

# **Designing Social Protection Frameworks for Three Zones of Somalia**

## **Final Report**

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## **Acknowledgement**

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This is an independent report and does not necessarily reflect the views of UNICEF. Any errors are on the part of the author.

## Acronyms

ADESO	Africa Development Solutions
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BRiCS	Building Resilience to Crisis in Somalia
CALP	Cash Learning Partnership
CSI	Coping Strategies Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CVMG	Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DDG	Digital Data Gathering
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
FAO	United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GSMA	GSM Association
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
HSNP	Hunger Safety Nets Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFM	Independent Field Monitors
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental NGO
IPC	International Phase Classification for Food Insecurity
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	Key Informant Interview
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MIS	Management Information System
MLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MNCH	Maternal Neonatal Child Health
MNO	Multi-national Organisation
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontiers
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORT	Oral Rehydration Therapy
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PAWSE	Puntland Agency for Welfare Services
PPPT	Protective, Preventative, Promotive and Transformative
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme
PWP	Public Works Programme
RMSN	Research Management Somali Network
SADO	Social-life and Agricultural Development Organisation

*Development of Social Protection Frameworks in Somalia*

SAGE	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment
SDF	Social Development Fund
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SOMREP	Somalia Resilience Programme
SPF	Social Protection Floor
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TOR	Terms of Reference
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United National High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Aid for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### *1. Background and Rationale*

Somalia ranks as one of the least developed countries in the world and has been severely affected by conflict and natural disaster. Since the civil war in 1991 a protracted and complex humanitarian and livelihoods crisis has existed in the country. Somalia is commonly identified as a fragile state context<sup>1</sup> and the country now consists of three semi-autonomous zones: North West Somalia, known as Somaliland; North East Somalia, known as Puntland; and South Central Somalia (SCS). Each zone has its own administration. The crisis has resulted in large-scale population displacement, deterioration of infrastructure and decline in access to services, all of which have limited the livelihood opportunities of poor Somali households. Declining access to natural resources and increasing frequency of drought cycles are making it increasingly difficult for rural households to maintain their livestock and crop production levels. It is commonly acknowledged that drought cycles in the Horn region as a whole are becoming shorter and more severe, meaning traditional coping mechanisms are becoming inadequate and households have little time to recover before the next crisis<sup>2</sup>.

Impact is seen in widespread chronic and extreme poverty and high levels of stunting and acute malnutrition among children. In mid-2011, two consecutive missed rains precipitated the worst drought in East Africa for 60 years and contributed to failed harvests, soaring food and water costs and depleted grazing and farm lands. Over thirteen million people across the Horn region were in need of humanitarian assistance. The impact of drought, on-going conflict and increasing global food prices meant that by May 2011 over 2.85 million people were in crisis in Somalia<sup>3</sup>. Famine was declared in five of the eight regions in South Central Somalia.

It is well recognised that inadequate measures were taken to prevent or mitigate the early signs of the food security crisis in 2010 and that humanitarian responses came late<sup>4</sup>. Out of this scrutiny has come renewed interest in the 'resilience agenda' – with the recognition that helping countries to protect themselves against increasingly frequent disasters in the longer term and to cope more effectively with crises that occur is a more effective and efficient way of spending aid compared with recurring humanitarian support.

In 2012 UNICEF in collaboration with WFP and FAO developed a Joint Resilience Strategy, a long-term approach aiming to strengthen the resilience of the people of Somalia to withstand shocks, in order to break the recurrent cycle of emergencies<sup>5</sup>. This aims for a strategic alignment of programming between the three agencies to increase resilience in vulnerable communities through three complementary pillars:

1. Strengthen the productive sectors – increase household income by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production and enhancing access to markets and market info;
2. Improve basic social services – strengthen vulnerable household human capital by enhancing demand and access; and
3. Establish predictable safety nets – to address most the vulnerable people's basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfer of food or cash, including for the destitute or seasonally at risk. The objective of the safety net pillar is to support transition from emergency assistance into longer term and more predictable support, with flexibility and capacity for timely scale up at times of crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> OECD-DAC characterises fragile states as those which are 'unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (OECD, 2008), while DFID similarly defines fragile states as 'those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people.'

<sup>2</sup> UNISDR (2012) 'Disaster Reduction in Africa: special edition in drought risk reduction', Africa Informs publication for UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Regional Office for Africa

<sup>3</sup> Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU)

<sup>4</sup> Haan et al (2012)

<sup>5</sup> DFID is also working towards a similar set of objectives through their Multi Annual Humanitarian Funding to INGOs

The Joint UN Resilience Strategy is to be implemented in five districts across Somaliland, Puntland and SCS<sup>6</sup>. Of major interest going forward is the potential of a social protection system and safety net style interventions to support the poor and vulnerable to better deal with crises.

### *1.1 Aims and objectives of the study*

The aims and objectives of the assignment were as follows:

**Purpose:** to undertake a study on Social Protection in Puntland, Somaliland and South Central Somalia and identify gaps and entry points for social protection within each Zone. Outputs are to be used by UNICEF to support advocacy to the Somaliland and Puntland authorities, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and donors, on the case for introduction and funding of social protection policies and programming.

#### **Expected results:**

1. **Vulnerability Analysis:** identification of key drivers of inequality and vulnerability in each region, to guide the development of social protection frameworks and future programmatic responses. It is to include analysis of the different types of vulnerability (including both economic and social) and the factors that affect this. The analysis is to be based upon secondary data sources as well as qualitative data collected from key stakeholders, including community members in both urban settlements and rural areas. It should include participation of vulnerable groups that are a priority for social protection including children, women, pastoral communities and minority clans.
2. **Mapping Exercise:** this will include stakeholders (institutions and structures) at national, sub-national and community level involved in social protection-related activity; the current social protection policy, institutional and regulatory/legal framework where this exists; along with existing social protection and safety net related initiatives.
3. **Social Protection Framework:** a draft child sensitive social protection framework will be developed that highlights feasible interventions to address particular risks facing vulnerable groups. In the northern regions where capacity and stability are greater, the framework will be government-owned and long-term. It will be aligned with national development priorities. In South Central Somalia, the focus will be on predictable, flexible assistance to reduce dependency on unreliable emergency support, with consideration of how to transition to something nationally owned as capacity develops. Frameworks will provide information including groups to be targeted; size and scope of intervention; expected impacts and estimations of costs.

### *1.2 Methodology*

Development Pathways worked in partnership with the Somali NGO 'Social-life and Agricultural Development Organisation' (SADO) on this assignment. SADO is committed to supporting initiatives which seek to release the potential of the Somali people to change their own lives through sustainable, integrated and people centered development and to improve living standards across Somalia. SADO is well established across the country, being members of countrywide networks and platforms including the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) and Somalia South-Central Non-State Actors (SOSCENSA).

**Literature Review:** A literature review was undertaken, comprising a comprehensive bibliography and inventory of relevant secondary data including grey and academic sources from Somalia, to inform the study approach. This was underpinned by the team's extensive knowledge of social protection schemes internationally.

**Qualitative Research:** Data collection was undertaken within communities in eight districts across Somaliland, Puntland and SCS, covering all livelihood zones including pastoral, agro-pastoral, riverine and urban communities. Urban data collection focused primarily on settlements for IDPs.

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<sup>6</sup> 5 districts – Burca; Odweyne; Bosaso; Iskushuban; Dolow



## Map of the Study Locations



Four instruments were used in the study:

**i) Community mapping:** a meeting with the local leader(s) in order to map the community and gain information on the main sources of livelihoods; services; whether the community receives any formal aid; significant historical and recent events and perceptions of vulnerability.

**ii) Focus group discussions:** held with key demographic groups in communities, to better understand vulnerability and risks, their causes, coping strategies and opinion of social protection. This included construction of seasonal timelines of risks and shocks. In each District the team aimed to complete approximately focus group discussions with older people 50+; adults of working age 25-50; young people 18-25; people with disabilities; and school age children 10-14.

**iii) Life History Interviews:** in depth one-on-one interviews were held with people from the demographic groups listed above, enabling discussion on key events and shocks in people's lives and exploration of how vulnerability changes through the life cycle.

**iv) Key informant interviews:** in order to better understand the context; existing institutions, policies and programmes relating to or complementing social protection; concerns of decision makers in government and development/humanitarian partners; and identify constraints and opportunities for social protection and safety net programming and synergies with other interventions. These took place with authorities, development partners and service providers at community and district level in the study locations, at national level and in Nairobi.

### 1.3 Conceptual framework

It was agreed with UNICEF during Inception Period that there is a need to narrow the focus of interventions supported under a social protection framework in order to build political understanding and therefore buy in and focus on what is feasible given the context and capacity.

There are numerous definitions of “social protection” available in the literature. However, generally speaking in all frameworks “social protection” refers to the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation. All frameworks agree that social protection protects against hazards that impact directly on income, living standards and wellbeing and prevents negative coping detrimental to long-term welfare. The main aim of government-financed systems is to ensure that a minimum floor is established to address chronic poverty and vulnerability to shocks for vulnerable individuals and families.

A well-established social protection system can be conceptualised – at a simple level – as comprising two pillars, namely social security and social care and support services. Social security is made up of three types of instrument:

1. **Tax-financed (or donor-financed) benefits:** Often referred to as social assistance or social transfers. These are at the core of any social protection system - predictable direct transfers to individuals or households, most commonly as income but also as food. These usually aim to provide individuals or families with some form of minimum consumption for the socially and economically vulnerable in the population and the means to smooth their consumption during challenging periods of their lives. Initiatives of governments providing universal access to social services can be understood as a form of social transfer although these tend to fall under the policies of the health and education sectors.
2. **Social insurance mechanisms:** These are financed through personal contributions (in formal economies generally by deductions from the salaries of employees)<sup>7</sup> – and focus on enabling people to smooth their consumption over their lifetimes: they save in a fund and, when a particular contingency happens – such as old age, disability, sickness or unemployment – they are eligible to receive regular and predictable payments for as long as the contingency lasts.
3. **Labour legislation:** Government can mandate employers to finance social protection by, for example, establishing a minimum wage and specifying statutory maternity payments, pay during leave or minimum notice periods.

The draft UNICEF social protection strategy for Somalia, in line with UNICEF’s global understanding of social protection systems, outlines a vision of a comprehensive system comprising interventions under social assistance, social insurance, measures to ensure equitable access to services, labour market interventions and social legislation<sup>8</sup>. Whilst these can be said to comprise good practice internationally, and such a vision is commendable, to build a comprehensive system such as this takes decades. It will not be feasible in any low income country to put in place such a disparate range of programmes at the same time.

Social transfers are the key building block for emerging social protection systems, impacting on all multidimensional areas of poverty. Social protection in the form of regular and predictable cash transfers<sup>9</sup> is increasingly acknowledged as a crucial component of strategies to tackle poverty, inequality and vulnerability. At least thirty countries now have significant long-term cash transfer schemes; in sub-Saharan Africa this includes Liberia, Niger, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lesotho and Malawi. Such transfers have proven feasible in the context of Somalia and there are recent experiences (both positive

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<sup>7</sup> An employer’s contribution can be regarded as finance from employees in that, if the employer did not pay the contribution, it is likely that wages would be higher. Employers’ contributions tend to suppress wages.

<sup>8</sup> Collins 2013

<sup>9</sup> Social assistance also includes in-kind transfers and waivers supporting access to services.

and negative) upon which to build. It was therefore agreed that the starting point should be to focus on social assistance in the form of social transfers. Well-designed social protection systems comprising social transfers can perform all the functions of social protection. They can protect the most vulnerable and prevent a fall further into poverty, but can also promote investment in human development and economic potential, and transform relationships in society.

## ***2. Analysis of the Macro Level Context***

Analysis of various existing secondary data sources such as the multiple indicator cluster surveys shows that poverty in Somaliland and wider Somalia is multidimensional and has both social and economic characteristics including low GDP and chronic under-employment, environmental degradation, chronic and transient food insecurity, lack of access to services and social marginalisation. Data shows that women and children are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of poverty; however other groups such as the elderly, disabled and youth are also likely to be vulnerable but data for these groups does not exist. Children and young people make up the majority of the population and over 60% of households have a child under the age of five. Urbanisation is continuing at a rapid pace. There are multiple challenges to be addressed, a number of which correlate with income insecurity and whilst it will be important to consider in the design of social transfer programmes; however it is unlikely that a single programme or programmes can address all needs simultaneously.

## ***3. Findings from the Study Sites: Mapping Vulnerability***

A person's vulnerability is a factor of their exposure to risk and their capacity to manage this risk. Idiosyncratic risks relate to those experienced at the level of the households and individuals, relating to family circumstances and lifecycle events, with localized impacts. These correlate very clearly with a person's lifecycle and socio-cultural norms. Covariate risks relate to those experienced on a wider scale, with effects felt by communities or whole populations (though affecting different households and demographic groups in different ways and to greater or lesser degrees). They include weather events, political events and macroeconomic events such as inflation. Capacity to manage risk is influenced by a person's access to (and return on) productive assets (such as labour and access to credit or inputs), services and social networks. Vulnerability to shocks and stresses can thus be economic (being in poverty/at risk of falling into poverty) and social (lack of autonomy, discrimination and marginalization).

### ***3.1 Trends in livelihoods and vulnerability***

Environmental shocks, conflict, poor governance, marginalization and chronic poverty are seen as the main drivers of vulnerability of the population as a whole. A fundamental concern in communities visited was chronic, entrenched poverty and extensive economic hardship. A number of major trends in livelihoods were identified. Several of these can be considered as both a consequence of these underlying drivers as well as further contributing to these drivers and increasing vulnerability of livelihoods within the study locations. This included increasing poverty and vulnerability affecting livelihoods in rural areas, on account of recurring and increasing climatic shocks and other constraints to livelihoods such as lack of economic opportunity. It also included increasing economic migration and rapid urbanisation as people drop out of traditional livelihoods or seek alternatives. In Somaliland and also in Puntland there have been some improvements to service provision due to recent investments by the authorities and development partners in health and education - however supply and demand side barriers mean these remain grossly inadequate and inaccessible to the majority in rural areas and to IDP and poor communities in urban areas.

There were social changes noted as a result. Changes to livelihood strategies are having an impact on the division of labour and gender roles within the household. Women's engagement in productive activities was found to be increasing. Women were acknowledged as shouldering the responsibility of supporting the household to cope with crises. In urban centres there are more economic opportunities available to and culturally appropriate for women than for men. In pastoral areas the increase in small stock is an asset in the care of women. In all cases this is increasing the burden of labour of women, who in Somali society continue to shoulder the responsibility of caring for the household. The switch to small stock, care of which is traditionally the role of women and children, whilst an asset controlled more by women and easier to

inherit, is increasing the already extensive burden of labour on these household members and disenfranchising young men. This was reported in some cases to create tension in the household. Divorce rates were reported to be rising especially in IDPs areas due to poverty and economic pressures in the home. Child labour is also prevalent and increasing. It was common to hear that girls would be expected to take on homemaker duties since mothers are working. In both rural and urban areas the increasing, almost daily, consumption of Khat by men is acknowledged to be approaching epidemic proportions and is a growing social problem.

### *3.2 Shocks and risks*

Respondents in urban and rural communities identified two broad categories of shocks and risks that affect households and individuals and that must be taken into account in the design of social protection frameworks.

#### ***Covariate shocks and stresses affecting the community as a whole***

***Conflict and insecurity:*** Conflict places particular constraints on population's movements and rights and the functioning of markets and services, affecting people's ability to earn a living or meet basic needs and increasing the exposure of the population to harassment and violence. Conflict and insecurity were identified as significant negative events in both North and South, however reflections on the impacts were different. In Somaliland and Puntland the civil war remains fresh in people's minds, and people place a high value on peace. The security context – at least in the areas visited in the study – was considered by communities to be much improved in recent years, on account of the government's investment in security measures and peace building. Whereas in SCS, on-going insecurity is a fundamental constraint governing how people manage their day to day lives. Even here however, people considered the situation to have improved since the worst times of five years ago.

***Hazardous weather:*** This was considered to be a seasonal hazard, which is increasing in intensity affecting both rural and urban livelihoods and with a lack of infrastructure to provide protection from or to divert water, heavy rain, flooding and hail are contributing to crop and livestock losses and reducing access to health centres and markets. This contributes to inflation of food prices (below) and can result in food shortages in urban areas. In overcrowded urban areas the lack of drainage means rainfall impacts negatively on overburdened sanitation systems.

***Water scarcity:*** The increasing frequency of drought cycles and issues of water scarcity were noted by all communities, though impacts are not evenly spread. Rural communities commented that rainfall is more erratic and is considered to be poorer; that the water table nowadays is lower and that there is a lack of adequate infrastructure for irrigation, water storage and conservation. Water scarcity was a major problem identified in Somaliland. This is affecting all rural livelihoods given the dependence of pastoralism and agricultural livelihoods on water, constraints to livestock migration and lack of opportunities for economic diversification. The repetition of stress on stress, interspersed with years of failed rains, was said to be resulting in loss of productive assets<sup>10</sup>, reduction in productive capacity of the land, and reduced ability of households to earn sufficient income from traditional livelihoods. Whilst livelihoods in urban areas are relatively better cushioned from the immediate impact of water scarcity, the linkages between the rural and urban economy mean negative shocks for urban households in terms of reduced supply/quality of milk and meat; increased cost of milk, meat and grain, and increasing burden of support to rural relatives.

***Inflation:*** This was noted as a seasonal factor linked to the shocks above, an issue for rural but especially for urban communities given the dependence of households on the market for the majority of their food needs.

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<sup>10</sup> In pastoral areas herd sizes are diminished, as they are not sufficiently replenished before more must be consumed or lost. In agricultural areas the 'yabar baruur' - the time of year when their crops are not ready to be harvested but other crops are finished is increasing, as harvest is not sufficient to last for the lean season.

### **Household level shocks and stresses**

**Disease/poor health:** Common diseases mentioned include high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis and back pain, strokes and eye diseases (adults and elderly); malnutrition, malaria, measles, diarrhoea/waterborne diseases, respiratory diseases, TB, whooping cough (children); and urinary tract infections, malnutrition, malaria, pneumonia, anaemia and eclampsia (women). Economic impacts include the need to cover the cost of transport to seek medical attention, or cost of healthcare, as well as reduced ability of the household to pursue a livelihood strategy on account of debility of the breadwinner(s) or time spent caring for sick relatives. Social impacts include the increasing burden of labour on others in the household including children and women – with further knock on effects on health and nutrition.

**Incapacity and death of a breadwinner:** There were numerous cases where respondents had lost family members on account of the conflict or illness. Besides impacting on the rest of the household in terms of loss of labour, there were cases where women also lost their livelihood in the event that the husband's business or land were taken over when husbands died. There were cases of breadwinners being disabled, affecting their ability to work. Loss of parents was identified repeatedly by children and young people – with both economic and psychological impacts.

**Gender based violence:** In urban IDP areas the risk of attacks on women were considered to have increased, on account of reduced social networks and lack of support from the law.

