentage of the population out of pastoral or agricultural food production)
* changes in food consumption habits among urbanised Somalis (who prefer wheat, rice, and pasta over locally-grown maize and sorghum)

In addition to the steady long-term decline in per capita food production, Somalia is prone to periodic crop failures due to prolonged drought, floods, pest infestation, and outbreak of livestock disease. Crop failures and drought tend to occur once every 3-5 years. The most recent periods have been in 1974-5, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990-2, and now in 1997-98. Pastoralists and small-scale farmers have developed a range of coping mechanisms to see them through drought. Farmers along the Lower and Middle Juba, for instance, plant separate plots of rainfed, riverine and dhusheeq (flood irrigation agriculture, in flood depressions near the river). This diversity of cropping systems virtually ensures a harvest even in cases of flood or drought. Many of the coping mechanisms developed to live within the cyclical droughts in Somalia have been disrupted or undermined in the past few decades by land expropriation along the rivers, the rise of enclosures in some pastoral zones, and other changes. Many communities in Somalia, therefore, are more vulnerable to the effects of drought and crop failure than in the past.

This already worrisome food security situation has been profoundly worsened by eight years of civil war and statelessness. Without a government, nomads faced a severely reduced supply of veterinary services. Range management, although never very efficient, disappeared entirely when farmers lost access to agricultural inputs and services formerly provided

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1. [For analysis of Somalia's food security challenges, see especially Peter Cozzie and Thomas Lubash, eds., *Somalia, Aufruhr in den Winden der Veranderung* (Frankfurt: epi-Verlag, 1986).]
2. [For analysis of Somalia's food security challenges, see especially Peter Cozzie and Thomas Lubash, eds., *Somalia, Aufruhr in den Winden der Veranderung* (Frankfurt: epi-Verlag, 1986).]
by the State. The private sector has responded to a degree, but unregulated sales of veterinary medicine have opened the door to misuse, poor quality control, and hence the spread of drug-resistant disease. The period of widespread looting in 1991-92 led to the dismantling of most of the infrastructure on which food production depended. Irrigation pumps were stolen, irrigation pipes dug up and resold, and packing and processing plants dismantled and sold for scrap metal. That which was not looted fell into serious deterioration. Many of the flood gates, irrigation canals, and flood bunds along the two rivers are now dysfunctional. Most importantly, ongoing insecurity throughout much of the inter-riverine area restricts agricultural production and can disrupt traditional livelihoods. Farmers tend to plant crops on small plots close to the village, leaving distant plots unattended due to security concerns. This practice reduces overall output. They are also often unable to keep most of what they harvest. Militias in many areas demand "taxes", as much as half the harvest, and looting of household grain storage bins still occurs. The net result is a steep drop in harvests compared to pre-war levels, and a sharp rise in levels of malnutrition and chronic hunger among some segments of the population. During the peak time of the war and insecurity period in 1991-92, a famine raged throughout Southern Somalia, claiming several hundred thousand lives, and leading to global malnutrition rates being as high as 80% in some areas. Consequently, deaths of children under five years of age in the Baidoa area, rose to an estimated 75%. Since 1993, the production of staple crops (see MAP IIa for main concentrations of livestock and MAP IIb for main crop locations) has recovered considerably but is still well below pre-war levels. Severe flooding caused by the El Nino phenomenon in late 1997 and early 1998 devastated the agricultural heartland of the country. It was followed by poor rainfall during the 1998 main planting season. The combination has left prospects for the 1998 harvest to be bleak with, according to the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), a possible decrease of around 38% over 1997 levels of production. Maize output will be around 60,600 tonnes this year compared to 110,000 last year. Sorghum production is 22,000 tonnes compared to 108,000 tonnes in 1997. The combined production is the lowest annual output in Somalia since 1993, and may result in the reappearance of widespread, severe malnutrition and famine in late 1998 and early 1999.

The gradual decline of per capita food production and sharp fluctuations in annual output would not constitute a food security crisis if the Somali economy featured other productive enterprises to generate hard currency to import food. The Somali economy was profoundly dependent on the rural sector as its main source of production, however, even before the war. The situation has not improved over eight years of Statelessness, except in a few special sectors (and perhaps, in the Northern and Central zones of the country), where livestock exports appear to generate enough earnings for the importation of other foodstuffs. The large quantity of food aid needed each year is evidence of the gap between Somalia's ability to import food and its total food needs.

Food security varies considerably within communities and even within households. Food security depends on the three main conditions of availability, access and utilisation within the household. Vulnerable groups (those with limited diversification of food/income sources, particularly agriculturists with little or no livestock or Somalis dependent on wage labour) face much greater food insecurity than others. In times of food shortages, some social groups (weak clans and minorities) suffer from limited access to international relief, although they are the main target populations. Indeed, they have been intentionally denied aid by groups seeking to divert the food. While relief agencies sometimes argue that looted or diverted food aid (euphemistically termed "spontaneous redistribution") ends up in the

42. FSAU has collected trend data on this and production of sorghum, maize or cowpeas varies significantly over time and between crop growing regions.
43. FSAU, Household Food Economy Analysis: An Introduction to its use in Somalia, Nairobi, December 1997
marketplace, thereby driving down the price of food for all, this is of small consolation to households with no purchasing power and no connections with clan militias.

The fact that food aid has been delivered, often in very large quantities, to Somalia for roughly forty years suggests that food security is both an urgent human development issue and one which four decades of foreign assistance have done little to improve. There is a real danger that Somalia has become perilously dependent on food aid.¹

The delivery of food aid to Somalia has evolved in recent years to try to avoid excessive disincentive effects on local agricultural production. Efforts have been made to minimise the general distribution of food and “food for work” programmes - both of which faced significant difficulties in Somalia - in favour of food monetisation, or purchase of locally available produced food (which have somewhat less negative effects on farm prices).

OVERVIEW OF NUTRITIONAL STATUS

Endemic malnutrition prevails in Somalia, particularly in the South. Many factors make it difficult to generalise about the nutritional status of the population at large. Continuous measurements of malnutrition come only from UNICEF/MCH (Mother and Child Health) centres and international NGOs. These centres tend to attract those in poor health and, consequently, malnutrition is more prevalent among such people than the population at large. MCH estimates, therefore, tend to overstate the problem. On the other hand, these centres tend to be located in away from remote rural settlements where severe malnutrition can go undetected. Furthermore, levels of malnutrition in Somalia vary seasonally, among different areas and population groups.

UNICEF has estimated that in the more stable areas of the country (the Northeast, Northwest and parts of the Central zones) rates of malnutrition are generally low (less than 10%). However, the rates typically increase among pastoral communities, towards the end of each dry season and among subsistence farming communities before the harvest. In these areas, the nutritional situation (including the seasonal variations) is broadly similar to that which existed before the war. Moderate to high levels of malnutrition (10-25%) is found among the urban poor and subsistence farmers in much of the Southern and Central zones. Very high levels of malnutrition (> 25%) have been found at specific times in localised pockets, especially among returnees and displaced people, and in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bakol and Kismayo. Malnutrition (wasting) rates are highest among young children between the ages of 12-24 months.

Although nutritional surveys during 1994-97 have reported generally low rates of malnutrition in most areas of the country (e.g. 3-10%), there have been some notable exceptions as listed in Table 2.1. There is a moderately high rate of malnutrition for Mogadishu (which accounts for about 15% of the total population of the country). Admissions to therapeutic feeding centres rose in the area during the month of May 1996 and 1997 (especially with admissions from populations recently displaced from Bay region). Mortality rates in some therapeutic feeding centres were high, varying between 10% and 20%.

The UNICEF survey in the Baidoa rural area in May 1995 revealed that children less than 30 months of age, were the worst affected. The rate of malnutrition for the 6-29 month age-group was 25.7% compared with 19.6% among the 6-59 month age-group. The same survey in the Northeast, and a similar one in the Northwest in early 1996, confirmed the findings of most earlier surveys in the Northern regions.
and found low global malnutrition rates of 6-12% (of which 2-3% severe malnutrition rates) in different regions. Rates were generally slightly higher in the Northeast. There were no significant differences between the rates for girls and boys, or between different population groups (nomads, rural and urban). The general nutritional status has improved, however, in most areas since 1993/94, notwithstanding the exceptions indicated in Table 2.1. The situation of nomadic groups and that in many rural areas and towns is believed to be broadly similar to that of the pre-war period, with rates of global malnutrition relatively low except at times of drought or food shortages. The principal exceptions (which, however, affect large numbers of people) are:

- **Mogadishu**, where long-standing chronic malnutrition among the urban and peri-urban poor is aggravated by the massive influx of displaced people and other effects of continuous insecurity
- **Kismayo, Baidoa and a few other towns in the south and central zones** where food supplies are precarious due to the unstable security situation or arrival of displaced families
- **Jalba Valley**, where many minority farming households live in a highly insecure environments

### Table 2.1

**ESTIMATES FOR MALNUTRITION IN SELECTED CITIES AND REGIONS DURING 1994-1997**

*Global Malnutrition* is the percentage of children 6/59 months of age below 80% of the normal weight-for-height ratio. It includes both moderate and severe malnutrition.

Between 70% and 80% of the normal weight-for-height is considered as Moderate Malnutrition; below 70% of the normal weight-for-height is considered as Severe Malnutrition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place/Area</th>
<th>Year/Date</th>
<th>Global Malnutrition Rate (%)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gode</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burhbera</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37-22</td>
<td>58% reported in 1993. Includes towns, rural areas and displaced camps. Survey explicitly to determine the need for a nutrition programme; some doubt conservative validity of the results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulooma</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>55-44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle &amp; Lower Juba</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>July 1996</td>
<td>31-24</td>
<td>7% severe malnutrition reported (but levels of oedema (4%) questioned - could be exaggerated).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhalinyoraso</td>
<td>November 1996</td>
<td>30-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kismayo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town &amp; Displaced Camp</td>
<td>September 1994</td>
<td>54-18</td>
<td>50-72% reported for displaced in 1992/93. 12-24% later in 1993. The “town” populations in 1993 included large numbers of recent arrivals. Most of the population in the displaced camp had been there for some years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>November 1995</td>
<td>30-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Babado &amp; Edn.</strong></td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>Low rates in region pre-war and since late 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hargeya</strong></td>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>17-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belet Weyne</td>
<td>December 1995</td>
<td>19-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belet Weyne</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>17-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Results from UNICEF, March 1998, op. cit.
HEALTH

BACKGROUND TO HEALTH CARE IN SOMALIA

Before the 1990 civil war, Somalia committed itself to improving its health services under the auspices of the WHO (World Health Organisation) "Health for all by the year 2000" programme of primary health care. Development plans were drawn up for basic health services that were to focus on rural and nomadic populations. The health care delivery system then consisted of 411 health posts, 94 maternal and child health centres, 50 primary health care units, 52 district hospitals, 19 regional hospitals, 4 general hospitals and 17 specialised hospitals. Almost all health care provided in pre-war Somalia was either heavily or completely subsidised by external sources thus raising concern over its sustainability.

A large percentage of these facilities were, however, neither functional nor operated at reasonable levels due to the government’s poor economic management and emerging security problems. Moreover, the distribution and mix of the health care facilities and programmes that existed did not follow population distribution patterns. Most health care facilities were concentrated in Mogadishu. These shortcomings manifested themselves in very poor health indicators. Even in the pre-war era, Somali ranked near the bottom of the world in many basic health indicators, such as infant mortality rates and life expectancy.

Since 1990, the situation has worsened considerably in many areas, though parts of the country continue to have roughly the same (poor) access to health care as before the war. It is estimated that at least 90% of these facilities have been seriously damaged and looted. In addition, there has been a massive migration of trained health personnel both to other countries, and within Somalia, to the more secure areas. Where health care is provided, it continues to be financed almost entirely by external sources, though cost-recovery programmes are being implemented in some locations to render health facilities and hospitals at least partially sustainable.

HEALTH INDICATORS IN SOMALIA

Evidence of Somalia's enduring health care crisis is borne out by incomplete but still revealing statistics tracking basic health indicators. What follows below is a combination of pre-war and current data, assembled to provide a basic picture of the state of health of the Somali population. Pre-civil war data collected and reported for Somalia remains, for the most part, the only systematic data for planning and evaluation purposes. This pre-war data has been augmented by the WHO (in early 1998) to monitor more recent developments in Somalia.

Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 43-46 years for the period 1995-97. Even in 1990, Somalia's life expectancy of 48 years was nearly three years lower than the average of 50.9 for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole in 1993 (1996 UNDP HDR). Infant mortality at around 129 per 1000 live births in 1990 was also much greater than the average for SSA in 1993 (97 per 1000) [see Table 2.2]. Here again, WHO believes that this figure worsened over the course of the 1990s, due to lack of pre-natal and hospital care, malnutrition, disease, and stress. Many of the deaths caused are from preventable causes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that stillbirth and death in the neonatal period are very common, and that almost every woman has experienced the death of one or more babies.

The poor state of health coverage is also illustrated in the table below. Estimates indicate that only 10% of infants are immunised and around 10% of women...

*Parts of this section have been drawn from WHO, Somalia Country Programme Statement, 1998/99, Nairobi, March 1998
attended to by trained personnel either during pregnancy or during childbirth. UNICEF surveys in 1997/8 indicated that in the North 19% of women are attended to by a doctor, midwife or nurse during childbirth. While the figures maybe lower in the Central and Southern parts, the percentage is probably around 10%. In Kismayo town, UNICEF reported that over 30% of child deliveries are attended to by a nurse or midwife.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000)</th>
<th>Under 5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000)</th>
<th>Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The main causes of death, illness and chronic disability among infants and children, according to UNICEF, are diarrhoeal disease-related dehydration, respiratory infections and malaria which, together, account for more than half of all child deaths. Neonatal tetanus and other birth-related problems are also believed to contribute significantly to infant mortality, while measles and its complications result in widespread illness and many deaths when outbreaks occur. Intestinal parasites, skin infections, anaemia, tuberculosis and schistosomiasis (along the Shabelle and Jubba rivers) are major causes of debilitating sickness, contribute to malnutrition, and increase the vulnerability of children to other diseases and further malnutrition.

The main causes of maternal death are bleeding after childbirth, prolonged and obstructed labour, infections and eclampsia. Anaemia and female...
genital mutilation contribute to, and aggravate, these conditions. Poor antenatal, delivery and post-natal care, and the extremely limited availability of emergency obstetric referral care for birth complications, result in high rates of mortality and disability.

There are also regular epidemic outbreaks of cholera and measles. As elsewhere in the world, these infectious diseases result in far higher morbidity rates among populations already weakened by malnutrition and stress. Cholera outbreaks have occurred each year since 1994 due to the collapse of sanitation systems and overcrowding in IDP camps. The international community has a well-developed response mechanism for this "routine emergency," resulting in one of the lowest fatality rates for cholera in the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, the disease, which is eminently preventable if basic sanitation practices are followed, results in the deaths of hundreds of Somalis each year. Measles outbreaks are also frequent, resulting increasing deaths as immunisation levels are insufficient. Major outbreaks seem to occur every 2-4 years. Studies by WHO in the 1980's also refer to outbreaks of hepatitis, including one in the Northeast in 1991. There was an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in the areas flooded in late 1997. Somalia is a high-risk zone for outbreaks of dysentery and meningitis.

Among the most prevalent health threats reported in Somalia, are lower respiratory tract infections (especially in children), malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrhoea. The majority of these health risks occur throughout the country, but with a few significant regional variations:

- Most infections and communicable diseases, including diarrhoea, respiratory infections, measles and TB, are particularly prevalent, and deadly, in major urban centres and especially among displaced people in crowded peri-urban areas;

- Malaria is seasonal in the Northern areas, but hyper-endemic and a major, year-round problem in the Southern riverine areas;

- Schistosomiasis is restricted to the Shabelle and Jubba river valleys.

Variations in health status are significant between pastoral, farming, urban and displaced populations, rather than between zones:

- Pastoralists are less exposed to communicable diseases and generally healthier than other groups because they are more adaptable, have ready sources of milk and meat (except during periods of drought), and usually take water from sand-filtered deep wells.

- Subsistence farmers are anchored to their land, subject to the vagaries of seasons (and militia violence) for their food, and heavily reliant on dubious surface water sources (hence particularly exposed to diarrhoea and other water-related diseases). They are also more vulnerable from a nutritional point of view.

- Urban sprawl and displaced people living in crowded, squalid and unsanitary conditions on the periphery of major urban centres, especially recently displaced people, are particularly exposed to diarrhoea and communicable diseases.

In some instances, cultural practices and preferences negatively affect the health of the population. Traditional medicine is still respected by many Somalis, especially outside the main urban centres. In many cases, people go first to traditional healers or sheikhs instead of going directly to formal medical centres. They ordinarily visit health centres only after the failure of the first cure, when the sickness is already developed. Certain diseases such as TB carry a powerful stigma, leading people to hide their illness as
long as possible since they fear being ostracised. If a woman needs a caesarean birth, she cannot make the decision - her husband or his closest relatives have to be consulted first, and they must approve of the operation before it is performed. The culture of female circumcision and infibulation, treated below, creates enormous health risks for the duration of a woman’s life.

**Special Health Care Challenges: Female Circumcision**

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is a deeply rooted practice in Somalia, and one with incalculable health risks. It is estimated that the prevalence rate of FGM in the rural areas of Somalia amounts to between 95-98%. The practice is typically applied to girls aged 7-10 years old. It involves radical (pharaonic) circumcision, and in 90% of the cases, involves infibulation.

Health risks associated with this practice have been documented, and make a compelling case for the abolition of FGM. Unsterile conditions and crude instruments for cutting and sewing young women lead to high rates of tetanus and infection. Profuse bleeding occasionally leads to fatalities; urinary tract infections are common; and infibulation leads to serious complications during child-bearing. It can also deprive the woman of a normal sex life, transforming sexual relations into very painful encounters. Many consider the practice to constitute an irreversible violation of a young woman’s basic human rights, as she is too young to independently decide whether or not to go ahead with the procedure.

That the practice endures in Somalia testifies to the power of culture, and points to the need for education and social work on this sensitive issue. Many women and girls believe that FGM is a necessary path to become a “clean” and marriageable woman, and is an essential rite of passage to adulthood. To reverse this perception, numerous educational programmes have been mounted. In urban areas, FGM eradication programmes have been organised by UNICEF and the Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH). In Somaliland, the administration has officially and publicly opposed FGM. Here, major activities include an well-publicised symposium in which political, religious, women, youth leaders, health care providers, school teachers and international organisations participated. Similar efforts are taking place in the rest of Somalia wherever Somali women associations are active. However, serious efforts at communicating these concerns to men who, in part, create or sustain demand for the practice of FGM need to be mounted.

**Health Care Facilities and Professionals**

Most health care facilities suffered extensive damage during the war, and most of the country’s trained physicians have left the country. Consequently, Somalia faces a serious shortage of both trained health workers and operative health centres. The health posts and hospitals that do provide care tend to be concentrated in a few large cities, and are heavily dependent on external support. The public health sector is essentially the domain of international agencies. Without their support, very few public health services would survive. Often, hospitals have only one general surgeon, relying on teams of international rotating specialists to periodically treat serious cases, or referring critical cases to Mogadishu. Somalis with the financial means to do so, prefer to travel abroad for treatment of major health problems.

In Somaliland, health care delivery is inadequate. As elsewhere in Somalia, health care services are heavily dependent on donor aid for drugs, equipment and materials as well as salaries. The main aid providers have been, to date, the European Union, UNICEF, WHO, and NGOs. With support of the interna-
tional community, the Somaliland Ministry of Health has begun to rehabilitate health services. For instance, since all the pre-war mother and child health (MCH) centres were destroyed during the civil wars - except those in the Awdal (Borama) and Sool (Las Anod) regions - new facilities are being located in buildings that were previously built to serve as banks, government offices, or public orientation centres. In addition, all the regional hospitals are functioning, with the exception of the one in Burao, which was destroyed twice by the war in Somaliland. The German NGO (GED) has partially re-equipped Hargeisa hospital, and Caritas International has done a similar job on the Berbera Mental Hospital. Borama hospital receives support from the Somali diaspora, which sends medical supplies from the Gulf States. An internationally funded TB hospital in Borama serves not only Somaliland, but parts of Eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti as well.

The rest of the country is served by scattered hospitals in major regional centres and a network of primary health care posts and MCHs. In Bosasso (Africa-70), Galkayo (MSF Holland), Jowhar (INTERSOS up to the late 1997 crisis), Belet Weyne, Merka (COSV), and Kismayo (MSF Belgium), regional hospitals are functioning. In Mogadishu, Kaysena hospital in North Mogadishu is managed by Somali Red Crescent Society and funded by ICRC, and SOS manages a hospital in South Mogadishu. Following the kidnapping of 10 ICRC staff in North Mogadishu in April 1998, ICRC has announced that it will "drastically reduce" its activities in the country. The impact of this decision on health care in Somalia is not yet known.

The shortage of public health care facilities has opened the door for a rapidly growing private sector involvement in the supply of health care, especially private clinics and pharmacies. The apparent magnitude of the private sector services (according to UNICEF surveys for the Northeast and Northwest in 1997/8, over 90% of curative care first contacts are in the private sector) is indicative of the significant role the private sector is playing in filling in the gaps and supplementing the government health care system. In the South, the proportion may be even higher since most NGOs and UN agencies pulled out of Mogadishu, Dadaab, and Bardhere. Private health care can involve a range of activities. Some private clinics are operative in most towns, run either by a physician or by a nurse. Most Somali physicians and nurses who work in the morning in local hospitals (usually on the payroll of an international agency) will hold "office hours" outside of a pharmacy, where he or she will prescribe drugs to patients for a fee. Nevertheless, many physicians and nurses who pose as trained health professionals are not, whereas some have only partial training. Moreover, pharmaceutical drugs, purchased by businessmen with no health expertise, are readily available on the open market. They then resell them to street vendors. Some of these drugs are expired, of poor quality, or have been discontinued for health reasons. Dosage regulations are routinely ignored by self-diagnosed patients, inviting dangerous misuse of drugs and creating ideal conditions for the rapid spread of drug resistance. In late 1992 and 1993, UN intervention temporarily made dramatic improvements in the supply of high-quality health facilities. This assistance, brought by over 200 international NGOs, UN agencies, and military hospitals brought more and better health services than the country had ever seen. Consequently, immunisation levels may well have reached an all time high in many parts of the country. Large numbers of MCH centres, OPDs and hospitals were either rehabilitated or re-established to serve the urban, rural and internally displaced populations.