**Loss of employment:** This was a factor in urban areas and there was general agreement that unemployment is increasing and competition for jobs increasing. There were particular issues mentioned including employment discrimination of minorities; competition for jobs and seasonal downturns in wage earning opportunities.

### **3.3 Coping strategies**

The Somali population are acknowledged to be some of most resilient people in the world, employing a range of strategies to deal with crises such as entrepreneurship, mobility and reliance on social networks. A variety of coping strategies to deal with shocks and stresses were mentioned which were broadly the same regardless of gender or clan. In rural areas, strategies were broadly the same for households in all types of livelihoods whilst in urban areas a major difference is the increase in begging. There was general agreement that some of these strategies are being constrained as a result of the increase in the frequency and intensity of shocks. Some strategies can be considered negative – meaning that the strategy risks increasing the household's vulnerability to future shocks and stresses. This includes reducing consumption and taking children out of school. Drawing down on assets – a traditional coping mechanism in nomadic society – can all be considered negative now in the context of dwindling herd sizes.

Not all strategies are available to everyone. The aggregate figures of remittances from the diaspora into Somalia are huge, however this study, as other studies have remarked, found that benefits are unequally shared, with the poorest and most vulnerable most likely to miss out. Similarly taking a loan from relatives, or taking food on credit from traders, are hugely important coping strategies at times of crisis but these rely on trust and of social networks, with evidence that socially marginalized groups, minorities, and IDPs can be excluded.

### **3.4 Vulnerability analysis**

In every community and in all groups included in the study, there were very clear ideas defining vulnerability and agreement on who is considered 'most vulnerable' to shocks in the community. The poor were defined as those households who cannot eat, or who have limited assets. Poverty was considered to be pervasive in all the communities visited, with key informants considering that up to 70% of the population could be considered vulnerable on account of poverty. However despite this being a defining characteristic of the population there was a clear perceived differentiation between the 'community' as a whole and those considered to be most vulnerable to shock. This included:



- The very poorest/destitute
- Those people who cannot get help from other means such as from relatives
- Those who cannot help themselves or are suffering most in almost all aspects of life, particularly health

Communities identified a number of vulnerable groups who are considered to be particularly vulnerable and deserving of assistance. This was the same in all communities, and for all groups interviewed. Ranking of vulnerability saw communities prioritise the needs of the following people in their community. The specific vulnerabilities facing these groups are detailed below and shows that vulnerability as conceived by communities themselves relates to social as well as economic factors.

- Children especially orphans
- People living with disabilities (including chronically ill) and especially those without family support (including those with mental illnesses)
- The elderly especially those without family support
- Female headed households (especially widows without family support)

Other groups in society were also acknowledged by communities to be vulnerable since they face particular challenges, particularly social vulnerabilities - though they were not prioritised for assistance in the ranking of vulnerability - essentially because they are seen as being economically able to help themselves. These include unemployed young people and minority clans.

These groups fit clear demographic categories of vulnerability and many correlate to risks felt at particular stages of the lifecycle and means that these groups are more pre-disposed to particular idiosyncratic shocks. Vulnerability can compound across the lifecycle – such that if specific vulnerabilities felt early in life are not addressed these can further determine and exacerbate vulnerabilities faced later in life. Exposure to these risks is also likely to mean that households and individuals will be disproportionately affected by covariate shocks.

### *3.5 Conclusions from the study*

- Given the high and chronic levels of poverty, exposure of large portions of the population to recurrent and cyclical shocks such as droughts and floods, seasonal and chronic shortages of water, food and employment as well as prolonged periods of stress due to conflict, the erosion of people's capacities to cope through traditional means and the vulnerability of large parts of the population to particular life cycle risks, there is a strong rationale for establishing some kind of formal, long-term and predictable social protection, that could address chronic poverty/vulnerability, but also be 'topped up' in the event of crisis.
- There is a need to address both lifecycle and covariate shocks and to consider the linkages between these as well as to address compounding vulnerabilities. Whilst the nature of covariate risks can vary between areas and between livelihood groups, the idiosyncratic risks are common to all and consistency in programming across locations could be feasible – though taking into account that some risks are likely to be greater in rural areas where service access is reduced.
- Social protection cannot do everything or address all the risk factors above, or the structural causes of vulnerability – social protection is an essential component but many other things are needed to address the immediate and underlying causes of vulnerability.
- Communities understand vulnerability as it relates to particular and clearly identifiable groups in the population, rather than by poverty since such a large percentage of the community can be considered poor. This is a lesson for targeting.

### *4. The Existing Social Protection System*

Through KII with government and development partners at national level and the wider literature review, the study reviewed the availability of social protection or safety net programmes and schemes implemented

by Authorities or by development partners. Through the community based research the team also considered any relevant interventions of agencies and NGOs within the study locations. This is not an exhaustive study of all existing interventions across the country however it clearly shows a picture of huge gaps in social protection to address the needs identified.

Besides some extremely limited and fairly ad hoc government support for small numbers of vulnerable and/or destitute people, the bulk of assistance identified is provided in a project based and therefore unsustainable fashion through UN agencies and NGOs. The coverage of these interventions is extremely low compared to the level of need, there was nothing with national coverage and generally communities included in this study were not benefiting from them. There is very little long-term and predictable support focusing on the chronically vulnerable. The majority retain a humanitarian focus of consumption support rather than wider livelihoods support. Nevertheless there are best practices to build upon in developing a social protection framework.

The study also highlighted the vital role that social solidarity and reciprocal support based on trust has played in the resilience of Somali households in the face of so many shocks. The country has a number of informal community based systems for providing for the most vulnerable at times of need. Some are based on reciprocal support between neighbours; others on circulation of animals and other assets. This social assistance tends to be given along kinship and clan lines meaning those new to the area, minorities and the marginalized can fall through the net. Whilst it is generally considered to support those in need it is also not predictable and regular enough to meet the needs of those who are chronically poor or vulnerable. There was agreement from communities that systems are becoming overwhelmed and the current level of assistance is insufficient to prevent asset depletion and poverty.

### *5. Feasibility and Entry Points for Social Protection*

There was agreement from all Key Informants that a long-term social protection style programme or system based on social transfers is needed in Somalia given the chronic nature of the problems being faced and the need to begin addressing these, even in this complex environment, as developmental issues – and that this should be feasible given previous experiences.

#### *5.1 The potential for government owned social protection*

In Somaliland and Puntland this study found that conditions are favourable for planning towards a formal government-owned system. A key objective for UNICEF and other stakeholders going forward therefore must be to build capacity of government, whilst any proposed framework should take into account government's own thinking on social protection where this exists. There is also a ministry with the mandate for social protection – the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA). This will be more challenging and perhaps unrealistic in the SCS where the administration is very new and understandably considerably weaker. However this shouldn't mean that progress towards establishing long-term and predictable social transfers cannot be made in the meantime - or that these systems should bypass the FGS. Rather it is likely that different degrees of involvement and ownership are appropriate in each case.

#### *5.2 Accountability, security and implementing partners*

Given the capacity shortfalls identified in national and local governance above, it is likely that some support to implementation will be required to varying. This will be necessary for all administrative stages of the programme operations cycle.

Administrative processes required on the programme side include communicating the programme to communities; administering the processes of identification, registration and enrolment of beneficiaries; establishing and maintaining the database; preparing monthly payment requests for authorisation; providing oversight and monitoring; and managing a grievance process. In Somaliland and Puntland, depending on the location it could be possible for district and local authorities to be directly involved in certain elements of the administration cycle, subject to a capacity assessment. A civil society partner could potentially provide added value and support in terms of community mobilisation, supporting accurate, transparent and accountable

targeting and monitoring as well as management of grievances. In the SCS it is likely that implementation through such third parties will be essential in the short to medium term.

The UN focus should be on high-level coordination, including adequately supporting those CSOs who are selected as administrative partners to set up robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms, along with advocacy around governance and fundraising for implementation of the framework, and capacity development of government in establishing technical capacity, resources, guidelines, policies and systems.

It is recognised good practice for a payment service provider to manage the delivery of transfers to recipients on national social protection schemes for transparency and accountability. Both the Hawala money transfer system and mobile money transfer services are well established and have been used to successfully to deliver cash transfers on aid programmes. Mobile money transfer is relatively new however coverage is rapidly expanding and is already penetrating rural areas. The flexibility it offers households and automated processes for programme implementers means it has potential to better deal with the mobility of populations and make rapid changes to programme design at scale. It would be good practice to invite both partners for discussion and assess the relative merits through a tender. It may be that there is a case for establishing a partnership with both providers.

### *5.3 Opportunity for financial and technical support*

Clearly any move to establish such a system – whether government owned or agency driven – will require long-term commitments for both financial and technical support on the part of the donor community and their partners, both humanitarian and development. If agencies are serious about moving forward with support for social protection or safety nets as a crucial component of developmental strategies to reduce poverty and vulnerability and build resilience to shock, commitments must go beyond the standard three-to-five years of programmatic and election cycles. The absolute minimum is ten years – the reality is more likely a 20-year approach. A major challenge of addressing vulnerability in this context has been the limited availability of long-term funding and separation of longer term and humanitarian approaches. It was considered both development and humanitarian donor appetite for longer-term approaches and for financing social protection were beginning to change.

### *5.4 Potential funding mechanisms for social transfers*

Historically low levels of domestic revenue mean that even in the North the administrations have been able to do little beyond expenditure to sustain core Government functions and maintain peace and stability. Social services receive a small percentage of the national budget and allocation for the MLSA is a tiny percentage. Therefore donor financing will be essential. However there are a couple of existing or planned funding mechanisms that could be an opportunity to finance social protection in the future. The Somaliland Development Fund is the first example of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) supporting national development priorities. Sectors prioritized at present do not relate to social development. But there could be opportunity for this to change in consultations in future years – particularly since the World Bank is also setting up a MDTF (£100m) for use on infrastructure projects. Donors such as DFID are beginning to engage with authorities in Puntland on development financing and there are talks of the Ministry of Education developing a social fund that would respond to issues around increasing access to education for vulnerable children. Meanwhile a stability fund is to be set up by DFID for Somalia whose focus will be on bottom up approaches that act as peace dividend. It hasn't focused yet on basic services. There could be opportunities for supporting the implementation of the framework financially through the Fund in the future.

## *6. Designing a Social Protection Framework: Design Issues*

### *6.1 Approaches to targeting*

Targeting refers to the methods and approaches used to establish criteria of eligibility for social transfer schemes and to identify those who fit the criteria. Most social assistance schemes have, as their priority, the inclusion of people living in poverty or who are considered particularly vulnerable. A basic distinction is seen in targeting approaches.



- A *poverty-focused targeting* approach aims to target scarce resources at those living in poverty. The focus is on household units, usually those that are “poor”. This seeks to tackle the *symptom*, which is poverty itself: in other words, all those who are suffering from the symptom should receive similar treatment. Such an approach is generally operationalized through a ‘proxy means test’ which scores households on various visible indicators assumed to correlate with poverty. Those who achieve under a threshold score are included in the programme whilst those exceeding the threshold are excluded.
- Programmes based on the premise of *universal entitlement through the lifecycle* are accessible to everyone within an eligible category of the population that is considered vulnerable, directing resources to tackling the main lifecycle risks. They focus on the individual (who is still part of a household/family unit). This approach tries to tackle the *causes* of poverty, recognising that people face risks and challenges that vary across the lifecycle and that these contribute to making them more vulnerable to falling into poverty. As such it attempts to capture more diffuse notions of vulnerability or social exclusion. These programmes have demographic characteristics assumed to correlate with poverty and vulnerability, such as age, widow status or disability, as the criteria for entry onto the scheme.
- Geographical targeting can be combined with both of the above to select areas of the country with particular indicators of vulnerability.
- Similarly community based targeting can be combined with the above approached. This relies on the community identifying who is poorest or most vulnerable for assistance. This is known to generate bias due to political power at local level.

There is no single best approach to targeting – however international experience highlights that complex concepts and multiple eligibility criteria can create challenges including opportunities for diverse interpretation and manipulation. Implementing poverty targeting approaches in contexts where the vast majority of the population are poor are proven to be fraught with difficulty and generate large errors of exclusion since there is very little separating the circumstances of a large proportion of the population. It is impossible to select the ‘bottom 10/20%’ of the population – the proxy means test is best understood as a rationing mechanism, with those selected spread across deciles. People do not understand why some are selected and some are not and this can generate social tensions. This can be compared to demographic criteria used on Lifecycle Approaches that are not easy to falsify, simple to administer and most importantly, people understand them and consider them to be fair. It is also interesting to note that internationally more national budget support goes to universal lifecycle programmes than poverty-targeted schemes. This is because of the political economy of targeting – universal programmes generate citizen buy in and thus more political commitment and larger budgets. Thus universal lifecycle programmes are likely to be a better option for `Somalia.

### 6.2 Attaching conditions

Some social protection programmes, known as Conditional Cash Transfers, have attached conditions that families perform some activity in order to continue to receive benefits – most often sending children to school or attending health clinics. However internationally there is a lack of conclusive evidence that implementing such conditions has any added value to such human development objectives compared to what would have been achieved through the cash transfer alone, since there is extensive evidence that similar investments are made by parents and families on unconditional programmes. There are high costs to monitoring conditionality, plus imposing conditions where there are so many barriers to accessing services is considered a risk of both unfairly penalising households whilst over-stretching already limited services and reducing quality. This framework therefore doesn't impose conditions.

### 6.3 Supporting the poor of working age

A common approach to meeting the social protection needs of the poor and vulnerable with capacity to work is to design Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW) programmes, where beneficiaries must undertake manual labour of some kind in order to receive the transfer. The attraction of such programmes in contexts where underemployment is a problem and where infrastructure is limited is understandable. However international

evidence shows that such win:wins and the combining of both employment creation/infrastructure development and social protection objectives efficiently into a single programme is very difficult in reality. Generally the prerequisites for a successful LIPW with social protection objectives are often not met (employment is of insufficient duration; timing of the work doesn't coincide with periods of need/labour availability; and the work risks impacting negatively on the household since it demands time away from normal livelihoods and can lead to an increase in child labour). In addition work outputs are often of limited quality and lack sustainability, whilst creating additional costs to the programme. Ultimately these programmes are not addressing the underlying cause of vulnerability – which is the inability to access long-term, productive livelihood opportunities. Ultimately this group needs access to improved, sustained labour market opportunities.

There are however other ways to support this demographic group through social protection programmes and these options should be explored:

- **Graduation programmes:** These programmes, such as the large scale Targeting the Ultra Poor programme of BRAC in Bangladesh and other subsequent replications seek to provide additional and often intensive livelihoods support to working age recipients alongside regular predictable social transfers. The type of support provided, which includes psychosocial support and livelihoods advice, training and assets for income generation, can be very helpful to those unable to participate and can lead to some increase in incomes as well as building the skills and resilience of recipients. It is a challenging and expensive undertaking to do well and family constraints and shocks will mean that not all households will succeed. However this offers more potential than public works
- **Unconditional transfers:** Well-designed unconditional cash transfers can enable families to engage more actively in the labour market, through various means. Transfers provide beneficiaries with investment capital to build small enterprises or invest in productive assets. The guarantee of a regular transfer also changes the worldview of recipients. It provides them with a minimum income platform that infuses their lives with predictability. As a result, families can plan ahead, invest in income generating activities or look for employment.
- **Transfers to others in the family:** In fact, it may be better in the short-term to invest in the other transfers such as to children, which will reach a lot more people and have potential to benefit youth and adults of working age indirectly. Many young people in Somalia are also parents, thus their households are also benefiting from a Child Grant. The establishment of a social protection system pumping cash into communities will increase disposable income of households for purchasing goods and services. Providing young people in these communities with the wherewithal – through skills, access to finance and/or a livelihood grant – could enable them to take advantage of these opportunities.

## ***7. Programme Options for a Social Protection Framework***

This section presents the proposed social protection framework comprising programme options for each of the three Zones along with recommendations. In Somaliland and Puntland the emphasis is on government engagement whilst in SCS the aim will be to move away from recurrent, short-term humanitarian programmes to something more predictable and long-term. The framework will provide a systematic approach to addressing the issues affecting the poor and vulnerable groups.

The main things to bear in mind are that i) it will take decades to establish a comprehensive framework in any context and particularly in this context and ii) this means that it is impossible to address all of the constraints and vulnerabilities identified, adequately or simultaneously. It will require hard choices to be made. **A national policy and strategy, should one be developed, can of course go beyond this to set a broader vision for social protection, however in the short to medium term the options that should be prioritised are a small number of simple social transfer programmes.**

It will be important that the framework is rolled out in phases with the initial phase being more of a pilot phase that allows for successes to be generated to build political and citizen support, lessons learning for adjustments, for capacity to be built and for funds to be made available. The programme options presented therefore include:

**Phase One** - considered the immediate priorities based on what can be considered feasible in the short to medium term (three - five years);

**Phase Two** - the longer-term requirements for building a more inclusive framework (10-15 years). It includes recommended next steps for consideration by UNICEF and other stakeholders in order to move forward with developing options set out in the frameworks.

**Proposed Vision for the Framework:** By 2030, Somalia will have in place the foundations of an inclusive social protection system of income transfers for families, that protects consumption of the most vulnerable citizens, prevents a fall further into poverty caused by shocks, promotes human development and productive livelihoods and which complements and adds value to other socio-economic development policy.

An Inclusive lifecycle approach to Social Protection will protect against the risks and shocks facing particular core groups identified as vulnerable. These groups are common to all societies and to many social protection systems around the world. Covariate shocks are a particular concern in Somalia and need to be factored into the framework. However this should not lead us to consider Somalia as fundamentally different to other countries or lose sight of the fact that the day-to-day lifecycle risks and vulnerabilities are similar in all contexts and all societies. Sooner or later, all national systems begin to evolve towards a lifecycle approach.

**Whilst the intensity and nature of covariate shocks differs between locations and between livelihood groups, these lifecycle risks are common to all Zones and all communities.** This means that a common and overarching framework can be designed for Somaliland, Puntland and SCS. It has the huge benefit of standardising design features and systems to simplify processes whilst still being owned and implemented relatively independently by authorities in autonomous regions. It also provides the operational structures upon which a safety net to better deal with covariate (climatic) shocks can begin to be tested.

**For the same reason the framework doesn't develop different programmes for particular livelihood groups such as IDPs.** In the first instance it is important to get the basics right, and to build the foundations of a lifecycle system, for all groups since all suffer the same lifecycle risks. It is also important not to pit livelihood groups against each other in this context. It will be possible to direct these programmes to serve the needs of particular livelihood groups according to the geographic areas selected in Phase One, with rigorous monitoring to determine similarities and differential impacts to inform Phase Two. ***Therefore it is vital to get away from agency mandates and target groups.***

The programmes outlined here would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally delivering payments every month but considering logistical challenges this could be arranged bi-monthly or even quarterly. Going forward this programme could work through on-demand registration or periodic community-based rounds of registration. In the future registration could be linked to a formal birth registration process should one be introduced, to health centres (in the case of pregnant women) or to school enrolment (in areas where services exist)<sup>11</sup>. This would build complementarities between the objectives of social protection and wider social policies.