Following the departure of UNOSOM in 1995, however, the number of operational NGOs in Somalia dropped to fewer than 40, and funding levels for health declined severely. Many NGOs in the health
sector were forced to withdraw due to security incidents. Most of those that remain continue to have serious security and logistical limitations on their activities, and operate at very high cost. Surprisingly, WHO believes that the remaining operational facilities are for the most part functioning at a higher level now than prior to the civil conflict due to the controlled inputs of the donor community. However, most pre-war hospitals remain empty shells. A similar situation exists for MCH centres and OPDs in most parts of the country. The reduced numbers of health posts are similarly thought to be providing a higher level of service than before 1991.

Training of health care workers remains a serious problem. The collapse of the educational system has prevented the training of doctors and nurses. Aid agencies have provided training for nurses, midwives, traditional birth attendants, and community health workers. They are the backbone of primary and preventive care, but cannot substitute for nurses and physicians beyond basic care. No data exists on the total number of Somali physicians and nurses working in the country.

**Health Financing**

The main characteristics of the present financing of public health care involve almost total dependence on international donor funding. There is negligible cost-recovery for the public sector services and the small charges that are made are mostly used to supplement the health workers’ own salaries. At the community level, contributions have generally been limited to supporting community health workers and traditional birth attendants, and even that has been uneven and irregular. In Somaliland, the government contribution is variously estimated to cover less than 2% of current costs. There is, as noted previously, a high rate of spending for privately supplied drugs everywhere.

A health financing study undertaken in 1997 and financed by the EC, found that many people were both willing and able to pay for curative services (as shown by the extensive use of private health care, typical spending on drugs of $2-3 per episode), but not for preventive services (such as EPI, antenatal care and family planning services) which are undervalued and have been provided at no cost in the past.

The study estimated 1997 expenditures on health care (recurrent costs only) at an average of $8.50 per capita of which at least 80% ($6.80 per person) was out-of-pocket expenditures by individuals and 20% ($1.70 per person) represented subsidies from the public sector or NGOs (by the public or NGO sector, both mostly financed by donor agencies). Nevertheless, the report observed the willingness of people to pay and the relative success of cost-recovery programmes when the perceived quality of care was good and services were convenient and accessible.

Data on total donor commitments to the Somali health sector are not available, but all agree that assistance to health care makes up an important part of total aid allocated to the country. Donors are acutely aware of the problem of sustainability, noting that external assistance covers 98-99% of total costs of public health care. The EC study recommends that a health financial strategy should be developed to maximise the sharing of recurrent costs and that drugs be sold. Moreover, community financing should be developed on a decentralised basis using a flexible, participatory approach, with fees being retained by the facility and managed by a community committee and used within the framework of specific rules and guidelines. Not all can afford to pay, and thus the health financing study recommends that the poor be protected by exemptions with criteria which are clear, unambiguous, easy to apply and limited in scope.

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HEALTH AUTHORITIES

The overwhelming financial contribution of major international donors into Somali health care means that the donors unavoidably possess the power to define health care policies. Certain public health issues (like vaccination campaigns) are necessarily "global," not local, and cannot be relegated to local authorities. Other health issues are eminently local. In some parts of the country, Somali communities have created district or regional health boards, aiming to give local health professionals and the local community a voice in prioritising health care needs, setting health care policy, allocating health care funds, and partnering with international donors. The establishment of this type of functional, sectorally-based local authority is a welcome development.

For a global (national) health strategy, the prolonged absence of a Central State has led donors and international agencies to form the SACB Health and Nutrition Sectoral Committee, one of five sectoral committees established by the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) - a body composed of donors, UN agencies, and NGOs operating in Somalia - which was designed to co-ordinate aid strategy and policy in the absence of a State. The SACB Health and Nutrition Sectoral Committee allows agencies and donors involved in the health sector to plan and co-ordinate health care in Somalia. The recent success of the National Immunisation Campaign (NIDs) in 1998, as well as the aid community's annual response mechanism to outbreaks of cholera, are a few examples of the importance and success of the Committee.

The SACB Health and Nutrition Sectoral Committee has proposed the development of national health policies as well as programme development and management. It aims for all zones or regions with an established, recognised local authority to agree to a common, sustainable strategy for primary health care by 1999.

GENDER

Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional Somali socio-cultural structures and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making processes and their access to and control of resources. Respect for women's rights in general, their rights related to governance and their participation in decision-making in particular, falls short of those expressed in the internationally recognised Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Since the civil war in Somalia, women are beginning to meet the basic needs of their families and communities. Though they may share the responsibility of the civil war with males, many women have condemned clan fighting which they see as only destruction and a senseless loss of lives. Women demonstrated several times during the last two years in Mogadishu to support peace and the establishment of a viable administration.

Under Siyad Barre's regime, women's rights were improved. Literacy and equal employment opportunities were increased for women, thereby helping to narrow the gender gap. The promulgation of the Family Law in 1975 gave men and women equal rights in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance. The Labour Code established in 1972 promulgated the equality of women in the workplace. Under the party system established in 1976, Somali women received equal opportunities to participate in government and to reach positions of leadership.46 The Constitution, promulgated in 1978, gave male and female citizens equal rights and duties and increased women's roles in high governmental positions. Of course, these laws were not applied with the same determination in all corners of the country and sometimes constituted rhetoric rather than actual change in policy. Nevertheless, they provided real opportunities that are currently challenged by the new trends...
in the society (see following chapter). While these new trends appear mostly negative, the new constitution of Puntland, however, shows some enlightenment in that women can run for elective office and a number of parliamentary seats are reserved to women.

The civil war and State collapse has had a mixed impact on the status of women in Somalia. On the one hand, women have come to assume many new responsibilities and, in the process, have gained greater social authority. Of particular importance is the rise of women in the business and commercial sectors. According to one recent estimate, 80% of Somali households rely exclusively on income generated by female members of the family. In addition to tending to daily maintenance of the household (food preparation, fuel-gathering), many Somali women have started to occupy the fields of small trade and business at all levels. They have also generated a capacity for mobilising initial funds from family lending, remittances or specific women’s credit and savings schemes. According to Roland Marchal, women have gained a strong autonomy in business and demonstrated excellent management capacities equivalent to, or even exceeding, men’s. Somali women have also been active in founding NGOs to promote women’s rights inter alia, IIDA, KERDO (Kenya Relief and Development Organisation), CCS (Committee of Concerned Somalis), SOMAID (Somali Aid and Development) and Candle Light.

On the other hand, women were the principal victims of the violence of a civil war waged mostly by men. Rape, once rare in Somalia, became a weapon of choice for militia/bandits moving into other clans’ territory. Inasmuch as groups with guns were empowered by the collapse of the State, women were marginalised in periods of conflict. With the collapse of the central government, Somalia is even further removed from a situation where respect for women rights can be enforced by a central authority.

It is revealing that in the Cairo and Sodere reconciliation meetings, not a single woman was present as a representative. The absence of any electoral system in Somalia at any level shuts women out of political processes dominated by men. The rise of Islamist politics in parts of Somalia promotes very retrogressive views on the position of women in society.

In terms of women’s roles in decision-making, UNIFEM, UNICEF, Life and Peace Institute, NOVIB and other international NGOs (like CSIW) organised in several regions (Somaliland, Central, Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle) have offered training workshops on Women’s role in Conflict Resolution. The purpose of the training is to build a critical mass of Somali women able to advocate for peace and act as agents of social change in their communities.

**DRUG ABUSE (Qaat Problem)**

Qaat* (or myrrha in Swahili) is a leafy plant grown in the highlands of Kenya and Ethiopia that has a mild narcotic quality. It is an addictive drug consumed widely in Somaliland and Somalia. Consumption used to be linked to religious practices in the past but has developed since the 1960s as an urban habit in Somaliland and then in the South. In 1983, Siyad Barre decided it be banned and ordered the destruction of the qaat fields in Somaliland. He believed that the benefits were used to fund the SNM, and because he hoped to win some foreign grants to support this “health” policy. Qaat, though illegal, was still available in the main urban centres. The only change was that trade networks were now controlled by Siyad Barre’s clients. By the late 1980s, consumption was greater and present even in the countryside. Today, in many regions of the country, more than 90% or more of adult males chew qaat daily.

Qaat is not, however, a controlled drug under UN treaties. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1993 decided against bringing it under interna-

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tional control, concluding that it was for individual governments to assess the situation in their own countries and take such action as they saw fit. Further, no global figures of consumption are known and its hallucinogenic effects are disputed.

There is not much doubt, however, that qaat is a major economic and social problem everywhere in Somalia. This is so for several reasons. Firstly, qaat consumption constitutes a serious drain of hard currency out of Somalia, and creates a serious trade deficit between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. Conservative estimates suggest that about $150,000 per day is spent on qaat consumption in Somalia, an enormous loss for such poor an economy. Secondly, at the household level, it diverts scarce funds away from needed food, medicine, and savings. Counting the costs of coke, tea, and cigarettes as well as the qaat itself, an individual spends between two and three US dollars per day on qaat-chewing (a figure which often dwarfs the remaining portion of the household budget). Thirdly, because chewing sessions normally begin at mid-day, it reduces the length of the work-day to roughly half a day, a setback to commercial productivity and efficiency of the civil service (as well as shaping a reduction of labour input into production).

Besides qaat, other drugs such as amphetamines and mandrax are increasingly used by different segments of the population, even in the countryside, and especially by young militiamen. These drugs are cheaper and always available in the unregulated market. They are often taken in combination with qaat with the intent of magnifying the effect of the drug. There is also anecdotal evidence that Somalia is becoming a producer and a staging point for international drug trafficking. This is one of the many negative consequences for the international community caused when large sections of territory fall outside the rule of law.

The main environmental problems in Somalia today are rangeland degradation, deforestation, the depletion of wildlife resources, desertification near some coastal areas, marine pollution and the damage to marine life through illegal fishing and over-fishing by foreign vessels.

About 1.5 million people in Somalia live in coastal areas and their observed procedures of solid waste disposal (in both urban and rural communities) are unsatisfactory in every respect. There have been unsubstantiated reports of discharge of toxic tannery wastes into the sea at Brava and Kismayo, and on land at Mogadishu, in Somaliland and in the Northeast. A scandal broke out in the summer of 1992 when foreign journalists made public a deal between one Minister of the Ali Mahdi cabinet and a Swiss company to use areas on the coast for waste disposal. These kinds of abuse are easy to commit given the lack of transparency and accountability whether of local or national administrations.

Desertification has become more serious in recent years since sand dune stabilisation programmes funded by the international community stopped because of the war. The areas most affected are the coastal strip between Mogadishu and Brava, sand dunes stretching North of Kismayo, the area between Hargeisa and Borama, parts of Bay region, and the perimeters of towns and refugee camps. Few anti-desertification measures have been taken. Good land is at risk of being lost for many decades to come.

A recent and very threatening environmental crisis has emerged in the form of illegal charcoal production for export. High demand in the Gulf for charcoal has led to wholesale destruction of acacia forests in parts of the Northwest and the Kismayo area. Kismayo's main export is now charcoal, and forests have been affected as far as 90 kilometres from the

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Charcoal production in the Bay region, long a major source of charcoal, has also been accelerated, with exports flowing out of Eel Mahaan port.

The main immediate environmental issue in Somalia today is probably the question of water. In most parts of Somalia, water has always been scarce but the problems have been aggravated by the destruction and looting of water supply installations and the general lack of maintenance. They are compounded by erratic rainfall patterns that produce both droughts and floods. Data on access to water supplies is not available for much of the country. However, relatively small proportion (may be even less than 5%) of the total population is believed to have secure access to water throughout the year, albeit with significant regional variations. 

Water availability has always been a major issue in the struggle for survival in Somalia. Competition for water and the livelihood options that derive from the control of water are deeply ingrained in Somali life and culture. Water is a precious resource to be owned and jealously defended by families, lineages and clans. Every developed water source is owned by someone or some group or belonged to the government that had constructed it. Historically, there has been a chronic shortage of water in Somalia and this has been exacerbated by the conflicts. At the very least, water sources existing before the civil war need to be rehabilitated.

Questions about access to safe drinking water were asked in the two recently published UNICEF household surveys of the Northwest in early 1996 and the Northeast in 1997. The results suggest that, on average, only 31% of the population have access to safe drinking water in the Northwest and even fewer, 19%, in the Northeast. In the Northwest, the situation is worse in the rural settled areas than the cities, although the reverse is true in the Northeast. The nomadic population, unsurprisingly, has very low rates of water access (put at 5% and 2% in the two regions respectively). Estimates available at the end of 1997 for other zones show that the situation is also as bad as in the North. In the Southern zone, less than 20% have access to safe supplies on a permanent, annual basis. In Mogadishu, the figure is not more than 23% (35% in the urban area, 10% in rural Benadir) and elsewhere in the Central zone, the figures are 7%-25% in cities and 4%-14% in rural areas.

To date, UNICEF has been at the forefront of efforts to restore and increase access to safe water throughout the country. Its activities include:

- urban systems (which provide access for large concentrations of people) in the more stable, secure areas;
- the rehabilitation or re-sinking of bore holes, where feasible;
- the rehabilitation and protection of dug wells and reservoirs in many regions;
- the construction of a few new, small-scale systems for rural villages and small towns.

ICRC and a considerable number of other agencies have also rehabilitated or constructed new boreholes and/or improved dug wells in the areas where they operate. The number of hand pumps has increased considerably as agencies have improved dug wells by means of such installations. Inter-agency co-ordination has been lacking at times but has improved with the establishment, in 1997, of the Water Sectoral Committee of the SACB. Some joint inter-agency projects have been agreed upon for major works in the Northwest and Northeast. Sustainability has been a recurrent issue. In many locales, wells and water delivery systems have not been properly maintained by local authorities, leading to renewed calls for international assistance.

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*Table A3, but see higher figures for the North in Table 2.2* #64 UNICEF-Somalia. *Water and Environmental Sanitation Sector — WES Workplan, August 1997, staff papers, Nairobi, August 1997*
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ECONOMY

Few developing countries have economies as paradoxical as Somalia's. On the one hand, it is indisputably weak. Indeed, by most standards it constitutes one of the poorest economies in the world. Even infusions of billions of dollars of economic assistance from 1960 to 1990 failed to lift it out of its position in the bottom rung of developing states. Most households live at or near subsistence level, in profound poverty, only a calamity away from severe malnutrition and even famine. The country continues to require annual infusions of food aid. Somalia's main productive activity, livestock herding, is sharply limited by the semi-arid environment and cannot be easily expanded without risk of environmental degradation. Perhaps, the most revealing evidence of the economy's weakness is the extent to which Somali society depends on remittances sent from relatives working abroad. Somalia's export of its own labour force rivals the importance of its livestock exports. From this perspective, Somalia risks becoming little more than a labour reserve. It risks being seen as a place where women, children, the elderly, and a residual group of bandits and faction leaders live off the remittances of adult males working abroad, or of the largesse of international relief agencies.58

On the other hand, Somalia's post-intervention economy is also marked by an impressive level of entrepreneurship, commercial activity, and consumption patterns that belie the country's statistical poverty. The port of Berbera is now Ethiopia's second most important port. It bustles with more import-export business than before the war. Rudimentary beach-ports around Mogadishu sustain a major entrepôt economy, from which a wide range of food imports, cloth, and electronics flow into Kenya and southern Ethiopia via merchants with offices in Dubai and Nairobi. Urban populations create demand for high-priced food imports, daily delivery of qaat, new vehicles, and international telecommunications services, in which several competing companies have invested millions of dollars since 1994.

Unraveling this paradox and understanding its implications for human development involves taking a closer look at sources of revenue, the nature of production, and the distribution of income in Somalia. It also requires a brief review of the history of economic development in Somalia.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITY

PRE-1990

The Somali economy has historically been poor, subsistence-oriented, and until recently, overwhelmingly rural. Pastoral animal husbandry has been and continues to be the dominant productive activity. Small-scale agriculture, usually carried out as part of agropastoralist activity, has been and continues to be a major source of production in the inter-riverine regions. Conventional economic measurements have, however, tended to exaggerate the level of household poverty in Somalia. Milk and meat consumption by nomadic families is rarely captured in conventional surveys. When such hidden consumption is taken into account, Somali pastoral "incomes" appear somewhat stronger.59 In more recent decades, many other "unofficial" economic transactions and productivity have evolved into what some have termed Somalia's "hidden economy." The rise of this vibrant informal sector, (e.g. smuggling and unreported agricultural production parallel markets) has tended to deflate economic indicators such as GNP per capita.60

Throughout both the colonial and post-colonial era, the Somali economy has proved exceedingly difficult to tax; customs duties on imports and exports have been the only reliable source of tax revenues. Consequently, colonial administration of Italian Somalia was always subsidised, and at independence the

58 This role of labour reserve is shared by many of Somalia's neighbours, especially Sudan, Eritrea, and Yemen.


new Somali State could only cover 69% of its budget; subsidies from Italy and Great Britain covered the rest. As the country’s development agenda expanded along with the size of its civil service and army, foreign aid came to constitute an ever-larger portion of the State’s budget, and the economy grew increasingly dependent on foreign aid. The fact that the Somali State has never been remotely sustainable based on locally generated revenues is one of the great challenges facing those trying to rebuild a new state in the aftermath of the civil war.

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of foreign aid on the Somali economy in the period from 1960 to 1990. Thanks to Somalia’s geographically strategic importance in the Horn of Africa, it attracted one of the highest rates of per capita foreign aid in the world. The total military aid has been estimated at $2.4 billion and economic aid about $5 billion between 1960 and 1988. This did not merely distort the economy in Somalia; it fueled the rise of an extremely bloated (and yet ineffective) civil service. In addition, it was the major factor in the rapid urbanisation of Mogadishu from a town of 40,000 in the early 1950s to a metropolis of over one million by the 1980s. Much, if not most, of the economy of Mogadishu depended, directly or indirectly, on this massive infusion of external funding. Nearly all of the human development activities and services were underwritten by external donors. Some of this aid did help to catalyse other productive enterprises. By the end of the 1960s, livestock exports were doubled, and banana output increased by more than 70% in the first five years of independence. Banana and cereals output rapidly increased after the 1982 liberalisation. However, these accomplishments were dwarfed by the impact of foreign aid. By the mid-1980s, 100% of the Somali development budget and about 60% of its regular budget was funded by foreign aid. Foreign aid constituted an astounding 57% of the country’s GDP. As one observer put it at the time, Somalia had become “a ward of the international community.”

Other important economic trends besides foreign aid dependence became visible over the course of the 1970s and 1980s.

- Firstly, the oil boom in the Arabian Peninsula in the early 1970s marked the beginning of a period of growing migrant labour from Somalia to the Gulf, and growing importance of remittances in the Somali economy. As a source of income, remittances rose and fell with the fortunes of OPEC, but even in years of low oil prices, they remained an important source of income for many Somali families.

- Secondly, the build-up of the Somali military into one of the largest armies in sub-Saharan Africa (thanks to very high levels of military assistance from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and lower but still significant levels of military aid from the US in the 1980s) absorbed large numbers of young men, camouflaging what would otherwise have been growing levels of unemployment.

- Thirdly, Somalia harnessed international aid to develop an industrial sector based on agro-industry, including sugar refineries, State rice farms, and factories for tomato canning, meat-processing, fish-processing, pasta, wheat flour, cigarettes, matches, and others, all State-run.

- Fourthly, Somalia had an external debt that it could not repay, forcing it into a decade-long series of negotiations, broken agreements, and renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, the Somali economy in this era was thoroughly corrupted. The financial sector, which was entirely owned by the public, was largely a financing tool for public agencies that often were working for either the army or the security or the closest clients of the regime. Enormous personal fortunes were created: the “real money” in Somalia was attained through access to the state coffers, not in the private sector.

Ken Menkhoff, US Foreign Assistance to Somalia: Review from the Adjusted Multilateral Policy, N. 3 (January 1991)

The "branco valor" system involved migrant labourers sending back remittances or consumer goods which relatives then received. See Abdiilahi Sheekh Ali, "Remittances in Somalia," (UNDO 8 (December 1997).

Debt increased much faster than export earnings in 1980, it reached four billion Somali shillings, about 75 years worth of banana exports (based on 1978 figures). Public sector foreign debt service over exports and the total outstanding foreign debt over GDP were 240% and 277%, in 1988 and 1990 respectively.

Interest rates on lending and savings were significantly negative in real terms. More than 80% of domestic credit went to public entities. The remaining credit was allocated to the private sector and fell into the hands of a few large customers with political influence, particularly Barre's family and friends. Due to these and other policies, the financial system accumulated huge losses and years of losses. The Commercial and Savings Bank was declared bankrupt. Development Bank was unable to provide new lending in 1989. The financial system fell into deep crisis and, with the complicity of corrupt officials, most of the daily operations of the banking system fell into the black market.
One of the most significant economic trends in the 1970s and 1980s was the failed imposition of a Statist economy on Somali society. This programme of State-led development and nationalisation was initially a consequence of the philosophy of “scientific socialism” embraced (if not understood) by Siyad Barre, whose 1969 coup was refashioned into a “revolution.” Long after Barre abandoned socialist rhetoric to please his new patrons in the West (beginning in 1979, shortly after Somalia was abandoned by the USSR over the Ogaden War), the government continued to try to maintain state involvement in the economy, not out of a residual commitment to socialism, but as part of “rent-seeking” policies by a corrupt and increasingly parasitic regime.

Heavy handed Statist interventions in the economy not only failed, in the sense that the mismanagement they entailed drove the economy into a deep crisis. They also produced a thriving parallel or black market, which came to serve as the foundation for much of Somalia’s post-1990 economic activity. Remittances of Somali workers abroad were sent through informal channels. The majority of exports and imports were transacted outside the purview of the custom authorities and at an essentially free-market exchange rate; and a great deal of internal trade and production also escaped official control. By the mid-1980s, the informal sector became the largest employer of labour. It provided health, educational, and financial services (activities that had formerly been public monopolies). It provided credit and investment-financing to small producers, since access to the official credit market was granted only to state monopolies and businessmen with political connections. Because of this, private traders were able to respond to local demand and import necessary consumption, intermediate and capital goods without help from state institutions. In the second half of the 1980s, local markets were thriving, in sharp contrast with the declining public sector.

Thus, by the mid-1980s, the State had already begun to “collapse,” holding less and less relevance to the economy except as a source of ongoing financial crisis and corruption. The collapse of economic institutions and the private sector’s efforts to cope with that collapse were processes that started long before the Somali State’s ultimate collapse in 1991.