### 7.1 Programme Options

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<sup>11</sup> This wouldn't mean that grants would be conditional upon school attendance- rather that services become more joined up so that the school registration process could be one channel by which families also register their child for the child grant.

### *Option One: Child Grant*

Childhood is associated with multiple vulnerabilities – social and economic dependence; a lack of voice; and health vulnerabilities. Indicators of child health and wellbeing across the globe consistently demonstrate the disproportionate impact of poverty and shocks on the wellbeing of children. Impacts of poverty felt in childhood, particularly stunting and lack of education, are critical to future development and contribute to poverty traps. Children are therefore a key target group to benefit from social protection programmes.

**Phase One:** A Child Grant should be rolled out as a pilot programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration upon launch of the programme. On this programme child age is likely to be the defining criteria for entry to and exit from the programme. Children face different risks between conception to two years, during infancy, during primary school and during adolescence. It will be important to start somewhere and decisions will need to be made on which age-group to prioritise:

**Children 0 – 2 years or 0 – 4 years:** a Child Grant reaching caregivers of infants and very young children has potential to support families to manage the impact of the birth on family income whilst supporting improved caregiving practices, early childhood nutrition and cognitive development.

**Children 6 - 11 years:** for children over the age of five there is potential for a Child Grant to contribute to food security, nutrition and schooling.

The proportion of families fitting these criteria will be high and it may be necessary to ration eligibility further. Rather than linking the Child Grant eligibility to low incomes given the difficulties with poverty targeting, additional rationing criteria could be applied:

- **Orphans and Vulnerable Children:** One way of rationing coverage of the programme would be to focus in the first instance on children in particularly vulnerable family circumstances – i.e. ‘Orphans and Vulnerable Children’.
- **Affluence testing:** instead of a focus on finding the poorest, it could be easier to remove the small percentage that can easily be considered wealthiest.
- **Benefit capping:** the value of the grant can be capped to a maximum number of children per family.
- **Geographical targeting:** The programme could be rolled out in a sufficiently restricted geographical area so as to ensure sufficient coverage of eligible families within the targeted zone. This could start with areas or livelihood groups considered most vulnerable.

**Phase Two:** Assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, the Child Grant should be progressively rolled out over several years in a phased implementation from district to district.

### *Option Two: Old Age Grant*

Older people globally are acknowledged to be highly vulnerable to falling into poverty. Small shocks such as illness, and the growing frailty of older people themselves, reduces their ability to work and can throw households into poverty. Old people then become dependent on others in the household or community for their basic needs.

Based on international evidence an income support programme for older people will generate strong citizen support and political buy in, whilst being financially manageable. Somalia has a youth bulge and as other countries will experience an aging population in the future, the proportion of the population who is older is projected to increase<sup>12</sup>. Besides enabling older people to support themselves with dignity, it is well recognised that such transfers are invested in the household, with benefits for working age families. The

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<sup>12</sup> People over 50 made up 7.9% of the population in 2010, by 2030 this is projected to be over 10% (UN population data)

state taking on the role of duty bearer for older people removes their dependence on others in the community and is proven to support households to improve economic potential<sup>13</sup>.

Of particular interest is the extensive evidence that programmes targeting older people can bring multiple benefits to children in their care, given the extent of orphan hood in Somalia and likelihood that a large number of children are cared for by grandparents.

**Phase One:** An Old Age Grant should be rolled out as a pilot programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration upon the launch. It is a relatively straightforward programme to implement, having clear eligibility criteria that cannot be easily falsified and clear exit criteria.

Normal practice is to have age as the defining criteria. Fifty five years and above seems reasonable in the short-term, given the life expectancy in Somalia and comparability with other old age grants in similar contexts. There are further ways to ration coverage, which can be considered:

- **Limit coverage geographically in the first instance:** In selecting the pilot locations it should also be possible to select an area of intervention that is expected to correlate with high poverty levels.
- **Vary eligibility thresholds for men and women:** The programme could set the age threshold lower for women than for men, taking into account the increased vulnerabilities facing women.
- **Make eligibility further contingent on low incomes:** This has been followed by some countries in the early stages of rolling out senior citizens' grants. However given the difficulties with poverty targeting it is considered that this should be avoided if possible. By making the programme eligible to all above the age threshold in the community this will include community leaders and will generate more support.

**Phase Two:** Assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, this programme should be rolled out over several years in a phased implementation from district to district.

#### *Option Three: Disability Grant*

There is a real need to support this demographic group in Somalia and this will be an important component of the framework to develop as capacity grows. Providing people living with disabilities a predictable income will relieve the burden on families and the wider community and is likely to also free up time of working adults, particularly women, to pursue other livelihood tasks. Nevertheless such a programme can be challenging to implement without national definitions of what constitutes a disability and how this is verified.

**Phase One:** No implementation is proposed, rather this time should be used to establish efficient and effective operating systems under the Child Grant and Old Age Grant. During this time the government can also further define national policy on disability, supported by studies into the level of disability.

**Phase Two:** Introduce a cash transfer for people living with disabilities, once the operational infrastructure for delivering social transfers is in place and this can be done with the same organisation structures.

#### *Option Four: Safety Net Addressing Covariate Risk*

The programme options implemented through the inclusive Lifecycle Approach will not only deal with the chronic issues **but should also act as an income floor to prevent some of the more acute issues brought about by covariate shocks such as drought**. It is envisaged that the support provided on these programmes will reduce the need to sell assets and potentially also enabling households to replace certain lost assets, so as to recover more quickly from shocks.

Nevertheless it is highly likely that further short-term assistance will be needed during times of acute crisis, both to 'top up' grants provided to existing social protection recipients as well as to scale up coverage to

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<sup>13</sup> In South Africa households in receipt of a pension had higher labour force participation

include others in the community who are not enrolled on a social protection programme and also vulnerable to the effects of the shock.

It is envisaged that the long-term social protection programme(s) outlined above will provide the delivery and administrative systems to make this a reality. **This is a very new and innovative approach, just recently being trialled in neighbouring countries and with limited experience of success to draw from.**

**Phase One:** A pilot temporary safety net programme or fund, that is linked to the long-term social protection system and that aims to address covariate risk, should be designed and funds committed from humanitarian and development partners. The focus should be on climatic shocks (ideally drought) since this is of greater predictability than conflict or disease, easier to develop recognisable triggers and because it is more appropriate to try and test this for the first time in a secure environment. Funds will need to be pre-committed to and/or ring-fenced by those involved. It is recommended that this initial pilot be linked to the long-term programmes in the North rather than in SCS since the south is unpredictable and with the real new radical nature of this it is important to have as smooth a process as possible.

#### *Potential Option Five: Support for Youth and those of Working Age – Social Protection linked to Labour Market Interventions*

Given the youth bulge and worries about the impact of a generation of disaffected young people on the security situation, dealing with the issues of lack of opportunity and employment for young people are becoming and are likely to continue to be politically of interest.

However it is important to inject some realism here – **these problems facing young people are much bigger than social transfers can address alone.** What is crucial for those of working age is access to labour market interventions. However these needs are more appropriately dealt with under employment and labour policy than through social protection interventions. A social protection programme can complement such interventions so as to help young people to access these opportunities.

**Phase One:** Linking social protection to complementary labour market interventions, similar to what is seen in the 'graduation' projects of BRAC and other organisations, can be piloted in a small area. It will be important not to underestimate either the costs or the challenges of these approaches. It will be important to start small, and to begin in a location conducive to success – i.e. an urban environment where the complementary services (financial services, access to markets, training) are more likely to exist. Partnerships would also need to be built with complementary services and organisations. A market assessment and full understanding of labour market opportunities for low skilled young men and women would be essential. It should also be expected that a number of those enrolled in the programme may not succeed and are likely to require long-term support through social transfers.

**Phase Two:** Depending on the outcomes from the pilot study further decisions can be made about the costs and benefits of investing separately and specifically in a system of social transfers targeting young people, linked to wider government and NGO labour market interventions.

Given the extensive international evidence from labour intensive public works programmes and from those in Somalia, it is considered that neither the rationale nor the evidence of success for such a programme in Somalia are particularly strong or that such a programme can be designed to adequately achieve both infrastructure development and social protection objectives, cost effectively or at the scale required. There are also risks of unintentional negative impacts of the works condition on livelihoods. **This is not a preferred option for inclusion in the framework.**

#### *Potential Option Six: School Feeding Programme for Primary Children*

School feeding is the only food transfer included as a potential option in this framework. There is potential value in the rollout of a school feeding programme given that it already has some good coverage in Somalia, is likely to generate political support. There is some evidence internationally that well designed programmes



in low income countries have had a positive impact on school attendance, in nutritional status of children attending school and potentially educational achievement. That said there is little clear information available concerning the objectives of school feeding in Somalia to date or rigorous evidence on its impact. There is extensive evidence, summarised in this paper, of numerous supply-side barriers to education outcomes for children, especially in rural areas. Such a programme can therefore only be expected to have an impact on education attendance in areas where services exist, whilst an impact on education outcomes cannot be guaranteed. There is also extensive evidence that broader financial barriers, beyond access to food, are preventing children from accessing education services where they exist. Thus it is likely that whilst school feeding may bring more children to school it will not bring all children and is likely going to be more beneficial for those who are “better off”. It is also important to bear in mind the international evidence that meals at school can simply substitute meals for children that would have been provided at home.

**Phase One:** The design of the on-going school feeding programme implemented by WFP should be reviewed taking into account the above. It should include rigorous evaluation of the benefits of the programme on school attendance, nutrition and education outcomes for poor families, taking into account the cost, in order to assess the longer-term relative merits of school feeding versus other instruments.

**Phase Two:** Subject to results of the review and of the child grant pilot, and taking into account budgetary constraints (below), the progressive expansion of a revised school feeding programme as a national programme with national budgetary allocation, designed so as to incorporate measures to improve education and nutritional outcomes especially for low income households, could be considered.

### **7.2 Recommended Next Steps**

Of course, a move to an inclusive system cannot happen overnight. In the short-term, it will be prudent to invest in first establishing and then increasing the coverage of just one or two schemes (the Child Grant and Old Age Grant outlined above), while, in the long-term, planning a gradual expansion of these and other priority schemes. The following are the recommended actions for UNICEF and other agencies to prioritise during Phase One in order to take the framework forward.

<b>Recommended Actions Phase 1 (2014-19)</b>
<p><b>1. National Capacity Building</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use SPF to inform the design of national SP policy and strategy</li> <li>• Capacity assessment of relevant institutions =&gt; gaps in technical skills, institutions, systems, financial management</li> <li>• Training of national government staff (could include country visits)</li> <li>• Capacity building of district staff in programme operations (JPLG)</li> </ul>

<p><b>2. Develop a Long-term Vision and Commitments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If UN JRS provides a vehicle to pilot social transfers, must be understood from beginning as ‘stage 1’ of a long-term nationally owned initiative, not a time-bound project</li> <li>• Establish <u>concrete long-term</u> funding and TA commitments from donors, for systems building, transfers, and for ‘crisis modifier’</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Pilot 2x Programmes and the ‘Crisis Modifier’ for Shocks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Design two x lifecycle programmes (children; elderly)</li> <li>• Select implementing partners</li> <li>• Pilot in a small number of defined geographical areas</li> </ul> <p><i>Locations could be selected where there is (e.g.) i) maximum chance of success; ii) complementary services exist; iii) indicators of vulnerability are high; iv) overlap of livelihood zones; v) high population density</i></p>
<p><b>4. Building Systems and Processes (Project Management Unit through a management contractor)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a Management Information System</li> <li>• Tender for appropriate payment service provider(s)</li> <li>• Establish clear institutional arrangements (national secretariat MLSA; steering committee of government and partners; district level implementation)</li> <li>• Design and train in operational procedures</li> </ul>
<p><b>5. Invest in Rigorous M&amp;E</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process monitoring/oversight, and impact evaluation</li> </ul>



# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background and Rationale

Somalia ranks as one of the least developed countries in the world and has been severely affected by conflict and natural disaster. Since the civil war in 1991 a protracted and complex humanitarian and livelihoods crisis has existed in the country. The crisis has resulted in large-scale population displacement, deterioration of infrastructure and decline in access to services, all of which have limited the livelihood opportunities of poor Somali households. Declining access to natural resources and increasing frequency of drought cycles are making it increasingly difficult for rural households to maintain their livestock and crop production levels. It is commonly acknowledged that drought cycles in the Horn of Africa region as a whole are becoming shorter and more severe, meaning traditional coping mechanisms are becoming inadequate and households have little time to recover before the next crisis<sup>14</sup>.

Impact is seen in widespread chronic and extreme poverty and high levels of stunting and acute malnutrition among children. In 2011, two consecutive missed rains precipitated the worst drought in East Africa for 60 years and contributed to failed harvests, soaring food and water costs and depleted grazing and farm lands. Over thirteen million people across the Horn of Africa region were in need of humanitarian assistance. The impact of drought, on-going conflict and increasing global food prices meant that by May 2011 over 2.85 million people were in crisis in Somalia<sup>15</sup> and famine was declared in five of the eight regions in South Central Somalia.

It is well recognised that inadequate measures were taken to prevent or mitigate the early signs of the food security crisis and that humanitarian responses came late<sup>16</sup>. The handling of the situation in the Horn of Africa and the following 2012 food security crisis in the Sahel has led to a critical scrutiny of the international aid system. In Somalia, the fundamental problems acknowledged included a focus on response to rather than prevention of chronic crises; the impact of counter-terrorism laws and related policies in donor countries; and an antipathy towards acting early or releasing funding based on forecasts of crises. Annual response appeals are increasingly recognised as an expensive and inefficient instrument to deal with recurrent crisis. At best they save lives but are severely limited in saving livelihoods.

Out of this scrutiny has come renewed interest in the 'resilience agenda'. The agenda recognises that helping countries to protect themselves against increasingly frequent disasters in the longer term and to cope more effectively with crises that occur, is a more effective and efficient way of spending aid compared with recurring humanitarian support<sup>17</sup>. Approaches to fostering resilience to shocks have been developed by a number of donors and agencies including EC, USAID, DFID and the UN<sup>18</sup>. There are several areas of consensus across the donor and NGO community concerning the things to address:

- More predictable and longer term funding for countries experiencing protracted crises;
- The need for flexible funding mechanisms to respond to earliest signs of crisis;
- Disaster risk reduction (DRR) embedded in longer term interventions, which cut across sectors to develop 'risk-informed programming' to build systems that can respond to a variety of crises;

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<sup>14</sup> UNISDR (2012) 'Disaster Reduction in Africa: special edition in drought risk reduction', Africa Informs publication for UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Regional Office for Africa

<sup>15</sup> Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU)

<sup>16</sup> Haan et al (2012)

<sup>17</sup> A DFID study found that in Kenya every \$1 spent on disaster resilience resulted in \$2.90 saved in the form of reduced humanitarian spending, avoided losses and led to development gains (DFID 2012)

<sup>18</sup> EU communiqué on resilience 2012; DFID Defining Disaster Resilience 2011; USAID Building Resilience and Fostering Growth in the Horn 2012; United Nations Strategy for Enhanced Resilience in Somalia 2012. UNICEF defines resilience as "the ability to withstand threats or adapt to new strategies in the face of shocks or crises, in ways that preserve the integrity of individuals, households and communities (while not deepening their vulnerability)".

- Linking relief to development including ‘crisis modifiers’, in order to anticipate and scale up or scale down developmental and relief interventions to address changing needs through responses that do not only save lives at any cost but also achieve positive livelihood impacts.

In 2012 UNICEF in collaboration with WFP and FAO developed a Joint Resilience Strategy, to be implemented in five districts across Somalia<sup>19</sup>. The Strategy is a long-term approach aiming to strengthen the resilience of the people of Somalia to withstand shocks, in order to break the recurrent cycle of emergencies<sup>20</sup>. This aims for a strategic alignment of programming between the three agencies to increase resilience in vulnerable communities through three complementary pillars:

1. **Strengthen the productive sectors:** to increase household income by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production and enhancing access to markets and market information;
2. **Improve basic social services:** to strengthen vulnerable household human capital by enhancing demand and access; and
3. **Establish predictable safety nets:** to address the basic needs of vulnerable people (including the destitute and seasonally at risk) through predictable and sustainable transfers of food or cash. The objective of the safety net pillar is to support the transition from emergency assistance into longer term and more predictable support, with the flexibility and capacity for timely scale up at times of crisis.

Of major interest going forward is the potential for a social protection system and safety net style interventions to support the poor and vulnerable to better deal with crises. Social protection as defined by UNICEF is the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation<sup>21</sup>. Social protection is generally conceived as being a government owned and budgeted social service. At the core of this service are social assistance programmes – regular and predictable transfers of food or income – with the common objective of providing food and income security and enhancing the wellbeing of citizens who are vulnerable to being exposed to unacceptable risk or deprivation. Social protection also plays a complementary cross-cutting role by ensuring the poorest and most vulnerable people can access essential social services.

## 1.2 Aims and Objectives

The aims and objectives of the assignment were as follows:

**Purpose:** to undertake a study on social protection in Puntland, Somaliland and South Central Somalia and to identify the gaps and entry points for social protection within each Zone. Outputs are to be used by UNICEF to support advocacy to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), authorities in the north and donors, on the case for introducing and funding social protection and safety net policies and programming.

### **Expected results:**

- **Vulnerability Analysis:** identification of key drivers of inequality and vulnerability in each region, to guide the development of social protection frameworks and future programmatic responses. It is to include analysis of the different types of vulnerability (including both economic and social) and the factors that affect this. The analysis is to be based upon secondary data sources as well as qualitative data collected from key stakeholders, including community members in both urban and rural

<sup>19</sup> 5 districts – Burco; Odweyne; Bosaso; Iskushuban; Dolow

<sup>20</sup> DFID is also working towards a similar set of objectives through their Multi Annual Humanitarian Funding to INGOs

<sup>21</sup> UNICEF (2012) Global Social Protection Framework: “Social protection can be understood as a set of public actions which address not only income poverty and economic shocks, but also social vulnerability, thus taking into account the inter-relationship between exclusion and poverty. Through income or in-kind support and programmes designed to increase access to services, social protection helps realize the human rights of children and families. Social protection strategies are a crucial element of effective policy responses to adverse economic conditions, addressing not only vulnerabilities caused or exacerbated by recent crises but also increasing preparedness to future uncertainty”.

settlements. It should include participation of vulnerable groups i.e. children, women, pastoral communities and minority clans, as they are a priority for social protection.

- **Mapping Exercise:** this will include stakeholders (institutions and structures) involved in social protection-related activity at national, sub-national and community levels; the current social protection policy, institutional and regulatory/legal framework where this exists; along with existing social protection and safety net related initiatives.
- **Social Protection Framework:** a draft child sensitive social protection framework will be developed that highlights feasible interventions to address particular risks facing vulnerable groups. The framework will be aligned with national development priorities. In the northern regions where capacity and stability are greater, the framework will be government-owned and long-term. In South Central Somalia, the focus will be on predictable, flexible assistance to reduce dependency on unreliable emergency support, with consideration of how to transition to something nationally owned as capacity develops. The frameworks will provide information on the groups to be targeted, size and scope of intervention, expected impacts and estimated costs.

### 1.3 Methodology

Development Pathways worked in partnership with the Somali NGO 'Social-life and Agricultural Development Organisation' (SADO) on this assignment. SADO was established in 1994 and is committed to supporting initiatives which seek to realize the potential of the Somali people to change their own lives through sustainable, integrated and people-centred development and to improve living standards across Somalia. SADO is well established across the country, with a network of branches across South Central Somalia<sup>22</sup> and ability to work effectively within this complex operating environment. SADO are also members of countrywide networks and platforms including the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) and Somalia South-Central Non-State Actors (SOSCENSA), providing access to a broad range of expertise and resources elsewhere in the country.

SADO provided two senior research supervisors to oversee data collection activity in all three Zones (Puntland, Somaliland and South Central Somalia), sourced and contracted four data collectors local to each Zone, and organised logistics for fieldwork.

#### 1.3.1 Inception Period

**Literature Review:** A literature review was undertaken, comprising a comprehensive bibliography and inventory of relevant secondary data including grey and academic sources from Somalia, to inform the study approach. This was underpinned by the team's extensive knowledge of international social protection schemes. This review highlighted a number of key issues that informed both the research design and the broader conceptual framework for developing the social protection framework. Full details can be found in the Inception report, and the key points on the conceptual framework are in section 1.4.

**Tool Development:** A qualitative research manual was developed for the research team. This outlined the main aims of the study, the geographic zones and locations, the institutional organisation of the study and expected results. It provided an overview of each research instrument: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, community mapping and key informant interviews. Detailed guidance on how to use these tools was also included. The manual provided general methodological guidelines for conducting the research based on ethical research principles and specific research protocol to follow when arriving in a district/locality and

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<sup>22</sup> SADO have Offices in Kismaayu, Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay, Wanlaweyn in Lower Shabelle, Mugadishu in Banaadir, Balanbale in Galgaduud and Beled Hawo in Gedo region

guidelines for working with women and children. Finally the manual also provided guidance and frameworks for reporting.

**Work Plan:** Districts and study locations within the Zones were finalised in discussion with SADO and UNICEF. In each Zone the rationale behind selecting the districts and study locations was as follows:

- Representation of communities from different livelihoods zones;
- Inclusion of views of minority and marginalised clans;
- Districts for which existing data<sup>23</sup> highlights high levels of vulnerability;
- Districts and study locations that are secure<sup>24</sup> and accessible within one days' traveling time from urban centres; and
- In all Zones, overlap with the targeted areas for the Joint UN Resilience Programme.

Annex A highlights the districts and communities included in the study. Locations are outlined in the map.

**Figure 1.3.1 Map of Study Locations**



### 1.3.2 Implementation Period

The field research was undertaken consecutively in each Zone, beginning with Somaliland and ending in Puntland.

<sup>23</sup> Including the MICS surveys for Somaliland and Puntland and WFP trends in nutrition 2007-2012

<sup>24</sup> Based on UN security classification and local partner's assessment

**Training:** Prior to data collection, a training workshop for local data collectors was held in each Zone. This included essential information on the background, rationale and objectives of the assignment; conceptualising risk and vulnerability; social protection and cash transfer programming including lessons from global experience and Somalia; training in the data collection methods, the themes to explore, facilitation techniques and the formats for reporting information; and the daily schedule of activities. Tools were field-tested and finalised based on feedback from the team.

**Qualitative data collection (tools and sampling):** Four instruments were used during the study as follows<sup>25</sup>.

1. **Community mapping:** a meeting with the local leader(s) in order to map the community and gain information to inform the demographic groups and research themes to pursue. Relevant information included:
  - Size of the village, main sources of livelihoods and the presence/absence of clinics, schools and other services;
  - Identification of the major traders and locations of markets;
  - Presence of any NGOs and the types of projects delivered in the area;
  - Whether the community receives any formal aid;
  - Significant historical and recent events in the village (both positive and negative); and
  - Perceptions of vulnerability.
2. **Focus group discussions (FGDs):** held with key demographic groups in communities to better understand vulnerability and risks, their causes, coping strategies and opinions of social protection. This included construction of seasonal timelines of risks and shocks. In each district the team aimed to complete approximately six FGDs, with an average size of six people. The following groups were included:
  - Older people aged 50 years and over: including separate FGDs with older women and men;
  - Adults of working age (25-50 years): including separate FGDs with adult women and men;
  - Young people aged 18-25 years: including separate FGDs with young women and men;
  - People with disabilities: mixed group of adults; and
  - Children of school age (10-14 years): mixed group of children.

In Hargeisa, the selection of Dami as a study location ensured the inclusion of the views of a marginalised group in Somalia – the Gabooye clan. In South Central Zone it was possible to cover locations with a high proportion of the marginalised Somali Bantu and also the Rahanweyne clan, a majority clan in other parts of South Central but who are a minority in Mogadishu.

3. **Life History Interviews:** in depth one-on-one interviews were held with people from the demographic groups listed above and with out-of-school children, enabling discussions on key events and shocks in people's lives and an exploration of how vulnerability changes through the life cycle.
4. **Key informant interviews (KII):** these were conducted with stakeholders in order to better understand the context including existing institutions, policies and programmes relating to or complementing social protection and the concerns of decision makers in government and development/humanitarian agencies. These interviews also helped to identify constraints and opportunities for social protection and safety net programming and synergies with other interventions. The interviews took place at the community and district levels in the study locations, at the national level and in Nairobi, and were conducted amongst the following key informants<sup>26</sup>:
  - UN: departments working on safety nets/cash transfers, service delivery, or resilience programming in Somalia;

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<sup>25</sup> Further details of the instruments and methodology are provided in Annex B

<sup>26</sup> A detailed summary of the stakeholders included in the KII is provided in Annex C.



- Other development partners;
- NGOs operating in Somalia;
- Experts from other relevant social protection programmes including the Hunger Safety Nets Programme (HSNP) in Kenya and the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia;
- Relevant Ministries;
- Relevant service providers including teachers, health workers and financial services;
- District representatives from the relevant Ministries;
- Local authorities;
- Community leaders;
- Religious leaders.

Figure 1.3.2 shows the number of activities completed per Zone:

Figure 1.3.2 Activities completed per Zone							
Activity	Somaliland		South Central Somalia		Puntland		
	Number of meetings	Number of people	Number of meetings	Number of people	Number of meetings	Number of people	
<b>Community mappings</b>	5	34	3	11	2	14	
FGDs older people 50+ years	Women	3	16	2	11	2	11
	Men	3	19	2	11	1	5
FGD adults 25-50	Women	4	23	3	16	2	10
	Men	3	18	4	22	1	5
FGD youth 18-25	Women	2	11	2	11	3	15
	Men	3	17	2	11	2	11
FGDs school aged children	1	7	2	11	1	5	
FGDs people with disabilities	1	5	1	6	1	4	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF FGD AND PARTICIPANTS PER ZONE</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>66</b>	
Life history interviews	16	16	11	11	8	8	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPANTS PER ZONE</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>88</b>	

**Reporting and analysis:** Detailed, handwritten notes of all interviews were taken during the research exercises. Where security permitted and communities were comfortable, electronic recordings were also made. Photos were taken of the flipcharts and diagrams produced. At the end of each day the research team came together to record a daily summary report of the key reflections and themes emerging and learned from the day. At the end of data collection in each Zone, a consolidation workshop was held with the Team Leader in order to synthesise and interpret the main findings from the research including trends, similarities, differences and implications for programming. Notes from the KIIs and Life Histories were typed up by the research supervisor and forwarded to the Team Leader to support the analysis.

## 1.4 Conceptual Framework

### 1.4.1 Defining the scope of the framework

During the inception period, it was agreed with UNICEF that there is a need to narrow the focus of interventions supported under a social protection framework in order to build political understanding (and subsequent political buy-in) and focus on what is feasible given the context and capacity.

There are numerous definitions of “social protection” available in the literature. However, generally speaking in all frameworks “social protection” refers to the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation. All frameworks agree that social protection protects against hazards that impact directly on income, living standards and well-being and prevents negative coping, which is detrimental to long-term welfare. The main aim of government-financed systems is to ensure that a minimum floor is established to address chronic poverty and vulnerability to shocks for vulnerable individuals and families.

A well-established social protection system can be conceptualised – at a simple level – as comprising of two pillars, namely social security and social care and support services. Social security is made up of three types of instruments, as set out in Figure 1.4.1:

1. **Tax-financed (or donor-financed) benefits:** Often referred to as social assistance or social transfers. At the core of social protection systems are social assistance programmes in the form of social transfers – predictable direct transfers to individuals or households, most commonly as income but also as food. These usually aim to provide individuals or families with some form of minimum consumption. They can either be provided to everyone of a particular category (such as children, the unemployed, elderly people or people with disabilities) or directed to the poor. They can include interventions to support engagement with the labour market. These interventions offer the socially and economically vulnerable a minimum income and the means to smooth their consumption during challenging periods of their lives. Government initiatives providing universal access to social services can be understood as a form of social transfer although these tend to fall under the policies of the health and education sectors.
2. **Social insurance mechanisms:** These are financed through personal contributions (in formal economies generally by deductions from the salaries of employees)<sup>27</sup> – and focus on enabling people to prepare for possible events throughout their life e.g. old age, disability, sickness or unemployment. Individuals save in a fund and when a particular event takes place, they are eligible to receive regular and predictable payments for as long as the contingency lasts.
3. **Labour legislation:** Government can mandate employers to finance social protection by, for example, establishing a minimum wage and specifying statutory maternity payments, pay during leave or minimum notice periods.

Social Safety Nets are another type of intervention conceptualised within the broader umbrella of social security. These are also non-contributory and publicly financed transfers but provided on a temporary or short-term basis<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> An employer’s contribution can be regarded as finance from employees in that, if the employer did not pay the contribution, it is likely that wages would be higher. Employers’ contributions tend to suppress wages.

<sup>28</sup> Definitions as per UNICEF (2012) Global Social Protection Framework

Figure 1.4.1a: A simple classification of social security schemes





Figure 1.4.1b: An example of a social protection system comprising social security and care services



To build a comprehensive system as outlined in Figure 1.4.1 takes decades, and as with any definition of social protection, there will always be uncertainty surrounding it. Each country develops its own understanding of what constitutes/does not constitute social protection and there will be contexts where other instruments are included which diverge from this – such as childcare services or health and safety regulations for example.

However at its core, the social protection system from country to country rarely changes and is based on a national system of income transfers. Social transfers are the key building block for emerging social protection systems, impacting on all multidimensional areas of poverty. A primary aim of government-financed social protection systems worldwide is to ensure that a minimum income floor and access to services is established



for economically and socially vulnerable groups in order to keep people out of poverty and to support investments in human capital development.

Social protection in the form of regular and predictable cash transfers<sup>29</sup> is increasingly acknowledged as a crucial component of strategies to tackle poverty, inequality and vulnerability. At least thirty countries now have significant long-term cash transfer schemes. In sub-Saharan Africa, countries include: Liberia, Niger, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lesotho and Malawi. Schemes includes interventions in the contexts of environmental fragility and recurrent crisis, such as the PSNP in Ethiopia; and experiences of providing social protection to pastoralists, such as the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) scheme in the Karamoja region of Uganda and the HSNP in northern Kenya, which reaches the Somali population. Evidence from these programmes is proving that cash transfers have the potential to enable the extreme poor and vulnerable to build resilience to shocks and break the inter-generational transmission of deprivation, by allowing better management of risks and a wide range of positive economic and social impacts.

Such transfers have proven feasible in the context of Somalia and there are recent experiences (both positive and negative) upon which to build. The recent experiences of providing cash transfers to vulnerable populations in South Central Somalia and Puntland has shown significant impacts on individual households and the wider local economy. Cash transfers are improving households' access to food, , improving the health and nutrition outcomes for children, servicing debts and opening credit lines that are critical coping strategies in times of stress. In Puntland it improved the ability of households to contribute to Zakat and Sadaaqa; improved community standing and contributed to the functioning of traditional social assistance. The majority of concerns proved to be unfounded and there were demonstrable benefits of cash and vouchers over in kind assistance<sup>30</sup>. There were a number of weaknesses identified within these programmes which serve as valuable lessons for future cash transfer programmes in Somalia.

The draft UNICEF Social Protection Strategy for Somalia, in line with UNICEF's global understanding of social protection systems, outlines a vision of a comprehensive system comprising interventions under social assistance and social insurance, equitable access to services, labour market and social legislation<sup>31</sup>. Whilst these can be said to comprise good practice internationally, and such a vision is commendable, it will not be feasible in any low income country and certainly not in Somalia (where provision of even basic services is poor and government capacity and access are limited) to put in place such a disparate range of programmes at the same time.

Given the capacity of the state and others, it was agreed that the framework should be kept simple and that certain interventions should be prioritised. As such, the starting point would focus on social assistance in the form of social transfers. Firstly the provision of social transfers is the only intervention that is truly feasible in the short-to-medium term; secondly there is a good deal of previous experience to build upon including social transfers in Somalia; and thirdly because of the importance of building understanding and buy-in in country for a clearly defined core to social protection as a stand-alone social sector. There is scope to add in other elements (social insurance and legislation) to the framework in the future.

In this study it was agreed that the team would take the PPPT (protective; preventative; promotive; transformative) framework of Devereux and Wheeler as the starting point and would focus on social transfers

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<sup>29</sup> Social assistance also includes in-kind transfers and waivers supporting access to services.

<sup>30</sup> Beneficiaries preferred cash to food aid (and requested 'no more food aid') whilst cash and vouchers appear more cost-efficient and cost-effective at reducing negative coping mechanisms and achieving a minimum dietary diversity. See Hedlund et al (2013) for further information.

<sup>31</sup> Collins (2013)

as the key building block for social protection and safety nets in Somalia. In fact, well designed cash transfer programmes can contribute to all of these outcomes<sup>32</sup>.


It is widely acknowledged that well-designed social protection systems comprising social transfers can protect the most vulnerable and prevent them falling further into poverty. However social transfers can also promote investment in human development and economic potential, and transform relationships in society:

- **Protective:** protecting the consumption and attainment of other basic needs of those who cannot meet them through other means;
- **Preventative:** mitigating risks and preventing a fall into, or further into, poverty;
- **Promotive:** supporting realisation of the productive potential of households and individuals; and
- **Transformative:** reducing structural inequalities, which cause vulnerability.

### 1.4.2 A conceptual framework for vulnerability

It was agreed with UNICEF during the inception period that the mapping of vulnerability must take into account not only covariate but also idiosyncratic risk<sup>33</sup> as illustrated in Figure 1.4.2. A social protection framework for Somalia must seek to address these lifecycle vulnerabilities whilst also taking into account the prevalence of covariate shocks.

**Figure 1.4.2 Risks and Shocks Experienced throughout the Lifecycle**



## 1.5 Structure of the report

This Report comprises the following:

<sup>32</sup> A recent feasibility study for the potential of Social Protection in South Central Somalia presents interventions for achieving these protective, preventative, promotive and transformative impacts as being mutually exclusive. In fact well designed social transfers have the potential to contribute to all of these outcomes (Brewin and Dunn 2014).

<sup>33</sup> Idiosyncratic risks relate to those experienced at the level of the households and individuals, relating to family circumstances and lifecycle events, with localised impacts. Covariate risks relate to those experienced on a wider scale, with effects felt by communities or whole populations (though affecting different households and demographic groups in different ways and to greater or lesser degrees). They include weather events, political events and macroeconomic events such as inflation.

- **Section One: Introduction and background**
- **Section Two: Macro level context** - presentation of available data on livelihoods, poverty and vulnerability for the country as a whole and each zone.
- **Section Three: Mapping of vulnerability** - main findings from the field research including trends in livelihoods, shocks and stresses, coping strategies, understandings of vulnerability, the causes, and how this varies by geography, livelihood age, gender, disability and ethnicity.
- **Section Four: Mapping of social protection** - including interventions of government and development and humanitarian partners, as well as a discussion of informal social protection sources and the identification of gaps and best practices.
- **Section Five: Feasibility and entry points** - the enabling environment and programme and policy linkages.
- **Section Six: Developing a theory of change for social transfers** - summary of the key debates and international evidence to inform the framework.
- **Section Seven: Framework and Recommendations** - this presents the proposed social protection framework options for each of the three Zones. In Somaliland and Puntland the emphasis is on government engagement whilst in South Central Somalia the aim is to move away from recurrent, short-term and time-limited humanitarian programmes to something more predictable and long-term. As per UNICEF's request the focus is on pilot cash transfer programmes. The options include the longer-term requirements (10-15 years) as well as the immediate priorities (three to five years), along with recommended next steps for consideration by UNICEF and others in order to move forward with developing options set out in the framework.

## 2. MACRO LEVEL CONTEXT

### 2.1 Political and Security Context

Following the civil war of 1991 and the collapse of the state, Somalia has been in a state of violence and civil strife. As a result, the social and economic infrastructure has severely deteriorated and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced.

Somalia is commonly identified as a fragile state context<sup>34</sup> and the country now consists of three semi-autonomous Zones: North West Somalia (known as Somaliland), North East Somalia (known as Puntland) and South Central Somalia. Each Zone has its own administration. The authorities in Somaliland have judiciary, legislative and executive systems, and similar Ministries exist in Puntland, which are able to deal directly with donors and set development priorities. Whilst the North has seen relative security in recent years, security continues to be a fundamental concern.

Since 2006 conflict escalated in the South of the country on account of the rise in control and influence of radical militia (the most prominent being Al Shabaab) fought by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) allies. As well as this, the impositions of religious militia have placed further curtailments on citizens and on the rights of vulnerable groups particularly women, children, minority clans and marginalised groups, and insecurity has severely hindered and restricted international humanitarian assistance. In 2012 the Federal Government of Somalia was established, however since inception there have already been three Prime Ministers.

All three administrations are in the early stages of development and there are inevitable capacity shortfalls in terms of resources and skills, which hampers the rollout of state services. All are lacking in capacity, but it is widely considered that the Ministries in Somaliland and Puntland are better established and offer relatively easy access for aid agencies. In South Central Somalia, reach is significantly restricted outside of the capital.