One other important economic trend in the pre-war period which is essential for understanding strategies of economic survival and adaptation in post-1990 Somalia is the development of the extended household as a diversified economic unit. Extended families have always served as the main micro-economic units in Somalia. Until recent decades, these households had limited opportunities to diversify family economic activities. The expansion of economic activities over the course of the past several decades has given extended families a much wider choice of occupations and sectors, and extended families have opted for a strategy of diversification. A typical division of labour for an extended family would include some members herding the family’s livestock; others managing a small farm; one tending a shop in a nearby town; another involved in brokering commercial transactions; still another working abroad, sending remittances; and, if the family were fortunate, one member with post-secondary education, working in the civil service. These household members act as a loose corporate economic unit, covering one another in case of a catastrophic setback in one sector. Individuals themselves were typically involved in multiple occupations; most civil servants hold second or even third job in the informal sector. This diversification of extended family economic activities remains an important micro-economic strategy for managing risk in Stateless Somalia.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1991 COLLAPSE OF THE STATE

The civil war coupled with the Siyad Barre inheritance nearly destroyed the productive capacity of the economy and contributed to the 1992 famine. By the end of 1992, all public sector institutions had collapsed and most state establishments, parastatals and small industries either were destroyed in the fighting or were ransacked of anything of value. Public utilities for electricity, running water, telephones, and sewage were destroyed. The electricity system in Mogadishu, which had benefited from an extensive foreign-financed rehabilitation programme, was destroyed. The limited road system, the most important means of transport, was totally worn out. Most of the airports and seaports were damaged and required extensive re-building. Public services in human development, especially health and education disappeared. Most of the skilled and professional people who operated these services had either already fled the country during Siyad Barre's oppressive regime or immediately after the outbreak of the civil war.

The rural economy was seriously affected by civil war as the violence in urban centres spread to rural villages. Cropts and livestock in the Bay region, one of the most fertile and productive of the rainfed areas in all of Somalia, were either stolen or destroyed by gunmen. Consequently, most of the agricultural land became idle and, coinciding with the 1992 major drought, led to the devastation that killed more than 300,000 people. In the urban areas, the looting of private businesses, especially those owned by non-ethnic Somalis and Somalis of weak clans led these traders to flee to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen.

THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMY

Basic Economic Indicators

Securing reliable and systematic data on economic activity, income, and distribution is exceedingly difficult in the current environment of Somalia. This is not an entirely new problem for economic analysis in Somalia. In 1988, Vali Jamal pointed out that reliable data was scarce in pre-war Somalia as well.

"Normally, one starts the analysis of an economy on the basis of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures. In Somalia such figures provide no guide to economic performance nor welfare because of two overwhelming facts about the Somali economy: (i) the predominance of the nomadic sector; and (ii) the importance of repatriated money. Each in its turn gives rise to two problems: the first is the estimation of livestock production and the valuation to be attached to it; and the second is the estimation of the size of the remittances and their impact on the inflationary process. The two together ensure that conventional figures of GDP and associated magnitudes fail to convey any meaningful picture of the real welfare position of the Somali people or the health of the national economy."  

Thus, even with the existence of a central government and a statistical office, estimates of Somali national accounts are loaded with difficulties and therefore only intelligent guesswork provides an idea of its national income. UNDOS puts the GNP for Somalia as a whole in 1997 at around SUS one billion, or SUS176 per head, based upon its household income enquiries.  


$US300, $US149 and $US106 for the urban, rural and nomadic populations respectively. This, according to the same UNDOS estimates, puts Somalia's national income at 60% of its pre-war levels. These figures are based upon the assumption that GNP in Somalia is mainly composed of household income since non-household income generating activities are practically non-existent.49

Main Economic Activity and Sources of Income

Though a variety of specialised, localised sources of income can be found throughout Somalia - fishing in some coastal settlements, charcoal in Kismayo, Bay, and Bakol, wage labour on plantations in the Lower Shabelle, aromatic gum-harvesting in the Northeast - there are four main sources of revenue in the country today: livestock, agriculture, remittances, and commerce. The relative importance of each of these sources of income varies by region and class, defining the parameters of each household's ability to satisfy its needs.

Livestock

Livestock continues to be the backbone of the economy, as before the war, providing both daily subsistence to nomadic families and the main source of export revenues.70 For the past 20 years Somalia has exported animals on-the-roof to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Gulf States. This export trade has always been in the private sector and normally is not seriously affected by price fluctuations, except during the 40-day Haj period when demand rises, and prices can increase by up to 60%.

Livestock export patterns have shifted significantly since 1990. Prior to the war, livestock was exported out of Berbera (primarily from the Northern regions and Eastern Ethiopia), Mogadishu (from Central and inter-riverine areas), and Kismayo (from the Jubba regions). Today, no livestock is exported out of Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, but livestock exports out of Berbera have grown considerably, exceeding pre-war levels, and are drawn back into the region from the Hiran and south-central Somalia. Berbera exported 2,936,711 head of livestock in 1997 and 2,376,646 in 1996. Bosasso port, once an inconsequential export centre, has also assumed a much more important role in livestock exports; it exported 528,858 head of livestock in 1998 and 650,204 in 1997.71 Both Berbera and Bosasso are strong players in the export of hides and skins as well. To the South, livestock from the Juba regions as well as parts of Bay and Bakol (especially cattle), now travel overland for sale in the Kenya market.72 Mogadishu, meanwhile, continues to generate enough internal demand for meat that most camels from Southern Somalia are sold there.

Other export patterns for livestock are emerging over the course of the 1990s. One is the move to increase the export of fresh meat by air to the Gulf. Before the civil war, Mogadishu and Hargeysa were the only centres for export of chilled meat. After several years of interruption, air export of fresh meat was again restarted in 1994, from Bale Dogle airport (between Baidoa and Mogadishu, controlled by Aideed) mostly to Dubai, but also to Saudi Arabia. This commerce is fraught with investment risks and is plagued by lack of investments: refrigeration facilities are minimal between slaughterhouse and the airport, and almost non-existent on the planes used to transport the meat. Therefore, customs authorities in Sharjah and Dubai periodically ban the importation of Somali fresh meat for health reasons. Nonetheless, livestock traders in other regions of Somalia are looking into the possibility of renovating airstrips and slaughterhouses in their areas to attract direct exports of fresh meat. They hope to profit from direct access to the Gulf market. This has already begun in Galkayo; due to the 1998 Saudi ban on Somali livestock (see below), export of fresh meat may start in the near future in Somaliland.

49 These estimates must be used with caution; the background to these UNDOS statistics is not available. Jamal used the production of milk and its consumption to estimate a higher GDP than was commonly used at that time. His estimates put Somalia on par with Uganda at that time. See Vali Jamal, "National Accounts in Somalia" and "National Income of Somalia", Technical papers 1 and 5 respectively in ILO Generating Employment and Income in Somalia, ILO/JASPA, Addis Ababa, 1989.

70 This paragraph is drawn from J. Drysdale, M. Waldo, M. Sabrie, "Bird's-eye View of Economic Growth in Somalia's Private Sector and Contributions to Growth which could be made by the International Community," presented to a UNDP workshop, April 24, 1997 (UNDOS, Somalia, Nairobi).

Second trend in livestock exports is the rising demand for young goat skin in the Gulf. The price of young goats is rising in Southern Somalia, as exporters of hides and skins purchase them in Mogadishu for their skins, exporting them by air via Bale Dogle.

Livestock exports have thus rebounded from the disruptions of the civil war despite the fact that two of the country’s four main seaports are not handling livestock exports. The reasons for the decline of Mogadishu and Kismayo as livestock export centres are straightforward. Firstly, the Mogadishu seaport has been closed since 1995 due to insecurity and disputed authority over the ports; export of livestock at the beach ports of Merka and Eel Mahaan is unfeasible. Likewise, ongoing political tensions in the Lower Juba valley have discouraged livestock traders from risking moving livestock from the interior to the port, although the port is open. In addition, only large ships can safely transport livestock the long distance to the Gulf, and they either cannot or will not dock at Mogadishu and Kismayo. Finally, livestock traders believe that the costs of sea transport from southern Somali ports to the Gulf are too high to compete effectively with livestock exported out of Berbera and Bosasso.

A major threat to Somalia’s livestock exports has arisen with the Saudi Arabian ban on imports of Somali livestock in February 1998. This decision was made in response to fears that animals from the Eastern Horn of Africa carried Rift Valley Fever, a vector-borne (mosquito) disease transmissible between goats and humans. This has seriously reduced exports and customs revenues in Berbera, creating a budgetary crisis for both households and authorities in the Northwest and Northeast. Somaliland livestock exports in 1997 amounted to $US 120.8 million, yielding about 80% of total hard currency income for Somaliland’s population, while livestock exports from Bosasso in 1997 were valued at $US 14.8 million. The ban on exports led to a fall in Somaliland government revenue in early 1998 by over 45% and to a shortfall, compared to expenditure, of an estimated $US 7.5 million. Several offsetting factors which have softened the blow of this crisis are increased remittances to affected family-members; increased smuggling of livestock into the Saudi market via Yemen, and the emergency response from the international aid community. The ban is not expected to be permanent. However, it underscored Somalia’s dependence on a single export, a single foreign market, and the need for diversification of exports and markets.

Distribution of income earned from livestock exports is uneven. In the Northwest, a small group of importers-exporters (roughly 10), with business links in Djibouti (which give them access to letters of credit), dominate the livestock export sector. Though they shoulder greater risks, they also can enjoy windfall profits from the trade. They also dominate the import of foodstuffs, and collectively form a market for foreign exchange thereby essentially setting the exchange rates. In contrast, middle-level livestock traders in the Northwest report very thin profit margins, often less than one US dollar a head, a margin which can quickly turn to loss, if anything goes wrong. To the South, where cattle and goats are sold in Kenya, relatively robust profits are enjoyed by a much larger number of mid-level traders, who monitor prices in major selling points inside Kenya to insure a good price. Because their animals travel overland to Kenyan markets, traders are less captive to changing prices than traders shipping animals by boat to the Gulf. If prices suddenly drop, traders instruct their herder (kowsaar) to hold the livestock off the market in local pasture areas until prices improve.

At the household level throughout the country, the profitability of livestock sales is calculated against the value of “rations” (rice, sugar, and flour). Terms of trade for sale of livestock are considered good if...
a goat or sheep fetches enough to pay for a 50-kilo-
gram sack of sugar or rice. Households under eco-
nomic duress will sell even when prices are low, but
in normal times, livestock is a very “non-perishable
commodity” which is simply kept off of the market
until prices improve.\footnote{K. Mendiasa, \textit{Agricul-
ture Region}, Nairobi, UNDOS Study on Governance, 1997} Since livestock (especially cam-
els) is the main unit of wealth in the countryside,
households sell only when cash is needed for essen-
tial items. The Somali pastoral society consists of a
range of relatively wealthy and quite poor nomadic
families. Those with large herds of camels and cat-
tle benefit far more from livestock exports than do
poor families, who are more likely to sell under du-
ress at lower prices. Likewise, agricultural commu-
nities in Somalia owning little or no livestock do not
directly benefit at all from the livestock sector.
Surveys of household income consistently show that
pastoral households and pastoral regions are wealthier
than their counterparts in agricultural communi-
te\footnote{This is the strategy currently employed by households in the Northwest, by keep-
ing their animals off the market, livestock selling prices have not dropped as dra-
natically as was expected, given the Saudi ban.} This fact helps to explain why the benefits of the
robust livestock export business is reaching only parts
of Somali society, contributing to the dichotomy of
absolute poverty and commercial revival in contem-
porary Somalia.

\textbf{Agriculture}

Agricultural production in Somalia is sharply divided
between subsistence farming and cash-cropping. The
two have little in common except a shared labour
pool and, in places, common claims on disputed land.
Anecdotal evidence suggests the possible existence
of forced or coerced labour in some areas. Irrigated
land is used for both commercial and subsistence
agriculture.

Commercial cash cropping for export, once preva-
 lent throughout the river valleys of Lower Shabelle,
Lower Juba, and parts of Middle Shabelle and Mid-
dle Juba, is today confined primarily to the Lower
Shabelle region. There, after several years of inac-
 tivity due to factional warfare, the plantation economy
was revived beginning in late 1993. In 1997, around
3,400 hectares of bananas were cultivated in the
Lower Shabelle, with an additional 950 hectares
planted in the Middle Shabelle. Much of this pro-
duction (about one-third) was damaged by the El
Nino floods of 1997. Banana exports were revived
through two international companies, Dole (US up
to late 1996) and De Nada (Italy). Banana exports
to the European Union were valued in 1997 at about
$US 12 million. Quantities exported since 1993 are
illustrated in the table below.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Metric Tons} \\
\hline
1993 & 501 \\
1994 & 4,634 \\
1995 & 21,701 \\
1996 & 26,983 \\
1997 & 17,774 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{Source: FSAU Focus, 3 April 1998}

Bananas are currently the only cash crop of conse-
quence exported from Somalia, though a new mar-
et is emerging for export of dried lemons flown to
Dubai. A range of other cash-cropping takes place
on irrigated farms. These cash crops are sold in the
main urban markets, especially Mogadishu. They
include grapefruit, lemons, melons, papaya, tobacco,
onions, vegetables, and mangoes. Much if not most
of this cash-cropping takes place in share-cropping
arrangements, in which Somali investors provide
pumps to smallholder farmers, or if they also own
the land, to tenant farmers, splitting the harvests.
This type of cash cropping can be found along the
Jubba river as well as in the Shabelle river valley.

The notable gap between revival of the Jubba and
Shabelle valleys as sites of both plantation agricul-
ture and small-scale (typically 5-10 hectares) irrigated
commercial agriculture is due to several factors.
Firstly, the Shabelle valley relies on gravity-fed irri-
gation canals, whereas the Jubba valley plantations
must use pumps (due to the much higher banks of
\footnotetext{UNDOS Household Surveys by Region.}
the Juba river). Pumps are easily looted in times of insecurity, and the Lower and Middle Juba regions have been hard-hit by endemic insecurity, making irrigated agriculture too risky for most potential investors. The Jilib-Janamé corridor, once the most productive farmland in the country, has changed hands a dozen or more times since 1990, most recently in May 1998. Further up the Juba river valley, in Sakow District and Gede region, greater levels of security have permitted the growth of pump irrigation again, despite the loss of most pumps to El Nino flooding. In the Lower Shabelle region no significant fighting has occurred in several years. There, the most powerful factions in the region have a vested interest in supporting the plantation economy, as it generates important revenues on which they depend both directly and indirectly.

The costs and benefits of a revived plantation/agricultural export economy in riverine areas of Southern Somalia were the subject of a protracted debate before the civil war. This remains a topic of debate within Somalia and the donor community. On the one hand, there are those who advocate support for the revival of the plantation economy. They argue that it is a vital source of hard currency for a country requiring enormous levels of hard currency to rebuild the economy and State. About 140,000 Somalis depend directly or indirectly on banana production. The plantation economy supplies cheap bananas for local consumption on which poor families depend. Critics argue that some of the land on which cash-cropping is taking place has been grabbed during the civil war by militarily stronger clans and is not theirs to farm. In addition, some argue that the proceeds of banana exports bankrolls militias whereas the profits are concentrated in the hands of a very small group. Hence, broader benefits to the community are minimal. Banana production is poor use of the best farmland of a country chronically short of food.

An important recent development for Somalia's banana export industry was a 1997 World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruling against part of the Lome Convention, in which the European Union provides preferential access for primary products such as bananas for ACP countries (former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean). Under the Lome Convention, Somalia was guaranteed a fixed quota of banana exports into the EU at a fixed (and profitable) price. If the WTO ruling is upheld, Somalia's bananas will have to compete in an open, competitive global market. Somali bananas are generally more expensive than Central American bananas, because of the costs of irrigation (Central American bananas are primarily rain-fed). Thus, Somali banana exports may lose some or all of the European market. As with livestock, Somalia's agricultural export industry will need to diversify both production and markets in years to come.

The main agricultural production in Somalia is subsistence-oriented grain production. This portion of the Somali economy provides for a significant part (roughly 30%) of the household income for the agro-pastoral households of the inter-riverine area, much less (under 5%) for predominantly pastoral populations throughout Somalia who engage in very casual agriculture, and most if not all of the household income for riverine villagers. Most of it is rain-fed, except for some flood recession and riverbank agriculture practised in select areas. Sorghum is the primary crop throughout the inter-riverine areas and parts of the Northwest (Gabiley to Boroma) where agricultural production has expanded. Maize is grown wherever rainfall is sufficient to permit it (parts of Lower Shabelle, all of riverine zones of lower and Middle Juba); and sesame is the crop of choice for flood recession farming. Subsistence agriculture in Southern Somalia has suffered a dramatic decline since 1990. Most farmers have reduced the area under cultivation due to security concerns. Thus, even in good years of rainfall, overall output has

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*FAO* estimates.

*Maize is a staple food item for many.

*This estimate, which has been voiced about land up and down both the Jubbis and Shabelle rivers, has led to the temporary suspension of agricultural support projects of the Somali Rehabilitation Programme (a UNDP programme) in Southwest Somalia. Dominant clans in each area claim, of weaker clans, who claim that local residents do not speak out publicly for fear of retaliation. This makes investigation of land disputes very difficult for outsiders to conduct. For a discussion on these issues, see R. Machal, *Lower Shabelle, Studies of Governance,* UNDOS, November 1997, pp. 50-56.

*Several cost-benefit calculations of cash-crop production versus food crop production in irrigation zones of Somalia were made prior to the war, each suggesting that cash-cropping appeared to be a poor investment relative to grain production. Sharing these concerns, the Ministry of Agriculture imposed a national limit of 6,000 hectares of land for banana production, to prevent banana production from...
declined compared to pre-war levels. Both yields and outputs may have declined relative to pre-war levels though in good years sizeable sales of surplus grain to the urban markets do occur. Household incomes in agricultural zones are lower than pastoral and urban settings, and are typically less diversified, so that these households are both poorer and more vulnerable to catastrophic loss. Yet, this sector’s poverty belies its importance to the economy at large. The performance of smallholder agriculture essentially determines whether and how much food aid Somalia will need each year.

**Remittances**

Quoted figures on remittances vary significantly in Somalia, making it difficult to generalise about their importance to the Somali economy. Despite variations in data, no one denies the importance of remittances. At the high end, some studies estimate remittances to total a staggering $US350 million annually, or $US60 per head of population. These remittances travel to a variety of destinations. Most go to family members inside Somalia, but some go to Somalis in refugee camps, and some to factions and militias, especially when the diaspora is mobilised to support the clan in time of threat (see chapter one for description of remittance companies).

The benefits of remittances are not equally distributed. Households, fortunate enough to possess a relative working abroad, may receive up to US$100 per month, enough to live relatively well in Somalia’s depressed economy. A neighbouring household will receive nothing, having no kin working abroad. Middle-class families are more likely to have sons or daughters working abroad than poorer households, as Somali refugees and immigrant workers abroad tend to be well-educated and skilled. The importance of remittances varies both by household and regionally. The largest urban centres of Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kismayo, and Bosasso receive much higher levels of remittances per capita than the rest of the country. For many regions, remittances are a rarity; in Sakow district. For instance, only five families are reported to receive remittances.

The concentration of remittances to urban, middle-class households partially explains the paradox of high urban demand for non-essential consumer goods and high-value foodstuffs. At the same time, the urban economy of contemporary Somalia produces so little and (in the case of Mogadishu) receives little foreign aid. The long-term sustainability of remittances to shore up urban economies in Somalia is a source of concern, but to date no evidence has emerged suggesting “donor fatigue” on the part of relatives abroad. Levels of remittances appear relatively constant, peaking only in times of emergency. Anecdotal evidence does, however, suggest that at least in a few instances relatives abroad are encouraging or even insisting that remittances be devoted to the establishment of small businesses rather than for immediate consumption.

**Commerce and service sectors**

One of the most intriguing trends in post-intervention Somalia is the dynamism of the commercial sector. In particular, Benadir and Berbera have risen as entrepôt economies serving as profitable gateways for import-export activity between Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali hinterland and the outside world. This trade is vibrant despite numerous “transaction costs” associated with doing business in a stateless environment.

The nature of this entrepôt economy is relatively simple. Exports out of Somalia’s main ports are mostly domestic products, except for Berbera, which exports Ethiopian as well as Somali livestock. Those exports vary by region. Livestock and skins are the main exports out of Berbera and Bosasso; bananas and charcoal out of Benadir ports; charcoal out of Kismayo. With the hard currency earned by the sale of exports in the Gulf, traders purchase a range of

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This is based partly on UNDP household surveys in Middle Shabelle region, which is agro-pastoral. There, agriculture produced 35% of household income, on average. This figure may be somewhat higher in Bay and Bari regions.

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*Based on UNDP household surveys in Bari, Mudug and Nugal, pastoralists are increasingly engaging in "tosi and turn" agriculture -owing seeds on quickly prepared land at the onset of rains, then turning away to drive herds to pasture, leaving the males on their own devices and returning in harvest. Yields are usually very low, but occasionally good rains produce a decent crop; it constitutes a low-cost gamble for the nomadic family. Casual agriculture like this is more common in the areas west of the Juba valley, where good rainfall makes the gamble worthwhile.*

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goods, including food rations (sugar, rice, flour, pasta), luggage (bundles of basic consumer goods such as sandals, flashlights, cigarettes), cloth, spare parts, fuel, tires, used clothing (known as wodaxor in Somali, from the English “who died?”), and electronic items. Some of these goods are sold locally inside Somalia. However, a significant portion is trucked from Berbera into Ethiopia, or from Benadir into Kenya, via Mandera. It is impossible to calculate precise percentages of imports consumed within Somalia, and that which is in transit to its neighbours. Since the goods flowing into Kenya are mostly smuggled, there are no official statistics from Kenya. From field observations and interviews with Somali traders, it is clear that the most interesting profits on imports are generated not by local sales but by transiting goods into Kenya and Ethiopia. Indeed, whole communities along the trade corridors between the Benadir ports and entry points into Ethiopia and Kenya rely heavily on this interstate commerce.

The comparative advantage that Somalia enjoys in imported goods (relative to its neighbours) is due to the country’s geography and low taxes. Geographically, Somalia’s Northern ports (especially Berbera) are well-positioned to serve as entrepôts between the Gulf States and Ethiopia. Since Eritrean independence, Ethiopia is land-locked, and since recent hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out, Ethiopia is more dependent than ever on the ports of Djibouti and Berbera. Progress towards the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland authorities on customs and transit goods through Berbera port may spur official transit trade in that region. To the South, Benadir ports also enjoy a geographic advantage as ports for Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. The real advantage that Benadir ports have over trade through Mombasa port in Kenya is low “customs” duties. Factions do charge a customs fee at Merka and El Mahaan on imported goods, but because these are essentially “beach ports,” traders can shift their

offloading sites if taxes are raised. Hence, goods passing through Somalia arrive in Kenya at a lower price than goods passing directly through Mombasa. While it would be an exaggeration to say that Somalia represents the biggest “duty-free shop” in the world, it is indisputable that merchants are taking advantage of the virtual absence of customs to serve markets in Kenya, Southern Ethiopia and even Uganda.34

This is even more remarkable given the unusual transaction costs associated with transporting goods overland in a stateless territory. Rates for transportation of goods by private trucks include not only the cost of the truck and fuel, but also security guards for the truck, anticipated costs of various (usually ad hoc) militia checkpoints and “tolls” on the roads, the high cost of maintenance of trucks due to badly deteriorating roads throughout the country, the calculated risk of periodic loss of cargo to looting, spoilage,35 or accidents, and bribes to Kenyan customs officials. Increasingly, goods arriving in Somalia are flown into Kenya as “transit goods” which can then be removed from the airport for a small bribe. Even when these transaction costs are added to the cost of the goods, they reach their destination in Kenya at a considerably lower price than the same goods imported through Mombasa. (Ironically, this can even be true for goods imported from Kenya. Kenyan Sportsmen cigarettes, for instance, are exported at low (untaxed) price to encourage exports, but are taxed heavily for local consumption. Somali merchants purchase Sportsmen as export goods through Kismayo or Mogadishu, then resell them at a profit back in Kenya.)

This level of transit trade would normally give most of Somalia a healthy trade surplus with Ethiopia and Kenya, were it not for the enormous amounts of qaat Somalia purchases from these two countries. Thus, Somaliland runs a high balance of trade deficit with Ethiopia. Southern Somalia’s balance of trade with Kenya is more difficult to calculate.

34Sesame production is a cash crop for farmers in areas where flood recession agriculture can be practiced (especially in Middle Juba); it fetches a good price in Mogadishu and Bosaso, and has even recently been exported to the Gulf.

*The UNDOS Household Surveys show about $180 million as remittances and this estimate was in turn used to calculate Somalia’s HDI. Many observers consider the estimate of $350 million too high; their figure is $200-250 million.
Remittance companies report that most remittance transfers average about US $50-100 per month.
*K. Merkhaus, Middle Juba, UNDOS Studies on Governance, forthcoming 199
This interstate trade over large areas of inland Somalia has helped to create webs of cross-clan alliances and partnerships within the commercial and trucking sectors. In order to move goods over a conflict line, these alliances are essential. Merchants often rely on maternal clan links to use relatives in other clans to insure the safety of goods in transit. In other cases, business partnerships have evolved over HF radios across clan lines, though the partners themselves have never met. Truck owners take care to hire security guards from clans controlling territory through which they must pass. Where trucks owned by one clan cannot pass into another clan's territory, border towns become vibrant off-loading centres, with goods transferred from one truck to another. Through these adaptations, goods are able to move across the country, usually safely, despite the absence of peace between clans and factions in the areas. In the process, trust and trustworthiness have become valuable business commodities inside Somalia: most commercial partnerships, and the entire remittance industry, are based on it.

The nature of market competition is highly variable in Somalia, defying easy generalisation. In some sectors and in some locations, open, fair, and intense competition is the rule. Competition among Somalia's numerous tele-communication and remittance companies has, at times, reduced the price of international phone calls or commissions charged for money transfers. At other times, collusion is the rule. Those same remittance companies will also fix commission rates. One of the reasons Kismayo port does not play a strong role in the entrepôt economy is the preference of its major traders to collude to fix high prices for rations in its captive local market. In many cases, the threat of new competition is dealt with by force. Merchants of strong clans can draw on their militia's strength to intimidate, loot, or in rare cases even assassinate potential rivals from weaker clans.

The nature of profit-taking also varies by location and sector. Generally, the big traders (those with partners or offices in Dubai) have easier access to credit and global commodity information, and some leverage because they can buy and sell in bulk, at discount. Medium and small traders usually are relegated to lower profit activities. If seeking to import goods, they must pool resources with other small traders and target short-term opportunities in the market. Yet, new economic opportunities Somalia has afforded new, young traders a chance to quickly expand. Nearly all of the major exporters of charcoal in Kismayo, for instance, are newcomers to commerce.

Contemporary commerce in Somalia is much more seasonal than in the past. Though the hajj has always strongly affected livestock exports, the monsoon seasons now play a greater role due to the closure of the all-weather Mogadishu seaport and reliance on dhows as the main ships for import-export (dhows cannot sail during the high seas of the monsoon). Deterioration of the road system has also increased the influence of weather in shaping how and when commerce can move overland.

A number of major problems shape the behaviour of the business community in Somalia. The first and greatest is risk. Because of uncertainty over possible fighting, few are willing to invest in fixed productive assets. Most commercial activity aims for short-term profit as a risk avoidance strategy. Investments promising returns in three to five years are rare. Secondly, lack of credit is a major constraint. Thirdly, businessmen face strong social pressure to redistribute profits to needy kinships (a prominent feature of Somalia's informal social security system is the obligation to assist clansmen in need) rather than reinvest in the business. Merchants ultimately must rely on their clan to protect their assets. If they ignore requests for assistance, they risk losing the clan's protection. Finally, commercial activity

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*This distinction is in some respects meaningless, since much of the pastoral activity directly passes across the border between Southern and Ethiopia.*

*Recently, several Somali traders were arrested in Uganda, where they had been selling spare parts imported through Mogadishu. Reports of arms smuggling through Southern Somali ports overland into Congo demonstrate the growing reach of the entrepôt economy.*

*Sugar is a very profitable smuggled good into Kenya, but it exposed to ruinous rates of sugar are rendered worthless. Typically the truck owner transporting the goods for merchants assumes responsibility for damage, which encourages truckers to take care of cargo, but which also raises the costs of transport.*
throughout the country is increasingly hampered by the rapid deterioration of roads, bridges, ports, and airport runways. Even the main highways - the Kismayo-Julub-Mogadishu road, the Mogadishu-Baidoa road, and the Mogadishu-Beled Weyn road leading to Somaliland and Bosasso - are deteriorating rapidly and becoming impassable. Destruction of bridges over the Jubba river has virtually cut off Kismayo from the rest of Somalia.

Despite these troubles, the commercial sector has remained highly adaptable and dynamic. To find ways of supporting the commercial sector, a workshop on Trade and Private Sector Development in Somalia was held in Dubai under the auspices of UNDOS, UNDP and UNCTAD in May 1998.46 About 160 Somali businessmen from the Gulf and Somalia gathered together to discuss future steps to promote business. The main conclusions of that meeting are sufficiently important, since it was perhaps the first of such meetings since the fall of Siyad Barre in 1991, that they are summarised here:

- There is a strong need to be organised. Business associations could be an easy way to define and deliver the training needed for an expansion of economic activities in Somalia. As contact points for seminars on specific markets, such business associations might supply trade information and trade regulations that are absolutely needed by most exporters. They should also adopt rules to be endorsed by all members, and help to restore the role of law in the business realm. They should also discuss and propose the private provision of some trade functions or infrastructure, given the state does not or cannot supply them.

- Improvement of infrastructure is essential. The major facilities such as ports, airports, roads and bridges are of major concern to the business community. They should be considered to prevent their further deterioration and provide a minimum level of safety. At this stage, most projects will require a Somali counterpart that could be either the regional authority, a fair expression of the regional business class or both, according to the regulations and wishes of the donors.

- Foreign direct investment and international cooperation are essential to economic recovery, although political instability has an adverse effect. The Somali private sector should play a leading role to attract these potential external private actors, as recently occurred in Somaliland through the agreement between the oil company TOTAL and Daallo airlines to rehabilitate the oil tanks of Berbera and the facilities at Berbera and Hargeisa airports.

- Mobilise the considerable pool of private sector savings that are available, through an appropriate banking infrastructure. This could tap the largely informal savings and channel them into employment and income-generating investments.

**Potential Productive Sectors**

Somalia's future economy will need to expand and diversify. Fisheries is one of the sectors with the greatest potential. Even now, fish constitutes over one-third of Somalia's current annual exports to the European Union (about $8 million). Somali fish resources are also being plundered by foreign ships fishing illegally.

Fisheries stand as a largely untapped productive resource, but otherwise Somalia's semi-arid environment offers few other obvious resources to exploit (though agriculture can, and must be expanded). The real resource of great potential in Somalia, and one that must be developed if the country's economy is to survive and prosper into the next century, is its human resources. It is investment in human resources - education - to which the report turns next.
CHAPTER 3
THE LOST GENERATIONS: FOCUS ON EDUCATION

The collapse of Somalia's educational system constitutes a societal emergency which will constrain development for decades, and for this reason has been chosen as one of two sectoral themes for this report. Somalia now faces the prospect of not one, but two "lost generations" with little education and training to take up productive roles and leadership in the future. Somalia's public education system had already virtually ceased functioning in the mid-1980s. A second generation of young people has lost access to education over the course of the decade of statelessness in the 1990s. Estimates suggest that only 13% to 16% of children ages 6-12 are enrolled in school, and are heavily concentrated in the early grades. This is one of the lowest enrolment ratios in the world. The loss of this "human capital" has enormous costs both to individual households and to a society attempting to rebuild a shattered economy and government. It also poses an enormous challenge to local efforts to demobilise young militiamen, whose lack of education makes them difficult to absorb into a peaceful economy. It is an impediment to the establishment of a viable, participatory political system. It is also tragic for hundreds of thousands of young Somalis who have been deprived of the right to basic education and the opportunities for personal growth that education affords.

HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN SOMALIA

Traditional, oral education has been important in Somalia for centuries and follows the values, norms and interests of the traditional pastoralists. This included domestic skills, livestock management, and trading as well as the skills required for survival on the land and for protection against warring parties. Formal school systems in the style and language of the colonial powers were established reluctantly in both the Italian and British colonies in the 20th century. The Somali Youth League established a few Arabic schools with support from some Arab countries. The colonial systems had relatively low coverage. They were restricted to settled population centres and were initially aimed at producing clerical and support staff for colonial administrations. This brought about resistance from both the Islamic and nomadic groups in particular who feared that the schools would be used as agents of Christian missionaries. Educational opportunities for children and adults were expanded in the years immediately preceding independence. The UN Trusteeship agreement called for a system of public education. The Italian Trusteeship (called AFIS, Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia) aimed to establish teacher training institutions and to facilitate higher and professional education by sending an adequate number of students for university study abroad or bringing university education to Somalia. Education facilities developed as well on a much larger scale after the Second World War in Somaliland.

At independence in 1960, the Republic of Somalia inherited 233 primary and 12 secondary schools (some general, some professional) of varying origins, using different languages of instruction (Somali was not yet a written language) and different curricula and teaching approaches. There were also differences in education policies, payment regimes for education and the degree of decentralisation. There were two languages of government, English and Italian.

In the mid-1960's, an integrated school system was established and in the early 1970s the Somali National University, was established in Mogadishu. In January 1973, Siyad Barre's regime introduced the first Somali alphabet using Latin script and this gradually became the medium of instruction in the school system. In 1973-74, a mass literacy campaign coupled with the expansion of the country's education system, claimed to have raised literacy from about 5% to almost 50% of the population of 15 years and above. Though lauded internationally, the suc-

M. Devadas, UNESCO/PFES, also provided substantial input to this chapter.
See also G. Retamal and M. Devadas, "Education in a Nation with Chronic Crisis: The Case of Somalia," 1994.

cess of this literacy campaign must be qualified. Firstly, most of the campaigners were secondary school students with little training. Secondly and more importantly, the success of the campaign itself appears to have been temporary as reading material was scarce. Pastoral populations that achieved rudimentary literacy eventually lost the skill through disuse.

Language and language politics complicated the Somali educational system throughout the 1970s and 1980s. With the adaptation of the Somali language to written form, primary schools began teaching in the Somali language. At the secondary school level and at the technical colleges, English was usually used with Somali, requiring students to learn a second language. At the University level, Somali National University was underwritten by the Italian government, which provided rotating Italian professors; courses were taught in Italian, imposing yet another language requirement on students. In some faculties (e.g. Education) English was the medium of instruction.

In the 1980s, the Saudi government linked the free delivery of oil to Somalia on the condition that all civil servants meet a certain level of proficiency in the Arabic language, thus requiring still more language training. However, this was not difficult considering Arabic was an obligatory second language from Grade 1.

Enrolment in primary schools reportedly rose from 28,000 in 1970 to 271,000 by 1982. The number of primary schools increased from 287 in 1970, to 1407 by 1980. The number of teachers rose to 3,376 in 1981. However, the system was still largely urban-focused in spite of some initiatives to extend primary education to nomadic groups. By the mid-1980s, there were general secondary schools in all major towns and a few technical or professional schools in some of the major cities.

Following the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, government resources were diverted from the social sectors to military use and, by the late 1980s, less than 2% of the national recurrent expenditure budget was allocated to education (compared with 11% in the mid-1970s). This resulted in the closure of many schools, a rapid decline in enrolment, the departure of many administrators and teachers who sought better renumeration elsewhere. In the 1980s, secondary school provision, in both enrolment and the quality of teaching, was well below the levels that were normal in other African countries. Moreover, in comparison with Ethiopia and Sudan, Somalia was not doing well. By 1990, only 644 schools and 611 trained teachers remained in service. Primary school enrolment rates were estimated in 1987 at 18% for boys and 6% for girls (one of the lowest school enrolment rates in the world). The collapse of the formal education system was clearly well advanced even before the civil war in 1991.

The perception of the value of formal education suffered as well under the Siyad Barre regime. In the past, formal education was seen as the key prerequisite for advancing in the civil service. By the 1980s, however, well educated Somalis working in the civil service or at the university were paid so little they could not sustain their nuclear family. At the same time, many poorly educated individuals took ministerial positions and grew rich through clan connections, or became rich as traders. The only paramount educational need and one that was reinforced by the civil war was to learn English in order to secure jobs with international agencies or to emigrate overseas.

The civil war dealt another devastating blow to the formal education system, which completely collapsed in 1990. Many teachers and pupils were displaced and forced to seek security in their clan areas or flee to refugee camps abroad. Moreover, many children and youths were forced by their clans to join the
armed movements to fight against Siyad Barre. In Somaliland and the Central regions of Somalia, schools were also gradually closed as the civil war advanced. The aftermath showed that about 90% of school buildings in the country were either completely or partially destroyed. In addition, many were occupied by internally displaced persons. Almost all educational materials and equipment were looted. There was no public financing for education and teachers and administrators went unpaid. No formal education took place in Somalia for at least two years (1991-92); most children had no school to attend. Adult education programmes also ceased to function and only the Koranic schools continued operating.

In parallel with whatever exists in formal education are two forms of Islamic traditional education, the dugsi and the madrassa. Sending children to a dugsi (Koranic school) is viewed as a moral and religious obligation and all children of both sexes are supposed to attend from the age of four or five. The dugsi are omnipresent throughout Somalia including among the nomadic groups where the teacher will move with the community. The dugsi is the first introduction to the Koran and involves the rote learning of the 30 chapters of the Koran in the Arabic language. The dugsi, although affected by the continuing wars, has been the sole place where some form of education and literacy has been imparted. It is claimed that almost all (or an overwhelming majority of) Somali children have some form of Koranic education. However, sample surveys have indicated that girls have less access in the rural areas and even less in the nomadic communities, since they have to share the work of their mothers. Koranic schools, however, are controversial. Some argue that many teachers are poorly schooled in the Koran, that they use counterproductive teaching methods (including whippings), and impart other values (for instance degradation of women, suspicion of foreigners) that may not necessarily be in the best interests of human development.

The madrassa (“place of learning”) are educational institutions with a broad curriculum as well as a strong religious foundation and orientation. They are similar to the secular systems found in Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In Somalia, they are normally found in the larger urban centres and incorporate the dugsi rote-learning memorisation of the Koran in the preparatory stage. They are established and managed by the local residents and Imams, and have three stages: primary (6 years), secondary (3 years) and higher (2 years). The education is also in Arabic but carried out in classrooms in contrast to the more informal settings of the dugsi. Subjects include the Arabic language, geography, science and mathematics as well as the Koran and Islamic history and civilisation. Somali students who do well in the third stage can qualify for acceptance and sponsorship to study at Islamic universities such as Medina and Um-al-Qura in Mecca, or Al-Azhar in Cairo. The madrassa charge fees but also receive support and sponsorship from wealthy community leaders, Islamic philanthropic organisations, NGOs and governments in Islamic States. A major problem with the madrassa is that many use “foreign” curricula, syllabi and texts in Arabic. In these documents, there is little or no Somali content or adaptation to the local context. Most of these schools, however, teach Somali as a second language using UNESCO-provided textbooks, teachers’ guides and teacher training.

**EDUCATION TODAY IN SOMALIA**

Revival of educational facilities began in early 1993 when communities and teachers began re-opening schools (particularly in urban centres) and former educational administrators and others created informal education committees in Mogadishu and some other regions and districts. For example, the number of schools increased in Mogadishu from 85 to over 400. UN agencies (UNESCO, UNHCR, UNOPS and UNICEF), donor organisations and international NGOs all took initiatives. These included the

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retrieving and reprinting of the existing (1980s) primary school textbooks and teachers’ guides, to organise in-service training for teachers and to provide basic supplies for pupils and teachers throughout the country. These organisations provided assistance to rehabilitate a limited numbers of school premises. A number of international NGOs provided material assistance, training and some degree of supervision for schools in specific, localised areas. WFP provided food incentives for teachers of registered primary schools in many areas. Consequently, there were reported to be 165,000 children enrolled in 465 schools staffed by 1,300 (largely untrained) teachers in 1994.123

However, as of 1995, the level of external donor assistance began to decline and food incentives were terminated. This resulted in a sharp drop in functional schools and enrolment. Many schools that claim to be open are not functioning, except when the possibility of donor assistance appears. By 1997, there were a very small number of children attending school in Somalia at a level above Grade 8 - less than 2000 according to some estimates - and there is no one near to finishing secondary school.124

For Somali households with adequate finances, private schools and use of private tutors have come to replace the collapsed public school system. Most private schools are concentrated in a few major urban centres, especially Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Many Somali families (with necessary financial resources) make decisions about where to reside based on the quality of private education available. A few of these schools are producing very well prepared students. This differential access to schooling based exclusively on income-level will likely widen the gap between poor and relatively affluent families in coming decades.

Households with educated adults also cope, with the collapse of the education system, through extensive home-schooling, and with hiring of private tutors. Moreover, for many Somalis seeking resettlement abroad, the desire to access quality education for their children often appears high on their list of priorities. Access to quality educational facilities is thus one of the primary “pull” factors leading Somali families to resettle in Kenya or elsewhere abroad. The children of the diaspora will be the core professional class of their generation in coming years. Whether they repatriate to Somalia or remain in the diaspora will have a powerful effect on Somalia’s ability to rebuild its economy and civil service.

No national system of formal education exists today in Somalia in the absence of a government for the whole country. Literacy and more general basic education for youth and adults, especially women, who missed out on formal education is provided in an uncoordinated way, for small numbers of beneficiaries, by various NGOs. Increasingly, and with the active encouragement of external agencies, public/community schools are charging low tuition fees (while often exempting poor families). In addition, schools or communities are starting to form committees to participate in or take responsibility for the management of the school.

The situation in Somaliland is somewhat better. It has a functioning Ministry of Education (MOEYS, along with Youth and Sports). It has established an embryonic, but yet weak and ill-funded system of educational administration and supervision, exhibiting many of the features of the previous national system and structure. The basic structure there follows that which existed in Somalia before the civil wars (a “4-4-4” structure of four years of lower primary, four years of upper primary and four years of secondary). This was also recommended as interim policy for the country by participants at the Somali Primary Education Curriculum Workshop in November 1997125 organised by UNICEF in Nairobi. In

124Africa Educational Trust and UNESCO-PEER, Feasibility Study on the Re-establishment of Secondary Education in Somalia with recommendations regarding study centres, Nairobi, February 1997
125 Lyceum Educational Consultants, UNICEF-Somalia and UNESCO-PEER (Programme of Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction), Somali Primary Education Curriculum Workshop, Nairobi, November 1997
the Northeast, regional education officers are present in the offices of the Regional Governors but still have little capacity or real authority. Elsewhere, in various districts and regions including Mogadishu, education committees or boards have been established which seek mainly to promote and co-ordinate schools within particular localities. In practice, their interest and influence is generally restricted to the immediate area of the particular urban centre. Few have any premises, equipment or materials. They may or may not have a relationship with a representative local authority. None has any independent resources. Some receive (or received in the past) limited resources from external agencies to build their own capacity.

UN agencies and a small number of international NGOs and donors, temporarily undertake many functions that would normally be the responsibility of a national ministry of education and regional or district education offices. Indeed, before 1996, there was neither a common overall policy nor agreement on assistance strategies between the various agencies and donors involved, although information was exchanged. Different agencies pursued different approaches or applied different standards in relation to teacher remuneration and assistance for physical reconstruction, for instance. However, as of 1996, co-ordination has increased within the framework of the SACB Education Sectoral Committee in Nairobi, which has established six working groups: curriculum renewal, professional development, learner assessment and certification, community ownership, donor mobilisation, and management information. It brings together representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and donors involved in education programmes. Meetings are open to Somali educationalists actively working inside Somalia, although the logistics (visas to enter Kenya, transport costs) of the meetings makes it difficult for them to attend.

The Somali Primary Curriculum of the mid-1980s was recuperated by UNESCO-PEER in 1993 and has gradually been re-introduced up to grade 4. After grade 5 for which new textbooks have been developed and distributed, from grade 6 onwards, the curriculum dates from the 1970s and is out of date. Distribution of textbooks has been patchy, particularly in Northwest Somalia where the first regular distribution of books since late 1980s was in October 1997 - and before that schools were operating with very few textbooks. Even now, in Somaliland, UNESCO-PEER estimates that there are only about 200 sets of books for grades 5 to 8 or something like one or two books per school.

Although UNESCO PEER has an impressive inventory of 84 titles in print and other materials besides for peace/health/environmental education and teacher training, problems remain in the areas of:

- distribution
- need to renew lower primary resources and create upper primary and secondary resources.