### 2.2 Demographic Context

Whilst no accurate data on population size exists<sup>35</sup>, Somalia has an estimated population of approximately 10.5 million<sup>36</sup>. The society is characterised by a high birth rate (6.4) and a large young population. Data from Somaliland and Puntland<sup>37</sup> estimate the average household size to be over 6 individuals, though a significant number of households are estimated to have ten or more members<sup>38</sup>. According to this data, almost half the population is under the age of fifteen and over 70% are under the age of 30. Life expectancy is low and only about 3% of the population are over the age of 65. Over 60% of households have at least one child under the age of five and 91% have a child under the age of 18. The years of conflict, increasing migration and, in urban areas, increasing abandonment of families have led to an increase in female-headed households with approximately 33% of households thought to be headed by a woman<sup>39</sup>.

Somalia is experiencing rapid rates of urbanisation, which is estimated at 3.4% per annum. In Somaliland, one-third of the population is estimated to be living in urban areas, however this figure is expected to increase to 50-60% of the population by 2050, which is well beyond that projected for neighbouring

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<sup>34</sup> OECD-DAC characterises fragile states as those which are 'unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (OECD, 2008).

<sup>35</sup> Somalia had a long absence of any form of reliable data system that supports humanitarian, recovery or development actions since the collapse of the central government in 1991. The last population census was done in 1985/86, but no data was released. Only a few data were released from the earlier census conducted in 1975. UNDP conducted a settlement survey in 2005/06, but the Somali administration came out against it, because they felt that their population had been underestimated.

<sup>36</sup> Esa.un.org/wpp

<sup>37</sup> MICS 2011

<sup>38</sup> In Somaliland 15% and Puntland 10%

<sup>39</sup> MICS 2011

countries<sup>40</sup>. This is a result in part of displacement, which has arisen from years of conflict and a subsequent 'drop-out' from nomadic pastoralism. Currently it is estimated that 1.6 million people are displaced across the country as a result of the recent famine and insecurity<sup>41</sup>.

## 2.3 Service Provision

Provision of basic services (education, water, sanitation and health) in Somalia is poor. This was exacerbated in 2013 when Médecins sans Frontières pulled out citing unacceptable security threats to its staff<sup>42</sup>. What is more, development plans in the northern Zones have been prioritising infrastructure (roads and government buildings) rather than social services.

In 2009, there were an estimated 625 health posts and 225 maternal and child health centres in Somalia. Assuming a population of 10.5 million, this amounts to just one health post per 15,200 people. Some of the unmet demand has been filled by the private sector, which charge user fees<sup>43</sup>. There are an estimated 1211 primary education posts in the country (counting both public and private).

Figure 2.3 below shows the chronically poor access to water and sanitation. There are huge disparities between rural and urban areas, with piped water only available in urban centres and most households in rural areas reliant on unimproved and insecure sources such as rainwater collection, unprotected wells, or tanker trucks.

## 2.4 Environmental Context

Whilst Somalia is populated by a resilient and highly independent people whose nomadic heritage has evolved to survive in the harsh and arid environment of the Horn of Africa, in recent years, climatic shocks compounded by the civil strife in parts of the country have severely affected the livelihoods of pastoralists and agriculturalists alike and have combined to contribute to the famine experienced in large parts of South Central Somalia in 2011. Somalia is prone to both recurrent drought and floods in much of the country and it is commonly agreed that the frequency and severity of climatic shocks is increasing. Whilst accurate data from Somalia is lacking, many areas in the Horn of Africa are experiencing long-term declines in rainfall<sup>44</sup>. Although rainfall is inherently unpredictable and there is considerable uncertainty about how climate change will affect rainfall trends in the future, the long-term decline in 'long rains' precipitation in the Horn of Africa has been linked to anthropogenic warming. This suggests that the 2011 drought was attributable to climate change and that increasingly arid conditions and more frequent droughts are expected as climate change gathers pace.

The increase in frequency and severity of drought cycles is reducing the ability of households to rebuild livelihoods between crisis years and contributing to a steady erosion of assets. Susceptibility to drought in the Horn of Africa and particularly Somalia is thought to be compounded by a variety of social, political, economic and environmental factors including: high rates of poverty and chronic malnutrition; poor access to health care and basic services; high dependency on low-productivity, rain-fed agriculture; high risk of conflict; high rates of environmental degradation; a government still facing capacity constraints; and political marginalisation of vulnerable groups<sup>45</sup>. Increasing frequency of droughts, expanding populations and widespread poverty also contribute to the growing challenge of environmental degradation.

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<sup>40</sup> UNICEF 2014

<sup>41</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014

<sup>42</sup> <http://somalia.msf.org/2013/08/msf-forced-to-close-all-medical-programmes-in-somalia/>

<sup>43</sup> Brewin 2014

<sup>44</sup> Bailey 2013: Southwestern Ethiopia has been on a downward trend since the 1960s. Across Southern, Western and Southeastern Ethiopia, growing season rainfall has declined by 15-20% since the 1970s, with impacts further exacerbated by significant warming. A similar pattern of decreasing rainfall and rising temperatures is evident in Kenya, where long rains have declined by 100mm since the mid-1970s in the areas of central Kenya that are critical for growing surplus crops.

<sup>45</sup> Bailey 2013

## 2.5 Social Economic Context

Somalia has some of the lowest economic indicators in the world. Available data for Somaliland shows GDP per capita estimated at \$347 (current US\$ prices) in 2012, which is the 4th lowest in the world<sup>46</sup>. The economy is based primarily on the livestock industry, wholesale and retail trade (particularly informal sector), and to a lesser extent agriculture. Over half the population depends on nomadic pastoralism with agriculture practiced primarily in the Northwest and in inter-riverine areas in the South. Poor households in urban environments including those residing in internally displaced person (IDP) settlements often depend on daily wage labour.

Cultural norms dictate defined economic roles in the household especially in nomadic livelihoods. Males predominate in cattle and camel rearing, whilst women are responsible for milk marketing and small stock production. Men sell primarily to the export market whereas women trade locally for consumption. Agricultural production involves men and women; again women trade primarily in local markets whilst milling and commercial sales are the domain of men.

Strong markets are a critical support facilitating the movement of people, money, goods and credit. The country is characterised by very low levels of investment (ranked 180th in the World for Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and chronic unemployment, with employment to population ratios much below the Sub-Saharan African average. Around \$1.3 billion in remittances is transferred annually to Somalia; some US\$500 million of it through the UK, which far exceeds international aid. These can be considered an important coping strategy for those who receive them, however such transfers are not equitably received and the poorest and most vulnerable without such social networks tend to lack access.

A recent Household Consumption and Expenditure Survey for Somaliland estimated that poverty in urban areas of Somaliland is 29%, which is similar to poverty in urban areas in neighbouring Ethiopia (26%) and that rural poverty is 38% in Somaliland, which is higher than in Ethiopia (30%). However the study covers only settled rural and urban populations, not urban IDP populations or nomadic communities commonly felt to have some of the highest indicators of poverty. Therefore these are likely to be underestimates<sup>47</sup>. Income inequality is much higher than Ethiopia, with an urban Gini coefficient of 0.43 and a rural Gini coefficient of 0.46.

The combination of the above factors above and the lack of a functional state have ensured that the country has some of the worst indicators of social development, as indicated in Table 2.5. Life expectancy at birth is just 54.7. Women and children are amongst the worst affected, although data is lacking for other vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled.

Infant mortality remains a huge concern and at a regional level there has been little if any improvement in child mortality indicators in the last 15 years. This is linked to limited access to reproductive health services, with almost half of women receiving no ante-natal care and the majority giving birth at home, especially in rural areas. Child caring and feeding practices including breastfeeding and complementary feeding are sub-optimal, and it is estimated that 28% of children under the age of five had been left with inadequate care in the previous week. Immunisation coverage is low and most children aged 12-23 months have not received the basic vaccines. Diarrhoeal disease and malaria are prevalent in children, with diarrhoea peaking in the weaning period of 12-23 months. Access to water and sanitation facilities is very restricted particularly in rural areas, and is much lower than in neighbouring countries. The use of contraception is very limited and

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<sup>46</sup> World Bank Economic Forum presentation of the Somaliland Household Survey: poverty line defined as cost of consuming 2100 kcal per day per person in the household, plus 'some non-food income' (value not defined); set at \$28.5/person/month in urban areas and \$25.2/person/month in rural areas.

<sup>47</sup> World Bank 2014 - Poverty line based on cost per person of consuming 2100 kcal plus some non food income (USD\$28.5/person/month urban or \$25.2 rural)

modern contraceptive methods are almost non-existent. Primary and secondary enrolment rates are much lower than neighbouring countries.

Table 2.5 Selected Indicators of Well-Being 2011 <sup>48</sup>			Does indicator improve		
Indicator	Puntland	Somaliland	With wealth	Education of mother	In Urban areas
<b>REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH</b>					
Neonatal mortality rate	46/1000 (national figure)				
Number of births per woman	Not available	5.4	✓	✓	✓
Use of contraception	3%	10%			
Antenatal care from trained professional	24%	32%	✓	✓	✓
Birth with a skilled attendant	38%	44%	✓	✓	✓
Birth in a health facility	13%	31%	✓	✓	✓
<b>CARE PRACTICES</b>					
Breastfed in first hour	56%	60%		✓	
Exclusive breast feeding first 6 months	5%	13%	X		X
Complementary feeding	35%	33%			
Vitamin A for child under 5 in last 6 months	27%	40%	✓	✓	✓
Full immunisation coverage for children aged 12-23 months	3%	7%		✓	✓
Appropriate treatment of diarrhoea with ORT	41%	50%	✓		
Malaria cases receiving proper medication	20%	1/10	✓		✓
Treated insecticide net use amongst children	30%		✓	✓	X
<b>CHILD HEALTH STATUS</b>					
Child mortality under 1 year	0.073	0.071	✓	✓	✓
Child mortality under 5 years	0.117	0.091	✓	✓	✓
Incidence of diarrhoea children under 5 – last two weeks	10%	13%	X		
Malarial fever in the last two weeks	11%	8%			
<b>ACCESS TO WATSAN</b>					
Access to improved water source	52%	42%	✓		✓
No sanitation	17%	33%	✓		✓
Access to improved water and sanitation	27%	29%	✓		✓
<b>EDUCATION</b>					
Literacy amongst women	37%	44%	✓		✓
Net intake rate of children age six entering grade 1	17%	20%	✓	✓	
Primary school net attendance	43%	50%	✓		✓
Primary completion	50% (boys 59%; girls 40%)	69% (85% boys; 53% girls)	✓	✓	✓
Secondary school net attendance	15%	20%	✓		✓
<b>MARRIAGE</b>					
Marriage amongst girls aged 15-19 years	1/10	1/10		✓	✓
Women in polygamous union	20%	17%			✓
<b>CHILD PROTECTION</b>					
Children living with neither parent (parents dead)	12% (13%)	12% (11%)			
Child labour (household/family livelihood) amongst children aged 5-14 years	26%	25%			✓

<sup>48</sup> MICS (2011): a representative sample survey of women aged 15-49 and children under the age of 5 in Somaliland and Puntland.

These figures mask huge disparities between rural and urban areas and between wealth quintiles. Many of the indicators correlate with poverty, with indicators for mortality, living conditions, access to services, health seeking behaviour and other health indicators all far worse for those in the bottom quintiles than in the wealthiest. Service access is much reduced in rural compared to urban areas. Many also correlate positively with education of the mother, showing the importance of education outcomes for girls and young women to break the cycle of poverty.

Traditions and behavioural norms that accompany the conservative form of Islam are defining characteristics of the country. Somalia ranks second to Afghanistan as the worst country worldwide for women<sup>273</sup>. Women are subordinate to men in nearly all aspects of life. Women and girls in Somali society face particular economic and social vulnerabilities including constraints of culturally gendered work norms; balancing income-generating opportunities with domestic demands; and mobility constraints. They disproportionately shoulder the burden of ill health and limited reproductive health rights are a significant concern. Polygamy is prevalent, especially in South Central Somalia, and combined with the unmet need for modern contraception methods, high birth rates are experienced. An estimated 98% of women in Somalia have undergone the practice of female genital cutting (FGC) to a greater or lesser degree – a practice that often complicates childbirth. Household decision-making power is often concentrated amongst husbands, which can be reinforced by physical violence. Women suffer from limited opportunities to exercise meaningful voice and agency at community level<sup>49</sup>. Despite this however, there are many households in Somalia where women are engaging in small-scale enterprises, especially in urban areas, and are successfully demonstrating themselves as the breadwinners and responsible for their family's welfare.

Low level of school attendance and completion and low levels of literacy are noticeable across the country as a whole and across livelihood zones. A lack of education is seen as a major contributor to poverty and vulnerability in this context, since it constrains livelihood options and resilience to shock. Education of children was a primary aspiration of communities in two recent studies<sup>50</sup>. School attendance is particularly low due to children having to provide support to the household. Child labour in the home or in family livelihoods is slightly more common for girls, especially in rural areas, and it increases for those children aged 12-14 years. In urban areas children working in remunerated economic activity outside the home is more common. The collapse of the education system and high birth rates resulted in a huge mass of poorly educated and underemployed youth. Youth unemployment is a critical issue and can serve as a rich pool of recruits for militarised groupings.

## 2.6 Food Security and Nutrition

Since the 2011 famine, the humanitarian situation in Somalia has improved somewhat largely due to consecutive good rains and the delivery of assistance in more areas of the country. However, Somalia is far from being self-sufficient. One million people still require aid to meet their basic needs and a further 1.7 million who recently emerged from crisis could fall back into crisis without sustained support<sup>51</sup>.

Child and maternal under-nutrition in their acute and chronic forms remain an enduring problem in Somalia. Data from 2001 to 2009 show that median rates of global acute malnutrition (GAM) have remained at 'serious' (10 to <15%) or 'critical' (15 to <20%) levels. It is estimated that for the period 2008-2012 some 32% of children were moderately or severely underweight, 42% were moderately or severely stunted and 13% suffered from moderate or severe wasting<sup>52</sup>. The majority of food for household consumption is purchased, even in rural areas, and as a result inflation poses a major challenge to the wellbeing of households. Prices of major goods have been volatile over the last five years, with sharp peaks in 2008 and 2012. The Somaliland Household Survey (2013) estimates that 57% of rural (not including nomads) and 42% of urban (not including IDP populations) households did not consume the minimum food requirements. Access to food is a major

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<sup>49</sup> MICS 2013, 2011

<sup>50</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014; SOMREP 2014

<sup>51</sup> AfDB 2013

<sup>52</sup> UNICEF 2011



contributory factor to poor nutrition but exacerbated by social norms and pressures leading to poor care practices, and poor hygiene and sanitation<sup>53</sup>.

## 2.7 Local Governance and Clan Dynamics

Somalia has a clan-based society, with clan membership playing an integral role in the socioeconomic and political arenas. Communities have long used local forms of conflict resolution, consisting of civil law, customary law and religious law, through clan lineage. The Somali population is divided into major clans and a number of minority groups. Clans include the Hawiye, Isaaq, Darod, Rahanweyn, Dir, Digil, and other ethnic minorities. Major clans dominate political structures and confer major benefits of social solidarity and support within the sub-clans and extended family networks. In contrast, minority groups (including the non-ethnic Somali groups such as the Jareer Bantu, the Banadir groups and also low status groups such as the Gabooye, Yibir and Tupal) lack the extended social network that forms a safety net for the majority of tribes, thus making them more vulnerable to economic crises. Members of minority clans also have limited political power. The famines of the early 1990s and 2011 affected minority clans most. The militant group Al Shabaab has garnered significant support from minority communities. The clan system has presented ready-made fault lines along which the country has been fractured for the last 30 years.

### MACRO LEVEL CONTEXT: KEY CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK

- Poverty is multidimensional and has both social and economic characteristics.
- Women and children are particularly vulnerable; however other groups such as the elderly, disabled and youth are also likely to be vulnerable but data for these groups does not exist.
- The situation is likely to be worse in South Central Somalia given the overlying shocks and access constraints.
- There are multiple challenges to be addressed, a number of which correlate with income insecurity. Whilst it will be important to consider this in the design of social protection programmes it is unlikely that a single programme or programmes can address all needs simultaneously.
- There exist both chronic long-term and transient poverty and food insecurity.

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<sup>53</sup> This is particularly the case for riverine areas

### 3. MAPPING VULNERABILITY

A person's vulnerability is a factor of their exposure to risk (including covariate risk and idiosyncratic risk<sup>54</sup>) and their capacity to manage this risk. This capacity is influenced by a person's access to (and return on) productive assets (such as labour and access to credit or inputs); services and social networks. Vulnerability to shocks and stresses can thus be economic (being in poverty/at risk of falling into poverty) and social (lack of autonomy, discrimination and marginalisation). The two are linked and social protection can protect against both. Social protection can reduce exposure to risk and strengthen individuals' and households' capacities to deal with these threats in an integrated manner.

Understanding individual, household and community vulnerabilities and their trends over time is important to ensure design of appropriate and effective social protection programmes and targeting mechanisms. It is critical to have a good understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability, in the context of Somalia, to understand who is vulnerable and why. To develop a theory of change it is important to appreciate trends in livelihoods in Somalia, in the shocks and stresses that occur, the coping strategies people have available, and to understand how people's exposure to risk can change according to both life cycle and external events.

#### 3.1 Contextual Information on the Study Sites

##### ***Study Sites: Somaliland***

Toghdeer is the second largest region in Somaliland with an estimated population of 350,000. The backbone of the economy in the Toghdeer region is livestock and there are many nomadic communities as well as agro-pastoralists (primarily rain fed). Land on the upper plateau comprises arid grassland, with wooded areas existing but receding due to land use change and charcoal production<sup>55</sup>. The region's urban centre, Burco town, is an important hub in the livestock trade. The region has the lowest rates of exclusive breast-feeding, female literacy, and attendance at secondary school and the highest infant mortality in Somaliland<sup>56</sup>. Study locations included, Odweyne District - the peri-urban centre and the rural community of Getitaly - and the rural community of Beer plus peri-urban settlements on the outskirts of Burco town in Burco District.

In Hargeisa two 'IDP camps' were visited. These settlements are still known as IDP camps despite being essentially permanent populations. The Stadium IDP settlement has existed for almost 20 years and is close to the centre of town whereas the most recent Digaale IDP settlement has existed for less than one year and was established by the government on the very outskirts of Hargeisa. The two camps share similar local governance structures, security situation, environmental conditions and trends and livelihood groups however they differ socio-economically. The third study location, Dami, is an area where the majority of the discriminated groups (the Gabooye clan) have lived for decades.

##### ***Study Sites: South Central Somalia***

In Mogadishu study locations included established IDP camps in Dharkenley district (estimated population of 30,000) and Waaberi district (estimated population of 46,856) on the outskirts of the city. In Dharkenley the Midnimo camp has been established since 2009 and the population increased during the famine in 2011 and subsequently on account of insecurity in surrounding rural districts. In Waaberi the 'UNICEF camp' was first established in 2009 and then relocated in 2011. The population swelled in 2013-2014 as a result of a wave of displacement following flooding in Afgoye. In Midnimo camp the majority of the population are comprised of the Rahenweyne clan and Somali Bantu (Jareerweyn). The UNICEF camp had a mix of majority clans and

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<sup>54</sup> Idiosyncratic risks relate to those experienced at the level of the households and individuals, relating to family circumstances and lifecycle events, with localized impacts. Covariate risks relate to those experienced on a wider scale, with effects felt by communities or whole populations (though affecting different households and demographic groups in different ways and to greater or lesser degrees). They include weather events, political events and macroeconomic events such as inflation.