In the absence of any central authority, private parties and donors from the Arab countries have introduced a number of alternative curricula, some using Arabic and others English as the medium of instruction. In Nairobi on November 14, 1997, UNICEF-Somalia with UNESCO launched a programme for mobilising Somali educational professionals to design a plan of action for curriculum and resources renewal for primary education and further development. With significant funding from EC, DANIDA and other donors UNESCO-PEER and UNICEF are currently creating upper primary textbooks and are revising lower primary books - these latter not reflecting the reality of the civil war and its aftermath. New texts now being written include peace education, environmental education, and other issues related to Somalia's current problems.
FORMAL EDUCATION: THE FACTS

Normally one would expect to find a number of indicators concerning the status and performance of an educational system in a given country. These might include such items as: literacy levels among different age groups, gross and net enrolment rates by educational level and age, attendance, promotion, repetition, drop-out and completion rates at the end of each year for each level of schooling. All of these would be broken down between boys and girls, between distinct population subgroups such as urban, rural, nomadic, and different geographic areas, in order to identify any significant disparities. Such data are not available for Somalia and were even unreliable and patchy in coverage before the civil war. Nevertheless, some information is available and is summarised below. Before presenting this data, it is worth mentioning that the 1997 UNICEF survey, upon which much of the data depend, was conducted in difficult security environments, and thus accuracy is not always assured. In addition, it is thought that many of the respondents might well have exaggerated school enrolment rates to present a better picture to outsiders than that which actually exists.

PRIMARY EDUCATION

Number of schools

A survey of primary schools throughout Somalia undertaken by UNICEF in March-April 1997 revealed that 773 primary schools existed, of which 613 or 80% were operating. Most of these schools are in the main towns and nearby villages although there are few either in the rural areas or in the IDP (internally displaced persons) camps around Mogadishu and other main towns. Of the operating schools surveyed, 75% did not go beyond grade 4 and less than half of these, only 32% of all schools, offered all of grades 1-4. Just 3% of schools had the full primary cycle of grades 1-8, while 21% offered grades 1-6 and 1% offered grades 5-8 only (without 1-4).

To partially compensate for the lack of capacity, many schools operate more than one shift in a day (although data are not available to examine this). Nevertheless, three quarters of Somali primary schools do not provide the opportunity for a child to build up a minimum set of basic educational competencies to avoid relapse or to continue to further education.

The main reason given for the closure of 20% of schools was the abolition in April 1996 (in Mogadishu) and at end-1996 (elsewhere) of the food-for-work incentives which had been paid to primary school teachers by WFP since 1993/4. There is reason to believe that this figure may be much higher.

Enrolment

As can be seen from Table 3.1, the same survey reported a total enrolment of 151,085 children in 604 schools (9 schools failed to report enrolment). Of this total, approximately 38% were girls. Almost a third (30%) of all children enrolled in primary school in Somalia were residing in Mogadishu, and almost a quarter (24%) in the Northwest. Enrolment was heavily concentrated in the lower grades. There was a progressive decline in enrolment from grades 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 (-26%, -30%, -37%), and even more rapid decline from 4 to 5 (-57%) and above. The decline was more rapid for girls than boys. Under 14,000 pupils (i.e. less than 10% of total enrolment), of whom only 28% were girls, were reported enrolled in grades 5-8. This suggests a very high dropout rate, but low enrolment in the higher grades (especially in zones other than the Northwest). It also reflects the fact that schooling has only recently been revived and the intake in the lower grades in the immediate post-civil war period was low.

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152 M. Devilon, UNESCO-PER, Personal Communication.
Eight schools (1.4% of the operating schools in Somalia) had girl enrolment only, while 22 schools (3.7% of all operating schools) were boys only. No data is available on the ages of children enrolled in primary schools. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that there are large numbers of over-age children in many grades (some being of an age where other, non-formal forms of education would be more appropriate than the textbooks and teaching designed for the younger children).

Actual attendance at school is almost certainly much lower than the figures for reported enrolment. Informal surveys by UNICEF staff in some areas before the main survey indicated levels about one third less. Based on the latest (UNDOS) population estimates, the total reported enrolment represents only about 20% of the primary-school-age population (6-14 years). In addition, enrolment is concentrated in the early grades, declining rapidly from one grade to the next (more rapidly among girls than boys). This is one of the lowest enrolment rates in the world.

Other major findings of the survey show that: most schools are financed by fees or other forms of support from parents, communities, or by inputs from external agencies; many teachers are unpaid (and those that are paid receive very low salaries); different curricula are in use; there is neither a system for the professional supervision of schools nor the testing and certification of teachers’ qualifications (of 6,289 teachers: 56% claimed to have been trained in some form and only 22% were female) nor is it possible to assess a pupil’s learning achievement.

-Regions

When looking at primary school enrolment by region, the following picture emerged. Mogadishu, with an estimated 12.15% of the total population, still has a large share of the total number of schools (17%) and teachers (33%), as well as reported enrolment (50%). It has the largest schools (average enrolment 391 per school compared with about 200 elsewhere), the highest proportions of trained teachers (67%) and of female school head teachers (19%), and the lowest gender imbalance amongst pupils (47% of enrolled children are girls). A high proportion of schools (21%) use a curriculum other than the former Somali national curriculum.

The Central zone has the greatest number of schools as well as 46% of all children enrolled in the country. It also has the highest percentage of girls enrolled in primary school although since it includes Mogadishu this skews the figures upward for the zone as a whole.
Table 3.1

REPORTED ENROLMENT FOR 604 PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN SOMALIA (1997; “THIS TERM”*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total # of pupils</th>
<th>Pupil per grade(as % of total # of pupils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of boys</td>
<td>% in grade</td>
<td># of girls</td>
<td>% in grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30,289</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22,485</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>23,690</td>
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<td>17,986</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9,710</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>11,723</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>83,688</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53,494</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,014</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>93,702</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57,383</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This term refers to the term in season at the time of fieldwork (February - April 1997) or, in case of holidays, the last term that the school was in session. Timing of the terms varied between zones, regions and districts.

The Southern zone has a high pupil/teacher ratio (30:1). Only 5% of enrolled children in grades 5-8; relatively few female teachers (18%) (and only 2% of female school head teachers); but a high proportion of schools (87%) with adult women's education activities in addition to basic primary education.

The Northeast has the lowest average enrolment per school (186); the smallest number of classes per school (4.9); the lowest pupil/teacher ratio (18:1) and the most teachers per class (2.3), but the lowest proportion of trained teachers (37%). It has (with Mogadishu) the highest proportion of female teachers (27%), and the highest proportion of girls in grades 5-8 (37% is almost the same as in grades 1-4).

The Northwest has the greatest gender imbalance (only 30% of enrolled children are girls); the lowest proportion of female teachers (15%); the highest pupil/teacher ratio (31:1); and the highest proportions of schools offering grades 5-8 (5% compared with 2% elsewhere) and of children in grades 5-8 (15% of all children enrolled). A high proportion of schools (20%) use a curriculum other than the Somali national curriculum (mainly the Egyptian curriculum). In addition, in the Northwest, 15% of all children are in grades 5-8, which is more than double the proportion in other zones (5% in the Southern zone, 8% in the Central, and 10% in Mogadishu).

### Table 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>GRADES 1 - 4</th>
<th>GRADES 5 - 8</th>
<th>TOTAL GRADES 1 - 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number. of Children</td>
<td>% of National Total</td>
<td>Number. of Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>22,293</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>63,876</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>20,044</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>30,969</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All zones</td>
<td>137,182</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>40,187</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional schools

When looking at the traditional schools (see Table 3.3), we can observe that more children aged 6 to 14 are enrolled in Koranic schools than in formal primary schools (and this is true in urban, rural and nomadic areas). Yet, few nomadic children go to either primary or Koranic school. Only 7% are recorded to have enrolled in Koranic school, while no nomadic children have been recorded in formal primary schools. (This could be, of course, because once registered in a formal school one is no longer a nomad).

The UNICEF surveys found that, in Somaliland, there was a Koranic school every 300-500 metres among settled populations, (38% of classes took place under the shade of a tree, but as many as 38% were conducted in buildings moled with iron sheets). Some 84% of the schools surveyed made use of blackboards and exercise books, while only 13% of children used the traditional wooden slates.

The vast majority of Koranic schools are single teacher institutions, with little by way of physical facilities. Almost all teachers are male and many have little formal, secular education. Except for the few primary school teachers who also serve as Koranic teachers, none have any pedagogical training. Children are taught in groups of up to 40 comprising different stages or levels, and learning (of the Koran) is by rote (memorisation). 129

Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Grouping</th>
<th>% of children enrolled in Primary school but not in Koranic school</th>
<th>% of children enrolled in Koranic school but not in Primary school</th>
<th>% of children enrolled in both Primary and Koranic schools</th>
<th>% of children enrolled in neither Primary nor Koranic school</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban (n=544)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (n=727)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomadic (n=375)</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1646)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Gender

Only about half as many girls as boys are enrolled in primary schools and the proportion decreases rapidly in the upper primary grades. Girls make up 38% of overall enrollment (see Table 3.4) - 39% in grades 1-4 falling to 28% by grades 5-8. These figures are comparable with those before the civil war, when girls were reported to make up 35% of total enrollment, the proportion having been more-or-less constant since 1975. However, the figure was as low as 19% in some regions and there are still large local variations. Within Northwest (which has the lowest overall proportion of girls at 30%), the proportion ranges from 8% in Awdal to 41% in Burao. The figure for Mogadishu is 47%, where 43% of schools had more girls than boys enrolled. Outside Mogadishu, about 12% of all schools reported more girls than boys enrolled in grades 1-4. With the exception of the Northeast, the gender gap is considerably wider in upper primary than in lower primary. Similar figures also apply among Somali refugees in neighboring countries. In camps in Dadaab, Kenya in 1996, girls made up 27% of pupils in primary schools compared with 44% in pre-school programmes and 6% in secondary schools. In the Somali refugee camps in Djibouti, girls constituted 22% of primary school enrollment, but only 11% above grade 2. There is a heavy dropout of girls after the second grade.

The low enrollment and high drop-out rates of girls in most areas are due to a combination of traditional attitudes, economic considerations, and unfavourable conditions and timing of classes for girl pupils, in most schools. This may be because little value is given to girls' education since a girl is often seen as a temporary member of the household who will marry at an early age and move to her husband's household. Investment in a girl's education, therefore, is not expected to benefit her own family. The benefit, if any, will accrue to her husband's family. In addition, there are traditional, Islamic constraints on the movement of young, unmarried females outside the home. Whatever the causes, this gender imbalance threatens to marginalize a generation of women in coming decades, and reverse important gains that educated Somali women have made in both commerce and professional life over the past thirty years.

Table 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>GRADES 1-4</th>
<th>% of National Total</th>
<th>GRADES 5-8</th>
<th>% of National Total</th>
<th>TOTAL GRADES</th>
<th>% of National Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>22,293</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23,462</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>63,876</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5,742</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>69,618</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>20,044</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21,370</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>30,969</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5,646</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36,615</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All zones</td>
<td>137,182</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13,903</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>151,085</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>40,187</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>44,606</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Curriculum

The 1986 Somali National curriculum was revised in 1989, but the revision was never published. The 1986 curriculum effectively provides the basis for teaching in most schools (84% of schools according to the 1997 survey). The Egyptian curriculum was found to be used in 13% of schools in Northwest and 6-8% of schools elsewhere (only 3% in Mogadishu). Other curricula (Saudil, Yemeni and English) were used in 20% of schools in Northwest and Central zones (including Mogadishu), and 4-5% elsewhere. Some schools reported using more than one curriculum simultaneously.

The two main professional assessments of education since the civil war - Bennisar and Mwangi, and Sesnan and Milas, emphasised the need to focus on the teaching-learning process and enhance the quality of teaching (i.e. methodologies) and content. They advocated:

- the review and improvement of existing texts,
- the development of texts for grades and subjects for which texts were missing,
- the establishment of a decentralised, “school-based” approach to refine or renew the curriculum and syllabi.

They observed, however, that many teachers have a very limited concept of education. There was no external assessment of pupils' learning and, therefore, no common or recognised standard. They concluded that, at the present juncture, texts should contain everything which it is hoped will be learned, and incorporate all the activities which should be carried out by the students and teachers both in the classroom and outside. Moreover, they advise a system of externally-marked and certified examinations be developed.

Quality of Education

The quality of instruction throughout Somalia is highly variable and on balance, very low. One reason for this is the lack of qualified teachers. An in-depth evaluation of the Nugal education project in one region of Somalia noted that the quality of education was poor because many qualified teachers were constantly opting out of the education system for other forms of employment. There were also a large number of young men and women engaged in the education system that had no teacher training at all.

UNESCO-PEER, UNICEF and INGOs have been conducting teacher-training workshops. UNESCO's SOMOLU (Somali Open Learning Unit) has been offering in-service teacher training using open learning and distance learning methods. Coverage, however, has been totally inadequate. With significant funding from EC Somalia, DANIDA and other donors, UNESCO-PEER and UNICEF are launching in 1998-99 a major teacher training initiative that includes a pre-service component.

Secondary and Higher Education

Most emphasis on reviving the education system in Somalia has focused on primary schooling. However, secondary and tertiary education also faces a prolonged crisis, and unlike primary schools, have received far less support. Only a few secondary schools, nearly all private and in the largest urban centres, operate in the country. This is resulting in a very low number of secondary-school graduates, far fewer than the country will need in both the private and public sectors. Likewise, the absence of a university in the country means that advanced education and training must be sought abroad. Given the better employment opportunities that professional

12See UNESCO-PEER, Evaluation de la mission educative des filles dans les camps, N'irobi, April 1998, p.3
15Sibiha, The Evaluation of the Nugal Education Rehabilitation Project, Nairobi, UNESCO-PEER, July 1998
16UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Northwest Zone (Somaliland), Nairobi, August 1996
Somalis can enjoy abroad, few university graduates return to the country, thus accelerating a “brain-drain” that was already a serious problem before 1990.

In 1986-87 there were reported to be 103 secondary schools in the country (20 in Mogadishu) with 42,000 students (down from 65,000 in 1980-8). In 1985, enrolment in secondary school was reported to be 5% for boys and 3% for girls of the relevant age groups.106

At the end of 1997, there were just three public secondary schools functioning, all in the Northwest zone, and they are using English as the medium of instruction. A few private schools are offering grade 9, which corresponds to the first grade of secondary under a 4-4-4 system or the last grade of intermediate under a 6-3-3 system. Some Madrassa Islamic schools also offer secondary-level tuition. UNESCO-PEER estimates that there were 3040,000 ex-students who should have, but did not, finish secondary school at the end of the 1980s. Furthermore, it believes that currently there are fewer than 2,000 potential students who have been through either the post-collapse primary system or the Arabic-medium religious schools. Consequently, a key issue is whether Somali students still know how to learn even should secondary schools, trained teachers, textbooks, materials, curricula and adequate facilities be available.

Even these latter items are problematic. For instance, all areas reported that they had enough qualified teachers to teach in a secondary school if it were to be opened. Yet, the quality of these teachers, many of whom have not been teaching for at least six years, would need to be improved drastically. This would not be easy under existing circumstances. The UNESCO-PEER report also found that in every meeting it had on the issue of re-introducing secondary school, the majority of people interviewed thought only of re-introducing what was there before. Somaliland is a possible exception to this. The development of a National Education Policy there is likely to bring forth changes.

University or college vocational education is currently unavailable in Somalia, though efforts are underway to establish a teaching college at Awood in Somaliland. The Somali Diaspora, of course, is a different matter. No overall figures are available but anecdotal evidence suggests that Somalis abroad are as motivated to attend higher education as any other displaced ethnic group.

**Education for Youth and Adults**

*Literacy*

Since the major literacy campaign of 1973-4, both literacy programmes and literacy levels have declined steadily. Census data for 1981 in Benadir, Lower Shabelle and Bay regions found literacy rates of 50% in Mogadishu and 12% in rural areas, with higher rates among men than women. Among nomads in the Bay region, only 12.6% of males and 0.2% of females were literate. In 1985, national literacy was estimated at 18% for males and 6% for females.107 Recent estimates are not available, and all estimates are questionable since there was never any agreed definition of literacy.

Currently, hardly any data are available concerning the extent of literacy or more general non-formal education for out-of-school youth and adults. Few assessments of literacy are being conducted, although the 1997 UNICEF survey of primary schools found 41% of all schools reporting “other” education programmes, mostly women’s education. A need exists of non-formal education for youth and adults.

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107 Personal Communication
A Women's Education Programme began in 1974 with the aim of providing non-formal educational opportunities to both urban and rural women who had no formal education. Family Life Centres (FLC) were opened in the main district towns of six regions offering a 4-year course in home economics and nutrition together with training in handicrafts. Teachers were trained at a Teacher Training Centre in Mogadishu. In 1986, the programme, which previously focused on urban centres, was reoriented towards rural women and was decentralised. Regional FLC training centres were opened in five regions and the level of teacher trainees up-graded. Lack of operating funds, low teacher salaries and a shortage of educational materials remained major constraints, however, and the lack of outreach programmes, a major limitation.

Since the civil war, the need to deal with social and economic complexities requiring skills beyond their previous knowledge and experience stimulated the search by women for basic education in numeracy, literacy and life skills outside the home. Voluntary women's organisations with educational objectives emerged (mostly in urban areas). Some of these groups make use of the premises of the pre-war FLCS. A few cases, with minimal external assistance, have revived similar courses for teenage girls and adult women who missed the opportunity of formal schooling as did along other Somali NGOs the IIDA Centre in Mogadishu from 1993 to 1995. The demand is for literacy, numeracy, home science/economics, income generating and entrepreneurial skills. No reliable data are presently available concerning these important educational activities or the numbers of girls and women benefiting.

The majority of youth who missed out on schooling opportunities in recent years, have practically no opportunities for any kind of education, basic or vocational (Sooyal in the Northwest has begun a vocational school), and few curricular materials are available for vocational/technical training although some draft materials have been prepared by UNESCO EDC (Education Development Centre) in Mogadishu. There is an urgent need for vocational training, particularly for young war veterans.

Nomads constitute some 40% of the population. Providing access to basic education for nomadic children presents particular problems. A significant proportion of nomadic children, including girls, has always attended the Koranic school that is a part of and moves with the group. Many families have also sought to ensure that one or two of their children received basic secular schooling in order to diversify the family's subsistence base. This was especially the case under the previous regime when education was a free service provided by the government. Typically, children would be sent to live with relatives in a town or village and attend a formal primary school there. A few boys would continue in town-based secondary schools with attached hostels/boarding facilities. However, most of them (and almost all of the girls) would complete only a few years of primary school (girls were needed to help their mothers to care for younger siblings and to tend to small livestock).

In the early years after independence, some initiatives were taken to organise "nomadic education" as a special educational service. However, no specific information concerning the nature or impact of those efforts has been found. Since the civil war and the collapse of the former education system and of
employment prospects, participation of children from nomad groups in formal primary schools is extremely low. The UNICEF multiple indicator cluster survey in the Northwest in 1996 found that only 1% of children 6-14 years of age from nomadic communities were enrolled in school. At present, there are no initiatives specifically aimed at extending basic education among nomad groups.

Because nomads represent about 40% of the Somali population, it is imperative that their education is given even more consideration than hitherto. Mohamed Fadul suggests that education and provision of permanent or semi-permanent water supply could be connected and co-ordinated. Where there is a dry season water well for the nomads, there could be a school that caters for them. There is a historical precedent for this in the former British Somaliland. Then, the colonial administration dug about twelve large water reservoirs to collect rainwater in waterless Haud area along the border. Commercial centres serving the pastoralists grew near each reservoir. The authorities then built at each centre an elementary school, a dispensary, an animal dip, a police station and a market centre. Large numbers of nomadic children got educated that way. Then the availability of boarding intermediate and secondary schools allowed the students to continue the schooling process. While this system probably could not be repeated as it is, it offers lessons for tackling the issue of creating education opportunities for the large nomadic segment of the population.

**Management and Financing**

**Management**

Before the civil war, all public schools were managed and teachers paid by the central government, although in some cases the premises were provided/constructed by the community. Regional and district education teams, headed by Regional or District Education Officers, together with head teachers were, in principle, responsible for managing and administering education services at local levels. In reality, however, administration and planning remained highly centralised in the Ministry, the local authorities were never fully established, and the management and supervision of schools was poor.

In 1987 the then Minister of Education announced new policies and strategies to encourage local communities to support teachers and help increase their salaries, and to decentralise educational services and strengthen local administration with the aim of inspiring innovations and cost-effectiveness. The system collapsed before these much-needed reforms could be implemented.

Public schools are managed through different ways. In Somaliland they are managed by the MOEYS which employs the teachers and inspectors but is not yet in a position to assure adequate salaries. In other regions, schools are managed sometimes by the local communities (together with the teachers), by NGOs or, in some cases, a combination. Unlike Somaliland, however, there is no overall organisation.

UNICEF, UNESCO and some international NGOs have persuaded some local communities to set up Community School/Education Committees. One hundred such committees existed in 1995/6, mainly in the Northwest and Central zones. Typically, such committees have 8-10 members of whom about 20% are women. The functions fulfilled by such committees vary, and ideas concerning the precise responsibilities and functions that committees should fulfil are evolving. In general, however, local “ownership” of primary education is weak and secondary education is, with the exception of Somaliland, almost non-existent.

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*Develompent Solutions for Africa, Cost and Financing of Primary Education in Somalia*, vol.1, Report to the EC-Somalia Unit, Nairobi, January 1998
Regional Education Committees (or Boards) exist in some regions, and a number of districts have education committees. In Mogadishu there is a Permanent Education Committee covering both North and South Mogadishu. These committees are largely self-appointed and made up of former education officials serving on a voluntary basis. A few of the regional committees are active and, to some extent, effective, (e.g. that in Nugal). Most of the district committees are not. In some districts (and regions) there are competing authorities representing different clan/sub-clan interests. Practices regarding school administration, schedules, teacher remuneration and examinations vary. In a few cases, district or regional authorities have defined policies. In most areas, schools make their own decisions.

UNESCO-PEER has established and maintains Education Development Centres (EDCs) in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe to produce educational material, organise teacher training and social mobilisation sessions. UNICEF’s zonal education officers also organise teacher training and social mobilisation, as do some international NGOs within localised areas.

*Financing*

Before the collapse heralded by the civil war, education was essentially free and provided by the government. Since the civil war, the revival of public primary schools has been almost entirely dependent on external support, and even this has declined since 1995. During 1993-4, substantial resources were provided by external agencies to pay teachers as well as to rehabilitate and reconstruct schools and provide training and materials. Different agencies adopted different policies regarding the payment of teachers, with significant disparities in levels of remuneration (creating, in some cases, expectations that are not sustainable in the long term).

UNICEF, UNESCO and some NGOs have attempted to encourage community participation in support of local schools through capacity-building initiatives but have mostly phased out assistance to physical (re)construction. Of particular significance is the work of international NGOs in Gedo region since 1992 which have sought to integrate schools into the traditional socio-economic systems, including income-generating as well as health, nutrition and social welfare activities at the village/community level.

More recently, SACB’s Education Sectoral Committee has been insisting that local community sources should finance recurrent expenditure, while for immediate financing of capital expenditure and initial printing of educational texts, sources should be sought from external (governmental and non-governmental) sources. However, there are wide variations in the type and level of community contributions to the running of schools. The concept and expectation that secular education is a free service provided by government remains widespread among some communities, hampering efforts to encourage community initiatives and participation.

The 1998 EC primary education financing study has highlighted that monthly fees are a common feature in most districts, but the overall level of contributions remains low ($US 0.50 - $US 1.30 per month) - far below what would be required to expand and sustain a primary education system. The principle of payment for desired services (not associated with government) are well established in Somalia, and Koranic education is generally paid for. Many households can afford to pay the recurrent costs of education, and most communities can afford the capital investments for school buildings, furniture and teacher housing. There are some subgroups (displaced and poor households) throughout the country with very low incomes and limited productive resources who would require exemptions from school fees plus other forms of support to meet the cost of education.

The study estimated the annual average indicative cost of primary education per pupil at US $51 ranging from US $40 (in communities with very limited ability) to pay to US $62 (for communities with a "fair" ability to pay). The most important single cost item was teachers' remuneration (average US $25 per pupil per year) followed by institutional support for training, planning, and supervision, including operational expenses for district/regional educational authorities. Capital costs represented only 6% of total costs (average US $3.2 per pupil per year).

**Priorities**

The collapse of the educational system in Somalia leaves both the Somali people and the international community with a series of difficult choices. At the household and community level, it is not always clear that education constitutes the highest priority. Few communities have shown the commitment to keep schools operating without external assistance. The rise of private school enrolments demonstrates that some families place a high priority on education, but this may reflect the perceptions of the educated, middle class. For poorer families, the immediate need for a child's labour with the herd or on the farm, or within the household, may outweigh the uncertain future benefits of literacy, especially when even the public schools are increasingly charging user fees for students.

For the international community, a number of difficult choices present themselves:

- **The first centres on the issue of sustainability.**
  Is the need to educate a generation of young Somalis so self-evident and overwhelming that foreign aid should subsidise schools even where local communities do not appear to share the same level of commitment to education?

- **The second has to do with levels of education.**
  Given fixed levels of international aid for education, should the bulk of the assistance go to primary schooling, or is there a need to focus more assistance to secondary schooling?

World Bank studies have shown that the rate of return to primary education is higher than other forms of education. This is in countries that have some modicum of secondary and tertiary education, however, and populations that have enough educated people to carry out government functions, run the legal system, manage large companies, teach in schools and universities, and operate the health care system. In Somalia, this is not the case.
CHAPTER 4

GOVERNANCE

"Development is about human beings. They need four things. First is water. It is the first thing needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal or a baby dies. Second, is food. Without enough of it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water and food are won, is health - otherwise the human being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a human being has water, food and health he needs to learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without those none of the four basic needs can be sustained." [Somali Elder, Baidoa. September, 1995]

The political context in Somalia is generally hostile to human development. Indeed, the ongoing crisis in governance in Somalia constitutes the core development impasse in the country. Efforts to address human development needs must be coupled with support for the building of good governance at the local and, where relevant, regional level. For this reason, governance has been chosen as a second theme of the report. 122

Specific events and trends in contemporary Somali politics have been amply treated in chapter one and need not be repeated here. Instead, this section of the report focuses on themes linking trends in governance to human development issues.

NATURE OF STATELESS GOVERNANCE

Somali communities seek to advance human development and meet basic needs in an unusually challenging political environment — namely, a context of complete statelessness. No other society in the contemporary world has had to deal with such a prolonged period of Statelessness, a condition that has gripped the country since 1991. Somali communities thus live under unprecedented conditions as they develop coping mechanisms for meeting basic development needs. Some of the essential features of these conditions include the following.

• Informal and Fluid Sources of Governance

It is easy to equate Statelessness with anarchy. Although Stateless, Somalia is not anarchic. A wide range of both the formal and informal systems of governance exist at local levels, and provide at least some of the services that communities expect of government. Clan elders continue to draw on customary law/social contract (xeer), to manage local and inter-clan disputes, thus providing a measure of law and order. Shari'a courts operate in parts of the country, providing an additional quasi-judicial function to local communities. Committees exist that manage public assets like ports and airstrips. Neighbourhood watch groups serve as a rudimentary police service in some areas; and some districts have revived district councils, which provide varying levels of local administration. Collectively, this mosaic of fluid, overlapping authorities triggers endemic disputes over political control in local areas, and falls well short of a conventional state, but is also far from anarchy. It is these informal and formal sources of local authority and organisation on which some responsibilities for human development services in Somalia must fall.

One of the notable aspects of these informal sources of authority is that they have proven far more effective at re-imposing law and order in Somalia than they have in providing minimal social services. Indeed, one of the political paradoxes in Somalia is that, despite the absence of a central state, some parts of Somalia enjoy reasonably good conditions of “law and order.” Even in the crisis zones of Southern

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Note: Mr. Bahaduni Badro, UNPOS, provided significant input to revise this section, as well as Appendix B.
Somalia, traditional methods of conflict management and dispute mediation are surprisingly effective in reducing and containing crime and armed conflict, as they were before the war. In addition, they are also less expensive than police forces and a formal judiciary. Nevertheless, rarely have those same authorities been able to generate sustained local support for a school, or sanitation services, or maintenance of a water source, or to raise the revenues needed for those activities.

When discussing informal sources of authority in Somalia, it is also worth noting that the collapse of the Central State was of less consequence in some parts of Somali society than others. For most pastoralists, contact with (and services from) the State were only occasional and usually incidental. For agricultural communities, the central state was far more often the source of problems—land expropriation, forced conscription, extortion, taxation—than a source of development services. In these sections of society, informal sources of authority functioned before the civil war because the State was marginal and predatory.

*Localisation of Authority*

Politics, it is said, is the “authoritative allocation of scarce resources”, the process which determines who gets what, when, and how. The locus of power in political systems has great impact on patterns and effectiveness of resource allocation. In Somalia, power itself has devolved over the past eight years to radically local levels. Most meaningful political authority today exists at the village, district, or (in large urban settings) neighbourhood level. Militias have the ability to project force across long distances, but the power to destroy and loot has proven to be quite different from the authority to govern. With the exception of Somaliland, factions, coalitions, and self-declared governments have met with frustration in their efforts to hold together even the most skeletal administrative structures. Few attempt to provide basic services of government in the neighbourhoods and districts they claim to control. For a variety of reasons, meaningful authority will probably continue to remain highly localised in the near future. Human development initiatives undertaken by and through Somali polities will be localised as well. This is likely to be true even in areas where trans-regional authorities like Puntland are being established or discussed.

**Disputed Nature of Authority**

Human development needs must also contend with a disputed political authority in the absence of a State. While sporadic conflicts between Somali clans and factions have attracted media attention, a more fundamental power struggle is occurring within these communities. Faction leaders, militiamen, elders, district councils, professionals, religious figures, businessmen, and other community leaders all claim some authority over local affairs. Efforts to raise money locally or to provide funds via international aid agencies have invariably provoked disputes over who has the right to prioritise needs, allocate jobs, and manage funds. Some communities have agreed to a local division of labour and chain of command; for others, it remains a volatile point of contention.

**Weak Capacity of Local Authority**

With the exception of clan elders who can resolve communal disputes (and are a central permanent feature of Somali political life), political authority in Central and Southern Somalia is highly localised, weak, and unstable. Few local polities are able to collect taxes to fund even minimal community services. Trained and experienced administrators for local governments are scarce. Few municipalities in Somalia (mostly in the Northwest) can point to any significant administrative achievement or provision of social services that were not either funded or managed by international aid agencies, or undertaken for profit by the private sector.
Even at the local level, in areas where warlord politics is not a factor, commitment to human development and good governance is not always strong. Many aspiring local politicians and ex-civil servants jostle for seats in district councils or other local administrative units, not out of an interest in local administration, but rather in the hope and expectation that those local polities will serve as a springboard to a position in a future central state. Elders, though usually responsive to the needs of their clan and community, are also capable of venal or corrupt behaviour that undermines rather than promotes human development.10

**Variations in Governance Capacities by Zone**

Different areas of Somalia are experiencing very divergent levels of governance. In some regions, especially in the “recovery zones” in Northern parts of the country, communities are enjoying more responsive and participatory government than at any time in recent decades. In the self-declared secessionist state of Somaliland, for example, the administration has overseen the creation of a modest State structure, a functional police force, a safe environment, basic school and health care systems, and a revitalised commercial economy. Though it continues to be plagued by serious problems of disputed authority, corruption, and weak administrative capacity, Somaliland enjoys governance of higher quality than any other part of Somalia. Political development in the Northeast, where the non secessionist State of Puntland has been established, is much less advanced, but has still provided local residents with a peaceful environment. To the South of the country, however, parts of the country remain “zones of crisis,” where political authority is highly fragmented, disputed, and militarised. Not surprisingly, these zones are the sites of recurrent humanitarian crises. The rest of the country — the Central regions and pockets of Southern Somalia — lies somewhere between crisis and recovery, and are classified by the

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10 These points are explored in more detail in Roland Marchal, *A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia,* Nairobi: UNDP discussion paper, November 1997
UN as “transition zones.” These regions are not plagued by endemic armed conflict, but possess only rudimentary, very localised political authorities, usually with little or no tax revenue to provide basic services.

Basic political rights, such as freedom of speech, of assembly, and of movement are variable throughout these three zones, and tend to be enjoyed more by members of powerful clans than weak ones. Freedom of speech, for instance, is evident in the vibrant independent newspapers in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, cities in two very different zones. Yet in both places, outspoken critics of the major factions can find themselves in harm’s way if not under the protection of a powerful clan or sub-clan. For members of the weakest social groups, such as the Bantu, public complaint or reporting about extortion, coercion, or violations of basic rights runs the very real risk of physical retaliation.

**Search for a “Repository of Somali Sovereignty”**

The absence of a Central State deprives Somalis of a mechanism by which they can articulate development interests and priorities. Various efforts by the international community have been made to create a temporary “repository of Somali sovereignty,” such as regional development authorities and district councils, but with limited success. Consequently, Somali input is often missing, and always problematic, in fora where Somali development needs are discussed.

The re-establishment of a Central State does not, in and of itself, guarantee that Somalis will gain greater “ownership” of the development process. Indeed, Somalia’s government under the authoritarian rule of Siyad Barre systematically shut out community input into the development agenda. However, the absence of a state structure makes inclusive, participatory processes much more difficult to achieve.

While some innovative development approaches have succeeded in fostering local ownership of rehabilitation and development work, certain key development activities, such as curriculum standardisation and immunisation campaigns, require co-ordinated, national-level decision-making that is difficult, if not impossible, in the absence of a central authority.

In the absence of a State, major aid donors have come to assume some of the prerogatives of development planning on behalf of the Somali people. This is, in many respects, inevitable in a situation wherein external funding constitutes 95% or more of the funds devoted to some social services, and is not entirely different from the relationship between major donors/lenders and very weak, highly indebted states elsewhere. In the case of Somalia, external donors, UN agencies, and NGOs have created a formal mechanism (the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body) as an advisory body which co-ordinates development approaches, policies and strategies in Somalia. The SACB is a unique structure for a unique development context, facilitating co-ordination that, under normal circumstances, would be the responsibility of an organ of the state. The SACB’s five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors, and play a valuable role in managing the prioritisation and programming of “global” issues (like immunisation campaigns and educational curricula) that cannot easily be handled at the local level.

Both Somalis and the international community have, over the past eight years, experimented with a number of temporary mechanisms in an effort to increase the Somali voice in Somali development. Most of these approaches have fallen short of expectations, though some have proven more effective than others. At times, aid agency frustration with endemic conflicts over local authority, predatory behaviour by militias and factions, mediocre local administrative or technical capacities, and cumbersome and
obstructionist Somali negotiations has led many external development actors to shun local participation. Instead, they prize and reward “output” (direct delivery of rehabilitation projects that they believe meet highest priority needs) They see Somalia’s fledgling politics as obstacles rather than partners in development. In the short-term, this emphasis on development “product” (numbers of schools renovated, health posts established, wells dug) is understandable both from a humanitarian and institutional perspective. In the end, though, such policies can constitute self-fulfilling prophecies. The more local authorities are bypassed on grounds that they are weak and incompetent, the more marginal and incompetent they become.

Agreeing that development efforts must build governmental capacity in Somalia is one thing. Identifying successful means of achieving that goal is quite another. International aid agencies, like the Somalis themselves, must learn as they go when attempting to assist human development in a Stateless context. Some approaches to the promotion of human development have permitted greater levels of partnership and consultation than others. These approaches have included the following:

- **Local NGOs as local counterparts**

Throughout the 1990s, one method for dealing with the donor dilemma of who to work through in the absence of a Somali State has been to sub-contract the problem out to implementing agencies, the international NGOs. They in turn have tended to gravitate towards structures made in their image: local NGOs, as implementing partners and sources of local input. The success of this approach was its apparent neutrality (one agent of civil society working with and through another). Local NGOs also can give more voice to Somali women, professionals, and intellectuals in the human development process. Strengthening civil society in this way has been a valuable contribution. Some local NGOs have proven to be powerful interlocutors for Somali communities, and operate in their communities with or without outside support. But most of the hundreds of local NGOs which sprang up in the early 1990s were either businesses disguised as NGOs, fronts for factions seeking to control rehabilitation funding, or simply bogus organisations responding to the incentives of international aid. As outside assistance dried up, so did most of these local NGOs. Another problem with reliance on local NGOs is the voice of local communities is that strategy has tended to marginalise local governmental structures, working around them rather than through them. NGOs (both local and international) which command a level of funding allowing them to provide jobs, contracts, and social services are quickly perceived as “the government” by local communities.

- **District Councils**

As part of its mandate to assist in the revival of government in Somalia, UNOSOM attempted to establish district councils throughout the country. It was hoped that the DCs would serve as functional local authorities, reliable interlocutors between local communities and aid agencies, and building blocks for regional and, eventually, a transitional national authority. From mid-1993 until early 1994, UNOSOM aggressively promoted establishment of DCs throughout the country; its Political Affairs officers travelled to districts, met with clan elders and requested that they lead a selection process for DC council members. By the end of 1993, over 50 districts had formed District Councils. Both UNOSOM and several NGOs (especially the Life and Peace Institute) provided supplies and training to these councils, support which continued beyond 1995.

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12. In that the success of development agencies and donors is measured by such discrete output, and careers advanced as well.

13. This “bottom-up” approach was the subject of debate. UNOSOM took its mandate both from the Security Council Resolution 814 (which instructed it to initiate a process of reconciliation “through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society”), and from the faction-based Addis Ababa Accords of March 1993. According to the original accord, factions (in the presence and under the pressure of several hundred Somali community leaders) agreed that DCs would be created “through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.” The DCs would then select three members each to form regional councils, which would in turn select representatives for a Transitional National Council. However, the factions reversed this provision by meeting separately days later and signing an “appendix” which arrogated to the factions the right to select regional council representatives. UNOSOM opted to ignore the original accord and not the appendix, creating tension with factions which occupied some areas by force and which stood to lose out if local government were selected by popular referendum.
In a few locations, these DCs have developed into functional local authorities, serving to articulate development priorities to international agencies and, in some instances, raising funds through local taxes or contributions to provide support to schools or a health post. Some came about after the departure of UNOSOM on the basis of purely local initiatives to create local government. For the most part, though, the DCs established by UNOSOM either disappeared after UNOSOM’s departure or exist mainly to interface with international aid agencies. Many, in fact, explicitly define their main task as coordinating with international NGOs to work out technical arrangements for car hire, money exchange, and hiring of security guards. Were it not for the intermittent presence of international NGOs or UN agencies, some of these DCs would quickly dissolve. Still others show promise of evolving into responsive and useful local administrations.

**District Management Groups**

In an effort to encourage more Somali ownership of the development process, and to encourage good governance locally, one aid project, the Somali Rehabilitation Project - (SRP) Southwest (a UNDP project), has encouraged the establishment of District Management Groups (DMG) to prioritise development needs, operationalise those priorities in specific project proposals, set contracts for execution of those projects, monitor and evaluate project work, and handle disbursement of funds. SRP insists only that the DMGs be broadly representative of the community residing in the district, and that its proceedings be completely open, transparent, and accountable to district residents. SRP allot a certain amount of rehabilitation funding to each district, and gives districts ample time to discuss development needs.\(^{126}\) In most cases, communities in Southwest Somalia opted to link their DMG to the District Council, as a type of development board serving beneath the DC. The DMG members typically include more professionals and civil servants than politicians. The DMG experiment has succeeded in forcing local authorities to assume more direct responsibility for governance and in succeeding in promoting good governance at the district level. This emphasis on promoting a process of good governance rather than emphasis on development product is unique and worthy of serious consideration elsewhere. Among the drawbacks of the program is its financial unsustainability (since DMGs work with funds allocated from UNDP, not locally generated revenue), the artificiality of the DMGs themselves, and the fact that such an approach is more difficult to implement in districts where control is actively disputed between clans and factions.

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\(^{126}\)SRP places some restriction on use of this aid; DMGs which propose obviously flawed development priorities are turned down.
Workshops, Conferences, and “Reference Groups”

National-level development priorities are often vetted with ad hoc convening of Somali professionals and experts in workshops. In a few instances, aid agencies have established Somali reference groups which periodically convene to provide guidance and Somali input on development priorities. This approach has proven useful in garnering Somali input for development issues that need national consensus. As a mechanism, however, it limits Somali ownership to that of consultants working on problems in their own country.

Regional and Trans-regional Policies

Recent efforts to establish regional or multi-regional States in Somalia are a potentially significant development. Puntland has recently been established in the Northeast, a Benadir regional authority has been the subject of negotiations by Mogadishu factions, and proposals for the creation of Hiranland, and Jubbaland have been raised as well. In a best-case scenario, these policies will serve as building-blocks for a federal State and as responsive structures for the prioritisation and delivery of basic rehabilitation and development. Puntland, for instance, is establishing sectoral ministries which may allow for trans-regional development planning “owned” by Somali authorities. Even if such trans-regional States are established, they will inherit very weak economies and will likely possess very modest administrative and enforcement capacities.

Somali Land Ministries

The issue of Somali ownership over development planning is qualitatively different in Somalia, where established ministries have formal roles by sector, and where the Ministry of Planning sets overall priorities. In reality, these ministries are of variable but mostly minimal effectiveness; they lack budgets, and civil servants are paid so little that they must work other jobs during the day. Still, the existence of these ministries provides a mechanism by which Somali authorities can prioritise development needs. International agencies and donors have not had a coordinated approach to national authority structures in Somalia. Some work through ministries; others work directly with municipalities; still others prefer to work directly through local NGOs or contractors, evading ministerial efforts to direct or control their work. In recent months, a joint Somali-SACB Committee (HEAC) has been established and given a mandate to prioritise projects and recommend their financing to donors. This represents the first time that international community permits an effective Somali say in development project selection.

Promotion of Good Governance as a Development Goal

The task of rebuilding a system of government and insuring that it is accountable, (good governance) is primarily the responsibility of the Somali people. International assistance (whether as emergency relief, rehabilitation, or development) has, however, an unavoidable impact on local governance. That impact can be negative or positive, depending on how aid is delivered. Just as Somali communities are adapting to the collapse of the State and learning new means of providing basic governance to themselves, so too are international aid agencies learning how better to promote good governance in their work. Some of these lessons include the following:

Treating governance as a cross-cutting theme in all aid intervention, not as a separate sector

Sectoral approaches to aid tend to “stove-pipe” issue-areas, so that little co-ordination and interaction takes place between sectors, and sectoral specialists (or sectorally-specialised agencies) work in isolation.
from other issues. Yet promotion of good governance is often best achieved via functional assistance in sanitation, health, education, and other social services. Increasingly, it is understood that all development assistance must place at the centre of its objectives the building-up of local capacity in governance, not just the delivery of a development “good.” And it must certainly avoid policies which unintentionally weaken local capacity in governance.

- Emphasising good governance, not just governance

At times, the international aid community has placed so much emphasis on provision of a secure environment as a precondition for aid that it appeared to equate “law and order” with governance. Over time, it became clear that good governance had to include a much wider range of goals: protection of civil and human rights, provision of basic social services, participation, and accountability. This has become an explicit principle of the SACB.

- Coordination

The international community - both aid agencies and diplomatic representatives - often works at cross-purposes inside Somalia. One agency will work only with local NGOs, another only with district councils, still another with factions. This can inadvertently marginalise promising local authority structures, shore-up unrepresentative or problematic local leaders, and create confusion and conflict between local actors. A well-thought out strategy and co-ordinated policies on the part of the international community at the national level can improve the odds that international assistance builds rather than tears down emerging local authorities. The decision facing the international community on how to interact with new Puntland authorities will be an important test of this principle.

- Technical assistance and training for local authorities

Capacity-building in local and regional authorities is vital, especially given the loss of so many of the country’s skilled professionals to emigration. Training in a wide range of technical, administrative skills (accounting, revenue collection, port management, judicial and police training, etc.) has been provided by several NGOs (including Life and Peace Institute) and UN agencies, including UNCTAD, ICAO, and the Local Administrative Structures Unit of the UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS).

- Data collection

Both emerging regional authorities and a future national State are inheriting completely destroyed information banks, archives, and ministerial records. Much of this basic data is vital to development planning and prioritisation. In response, donors have funded a data collection project through the UN Development Office for Somalia, which will turn over to a future Somali State updated data on demographics, household incomes, market activity, and a host of other information.

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10 Defining what is meant by “local” government has not been easy in a country where authority is so fluid and tenuous. It is not always clear where meaningful “local” governance exists - at the regional level, district level, village or neighbourhood level? Different agencies and Somali groups have come to define local government in different ways, leading to some confusion.
CHAPTER 5

TOWARD A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

An important component of Human Development Reports is not only analysis of current human development trends, but also policy recommendations. The following policy proposals represent only the conclusions of the independent authors of the report. They are presented as points of departure for discussion among donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, and the many Somali stakeholders in human development initiatives. Because the international aid community possesses a dominant influence over the direction of human development initiatives at this time, many of these recommendations are directed primarily at them.