<sup>55</sup> Ministry of Planning 2014

<sup>56</sup> MICS 2011

minority clans. The populations were primarily from riverine communities however there were also previously pastoral households who came to the camps following destocking in 2009 and 2011.

Afgoye is a district and market town in Lower Shabelle, on the main road to Mogadishu, making it a waypoint for people and commodities. The river supports some irrigated agriculture and farming and agro-pastoralism dominate. Population in the district and its surroundings area is estimated to be around 200,000 people. The town has grown rapidly in response to conflict and displacement in South Central Somalia generally and especially in the Shabelle regions. The area was affected badly by the famine in 2011 and also by recent floods. In Afgoye district, study locations comprised the urban 'old town' of some estimated 20,000-30,000 residents and surrounding rural settlements comprising primarily riverine (river-fed and rain fed - Jareerweyn and Geladi) and agro-pastoral and some pastoral livelihoods.

### ***Study Sites: Puntland***

Bosaso town in Bosaso district is the most important urban centre in the North East as it is the site of the main port to the Gulf and import of staple foods. The population in the district and its surroundings area is approximately 600,000-800,000 people. The focus of the economy is commerce (import, export and small enterprise) plus fishing (primarily for export) and agro-pastoralism. Industry attracts migrants from the rest of Puntland and Ethiopia, including dropout pastoralists as well as households migrating as a result of conflict and environmental shocks in South Central Somalia. Three IDP camps in the city – Biyokulule, Mingis and Ajuuraan – were included in the study. Generally these have been established for a long period of time.

In the Nugal region in the South of Puntland, livelihoods are primarily pastoral with agriculture in the Gollis Mountains and frankincense trade and collection. Garowe town in Garowe district is rapidly growing as a result of continued conflict in South Central Somalia as well as improved security and recent economic upturn in the town. The Jowle IDP camp population are primarily from riverine communities in Lower Shabelle with some having been residing in the area for 10-20 years, plus more recent residents from Puntland due to shocks faced by pastoral households. The camp was established three to four years ago when it was forcibly relocated to its present location outside of the town, however many of the population lived together for years in the previous location. The camp is estimated to have 2,500 households/families with 85-90% of residents either unemployed or underemployed. The local government manages it with input and oversight from the camp director and camp leaders. Part of the camp is on private land and part on land rented by an NGO. Sin U Jiif is a small pastoral community in Garowe district. Approximately 5000 households are pastoral but no longer nomadic, having settled during the years when this village served as an outpost on the trading route of the nomadic pastoralists, selling commodities from Garowe in exchange for livestock. The community is a combination of sedentary residents and pastoralists that migrate back and forth to the village seasonally.

## **3.2 Trends in Livelihoods and Vulnerability**

Environmental shocks, conflict, poor governance, marginalisation and chronic poverty are seen as the main drivers of vulnerability of the population as a whole. A fundamental concern in communities visited was chronic, entrenched poverty and extensive economic hardship. In the study locations the vast majority of households can be considered to be low income and there were very few that are high income. Collective purchasing power is low.

Across all Zones a number of major trends in livelihoods were identified. A number of these can be considered as both a consequence of these underlying drivers as well as further contributing to these drivers and increasing vulnerability of livelihoods within the study locations. This included increasing poverty and vulnerability affecting livelihoods in rural areas, on account of recurring and increasing climatic shocks and other constraints to livelihoods such as lack of economic opportunity. It also included increasing economic migration and rapid urbanisation. In South Central Somalia a major additional constraint to livelihoods has been the recent conflict and insecurity - a driver behind the growth of the population in the camps visited. Governance capacity remains limited. In Somaliland there were slight improvements to services however

these remain inadequate and inaccessible to the majority in rural areas and to IDP and poor communities in urban areas. In the communities visited in South Central Somalia, access to services was so limited it was almost non-existent.

These trends in livelihoods, which have a bearing on vulnerability and on design of social protection programmes, are discussed in detail below. Analysis shows that these trends can affect different groups of the population – including men and women, rural and urban populations, different age groups and ethnic groups in different ways.

### **3.2.1 Trends in Rural Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities**

Livelihoods in the rural study sites visited are primarily subsistence based, with surplus crops or livestock being exchanged for basic commodities in the region's urban centres.

Whilst herding remains the dominant livelihood overall in Somaliland, in the districts and communities visited there has been a reduction in herd sizes in recent years due to livestock disease, recurrent droughts and general water scarcity, overgrazing and land use change. This has reduced the traditional coping mechanism available to households to deal with their consumption and expenditure needs. There have been changes in herd composition where cattle have all but vanished from the study areas, with few stock kept as working animals for agriculture only. Herds constitute some camels and small stock. The access of pastoral households to range in the North West is becoming constrained, on account of land acquisition and fencing off of traditional communal grazing land for private use. This goes against the founding principle of pastoralism that makes the livelihood resilient in the face of water scarcity and is contributing to resource conflicts.

Pastoralism continues to be the dominant livelihood of the North East, with livestock exports accounting for some 80% of foreign exchange. Goats and sheep predominate, though camels are the most important for nomadic pastoralists. In the rural study site visited respondents did not report the same constraints in terms of ranging as were found in study sites in Somaliland and large livestock were visibly more plentiful within the districts visited than those in Somaliland<sup>57</sup>. In the study sites visited it was considered by communities that in recent years nomads have been enjoying an upturn in the livestock trade given the proximity of the port and recent investments in the livestock industry. There have also been good rains in recent years and improvement in pasture and water availability. However such benefits are not evenly distributed across all pastoralist households. Some have been severely impacted by cyclical shocks in recent years, particularly severe storms, affecting herd sizes and encouraging dropout from nomadic lifestyle.

Those sedentary pastoralists relying on economic exchange with rural nomadic pastoralists are being negatively affected by the growth of Garowe town as livestock trading hub and investments in large livestock industry. There is a trend towards nomads trading directly with these industries and thus the role of these sedentary pastoralists as 'middle men' and source of income and livelihood is deteriorating.

Agro-pastoralism in Somaliland was acknowledged to be more diverse, but still water-dependent and therefore also exposed to the climatic trends mentioned above. Some communities considered that this way of life was potentially more vulnerable to shock than pastoralism since it is sedentary, though as noted above this coping strategy for pastoralists in certain areas is reducing.

In Afgoye in South Central Somalia, agro-pastoral and riverine livelihoods were also becoming increasingly affected by environmental shocks including extended dry seasons<sup>58</sup> and droughts but also flooding. Besides destroying crops, flooding reduces access to markets for harvest in this area. There were also constraints to agricultural production on account of illegal land grabbing rife in South Central Somalia, a trend that was

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<sup>57</sup> However during the study period in Somaliland, it was the beginning of the rains so therefore the camel herds could have still been some distance away.

<sup>58</sup> River in Afgoye dries up in Jilaal season

reported to be increasing on account of the vacuum of law enforcement, which is forcing farmers off their land. In communities in Afgoye, livelihoods in the recent past have been constrained by conflict between government forces and militant groups creating widespread insecurity, which is affecting markets and mobility of the population. However at present time the situation was considered by all to be improved compared to the last five years on account of improvements in security and increase in commerce. This highlights the fluid and highly context-specific nature of the on-going offensives in South Central Somalia. Riverine and agro-pastoral communities were considered more vulnerable than pastoral communities due to the effects of conflict as when they are displaced they lose their assets and food source.

In North and South Somaliland, agro-pastoral and riverine communities and IDP populations from riverine areas commented on the untapped potential of agriculture. Production of agriculture in the study areas was reported to be low, despite potential, with some considering that production over time has been declining. Overall there has been very little investment in agriculture in the North or South of the region, in terms of inputs, finance, infrastructure, irrigation or markets.

Rural areas in general suffered from a chronic lack of alternative opportunities for productive livelihoods or employment. In Somaliland, during drought years but also Jilal, the local economy in the study sites reportedly almost collapsed. In all focus groups, communities highlighted the desire to diversify but cited that they have limited options. They lack the necessary inputs to move beyond subsistence farming and to become more climate-resilient. There were numerous barriers that prevent pastoral households entering into agriculture including access to land, tools and knowledge as well as cultural barriers.

There have been attempts, particularly amongst women, to diversify into small businesses such as teashops, vegetable trading and fodder production. These tend to be in peri-urban areas rather than within rural communities where purchasing power is minimal. The sale of Khat is a relatively lucrative trade, given the high demand and is increasingly becoming a livelihood opportunity for women however this must be weighed against the significant negative social and economic impacts of the custom on households and communities (see below). In farming communities, respondents commented that skills such as basket weaving and other crafts are underutilised on account of lack of access to capital to start up businesses.

### 3.2.2 Trends in Migration and Urbanisation

*“You can’t eat from an empty hand” (Somali Proverb)  
A participant in Mogadishu expressing their extreme poverty and focus on simply trying to survive*

In Somaliland and Puntland there is a trend of increasing sedentarisation of pastoralists as a result of constraints to nomadic livelihoods and changes in herd size and composition, which is most visible in Somaliland<sup>59</sup>. Those without or with very few pack animals are forced to drop out of the nomadic way of life. Agro-pastoralists too were seen to be increasingly reliant upon a semi-sedentary household for agriculture with pastoral satellites. This sedentarisation is leading to more ‘urban’ characteristics even in rural areas, with settlements becoming more permanent. This was seen in Sin U Jiif, which has a high proportion of dependent people, e.g. the elderly, children and the chronically sick, from nomadic communities who are brought here by nomadic relatives.

Across the country there is a rapidly increasing trend towards migration to urban areas<sup>60</sup>, particularly for pastoral households, but also agro-pastoral and riverine households. Drift is seen both towards peri-urban centres such as Burco<sup>61</sup> and to the main cities of Hargeisa, Garowe, Bosaso and Mogadishu leading to the creation of or expansion of overcrowded and impoverished informal settlements i.e. IDP settlements, despite

<sup>59</sup> This is likely to be further encouraged by Government of Somaliland in future years and it is a priority under the agricultural sector of the Regional Development Plan

<sup>60</sup> It was estimated that in 2006, 30% urban live in urban areas of Puntland

<sup>61</sup> There were two IDP camps on the edge of Burco to which rural migrants are arriving and setting up home; the population is approximately 15,000

the fact than some have been established for decades. There is immigration to the North from South Central Somalia, as well as poor migrants incoming from Ethiopia.

This issue of fracturing families is important and has implications for social protection measures. Generally it is the able-bodied men (and increasingly also women) who migrate either to the pastoral satellites or the towns for work while others remain in the settlements.

Whereas communities in all Zones explained that previous movement in and out of urban centres depending on the seasons was a common but temporary activity for pastoralists and farmers alike, there is an increasing trend for households to settle for long periods (or even permanently) in urban and peri-urban areas. The permanence depends on the context and the causes of migration:

- Pastoral households that have destocked have no livelihood to return to. Whilst small livestock generally remains a common asset for households in these settled areas<sup>62</sup>, herds are gone and the way of life for these people has totally changed. The lack of hope of previous pastoralists was palpable in Hargeisa, due to the high investment it would require to re-establish viable herds.
- Besides pastoral households who have destocked, the majority of residents in the camps in Mogadishu (considered the 'breadbasket of Somalia') were previously farmers from Middle or Lower Shabelle migrating as a result of environmental shocks in the farming districts (see below) and the recent conflicts in Shabelle and Afgoye. In some cases, residents of the camps in Mogadishu had been present for six years. Those IDPs from farming backgrounds had a continued aspiration to return to their previous way of life. Many people expressed that they would return if livelihoods were restored, identifying a need for inputs, tools and support to build resilience against environmental shocks. Given the proximity of Mogadishu to Afgoye, some people are attempting to do this and splitting of households was reportedly commonplace, with families in the camps sending able bodied members (and in some cases children) back to their landholding in the rainy season. There is also the option for the able-bodied household members to work on the land of others and thus retain a link to their traditional livelihood and use their expertise.
- Amongst IDP settlements in Puntland, those farmers from South Central Somalia who had fled the conflict have been there for many years and are settled. For many, this was considered a permanent move. This is compared to those who arrived more recently from pastoral backgrounds who cited a desire to re-establish their livelihoods. It was reported that a large proportion of those affected by a typhoon in 2013 had restocked with Government support. In Puntland a splitting of households was also seen, with different members migrating for labour opportunities according to the season.
- In all cases there exist those who have moved from rural areas because they no longer see the potential in their traditional livelihoods.

Those people interviewed in the IDP settlements in all Zones were employed primarily as daily labourers, particularly in construction and hauling goods (men) and as domestic servants (women). There were also people employed in a variety of petty trades including tea shops, hawking/street vendors, buying and selling milk, shoe shining, car washing and selling Khat. Towns such as Mogadishu and Bossaso have growing numbers of labour opportunities linked to the port warehouses, factories, and a booming construction industry. Nevertheless these jobs are insecure and poorly paid. As markets and opportunities in the city are generally far from IDP settlements and expensive to reach, there is increasing competition as the influx to the cities continues. IDPs felt they experienced discrimination in the job market as they were in competition with local people. There were certainly recent drop out pastoralists in the camps in Puntland that the older residents from areas felt some resentment towards on account of increasing competition for work. Households find it difficult to invest or diversify livelihoods as they lack the capital and skills to do so. IDPs coming from riverine or agro-pastoral communities were considered to have more direct transferable skills than pastoralists, enabling them to adapt better to urban opportunities. In and Garowe camps, almost all people originating from farming communities were running all the small shops. Destocked pastoralists were

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<sup>62</sup>The World Bank household consumption survey 2013 shows that 6/10 urban and settled rural households have access to livestock. However this doesn't include IDP camp residents.

mostly daily labourers and unskilled constructors. A major difference in Mogadishu was the extent of begging as a livelihood strategy where it was a well-organised activity. In Mogadishu, men also collected wood/trees to build traditional shelters called 'aqal' in IDP settlements. Attending to basic needs was reported to be the main concern of those interviewed in the IDP settlements, especially in Mogadishu.

The research highlighted the high heterogeneity of urban informal settlements depending on the location and length of establishment. Amongst the recently established government IDP settlements on the very edge of the city (Digaale in Somaliland), households and new arrivals were experiencing many problems due to their isolation from employment opportunities and transport links. Similarly, residents of the UNICEF IDP camp in Waaberi (Mogadishu), which was established during the 2013-2014 conflict, were experiencing flooding, reduced social networks and access to markets and less awareness of where to find jobs than longer term residents in Dharkenley District camp. A difference in Puntland was the extent of integration of (at least long-term) IDPs, where there was less of a class divide between 'IDPs' and urban residents/host communities. This was considered to be thanks to the efforts of the First President of Puntland.

A major difference was seen in the urban IDP settlements in the North, which were organised around community committees, compared to Mogadishu camps, which operated through the gatekeeper system. Camps have been fully privatised and have gatekeepers responsible for keeping order and security and providing access to services, in return for financial compensation from residents. Generally residents interviewed were very positive about the gatekeepers, who retain a certain level of order in the absence of other security, and cited willingness to pay. A minority of the residents of the IDP camps in Mogadishu were in fact urban poor from elsewhere in the city who had taken residence in the camp to access protection from the private management of the camp as well as resources (at the time when aid was being distributed).

Economic migration is becoming more common, especially for young men, leading to an increase in the number of female-headed households. This is discussed further under coping strategies below. In the North there was a trend in both rural areas and urban settlements for youth out-migration. Youth migration from rural pastoral communities in Togdheer region has been significant and increasing over the last two decades, with young men travelling to Burco and Hargeisa, as they are disillusioned with the future of pastoralism. Young people were generally considered to lack hope of make a living, and are migrating inside the country as well as overseas (Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya and even on to Europe and the Middle East). There is a perception amongst youth interviewees that migrating overseas is the opportunity for a better life, with one young person commenting that 'life would be better if I have a passport'. This was less visible in South Central Somalia due to the reduced access to such opportunities on account of geographical location and security.

Urbanisation is creating a continuous new demand for livestock products from households that are unable to meet these through their own production. This can create new opportunities for rural households, however the constraints to livelihoods mean it remains an opportunity for those only with the resources to do so. No one interviewed highlighted this demand from urban centres as a positive trend affecting their community.

### **3.2.3 Trends in household labour**

Changes to livelihood strategies are having an impact on the division of labour and gender roles within the household. In all rural and urban livelihood zones, women's engagement in productive activities was found to be increasing. Women were acknowledged as shouldering the responsibility of supporting the household to cope with crises. In urban centres there are more economic and culturally appropriate opportunities available for women than for men and in Mogadishu, Bosaso and Garowe women are reportedly more trusted than men to undertake jobs as cooks or domestic servants on account of the recent conflict. In pastoral areas the increase in small stock is an asset in the care of women.

In all cases this is increasing the burden of labour upon women, who in Somali society continue to bear the responsibility of caring for the household. Economic activity thus far has not changed the entrenched gender roles or marginalisation of women in decision-making. In pastoral communities the changes in herd



composition was creating an interesting social dynamic. In households that can afford camels, there remains a traditional role for young men. However, the switch to small stock (care of which is traditionally the role of women and children) is increasing the already extensive burden of labour on these household members and disenfranchising young men. Men in urban areas (especially but not only pastoral men) similarly considered certain jobs to be only suitable for women.

Men have increasingly become dependent on their wives for economic support. This was reported to create tension in the household and there were stories that women's increased engagement in the labour market was creating incentives for the head of the household not to seek work. In Puntland the marked lack of contribution of men to the household was noticed and cases of domestic violence were reported in the event that wives do not make enough income. Divorce rates were reported to be rising, especially in IDP settlement areas due to poverty and economic pressures in the home.

Child labour is also prevalent, and increasing in areas facing water scarcity and where stock is switching to smaller animals. It was common to hear that girls would be expected to take on homemaker duties since mothers were working. Child labour was most visible in Mogadishu, where it was the norm rather than the exception for children to contribute to household income. Specific to Mogadishu, child labour opportunities included begging, and the renting out of children to begging gangs. However it is also common practice in rural areas for children to work on herding and seasonal farming activities.

#### **3.2.4 Environmental trends**

Officials and communities commented on the environmental changes taking place in the recent past including the increasing desertification caused by recurring poor rains in the North West and increasing charcoal burning across the North. Invasive tree species were also noted as problems in the North, as was the encroachment of urban settlements on what was previously grazing area. Officials cited population pressures, poverty and lack of access to critical inputs (e.g. seeds, skills, water) as contributing to environmental degradation since communities were unable to follow sustainable livelihoods practices. Another problem mentioned repeatedly was the introduction of genetically modified seeds, which was preventing seed saving and threatening agro-pastoral and farming livelihoods.