At this troubled moment in its history, Somalia presents unique challenges, constraints, and trade-offs for those attempting to promote human development there. Nevertheless, it also presents opportunities, as some “recovery zones” within Somalia amply demonstrate. Somalia continues to demand our collective attention and responsibility: a responsibility not to allow past frustrations and setbacks to degenerate into cynicism and disengagement (in the international community) or despair and emigration (within Somali society). Sustained commitment to human development in Somalia is imperative both for humanitarian reasons and as a matter of enlightened self-interest. If Somalia’s ongoing political crisis and development impasse are not resolved, the country will continue to spin-off dangerous and destabilising phenomena well beyond its borders: drug-resistant diseases, gun and drug smuggling, refugee flows and asylum seekers, banditry, terrorism, and armed conflict. The greatest stakeholders in Somalia’s development are, of course, the Somali people themselves. They face the prospect of raising families in an environment with little or no health care, a collapsed education system, high unemployment, periodic warfare, and lawlessness. No set of outside consultants, however empathetic, can possibly appreciate the terribly high costs that Somalia’s political and development crisis has exacted on Somali families.

- Maximising Somali ownership of the development process

In Chapter four, this study documented a number of ways in which Somali voices have been brought into the process of prioritising, operationalising, and executing development initiatives. Some of these approaches have been more successful than others. Somalis and their international counterparts in development agencies must continue to explore new and better ways to maximise Somali ownership of the human development agenda. Innovative programmes such as the SRP-Southwest project merit close examination for possible application in other parts of Somalia. The need for Somali ownership of development is imperative both in order to promote good governance and as a practical matter: the development record in Somalia amply demonstrates that development efforts not “owned” by local communities have a very high rate of failure.

- Promoting good governance

Throughout this document, a recurring theme has been that at the root of the Somali development impasse is the crisis of governance. Analysis in Chapter Four highlighted the fact that the international aid community has increasingly laid emphasis on the need to consider promotion of good governance to be a cross-sectoral theme infused into all aid activities. Even humanitarian assistance can be crafted in ways which build-up local capacity in governance. This is a trend worth encouraging and supporting. With or without international assistance, it is a trend that is also pursued by many Somali communities eager to improve local administrative capacities.
It is not, however, clear that this support for promotion of good governance always translates into international commitment. Many international and national staff of aid agencies express unease with good governance as a goal, and pay it only lip service. Some do so because they fear the “political” implications and wish their work to remain strictly technical, functional, and apolitical. Others do so because the promotion of good governance involves improving a process rather than delivering a product, although the reward system in development agencies emphasises products (number of wells dug is valued more than breadth of local participation involved in prioritising water as a development activity). Until the headquarters of aid agencies change their methods of measuring output and success for their field operations, a strong incentive will exist for field operations to bypass the cumbersome and often contentious process of involving local governmental structures in development work.

It is also terribly important that the international community and Somalis involved in development initiatives continue to emphasise good governance, not just governance. Local and regional Somali authorities need to hear again and again from their own constituents and the outside world that their legitimacy does not merely derive from insuring the physical security of aid workers and seaports, but rather from establishing accountable, responsive administrations that make real efforts to devote tax revenues and energies towards meeting the development needs of population. This is the litmus test that should be used in determining the legitimacy of the new regional and trans-regional authorities being announced or discussed in Somalia today. Leaders of these polities must be made to understand that the legitimacy of their administrations will be measured by their commitment to delivering good governance to their people.

Matching support for humanitarian aid with support for human development

Human development issues in Somalia have been overwhelmed by pressing humanitarian needs since 1990, when the Somali State collapsed amidst civil war and factional fighting. Throughout the 1990s, Southern Somalia has periodically constituted a “complex emergency,” with outbreaks of famine, epidemics, large scale refugee flows, and armed conflict. Such recurrent “loud” emergencies in parts of Somalia make it difficult and, at times, inappropriate for local communities and international aid agencies to focus on longer-term human development goals.

These recurrent humanitarian crises have been met with a generous international response. When the humanitarian crisis subsides, however, international funding for rehabilitation and development shrinks as well. There are powerful institutional reasons for this within the donor community, where food and funds for emergency response are far easier to release and far more available than funds for development. However, the disjoint between international generosity in times of humanitarian crisis and international disengagement for development is self-defeating. Without more sustainable development activities and progress, regions emerging from humanitarian disaster are much more vulnerable to setbacks caused by weather or conflict, and much more prone to slip back into humanitarian crises. In a sense, the absence of development is a root cause of the humanitarian emergencies. Treating the symptom but not the cause is a recipe for recurrent crises, and imposes enormous suffering on the Somali people.

This vicious circle is true for low levels of human development and the political crisis in Somalia as well. Statelessness and endemic conflict have shattered communal safety nets and social services, reversing past gains in human development. At the same time, lack of jobs and social services has fuelled conflict...
and prolonged the emergence of a state. Populations of young men without access to education gravitate towards militias as the only viable source of “employment”. Trained professionals are lost to an international “brain-drain,” since few Somalis with options abroad are willing to raise a family without health care and clean water; and the productivity of the labour force is dramatically reduced by chronic illness and high morbidity rates. In sum, efforts to promote national reconciliation without improving human development will likely fail.

More creative engagement in Somalia on the part of the world’s major multi-lateral donors, the IMF and the World Bank, should be sought to obtain more investment capital. Regional states which meet standards of good governance should be considered for this type of assistance. For years, these multi-lateral bodies declined involvement in Somalia on the grounds that they deal only with states. Yet all indications suggest that Somalia’s mosaic of polities will not add up to a conventional state for some years to come. The World Bank’s recent involvement in post-conflict reconstruction (as described in its 1997 document on this subject)\(^1\) suggests a new flexibility in dealing with non-state actors. As for the IMF, it may be needed to help understand an economy without a legitimate monetary authority and the impossibility of any co-ordinated monetary. If factions purchase newly-printed shillings from in pursuit of gains from “seigneuriage”, they may well create a crisis of confidence in the shilling, leading to hyperinflation and a collapse of the exchange rate. If these major donors devise ways to provide development or fiscal assistance to a stateless society, however, they must take great care not to trigger political conflicts over access to, or misuse of, resources by corrupt authorities. Somali authorities must be made to understand the “new rules of the game” and abuse of development aid must not be tolerated.

Balancing sustainability with investment in the future of Somalia

Aid donors, aid agencies, and Somalis themselves agree that development initiatives heavily dependent on external support are most likely to fail. For a variety of reasons, related to budget cuts, security, or other factors, the external assistance eventually is cut off, and activities invariably collapse, leaving the community with only memories of a hospital or school. Sustainability has thus become, appropriately, a cornerstone of development assistance in Somalia today. Efforts are underway to introduce cost recovery schemes in hospitals and health posts, tuition in schools, and user fees for other services. However, given the precariousness of Somali incomes, user fees may not be sustainable and usually will be abandoned as soon as “real” emergencies occur as humanitarian concerns overwhelm all others.

Sustainability is a very important principle in development, and must not be casually subordinated to other goals. Nevertheless, it is not an absolute value, and must be weighed against other compelling needs. In the case of education in Somalia, the difficult choice facing aid donors is this: the current poverty of Somalia, combined with variable levels of community commitment to education, means that schools will only function in most parts of Somalia if heavily subsidised from outside. Sustainability and broad access to public education appear at this time to be incompatible. Yet both are compelling and desirable goals. If yet another generation of Somali children is denied access to schooling, the country faces a very bleak future for decades to come. Can a country survive and recover when virtually its entire population between the ages of 20 and 40 are without formal education?

There are no obvious answers to this dilemma, but a case could be made for setting aside the principle of sustainability in order to provide access to education for a generation of Somalis. An international commitment to underwrite most of the costs of a primary (and limited secondary and vocational) education system would be expensive. Nevertheless, it would pay significant dividends in years to come, and give Somalia a much better chance of sustained recovery. Targeting demobilised militiamen, with adult vocational training would also increase Somalia's chances of re-establishing the rule of law. The alternative - to consign one, perhaps two generations of Somalis to illiteracy and lack of education - has enormous costs as well. These costs are just less visible than the cost of educating a neglected cohort of students.

**Developing a more comprehensive strategy for transition zones**

The UN strategic framework in Somalia refers to zones of recovery, crisis, and transition; each of these situations involves distinct political settings and distinct development needs and possibilities. This framework has proven useful in organising the types of development activities needed throughout Somalia. It is clear, for instance, that in zones of crisis, humanitarian needs must take precedence, and development initiatives may not be appropriate or possible. Moreover, in recovery zones, many to most types of conventional development work can be undertaken. What has been missing, though, is a more comprehensive strategy for catalysing development in transitional zones of Somalia. The direction these areas take is crucial to the future of the country: they can either be pulled into the orbit of recovery zones, or can be pulled back into crisis. Yet, the aid community has a very weak presence in these areas, and no apparent strategy to tailor appropriate development initiatives for zones of transition. The strategic goal of the UN of "enlargement" of recovery zones in Somalia is laudable, and the strategic framework itself is a useful way to organise development efforts. However, strategic goals and strategic frameworks are not the same as strategy. Closer attention must be paid to the specific development initiatives that can work in transition zones, and then more resources should be devoted to them. Otherwise, these areas risk falling between the cracks as humanitarian relief is directed to crisis areas and development aid fed into the recovery areas.

**Provision of support to the private sector**

The private sector has demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability in the context of Statelessness. It is increasingly viewed as the main engine of economic recovery. It is virtually the only provider of whatever development services (private schools, private health clinics, etc.) exist in the country; and it is potentially a catalyst for political reconciliation as well. Crucially, it is the main generator of employment opportunities in a country where high unemployment is at the core of many political conflicts and the difficulties of demobilising militia. Donors and aid agencies are beginning to explore ways to support the recovery and expansion of the private sector.

By definition, profitable private enterprises in a Stateless environment have not needed external assistance, and a cardinal rule of any development aid to the private sector is that it should not involve subsidies which cannot be sustained. There are, however, a number of forms of assistance that could be of great help to the private sector. Among the issues worthy of further exploration are access to credit (scarce credit is a major constraint to small businesses; rotating credit schemes, carefully monitored, have had notable success in parts of Somalia); improvement of key roads, bridges, airports, and seaports (deteriorating transport systems are major constraints on commerce); and vocational training (to impart needed business skills). Any external assistance to the

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1. COSV/IBDA, Peace Building and Reintegration in Lower Shabelle region, Milan, COSV, September 1998
3. B. Marchal, Project of a Public and Business Administration School in Somalia, Nairobi, UN/OS, December 1997
private sector in Somalia should insure that it take the lead from the business community itself, and that businesses enjoying support are in the public interest but should, in any case, be financially profitable. The thriving business of charcoal exports, for instance, provides jobs for many but is an environmental disaster and should not receive external support.

Gender

Evidence collected for this report strongly suggests that, since the civil war, Somali women have come to assume even greater responsibilities for both management of the household and generation of household income through productive and commercial activity. This gives women an important role in the satisfaction of human development needs at the household level. It stands to reason, then, that women must also be at the centre of discussions of, and planning for, human development initiatives. This, however, has not been the case. Wherever formal structures have been established to enhance Somali voice in and ownership of development priorities, the voices have been predominantly male.

Like governance, gender issues are cross-sectoral, a theme that must run through every development project and programme in the country. It is not enough to insure that women constitute a reasonable portion of the recipients of development (though it is terribly important that female children enjoy equal access to education). It is not enough to advocate “women’s issues” (though it is essential that education and awareness programmes work to halt female circumcision). Women must win full access to positions of authority over human development prioritisation and implementation. If they are given a full voice in matters of human development by the donors and agencies seeking to promote development, there is a much greater likelihood that development initiatives will meet the actual needs of households.

Environmental protection

The sustainability of the environment is closely linked to human development. Poor levels of human development directly contribute to environmental degradation. Environmental collapse leads to more fragile human development conditions. In the absence of government there is, nevertheless, a need, (as IUCN recommended in its report on the coastal regions in 1998), to create Environmental Protection Agencies on a regional basis. These agencies should be assisted to develop and adopt an integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) programme for the future management of the country’s coastal zones. They should also focus on ways and means to promote range management and prevent deforestation and desertification.

Managing the problem of qaat

Qaat consumption is a major drain of resources in a country far too poor to afford it. Diversions of family funds from food and medicine toward daily qaat purchases directly diminishes welfare.

Finding ways to discourage qaat use should be a major priority for local governments. Outright prohibition of qaat would be pointless, since local authorities do not have the means to enforce it. Likewise, direct international involvement in an anti-qaat campaign would almost be counter-productive. This is an issue that only local communities can manage. Some Somali communities have considered a “sin tax” on qaat, collected at the airports or road checkpoints, which would raise the price to a point that some might reconsider purchasing it. If the proceeds from this tax are specifically and transparently earmarked for a high priority local development need, like schools, public opposition to the tax might be muted. On the other hand, inability to satisfy a felt need might lead to high feelings of frustration and lead to unpredictable behaviour patterns.
APPENDIX A

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX OF SOMALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Indicators</th>
<th>1989-90 (Base)</th>
<th>1995-97 (High)</th>
<th>1995-97 (Low)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy (# of years)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy (%)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Enrolment Ratio (6-17)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Enrolment Ratio (13-16)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Enrolment Ratio</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Gross Enrolment Ratio</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per capita (US $)</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy Index</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy Index</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Enrolment Ratio</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment Index</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per capita Income Index</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: UNDOS; UNESCO; UNICEF; WHO. Calculations made by KNS Nair, UNDOS. Note: Due to the absence of a national government in Somalia, the statistical data are generated mostly by the aid agencies. Often, there would be some variations in such statistics. Therefore, the HDI for Somalia has been computed for the high and low values at the margin as an attempt to bracket the situation in Somalia realistically.

The HDI of the five countries, which appear at the bottom of the HDI rankings in the 1998 Human Development Report, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>170/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>171/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>172/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>173/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>1/4/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.184-0.159</td>
<td>175/175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

MAIN EVENTS IN SOMALIA’S HISTORY

1869  Opening of the Suez Canal, which increases European involvement and interests in the Horn of Africa.

1897  Colonial partition of Somali-inhabited territories between the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Ethiopia.

1936  Italian occupation of Ethiopia and the establishment of “L’Africa orientale italiana.” This was the first time that Somalis in Ethiopia came under one administration with Italian Somaliland.

1941-49 British military occupation and administration of the Italian protectorate.

1943  Creation of the Somali Youth Club; in 1947 it changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL), adopting nationalist goals of unification of all Somali territories, independence from colonial rule, and opposition to clannism. In British Somaliland, creation of the Somali National League, sharing similar nationalist aims.

1948  Withdrawal of Britain from Ogaden and the reintegration of the region into Ethiopia.

1948  UN Four Powers Commission investigates options for the future disposition of the Italian Somalia colony.

1949  United Nations resolution passed which makes Italian Somalia a UN Trust Territory, to be administered by Italy for a ten year period prior to independence.

1955  Annexation of the west part of Somaliland and Reserved Area to Ethiopia.

1960  Independence of Somaliland from Britain (26 June).

1960  Independence of Somalia and unification of the British and ex-Italian Somali protectorates. For the first time of government with Abdurahmen Ali Sharmarke as the Prime Minister and Aden Abdulle Osman as the provisional President. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Prime Minister of Somaliland, is appointed Minister of Defence (1 July).

1961  Presidential election in which Aden Abdulle Osman wins as the first elected President of the Somali Republic. Abdurahmen Ali Sharmarke is again appointed Prime Minister (6 July).

1961  Failed coup d'etat attempt by young army officers led by Hassan Abdullele Walanwal (Hassan Kaid) from the former British Somaliland. Their intention was to declare a separate state; the coup was repressed by Somaliland troops (December).
1963 Relations with Britain are severed due to disputes over the Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District in Kenya. In November, first military agreement with the Soviet Union (12 March).

1964 Abdirizak Haji Hussein is appointed Prime Minister after the March legislative elections (April).

1967 Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke is elected President and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal is appointed Prime Minister (June).

1969 President Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke is assassinated by one of his bodyguards (15 October).

1969 Coup d'état in Somalia. Major General Mahamed Siyad Barre takes over as Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). A number of prominent leaders and potential political rivals to Barre are imprisoned (21 October).

1970 Siyad Barre declares Somalia a socialist state; begins to embark on a range of socialist economic programmes, such as nationalisations. He also begins to construct a national security service (NSS) to monitor and arrest dissidents (21 October).

1972 The Supreme Revolutionary Council decrees the Latin script as the orthography for Somali and launches a nationwide urban and rural literacy campaign (21 October).

1974 Somali Democratic Republic joins the Arab League.

1974 Somali-Soviet friendship Treaty signed, and a Soviet naval base established in Berbera. Substantial military aid from the Soviet Union received, allowing Somalia to build up one of the largest armies in sub-Saharan Africa (July).

1975 Execution of ten Islamic sheikhs who had publicly opposed policies giving equal rights to women; considered by some as a watershed event, exposing growing repression by the regime (23 January).

1977 Following months of clashes between the Ethiopian Army and the Western Somali Liberation Front, Somali troops invade Ogaden region of Ethiopia in June. In August, the Soviet Union suspends arms shipments to Siyad Barre’s regime and accelerates military deliveries to Ethiopia. In November, Somalia renounces the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, expels Soviet advisers and breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba.

1978 Siyad Barre announces the withdrawal of all Somali armed forces from the Ogaden after a disastrous defeat by the Soviet and Cuban-backed Ethiopian army. A month later, a group of military officers (mostly Mijirteen) attempt a coup d'état that fails. This leads to the first armed opposition group in Somalia, the Somali Salvation Front, led by Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. This organisation merges with other civilian opposition parties in exile to create the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in October 1981. SSDF collapses after the arrest of its Chairman, Abdullahi Yusuf, by the Ethiopian Security on October 12, 1985. Harsh repression of the regime in the Northeast of the country throughout these years. The defeat also produces hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees from Ethiopia, who are settled in camps inside Somalia (9 March).
1980 Diplomatic links to the United States are strengthened, including a package of economic and military aid in return for United States access to Berbera Port for use by its Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

1981 Creation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) by a group of overseas Isaq. SNM becomes subsequently the strongest of the various insurgent movements. Repressive policies and virtual military occupation of Isaq areas of the Northwest by the government (April).

1982 Barre government announces liberalisation of the agricultural sector, as part of a slow process of dismantling some socialist policies under pressure from Western donors. This begins a decade of substantial foreign aid from Western and multi-lateral donors.

1988 Siyad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia sign an accord agreeing to restore diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners of war, start a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border area and end subversive activities and hostile propaganda against each other (4 April).

1988 Faced with a cut-off of Ethiopian military assistance, SNM units launch a major offensive and temporarily occupy the provincial capitals of Burao and Hargeisa. The Somali army reacts by destroying Hargeisa, killing thousands of civilians and creating a refugee crisis in the North. Barre government comes under growing international criticism for human rights abuses, accused of atrocities against the Isaq and systematic repression throughout the country. Most foreign aid to Somalia is frozen (May).

1989 Creation of the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) in Rome, founded by Ali Mohamed Osobleh Wardhigley. One year later, in June 1990, the USC military wing led by General Mohamed Farah Hassen Aideed organises a contested congress in Musul, (Ethiopia) where he is elected USC Chairman (January).

1989 Creation of the Ogaden-based Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in Middle Juba after the imprisonment of a former Minister of Defence, General Aden Abdullahi Nuur Gabio. Another wing is established by Ahmed Omar Jess who defected from the Somali army while serving in Somaliland late June 1989 (March).

1990 Publication of the “Manifesto,” signed by 114 business people, religious and former political figures, (who come to be known as the “Manifesto Group”), calling for dialogue and political reform. Many of the Manifesto signees are imprisoned. Ali Mahdi Mohamed emerges as one of the main leaders of Mogadishu Hawiye opposition. The USC-Mogadishu emerges late in the year and is led by Ali Mahdi, Hussein Haji Bod and others. By 1990, faced by multiple liberation fronts, Barre’s forces lose control of most of the countryside. Growing loss of control of Mogadishu; by late 1990, most internationals evacuate (June).

1991 Barre and his remaining forces flee the capital to Kismayo. USC and its supporters claim control of Mogadishu. Period of looting and chaos ensues in the capital. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis are internally displaced as they relocate to areas that their clans control. In the countryside, retreating Barre forces pillage and lay waste to villages. Only the northern sections of the country are spared from the looting and fighting (26 January).
1991 Ali Mahdi is elected president by a small group of Hawiye notables in Mogadishu. This decision is disputed by many, who oppose a nomination process that lacked broad consultations. Mahdi's "presidency" goes unrecognised internationally (29 January).

1991 Somali National Movement (SNM) declares independence for the Somaliland Republic and elects Abdirahman Tuur, then Chairman of the SNM, as the first President of Somaliland. The secessionist state goes unrecognised internationally (18 May).

1991 Siyad Barre's forces launch a new offensive to retake Mogadishu. The counter-offensive led by General Aideed reaches Kismayo. In the process, the inter-riverine region is repeatedly plundered and its population subjected to brutalities by free-lance militia, setting the stage for famine conditions (March).

1991 Siyad Barre forces take over Baidoa. Fighting spreads in April 1992 to South Central Somalia creating the conditions for a major famine in this area (September).

1991 Rivalry between Ali Mahdi and General Aideed within the USC spills over heavy fighting in Mogadishu between November 1991 and April 1992, splitting the Hawiye. Thousands of people are killed or wounded; most of the centre of Mogadishu is destroyed; and the city is divided by the Green Line. Humanitarian conditions worsen in the city. Aideed forms a coalition known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA). Similar intra-clan fighting breaks out over control of Kismayo within the Darood clan, pitting Col. Omar Jess and his Ogaden militia against the forces of General Mohamed Sayid Hersi "Morgan," who leads a predominantly Henti-Marehan clan coalition (17 November).

1992 Famine rages throughout much of southern Somalia for most of the year, peaking in June-July of 1992 in the epi-centre of the famine, Baidoa. Increasing international media coverage and of frustrated attempts by aid agencies to respond to the famine. Food aid is repeatedly looted as militias profit off of the crisis. Militias battles are increasingly over control of the food relief itself.

1992 UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia) created. Mohamed Sahnoun is appointed Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General and attempts to broker a peace. A small Pakistani UN peacekeeping unit is deployed to the Mogadishu airport over the summer but is unable to control the airport from militias (March).