The poor planning and rapid sprawl of informal settlements is creating additional environmental challenges across the country, including a huge increase in plastic waste and sanitation problems. In districts of Mogadishu a slight improvement in the environment was noted since rubbish collection services began with support from the Turkish Government.

#### **3.2.5 Khat consumption: an emerging social problem**

In all Zones and in both rural and urban areas the increasing, almost daily consumption of Khat by men is acknowledged to be approaching epidemic proportions and is a growing social problem. Every single young man interviewed in Somaliland chewed Khat. The problem was less visible in South Central Somalia in terms of the number of vendors on the street but was acknowledged to exist and to be growing, and there were more cases of women chewing Khat. The increase in Khat consumption is linked to the lack of economic opportunities available for young men and is contributing to women shouldering further burdens of labour as they take on productive roles. All discussions with women highlighted this as a growing issue.

#### **3.2.6 Trends in access to services in the study sites**

In both rural areas and urban informal settlements visited there remains a chronic lack of access to essential services including health and education services and water and sanitation. In South Central Somalia, access was so limited it was almost non-existent. It is clear that the gap between the need for, and availability of public services, is vast.

**Health:** women and older people in particular, repeatedly cited poor health as a major challenge, as almost all health services available are private and very few people can afford to pay<sup>63</sup>. For those communities in South Central Somalia especially, accessing formal health services was only something that was considered in absolute emergencies.

In Somaliland and Puntland, primary healthcare for mother, neo-natal and child health (MNCH) has been made free at point of use<sup>64</sup>, however there remain significant barriers to access on both the supply and demand sides. In rural areas, supply side barriers include low coverage and capacity of government services, huge queues and a lack of trained personnel and supplies. The Government of Somaliland in partnership with development partners such as UNICEF has been increasingly investing in the health sector over the last five years to support the supply side (see Section Four), however change will take time. Burco District (Somaliland) has the best facilities in Togdheer region and only has one general hospital with 150 beds. MSF recently stopped support to the hospital in Burco and people acknowledged supply side issues had got worse since then. Other districts only have health centres, without qualified doctors. Odweyne District has one health centre to serve the entire population and 5 primary health units. In all rural communities visited there were no MNCH posts and families have to travel to the urban centre, up to 45km away. Where transportation was required (e.g. for pregnant women going into labour), households were forced to sell livestock to cover the costs. In rainy seasons the roads become impassable and restricted access. Maternal mortality, due to the lack of access to medical facilities, was cited as very common<sup>65</sup>.

In South Central Somalia, there is no free MNCH strategy and there were no government health posts in the rural communities visited. Whilst there was a government and private hospital in Afgoye, similar problems associated with access were also reported.

In Puntland, MNCH posts were available in the IDP camps but were not available elsewhere. In urban centres health services are improving but these are mostly private and are not in close proximity to the IDP settlements, which presents major financial barriers to access. Another barrier cited by mothers was the challenge of arranging care for other children if one child was sick.

In all Zones, concerns over the quality of the healthcare and supplies provided including widespread suspicion about the results of diagnosis and source of medicines also impact on the demand for services. This is particularly the case for the services provided free of charge, where people considered that you receive a 'single pill for every ill', in other words there is a lack of quality diagnosis<sup>66</sup>. Religious leaders and traditional healers were also a source of for treatment. In South Central Somalia particularly, women cited that they trusted traditional midwives more than hospitals or clinics. These findings are similar to those of a recent DFID study into the barriers to access to health services for women and children in Somaliland<sup>67</sup>.

**Education:** The education status of the population in all Zones is generally low. Barriers to access included the costs of schooling, nomadic lifestyle, poor coverage and capacity of public schools and lack of qualified staff and supplies. In the North, the importance of education was highlighted in all communities and by all ages. Those residing in IDP camps in Mogadishu put a lower value on education. Parents and older people considered the inability to educate their children to a higher level was one of the biggest challenges in their life whilst young people cited leaving school as one of their biggest personal issues.

In Somaliland, access to education in the rural areas visited has improved somewhat on account of investments in infrastructure and the free education policy of the Ministry of Education. However in both

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<sup>63</sup> Odweyne have around 7 private clinics and one public health outpost. In Somaliland per capita expenditure on health is less than US\$5, compared to US\$33 recommended by WHO (Somaliland Health Sector System Strengthening 2014).

<sup>64</sup> In Bosaso referral to the local hospital for certain emergency care for women and children was also free.

<sup>65</sup> Maternal mortality continues to be the leading cause of death among the reproductive age women in Somaliland.

<sup>66</sup> This was a barrier of access cited in relation to the IOM funded free MNCH post in Mogadishu.

<sup>67</sup> Brewin 2014

rural and urban areas people commented that the introduction of the free education policy without adequate commensurate supply side support has had a negative impact on the quality of state-provided education. The pupil teacher ratio has increased and qualified teachers moving to private schools since they were not being paid. Hidden costs for parents and guardians still exist; for instance exam fees, school maintenance costs and learning materials. This continues to force many parents to take their children out of school.

In Puntland there is currently no universal access policy for education, and government-provided services remain sorely limited. Private businesses fill the gap, but there is no standardisation in service quality and such services were not available in the IDP camps visited. There were NGO-provided primary school facilities in the camp in Jowle but the teacher is self-taught and not paid<sup>68</sup>.

In South Central Somalia, there is no free education policy as of yet, however the Federal Government of Somalia is working on a draft education policy. The UNICEF 'one million children to school' programme is ongoing but did not cover the camps visited. State-provided schools were non-existent in the camps visited, with children attending Koranic schools only. One camp had attempted to provide a school but it was poorly constructed and there was no teacher. There were private schools in Afgoye, however this presented barriers to access for rural households. It was estimated that only 10-15% of school-aged children went to school<sup>69</sup>, and as a result, youth in these camps are highly illiterate.

In all Zones and study sites visited, there are no secondary education opportunities in rural areas, which means that children must be sent away to live with relatives if they are to continue schooling. The fees for secondary education make this opportunity inaccessible for the majority and especially those living in rural areas. It was generally agreed that it is more likely to be boys than girls who can access this opportunity. There were no vocational training opportunities available in rural areas and the youth interviewed expressed frustration that they cannot pursue their education.

As well as bearing the actual costs of sending children to school, families also have to relinquish the support that children could have provided had they stayed at home. In the camps in Mogadishu and Puntland, households have to pay for all food, water, and camp fees and a major reason given for why parents were not sending children to school was because they need to work for the family in order to meet basic survival needs. Families having to make hard choices are putting greater value on their children having the necessary skills to help them in the working world.

An interesting finding was an anecdote of how a Turkish NGO recently set up free schools in Mogadishu city and ended up introducing fees in order to create more demand for the service from parents. It may be that people are sceptical of the quality of free education services as they are about free healthcare.

There are gender disparities noted in both state and Koranic education, with girls dropping out around the age of 12. This was particularly noted in one rural community in Somaliland and in Sin U Jiif in Puntland, where only one girl was attending school.

**Water and sanitation:** Access to clean water is a growing challenge in rural areas and in the poor informal settlements in urban centres. The water catchments in rural areas were generally open and not considered clean and were shared with livestock. Water scarcity is increasing in Togdheer and many areas have water trucked in and people are required to pay for it. In Afgoye people also reported paying for water, which was transported from communal wells by donkeys. In urban centres all households must pay for water, however the facilities are overcrowded. In the case of the most recently established camp in Hargeisa there was no piped water supply. In overcrowded urban areas sanitation is a growing concern. The sanitation of the camps

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<sup>68</sup> Save the Children pay small contributions to teachers in two locations

<sup>69</sup> Key informants from Afgoye

visited is very poor, with no rubbish collection and few toilets<sup>70</sup>. Again these are not emptied and are poorly maintained.

### 3.2.7 Trends in Food and Nutrition Security

People in all locations commented that in comparison to years of drought and especially the famine of 2011, the level of hunger of the population has decreased. However respondents reported a generalised and chronic difficulty with accessing sufficient food, especially in urban areas. Insufficient food was a challenge cited repeatedly by children in all locations. Malnutrition was reportedly widespread in IDP camps as a result of lack of economic access, and was a visible problem in IDP camps in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. In all urban areas inflation was mentioned as an increasing problem in recent years. Some pointed to the arrival of the diaspora as a contributory factor in the increases to the cost of living. In rural areas, seasonal variations in access to food were highlighted as contributing to spikes in malnutrition during dry seasons. Besides access to food, women's workload and care practices were mentioned as contributing to malnutrition. Across all Zones it was noted that the impacts are most acutely felt among young children, the elderly and expectant mothers.

### 3.2.8 Trends in Technology

The spread of the mobile network, access to phones and exponential rise in the use of mobile money in recent years across Somalia is quite extraordinary. As well as providing a communication device for families separated by migration, mobile technology is removing the need for carrying cash. Mobile penetration in Somaliland is approaching 45%<sup>71</sup>. In Somaliland, telecommunications is one of the most dynamic and innovative industry sectors and is also very competitive. There are four MNOs operating in Somaliland alone and seven more in the rest of Somalia. Fierce competition has led operators to offer some of the world's cheapest mobile rates. The telecommunications industry is investing heavily in this region to improve connectivity.

Mobile money is expanding in Somalia at one of the quickest rates internationally according to GSMA<sup>72</sup>. In the areas visited for this study, mobile money transfer is being used for e-money transactions in the smallest of stores and even for payments such as public transport fares. The population are rapidly becoming mobile literate, and a number of those included reported access to mobile phones. Urban IDPs in Puntland said this was their most trusted means of money transfer. It is important to note however that there have been some restrictions in areas of South Central Somalia that are under Al Shabaab control.

## 3.3 Shocks and Risks

*'Life is water and we don't have it enough'  
Female youth, IDP camp in Hargeisa*

In other recent surveys with communities, drought and conflict have been the main risks identified<sup>73</sup>. This is understandable, given the recent memory of households in these survey sites affected by and still recovering from one of the worst droughts in history and the on-going insecurity across large areas of the country. However there are also other significant risks that people encounter in a predictable and even regular basis.

Respondents in urban and rural communities identified two broad categories of shocks and risks that affect households and individuals and that must be taken into account in the design of social protection

<sup>70</sup> In Stadium ten families were using one toilet

<sup>71</sup> GSMA

<sup>72</sup> However, there is significant variation across the country.

<sup>73</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014; SOMREP 2014

frameworks. As mentioned earlier, these can be divided into covariate shocks and stresses (i.e. those that affect the community as a whole) and idiosyncratic risks (i.e. those that are felt at the individual and household levels and which correlate very clearly with a person’s lifecycle and socio-cultural norms meaning certain demographic groups are more vulnerable). These shocks and stresses overlap and compound each other, such that households and individuals affected by idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be more severely impacted by covariate shocks.

### 3.3.1 Covariate Shocks

“The times we had caga barar”  
*Meaning swollen feet - used to refer to the times when people became displaced*

There were similarities as well as certain important differences in the covariate shocks between Zones and between urban and rural communities. The household level shocks and stresses mentioned were consistent across all locations and can overlap and reinforce each other. Whilst community-wide issues such as water scarcity affect everyone in the community they therefore do not affect everyone equally, rather the groups and individuals facing idiosyncratic shocks, are likely to be more exposed to the impacts of these covariate shocks and/or struggle to cope when they occur.

Communities mapped the significant events affecting them in recent decades, which formed the basis of a discussion on covariate shocks and stresses. Seasonal calendars were drawn up to note the variety of cyclical events that can impact on livelihoods. Communities identified both natural and man-made shocks and stresses, including droughts and water scarcity, flooding, typhoons, disease outbreaks and conflict. These are illustrated in Table 3.3.1a.

Table 3.3.1a: Community Mapping of Significant Events										
Years	1970-1974	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990 – 1994	1995-1999	2000- 2004	2005- 2009	2010- 2014	
Somali-land							Rift valley fever			
	Drought (1974)				Drought (1992)	Drought (1997)			Drought (2009)	Drought (2011)
					Conflict during the Somaliland war of 1994					
										Floods (urban)
								Peaceful elections (2002 and 2003)	Peaceful elections	
Punt-land	Drought (1974)						Recurrent droughts elsewhere, which has increased in IDPs			
						Puntland established				
							Conflict in South Central Somalia, which increased IDPs			
									2013 Tsunami, which increased pastoral IDPs	
									Fire destroys market (Bosaso)	
									Relief to camps (2011 - 2012)	

				School built (Jowle)
				Peaceful elections
South Central Somalia	Drought (1974)		Drought (1992)	Drought (2011)
			Water infrastructure development	
			Collapse of government in 1991 and civil war	
			District government active in Mogadishu reduces clan hostilities (2002)	ICU restore order to Mogadishu (2006)
				Rise of Islamic militants and conflict with TFG
				2011 some peace while Al Shabaab in control
				Peaceful election (2012) improved security and economy
				Inflation Mogadishu (since 2012)
				Inflation (2009)
				Flooding (2013)
			Increase hostilities Mogadishu (2014)	

**Conflict and insecurity:** Conflict places particular constraints on a population's movements and rights and the functioning of markets and services, which in turn affects people's ability to earn a living or meet basic needs and increases their exposure to harassment and violence. Conflict and insecurity were identified as significant negative events in both North and South, however reflections on the impacts were different.

In the North West, study participants highlighted the impact of the Somali civil war that caused mass displacement to Ethiopia. The resulting power vacuum and local tribal clashes continued to cause population displacement from Burco and Odweyne until 1996. This remains fresh in people's minds, causing them to place a high value on peace. In the North East, there are memories of the civil war amongst those older household members but thereafter the only periods of conflict mentioned were by those IDPs who had migrated from South Central Somalia on account of this. In the present day all interviewees agreed that security is improving and there are no political or inter-clan security issues.

There were no current issues with security reported in rural or urban Puntland or Somaliland. In Puntland, Garowe was particularly considered to be very secure, though resource conflicts can flare up in rural areas. The security context in the North, at least in the areas visited in the study was considered by communities to

be much improved in recent years, on account of the government's investment in security measures and peace building. It was acknowledged, however, that there are cases of crime and rape, which can affect those living in IDP camps.

Outside of the study areas in Puntland, militant cells are reported to have moved into hiding in the Gollis Mountains but were not considered a threat to the general population<sup>74</sup>. The situation in Sool-Sanaag disputed territories was mentioned in discussions on security. These disputes were considered to be contained and do not directly affect the study communities, however people reported that a lot of government resources are going towards this area to ensure stability. Local government stakeholders stated that other authorities receive less as a result.

The on-going context of insecurity in South Central Somalia was a major difference between reflections in the North and South, with insecurity affecting how people think and manage their lives. Security continues to be fluid and highly context specific. Communities must plan their lives and livelihoods around this insecurity. The effect of insecurity is seen on the closure of markets, marked inflation in the price of staple commodities, and unemployment in urban areas, with a significant impact on the local economy.

However even in South Central Somalia the situation was considered to have markedly improved compared to 2007 when the Islamic Courts and Ethiopians were engaged in war, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were fighting Al Shabaab. There was reported to be no significant issues between clans and increased integration among the different sub-clans, and people in Afgoye and Mogadishu commented that citizens are generally free to go about their business, which is having a positive impact on economic conditions. There have been recent security threats in Mogadishu compared to 2012-2013, and renewed fighting between militant groups and government forces in Shabelle are impacting access to markets. A number of the more recent migrants into the Mogadishu camps came in as a result of these increases in insecurity.

However if the study had been taking place in other areas in the South where fighting still rages, findings would likely have been different. Even during the period of the study, proposed research locations changed from being accessible to being inaccessible. This highlights the importance of looking at the local context rather than making generalisations about conflict and insecurity. It is likely that if different communities had been included in the research the on-going impact of insecurity may have been more pronounced.

Land related conflicts were mentioned in both the North and South. In Somaliland and South Central Somalia, this included small-scale resource conflicts between sub-clans in rural areas especially between pastoral and agricultural land, whereas in the South it also included cases of land grabs from farmers by militant groups.

Communities in Mogadishu and Bosaso commented on the piracy threat, which is impacting on trade and the local economy. This is considered below.

**Hazardous weather:** Hazardous weather was highlighted as an issue in all Zones and was considered to be a seasonal hazard, which is increasing in intensity and affecting both rural and urban livelihoods. Pastoral communities in the North East are being particularly affected by seasonal cold rain and strong winds and typhoons and coastal areas have high risk of Tsunamis. These climatic hazards destroy shelters and assets and endanger livestock. Elsewhere, with a lack of infrastructure to provide protection from or to divert water, heavy rain, flooding and hail are contributing to crop and livestock losses and reducing access to health centres and markets. Flooding in 2013-2014 has displaced an increasing number of people from riverine areas especially Jowhar (Middle Shabelle) to the IDP settlements in Mogadishu. Those in Puntland commented that there is little humanitarian response to these events because of the focus of aid agencies on drought and water scarcity.

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<sup>74</sup>There appeared a zero tolerance approach to these cells in the communities visited with cases of summary executions



When there are floods, urban cities close to rivers such as Afgoye are heavily impacted and the economy slows down because roads become inaccessible due to poor infrastructure. This contributes to inflation of food prices (see below) and can result in food shortages in urban areas. During Xagaa season in Puntland, the economic trade (imports/exports) slows down because the poor weather means small dhows cannot bring in the goods. The impact of piracy off the coast of Somalia means that large ships will not come to port, thus without these dhows the port activity is much reduced in this season and with it, employment opportunities.

In overcrowded urban areas the lack of drainage means rainfall impacts negatively on overburdened sanitation systems. Even in 'normal' rainy seasons the seasonal increase in waterborne diseases (i.e. cholera, malaria and diarrhoea) affecting children, women and the elderly were noted in both rural and urban communities.

**Water scarcity:** The increasing frequency of drought cycles and all communities noted issues of water scarcity, though impacts are not evenly spread. Drought was specifically mentioned as a shock in a handful of years however drought cycles are more frequent than previously experienced. In the 'normal' years, communities identified stresses associated with water scarcity in the dry seasons, which are contributing to economic and health related problems.

Rural communities in the North West and Afgoye commented that rainfall is more erratic which is resulting in lower water tables, and that there is a lack of adequate infrastructure for irrigation, water storage and conservation. Water scarcity was a major problem identified in the North West. This is affecting all rural livelihoods given the dependence of pastoralism and agricultural livelihoods on water, constraints to livestock migration and lack of opportunities for economic diversification. The repetition of stress on stress, interspersed with years of failed rains, was said to be resulting in the loss of productive assets<sup>75</sup>, reduction in productive capacity of the land, and reduced ability of households to earn sufficient income from traditional livelihoods. Traders and other businesses in rural areas also suffer from the reduced purchasing power and migration of the population during these poor seasons. These climatic shocks are contributing to loss of livelihoods and the increasing urban drift of households who have dropped out of the nomadic way of life or who have lost farming livelihoods<sup>76</sup>.