1992 US President George Bush announces "Operation Provide Relief," a massive airlift of food aid to zones of famine in Southern Somalia using US military aircraft, but no peacekeeping forces. The operation reaches some populations, but distribution of aid goes uncontrolled and attracts militia and looting. The famine continues, and by October peaks in the Jubba valley (July).
1992  "Operation Restore Hope," a US-led, UN-sanctioned multinational peacekeeping force, is announced. 30,000 UNITAF troops land in Somalia, taking control of seaports, airports, and major roads, and provide security for relief operations. This dramatic move quickly ends the famine in Southern Somalia and freezes militia conflicts. General Aideed, who sharply opposed proposals for UN peacekeeping in the past, changes policies and welcomes the intervention. Following a protracted debate within the UN and US, the UNITAF mandate is limited to protection of humanitarian relief, and makes little effort to disarm the militias, though it does impose cantonment of weaponry (December).

1993  The UN convenes 15 factions to negotiate a comprehensive national reconciliation agreement in Addis-Ababa. It calls for disarmament and establishes a process for the creation of a transitional national council as well as regional and district councils. How the district and regional councils are to be chosen (by local populations or by factions) is left unclear, however, and later becomes a source of sharp disagreement. Also in March, the UN Security Council establishes UNOSOM II (Resolution 814), giving the UN operation a broad peace enforcement mandate that includes disarmament and support of the re-establishment of a Somali state (March).

1993  US-led forces (UNITAF) turn over authority to UNOSOM II, which is led by American Admiral Jonathan Howe (5 April).

1993  Mohamed Ibrahim Egal is elected as President of Somalia by the "Guurtii" (assembly of elders) at the Boroma Conference. This meeting ends a year of fighting in the Northwest due following the collapse of the SNM and ensuing clan rivalries. The accord provides an institutional framework for the new authority of Somali land (5 May).

1993  General Aideed returns to Mogadishu after a two-month trip abroad. He accuses UNOSOM of anti-SNA bias, tensions mount between UNOSOM and the SNA in Mogadishu (May).

1993  24 UNOSOM Pakistani troops are killed in an ambush by General Aideed's supporters, following an inspection of an SNA arms cantonment site. This leads to UN armed retaliation against SNA installations and a campaign to arrest Aideed. Most armed operations are carried out by US forces. A virtual urban war ensues between the Aideed's Haber-Gedir sub-clan and the U.S. in Mogadishu. Several heavy clashes and bombardments especially, on June 17 and on July 12, lead to high civilian casualties and create mounting international criticism of the UN mission. Efforts to capture Aideed fail (5 June).

1993  Frustrated by the worsening situation in Mogadishu and the failure of faction leaders to adhere to the Addis Ababa accords, UNOSOM devotes energies to building local-level administration in districts throughout the country, and sponsors regional-level peace processes. This "bottom-up" approach meets with scattered success - some district councils are formed, and local peace accords between feuding clans forged in Bardhere, Kismayo, Afmadow, and elsewhere (June).
In a military operation in South Mogadishu, a fire-fight leads to the deaths of 18 US Special Forces soldiers and hundreds of Somalis. Uncontrolled youths drag US bodies through the streets of Mogadishu, scenes broadcast on international media. Four days later, President Clinton announces that all US troops will pull out by the end of March 1994. The same decision is taken by many other Western States in the following weeks (10 March).

A peace agreement is signed in Mogadishu between Hirshclan clans (mostly Habar Gidir and Abgal). Though Aideed and Mahdi remain political rivals, fighting between their clans ceases. This agreement brings back some normalisation in a divided city (January).

Armed clashes break out in Kismayo between SPM and SPM/SNA. The Absame militia and most of the Absame population are driven out of the town (February).

UNOSOM shifts strategies from a bottom-up to a top-down approach, seeking to broker a deal between what it perceives to be the strongest factions/militias in the country. The first such effort occurs in Nairobi. Following these talks, a new agenda for national reconciliation is agreed to by Aideed and Ali Mahdi as leaders of the two main political groupings, respectively the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). But the accords are not implemented (March).

USA military forces complete their withdrawal from Somalia. Most other contingents of UNOSOM leave behind a smaller, mainly Third World, forces with limited equipment and a diminished mandate (March).

Lower Jubba Peace Conference leads to a peace agreement signed by General Morgan and SNA representative, Osman Atto. However, General Morgan's real adversary in Lower Jubba, the Absame clan, do not take part, making the peace accord stillborn (9 July).

Siyad Barre dies in exile in Nigeria (2 January).

UNOSOM forces and civilian officials depart Somalia after a long period of draw-down, leaving the country still divided and with no central government (31 March).

General Aideed declares a government, but at the same time, his faction splits. His former financial backer Osman Atto declares he is Chairman of the SNA. Aideed's self-declared government is not recognised internationally and is unable to administer the portion of the city it claims to control (15 June).

General Aideed's forces occupy Baidoa, displacing much of the population of Baidoa town. This move leads to the creation of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, which begins to launch guerrilla attacks on Haber-Gedir and Rahanweyn allied to them (September).

Fighting breaks out between the forces of General Aideed and Osman Atto in South Mogadishu.

General Aideed dies of gunshot wounds sustained in a neighbourhood battle. His son, Hussein Aideed (formerly a corporal in the United States Marines Corps Reserve) takes over his
“presidency” (8 January).

1997 Leaders of the SSA and Osman Atto meet in Sodere, Ethiopia, and sign an agreement to seek a comprehensive peace settlement and establishment of a new government of Somalia. However, tensions within Ali Mahdi’s Abgal clan worsens, leading to armed conflict in North Mogadishu (1 March).

1997 President Egal of SomaliLand is reinstated for an additional term of two years. A new constitution is adopted giving him major leverage in all decisions (3 December).

1997 Ethiopian and forces attack Al-Ittihaad strongholds in Gedo region (8 June).

1997 Leaders of 30 factions sign a peace accord in Cairo. Like past accords, it is not implemented, but it solidifies a growing alliance between two former adversaries, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed. The Cairo accord is sponsored by Egypt, whereas the Sodere meeting was sponsored by Ethiopia (22 December).

1998 A Saudi ban on Somali livestock due to perceived threat of disease severely affects SomaliLand, which depends on livestock exports to the Gulf for most of its hard currency.

1998 Mogadishu-based faction leaders (Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto, Hussein Aideed, and Mohamed Qanyare Afrah) negotiate the establishment of a Benadir regional authority. Hussein Ali Ahmed is named Governor by the Benadir Regional Supreme Council. But opposition from other militia leaders in Mogadishu, Hussein Bod and Muse Sude, and wavering by Osman Atto, blocks progress and prevents the reopening of the seaport. Hussein Aideed formally relinquishes his claim that was made in February to the “Presidency” of Somalia, which had not received international recognition (July/August).

1998 Leaders in the Northeast agree in Garowe to form “Puntland,” a regional state of Somalia composed of Harari-inhabited areas, including Bari and Nugal regions and parts of Mudug, Sanaag and Sool regions. The decision to include Harari-inhabited portions of regions falling within the borders of SomaliLand raises tension between Somaliland authorities and the new Puntland President, Abdullahi Yusuf (July).
APPENDIX C

CLANS OF SOMALIA

Note: Somali clans can be found throughout the country; larger cities and agro-industrial areas are particularly "cosmopolitan," having attracted settlers from throughout the country over the past fifty years. Below, we note only where these clans have been historically concentrated, recognizing that most regions and cities of Somalia are a mosaic of different clans and cannot be easily described as the domain of a single clan. Readers should also be aware that clan linkages are flexible and the subject of constant reinterpretation; there is debate over whether some sub-clans actually "belong" to a particular clan, a debate that is influenced by changes in political alignments.

Predominantly Nomadic Clans

Dir
A relatively small group, its sub-clans include the Isse and Gadabursi concentrated in Awdal region of Somaliland (and into Djibouti and Ethiopia), and the Biid, concentrated in the Merka and Jamaame districts of Southern Somalia.

Daroel
Includes the Herti (comprised of the Mijerteen, Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans), concentrated in the Northeast regions, and Sanaag and Sool regions, as well as in the Kismayo area in the South; the Absame (comprised of the Jidwak and Ogadeni clans, of which the Ogadeni clan is divided into Mohamed Zubeir, Aulihan, Makabul, and Talanoge), concentrated throughout Western Ethiopia, parts of Bakool region, and much of the area west of the Juba river and into Northern Kenya; and the Marehan, concentrated in Gede and parts of Galgadood regions. The Darood includes smaller clans such as the Awtableh, Dishishe, and Lelkasse. Darood clans are predominant in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and in Northeast Kenya.

Issa
Includes Haber Yonis, Haber Awal, Haber Jaalo, Arab, Ayub and Iidagale, concentrated in the Northwest and neighbouring areas of Ethiopia.

Hawiye
Includes the Abgaal, Haber-Gidir, Murusade, Sheikhal, Ajuran, Gugundhabe, Hawadle, Gaaljaal, as well as many other smaller clans. They are concentrated in the central regions, from Mudug to the Benadir region, but pockets of Hawiye are found throughout Southern Somalia, in Western and Southern Ethiopia, and Northern Kenya.

Predominantly Agro-pastoral Clans

Rahanweyn (or Digil-Mirifle)
A confederation of clans, mostly composed of newcomers of other clans absorbed into the Rahanweyn. Includes among others the Leysan, Ealey, Mahalinweyne, Garre, Dabarre, Tunn, Jiron, Hadama, Geledi, Dossow and Jiddo; they are concentrated in the inter-riverine region (Bay, Bakol, Lower Shabelle, parts of Gede, and Middle Juba regions) between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. They speak a distinct dialect (some argue it constitutes a separate language, though this is a subject of debate) called Af-Maay.
Other Groups

Reer/Hamar/Benaadir
An ancient coastal urban population residing in the cities of Merka, Mogadishu, and Brava. Their ancestry is a mix of Arab, Persian, Indian, Swahili, and Somali. The Barawan people (of Brava) have a distinct identity within this group.

Bantu/Jeere
Agricultural group found in pockets usually in the river valleys of southern Somalia, in Hiran (Reer Shabelle and Makanne), Gedo (Gobaweyye), Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle (Shiddle and Jeere), and Lower Jubba (Gosha). Some have adopted Somali clan identity; others maintain their East African tribal identity. Some are descendants of pre-Somali Bantu populations; others are descendants of slaves from East Africa. [Note: "Bantu" is a very recent term for this group; in Somalia, they are known as "Jeere" though this is considered pejorative by some].

Reer/Jeere
Swahili-speaking fishing community inhabiting the islands south of Kismayo into Kenya and resident in Kismayo.

Arabs
Made up of Arabs mainly of Yemeni origin who settled in Somalia, especially over the past century; scattered throughout Somalia.

Midgari/Turral/Yibi
A "low caste" strata of Somalis within each of the major clans; traditionally involved in low status occupations.
APPENDIX D

MAIN POLITICAL Factions, Coalitions, and Political Movements in Somalia, 1998

(NOTE: There are over 30 factions and political movements in Somalia, and new ones are announced regularly. Many are inconsequential or relatively inactive at this time. What follows is a list of only the most active and politically or historically significant of the factions, coalitions, and movements in 1998, as judged by the authors.)

Factions

SSDF
The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) is based in the Northeast and identified with the Mijjeriteen clan. It is the first opposition front against Siyad Barre. It has claimed control over the Northeast since 1991, but never formed an effective administration of the region. A long-running leadership rivalry, with sub-clan dimensions between Mohamed Abshir Musse (SSDF Chairman from 1991 to 1994) and Abdullahi Yusuf (elected chairman in a contested congress in Summer 1994) has weakened the faction, but has never led to armed conflict. Abdullahi Yusuf, as President of Puntland, declared all factions to be illegal in mid-1998; Abshir Musse and some SSDF are contesting this. If the ruling holds, the SSDF will pass out of existence.

SNM
The Somali National Movement (SNM) is a movement of the Isaaq clan of the Northwest, formed in 1980 as an armed liberation group against the Barre regime. It engaged the Barre forces in occasional clashes from 1983-87. In May 1988, the SNM launched a full-scale attack on Barre forces in the North, precipitating the civil war that eventually led to his overthrow. The SNM assumed control of the Northwest in early 1991, and in May 1991 declared the secession of the Somali-Land Republic. Subsequently the SNM collapsed. The last Chairman, Abdurahman Tuur, tried to revive it in 1994 when he denounced Somali-Land secession, relocated to Mogadishu and was named “vice-president” of Aideed’s unrecognised government. Another attempt to revive it took place in April 1998 in Harageya, through the SNM veterans’ association “Soyaal.”

SPM
The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), originally formed by the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darood, grew out of a mutiny by Ogaden troops following the arrest of their leader, General Aden Abdullahi Nuur ‘Gabio’ in 1989. SPM forces led by Col. Omar Jese fought against Barre forces in 1990. Efforts in 1991 to unify all Darood under the SPM (placing Jese and his forces back in an uneasy alliance with ex-Barre militia) never really held, and in late 1991 the SPM split into hostile factions, later known as “SPM/SNA” and SPM/Morgan.” In 1997, reconciliation between the Harti and Absame clans allowed for a rapprochement between the two factions’ local representatives. In general, neither of the factions has much authority or relevance in the lower and middle Juba — politics there is centred more on clan and personalities than organised factions.
SPM/SNA
Nominally chaired by Col. Omar Jess, who is rarely in the country; Ahmed Hashi and Abdi Mahdi are acting deputies. Virtually defunct for several years. The Ogaden clan prefers to be represented in political meetings as a clan rather than as a faction and has actively marginalised the SPM/SNA.

SPM/Morgan
Also known as simply “SPM,” or SPM/SSA, this faction is technically chaired by Aalihau General Aaleu Gabi’o, but is actually controlled and built around General Mohamed Siyad Hersi “Morgan,” former minister of defense under Siyad Barre. Until 1997, Morgan relied on a coalition of Harti, residents of Kismayo, a Marehan contingent, and a few sub-clans of Absame in an uneasy coalition against the SPM/SNA. As of 1997, the SPM’s power base is narrowed to the Harti clan. The SPM is currently closely allied with Puntland authorities, receives Ethiopian backing, and has an alliance with the Ogaden militia.

USC
The United Somali Congress was formed in 1989 as a Hawiye opposition movement. It had three groups; the USC-Mustinil, led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed, the USC-Mogadishu, led by Ali Mahdi and Hussein Bod, and the USC-Rome, led by Ali Wardhugley. Following the fall of the Barre regime, these two split into two separate factions over competing leadership claims between Mahdi and Aideed; the factions fought bitterly in Mogadishu from November 1991 to March 1992. In recent years the USC has divided still further along sub-clan lines.

USC/SSA
A Mudulod/Abgaal faction led by Ali Madhi, based in North Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle. It has suffered from power struggles with Abgaal Islamic leaders and from internal divisions. Hussein Bod now openly contests Ali Mahdi’s leadership.

USC/SNA
A Haber-Gedir-dominated faction led by General Aideed and since his death by his son, Hussein Aideed. Based in South Mogadishu, it extends its militia activity into Lower Shabelle and Middle Juba regions, and militarily occupies Baidoa and Hobodur towns in the inter-riverine areas. It was once the militarily strongest of the Somali factions, but suffered from a split over leadership between General Aideed and Osman Atto; internal USC/SNA fighting in South Mogadishu has intermittently occurred since 1995. From June 1995, USC/SNA tends to describe Osman Ali Atto group.

USC/PM
A Hawadle faction, led by Abdullahi Ossobleh Siad, with its base in Beled Weyn.

SDM
The Somali Democratic Movement was formed by the Rabantein clans. It never possessed a militia capacity. It is now split into numerous factions (including the SDM/SNA, SDM/SSA, and SDM/Bonka), which are based on sub-clan and personality rivalries.

RRA
The Rabantein Resistance Army (RRA), a politico-militia group formed by the Rabantein in response to the SNA’s occupation of Baidoa in 1995. Led by Hassan Mohamed Nuur “Shanti Cadood,” it has engaged in a low-level but increasingly effective guerilla war against the SNA militia in Baidoa and Hododur. Though
SDM officials claim that the RRA is the military wing of SDM, RRA leaders contend that the RRA is independent of the various SDMs.

**SNF**
The faction representing the *Marehan* clan in both Central Somalia and Gedo region. General Omar Haji is Chairman. Its military wing commands a relatively organised and trained standing militia. Under pressure from *Marehan* elders, SNF recently (mid-1998) concluded a peace accord with *Marehan Al-Ittihad* members. An SNF congress is scheduled for late 1998. Recently, the SNF has begun to assume leadership over the *Marehan* militia fighting for control of Kismayo as well.

**SAMO**
The Somali Agricultural Muki Organisation (SAMO), which represents the *Bantu/Jerer* minority population of Southern Somalia. It is divided into different sub-factions, one supporting SNA and the other SSA. It has no militia, but is significant as the first expression of political identity among the *Bantu* of Somalia.

**Coalitions**

**SNA**
The Somali National Alliance (SNA), formed by General Aideed in 1992 to solidify a multi-clan, multi-factional alliance he sought to build. At its height in 1993, the SNA was the strongest political coalition in the country, and included several of the largest militias. But it was unable to hold together when it attempted to declare a national government, and fragmented badly when Aideed's own sub-clan began internal fighting.

**SSA**
The Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), a multi-clan, multi-factional alliance built around the leadership of Ali Mahdi and more recently Abdullahi Yusuf. It existed mostly as collective opposition to Aideed and the SNA. In late 1996, the SSA convened a meeting in Sodere, Ethiopia seeking to establish a national government. Like the SNA, it failed and the coalition fell prey to internal disputes within member factions.

**BRSC**
Benadir Regional Supreme Council (BRSC), a 39-man, multi-clan group of political and faction leaders seeking to negotiate the establishment of a Benadir Regional Authority in 1998. It is not a national coalition, but rather Mogadishu-based. This effort has been blocked by internal disputes over authority, but remains active.
Movements

Al-Ittihad
Islamist movement operating in much of the country. It tends to be very decentralised; its regional or local groups are usually clan-based. Funding it receives from abroad goes into social services, schools, and shari'a courts, and into weaponry. In a few places and for short periods, Al-Ittihad has succeeded in establishing direct control over towns and seaports, though it suffered a setback in 1997 when Ethiopian forces and the SNF attacked it and pushed it out of several Gedo region towns. More commonly, the movement prefers to live within communities in Somalia and keep a low profile until conditions improve. Its overall strength, numbers, and public support are matters of speculation, but it has grown significantly as a political and social force in contemporary Somalia.
APPENDIX E

SELECTED INTERNATIONAL AID COMMUNITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA 1997/1998

Note: The following list is not exhaustive. Many UN agency activities are not listed. It is not currently possible to receive complete figures for foreign aid allocations to Somalia from donors, so dollar amounts are not provided. What follows is the most recent compilation by the SACB Secretariat based on self-reporting by donor states.

Project funding and direct funding for emergency, rehabilitation and development interventions is provided by Canada (CIDA-PSU), Denmark, Egypt, the European Commission, Italy, Norway, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (DFID), United States (US Aid). Additional funding was allocated for the 1998 emergency which resulted from the

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MAP 1 SOMALIA POPULATION ESTIMATE BY REGION - 1997

Publication of this map is done in accordance to the page title to the reader or the legal owner of the publication shown in a conclusion only for convenience of the reader. The population figures are UNFA estimates and are not approved by the local authorities.

UNDOG GIS Lab 1998
MAP II a MAIN LIVESTOCK CONCENTRATIONS IN SOMALIA (circa 1990)

(Percentage of all livestock in each area)

GOATS

SHEEP

CAMELS

CATTLE

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT - 1998
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
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<td>ACORD</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
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<td>AHI</td>
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<td>AMA</td>
<td>Africa Muslim Agency</td>
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<td>AMREF</td>
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<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BRT/CCFD</td>
<td>Comite Catholique Contre La Faim et Pour Le Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Relief and Assistance Everywhere</td>
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<td>CARITAS</td>
<td>Catholic Charity</td>
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<td>CFN</td>
<td>Committee of Concerned Somalis</td>
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<td>Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Violence against Women</td>
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<td>COOPI</td>
<td>Cooperazione Internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSPE</td>
<td>Cooperazione per lo Sviluppo dei paesi Emergenti</td>
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<td>COSV</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee of the Organisation for Voluntary Service</td>
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<td>CSIW</td>
<td>Council for Strategic Initiatives on Women</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Council</td>
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<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DMC</td>
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<td>Development Solutions for Africa</td>
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<td>DULMAR</td>
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<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>Education Development Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPAG</td>
<td>Emergency Pastoralist Assistance Group</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Enlarged Programmes of Immunisation</td>
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<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<td>FLC</td>
<td>Family Life Centre</td>
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<td>FSAU</td>
<td>Food Security Assessment Unit</td>
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<td>GED</td>
<td>German Emergency Doctors</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Gross National Product</td>
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HDR
HEAC
IAS
ICAO
ICRC
ICZM
IDP
IIA
ILO
IMF
INTERSOS
IPGRI
IUCN

JUH
KERDO
LPI
MAPPS

MCH
MEMISA
MOEYS
MSF
NCA
NGO
NID
NOVIB
NSC
OPD
PATH

PHC
PROFNET
PSF
RRA
SACB
SAMO
SAWA
SCF
SCF – FEAT
SDM
SNA
SNF
SNM
SOMAID

Human Development Report
Hargeisa Emergency Appeal Committee
International Aid Sweden
International Civil Aviation Organisation
International Committee of the Red Cross
Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Internally Displaced Person
Somali NGO
International Labour Organisation
International Monetary Fund
Humanitarian Organisation for Emergency
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute
International Union for Conservation of Nature

Johanniter Unfall Hilfe
Kenyatta Relief Development Organisation
Life and Peace Institute
Somalia Marketing Assistance and Product Promotion Programme
Mother and Child Health
Help for All in the Third World
Ministry of Education and Youth in Somaliland
Medecins Sans Frontieres
Norwegian Church Aid
Non-governmental Organisation
National Immunisation Days
Netherlands Corporation Agency
National Security Council
Out Patient Department
Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health
Primary Health Care
Somali Professional Network
Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres
Rahmaanyo Resistance Army
Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body
Somali Agricultural Muki Organisation
Somali NGO
Save the Children Fund
Save the Children Fund - Food Economy
Analysis Team
Somali Democratic Movement
Somali National Alliance
Somali National Front
Somali National Movement
Somali Aid Development
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>SOMOLU</td>
<td>Somali Open Learning Unit</td>
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<td>SOS</td>
<td>Save Our Souls</td>
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<td>SOWDA</td>
<td>Somali Women's Development Aid</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Somali Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Somali Rehabilitation Project</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Alliance</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>Italian Umbrella NGO</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>UNESCO-PEER</td>
<td>Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<td>Water and Environment Sanitation</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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