The study in Puntland highlighted the importance of context specificity and of not generalising the effects of 'drought'. Whilst key informants and communities mentioned the broader context of water scarcity affecting rural livelihoods in the North East<sup>77</sup>, in the particular study locations drought was not something that was mentioned as a shock affecting them directly in recent years. Whilst pasture is becoming a challenge, in the study location of Sin U Jiif it was reported that 'you don't have to dig deep to find water', suggesting that communities here were less affected by the 2011 crisis than the rest of Somalia; whilst camps also did not comment on water shortage.

Whilst livelihoods in urban areas are relatively better cushioned from the immediate impact of water scarcity, the linkages between the rural and urban economy mean negative shocks for urban households. Shocks include reduced supply and quality of milk and meat, increased cost of milk, meat and grain, and increasing burden of support to rural relatives. In Mogadishu there were reduced employment opportunities for urban IDPs as seasonal migrants to rural areas.

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<sup>75</sup> In pastoral areas, herd sizes are diminishing, as they are not sufficiently replenished before more must be consumed or lost. In agricultural areas the 'yabar baruur' (the time of year when their crops are not ready to be harvested but other crops are finished) is increasing, as harvest is not sufficient to last for the lean season.

<sup>76</sup> People impacted by the 2006 tsunami still live in IDP camps in cities in Puntland and have not returned to their livelihoods.

<sup>77</sup> Lack of rain and pasture can be a significant concern in rural areas around Bosaso and IDP camps have increased in size because local nomadic/pastoralists have entered the camp.

**Inflation:** Inflation was noted as a seasonal factor linked to the shocks above. It was regarded as an issue for all areas, however especially amongst urban communities given the dependence of households on the market for the majority of their food needs. There is a considerable reliance upon imports. Consistently high prices, with seasonal increases, were reported in Garowe and Bosaso and were considered linked to the return of diaspora. Food prices were noted to be extremely high in Mogadishu. This was considered to be a consequence of increased insecurity in the last 12 months reducing access to markets as well as the reduced supply of food aid compared to 2011-2013.

Table 3.3.1b summarises the communities' seasonal calendars of a typical year, which showed strong similarities across all Zones and livelihood groups and highlights the impacts (both positive and negative) of seasonal events in rural and urban areas. As a generalisation pastoralists, and casual labourers in the North West and South Central Somalia, were more likely to face food shortage during the dry seasons, while labourers in Bosaso were more likely to experience problems during Xagaa. Agriculturalists reported experiencing food shortages in the end of the dry season and during the first two months of Gu, until the harvest, and all livelihood groups are regularly facing food shortages.

<b>Table 3.3.1b Summary of community seasonal calendars of a typical year</b>				
<b>Context</b>	<b>Jiilaal (dry) Jan-Apr</b>	<b>Gu (rain) Apr – July</b>	<b>Xagaa (dry/coastal storms) Jul – Sept</b>	<b>Deyr (rain) Sept - Dec</b>
<b>Rural</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migration of pastoralists affecting access to milk and education; reduced business in the area</li> <li>• High price of good</li> <li>• Lack of food and water</li> <li>• Malnutrition increases</li> <li>• Low or no agricultural production</li> <li>• Livestock become weak/death of livestock</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Animals have grass</li> <li>• Enough milk and meat</li> <li>• Low inflation of food</li> <li>• Crops (including fodder) growing</li> <li>• Malaria increases</li> <li>• Diarrhoea increases</li> <li>• Colds increase</li> <li>• Child labour on the land</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low water</li> <li>• Inflation of food</li> <li>• No pasture for livestock</li> <li>• Migration of herds</li> <li>• Search for daily labour</li> <li>• Ramadan</li> <li>• Food prices become high</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Waterborne disease</li> <li>• Eid<sup>78</sup> – celebration, but expenses for the household</li> <li>• Increased water (but maybe not clean)</li> <li>• Crops growing</li> </ul>
<b>Urban</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of water</li> <li>• Lack of food – inflation and more demand for food from the town</li> <li>• Malnutrition</li> <li>• Inflation of meat/milk or bad quality of products</li> <li>• Demand for financial support from rural areas increase</li> <li>• Immigration of rural people to town</li> <li>• Unemployment increases as competition from rural influx/no rural seasonal employment (Mogadishu)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water isn't clean – poor sanitation</li> <li>• Malaria increases</li> <li>• Diarrhoea increases</li> <li>• Colds increase</li> <li>• Low price of meat and milk</li> <li>• Mogadishu – jobs increase as seasonal agricultural work in nearby areas (some cases of child labour)</li> <li>• Decreased opportunities for some trades in town (car washing; ice cream sales)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of money and food</li> <li>• Food prices become high as reduced imports from Gulf (too windy for boats)</li> <li>• People are living hand to mouth</li> <li>• Immigration of people from rural areas, and selling charcoal, tomatoes and milk</li> <li>• Ramadan – increases social assistance</li> <li>• Malaria rates are still high</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Malaria</li> <li>• Diarrhoea</li> <li>• No clean water</li> <li>• Low price of meat and milk</li> <li>• Decreased opportunities for some trades in town</li> </ul>

**Disease outbreak:**

<sup>78</sup> Note that Eid falls in different calendar months year on year so the above can be said to relate to 2014.

In pastoral communities, Rift Valley Fever was noted to have had a huge negative impact between 2000-2006, in terms of livestock health and the immediate impact on nomadic livelihoods, as well as the direct and indirect impacts of the livestock export ban that reduced government revenues. Rural and urban communities also cited outbreaks of measles and the incidence of polio in recent years.

***Loss of social assistance:***

A shock specific to the IDP communities in Mogadishu and Garowe was the recent pulling out of humanitarian agencies that were engaged in providing assistance during and after the 2011 famine. IDPs still cannot access either their traditional livelihood or sufficient earning in the city. In Jowle camp, it was also reported by IDPs that assistance they can expect to receive from the local population has decreased, since nomads have lost their livelihoods.

**3.3.2 Household level shocks and stresses**

There are a number of other, significant and regular shocks and stresses that are a key contributor to poverty and vulnerability in both urban and rural contexts. These are the idiosyncratic risks that can be considered to affect people in different ways at different stages of the lifecycle, with some being age and gender specific. Those that came up repeatedly were disease, poor health, incapacity or death of a family member, and family breakdown. In South Central Somalia, IDPs also highlighted loss of employment and sexual violence on women and girls. Details of idiosyncratic risks are highlighted below. Annex D shows examples taken from the life history interviews of significant events throughout people's life cycle, illustrating the significance of these personal and household level events in addition to the covariate shocks to people's wellbeing.

**Disease/poor health:**

Common diseases mentioned include high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis and back pain, strokes and eye diseases amongst adults and the elderly; malnutrition, malaria, measles, diarrhoea/waterborne diseases, respiratory diseases, TB, whooping cough amongst children; and urinary tract infections, malnutrition, malaria, pneumonia, anaemia and eclampsia amongst women.

Economic impacts include the need to cover the cost of transport to seek medical attention, or the cost of healthcare, as well as the reduced ability of the household to pursue a livelihood strategy on account of debility of the breadwinner(s), or time spent caring for sick relatives. Social impacts include the increasing burden of labour on others in the household including children and women, with further knock on effects on health and nutrition.

Waterborne diseases were noted as a challenge in all livelihoods. As outlined above, some health risks were associated with the rainy and the dry seasons including malnutrition in the dry seasons and an increase in water borne and respiratory<sup>79</sup> diseases during rainy months. Malnutrition is pervasive and chronic and is visibly affecting a large percentage of the population, however it is interesting that it appeared to be considered by many people as only a seasonal issue, and only affecting particular groups i.e. children and women. It is likely that everyone's diet is so chronically, and traditionally, nutrient poor that this situation has become 'normalised'. Child malnutrition can have irreversible effects on the future growth and wellbeing of children into adulthood.

Non-communicable diseases were considered to be increasing, particularly in urban areas, and on account of a combination of old age, livelihood activity and lifestyle/diet. Frailty and debility of the elderly were noted as challenges to pursuing economic strategies. Besides aging, the livelihood strategies people pursue can contribute to rheumatism, arthritis and joint pains in later life. Disease was understood to correlate with particular lifecycle stages, including child susceptibility to disease and malnutrition; women's risk of reproductive health problems; and the frailty of older people and their pre-disposition to both communicable and non-communicable diseases.

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<sup>79</sup> Malaria, cholera, diarrhea and common cold were mentioned frequently

Mental illness was considered to be increasing, which was blamed both on the increase in Khat misuse and stress related illnesses because of the life uncertainties that people are facing. Related to this was the increase in cases of family breakdown and divorce.

***Incapacity and death of a breadwinner:***

The research identified many women in Digaale IDP camp (Hargeisa) and in Puntland IDP camps, whose husbands had died in conflict in South Central Somalia. This was also a major shock identified by respondents in South Central Somalia, and by older respondents in Somaliland (relating to the conflicts there from the 1980s and 1990s). Besides impacting on the rest of the household in terms of loss of labour, there were cases where women also lost their livelihood in the event that their husband’s business or land were taken over when husbands died. There were cases of breadwinners being disabled in the conflict, which affected their ability to work. There were also numerous cases where respondents had lost family members on account of the conflict or illness. Children and young people repeatedly identified loss of parents as a major issue. As well as being the worst thing that had happened in their lives, the death of parents caused severe economic and psychological impacts.

***Gender based violence:***

In urban IDP areas the risk of attacks on women were considered to have increased, on account of reduced social networks and lack of support from the law, especially in South Central Somalia, but also in IDP areas in Bosaso. In IDP camps without latrines the prevalence of rape was considered to be high. In Garowe and Bosaso gender based violence was associated with the difficulties households faced with earning a living and unemployment.

***Loss of employment:***

This was a factor in urban areas and there was general agreement that unemployment is increasing and so too is the competition for jobs. In Bosaso some respondents considered this to be one of the biggest shocks they had faced in recent years. There were particular issues mentioned including employment discrimination of minorities seasonal downturns in wage earning opportunities in port cities and in areas close to farming communities and the impact of illegal fishing in Bosaso. The Somalia Resilience Consortium (SOMREP) baseline study indicates that 80% of household income was earned by a single individual. This is a high-risk situation, especially when combined with poverty, scarcity of health services and harsh living conditions. These households were proven to have a lower food consumption score than households with more than one income provider.

### **3.4 Coping Strategies**

“We are hunters but hungry; we are people with water but thirst; we are moving always but never get away from our place”  
*Quote from Bosaso FGD respondents, explaining how they cope but cannot change their situation*

The Somali population are thought to be some of most resilient people in the world, employing a range of strategies to deal with crises such as entrepreneurship, mobility and reliance on social networks. A variety of coping strategies to deal with shocks and stresses were mentioned during the research and these are listed in Table 3.4. Strategies listed were broadly the same regardless of gender or clan. There are some differences on account of age and livelihood characteristics. Some of these can be considered negative, meaning that the strategy risks increasing the household’s vulnerability to future shocks and stresses.

In rural areas, across all Zones, strategies were broadly the same for households in all types of livelihood zones (i.e. pastoral, agro-pastoral or riverine); in urban areas a major difference is the increase in begging, especially in Mogadishu. There were many similarities but also some interesting differences between Zones. One difference is that in the case of community-wide shocks, in South Central Somalia, communities have come to expect that they will receive external humanitarian support. There was general agreement that some of these strategies are being constrained as a result of the increase in the frequency and intensity of shocks.

<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sale of livestock</li> <li>• Consuming livestock or crops</li> <li>• Reduce consumption</li> <li>• Buying food on credit</li> <li>• Taking on debt</li> <li>• Seek support from relatives in urban areas, or others in the community</li> <li>• Seek alternative income/diversify livestock /economic migration to towns and abroad (including some women)</li> <li>• Drying grass for fodder</li> <li>• Migration herds</li> <li>• Charcoal production</li> <li>• Taking children out of school</li> <li>• Send children away to relatives in urban areas</li> <li>• Humanitarian assistance (South Central Somalia only)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sale of assets</li> <li>• Reduce consumption</li> <li>• Buying food on credit</li> <li>• Taking on debt</li> <li>• Seek support from others in the community</li> <li>• Remittances</li> <li>• Seek alternative income/economic migration</li> <li>• Begging – women and children, especially in Gabooye</li> <li>• Rely on wild food</li> <li>• Taking children out of school</li> <li>• Sending children to work</li> <li>• Humanitarian assistance (South Central Somalia only)</li> <li>• Polygamy (Garowe IDP only)</li> </ul>

**Debt and credit:** Taking a loan from relatives, or taking food on credit from traders, are hugely important coping strategies at times of crisis or stress and to smooth seasonal income. The literature highlights the importance of trust and of social networks in being able to access loans or credit, with evidence that socially marginalised groups, minorities, and IDPs can be excluded from these support systems<sup>80</sup>. In the study locations, accessing this coping strategy was found to depend on confidence of the creditor and collateral of the debt. Therefore, it was difficult for those lacking assets and for IDPs and minorities without social networks to access loans. This was particularly evident in Mogadishu. An interesting finding was the presence of informal revolving credit schemes established by women in Afgoye and Somaliland. These mechanisms can also become constrained in prolonged times of stress.

**Selling or consuming assets:** Selling livestock is a traditional means for pastoral households to create cash for other needs, however this is reliant upon herd size and livestock being sold at times of good health. For the majority of pastoral households included in the research, livestock is now only sufficient for them to consume milk and sell livestock as a last resort when times are difficult. With herd sizes dwindling and the frequency of drought cycles also increasing, these coping strategies have negative impacts as herd sizes are unable to fully recover<sup>81</sup>. The tradition of destocking only as a last resort, when livestock is in poor condition, combined with the increasing frequency of drought cycles, is contributing to the destitution of households. In Bosaso during periods when the port closes, it was explained that poor IDP and urban families sell their household assets (e.g. plates) to make ends meet since they cannot afford the cost of migrating elsewhere to seek work.

**Reducing consumption:** This was mentioned by urban respondents, who cited that they would reduce the number of meals and also purchase inferior goods (e.g. powdered milk) during the lean season.

**Diversification:** Livelihood diversification, within the constraints of the limited economic opportunities mentioned above, has developed as a common coping strategy for agro-pastoral and riverine households in response to environmental and seasonal shocks as well as to localised conflict. The opportunity for this was

<sup>80</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014; Gabrielle and Nori 2007; SOMREP 2014. The latter study highlights the primary reasons for respondents taking credit as being for buying food (60%) or servicing other debts, and the secondary reason as being for accessing social services. This highlights the inability to cover basic needs. Only a small percentage (7%) had taken debt to invest in livelihoods.

<sup>81</sup> According to pastoral respondent it takes 7 years to recover herds from a drought.

more obvious in communities in South Central Somalia, given the proximity of Afgoye to Mogadishu and the recent economic upturn in Mogadishu. It was common practice for households to combine working on farms, practicing pastoralism and going to the city to work as casual labourers. In urban areas entire families are working. It was generally agreed that pastoral households have fewer options for diversification, since they generally lack the skills required, besides which there is not the culture to take on particular income generating activities. Rather, there is a tendency to continue in pastoralism until the herd has dwindled to the point when the household must resort to dropping out and transitioning to urban areas.

Polygamy as a coping strategy was an interesting finding in the Garowe IDP study locations. Here men were marrying more than one wife, all of whom worked, so as to increase and diversify the income streams into the home.

**Migration:** Seasonal migration is a traditional and established coping strategy for nomadic communities and is a major factor contributing to the resilience of pastoral households in the face of water scarcity and seasonal decreases in pasture availability. In certain areas the constraints to this migration outlined above is impacting on the efficacy of this vital strategy. Communities have also used seasonal migration as means of dealing with the recent years of conflict and insecurity. Currently the principal coping strategy for those living in Afgoye is for people to go into urban areas during these shocks and to avoid insecurity.

There was agreement that economic migration to urban centres and further afield is increasing in all Zones. This was especially the case for young men, though it is becoming increasingly common for women also. Economic migration can be a positive coping strategy, but when it is forced and when options are limited this can increase vulnerability. It can be expensive to migrate. There were cases in Hargeisa and Garowe of families selling everything they had (including their home) in the hope of sending a child overseas, however there was no guarantee that well paid or sustained employment would be found. The cost of sending a relative overseas is such that it was considered that the poor in the IDP camps generally do not have this option. Human trafficking across borders is increasing, and with this comes the risk of kidnappings for ransom.

Vulnerability of families left behind can increase. People commented on a 'brain drain' particularly from rural areas, where the more educated leave to seek opportunity elsewhere. In Sin U Jiif the lack of male youth was startling. This is contributing also to a situation where rural communities have an increasing proportion of dependents, since the economically active are leaving whereas the children and elderly remain at home. Migration can increase social or economic vulnerability such as having no means of earning an income or having to live outside traditional clan areas. For the poorest, the costs of economic migration (even over short distances) given the lack of security of employment can present a barrier. During the monsoon season in Bosaso it was reported that it is the well off residents that will migrate temporarily to other towns whereas the low-income IDP populations will remain in the town.

**Remittances:** The value in remittances from the diaspora into Somalia is well documented and it is certainly an important source of household income. For example the remittance value in Somaliland is up to \$400 million annually<sup>82</sup> whilst the Burco District Development Plan cites remittances as being the second most significant source of income in the District. As with cash transfers these will have positive multiplier effects on the wider economy. However other studies have remarked that the benefits are unequally shared, with the poorest and most vulnerable most likely to miss out. This was in line with the findings from this study.

In Somaliland, although remittances were commonly mentioned in Burco town there were few cases cited in Odweyne and no examples reported in the rural communities. There were few cases of urban households in the camps in Mogadishu receiving remittances from overseas, since those camp residents who were able to access this line of support have tended to move out of the IDP camps. Given that it is majority clans who form the diaspora and that assistance is often given along clan lines (see Section Four), this is not surprising.

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<sup>82</sup> Somaliland Vision-2030 document

Rural households were rather more likely to receive domestic remittance/support from relatives in Somaliland. This was similar for rural households in South Central Somalia where it was more common for rural households interviewed to receive domestic support. There were also cases of rural to urban remittance in South Central Somalia, given the splitting of households between rural and urban locations.

Whilst it is recognised that remittance outlets do have high penetration, there was a lack of remittance outlets in the rural areas that were visited, with coverage only noted in the district peri-urban centres. However, in the study areas in Somaliland mobile money transfer service is available everywhere. Of course this does not mean that penetration is equal across the country but it is an encouraging sign of the speed that this service is being adopted. Communities explained that nowadays even the poorest households are becoming able to access phones, even if they do not necessarily own one. Households in rural areas are using this as a communication channel for immediate support from relatives further afield. This is seen as a new channel of assistance that cuts across time and space. This triangulates with findings from a recent study by the Cash Learning Partnership of mobile money transfers on emergency cash transfer programmes in South Central Somalia, which highlighted that households on the programme were so comfortable with the service, and use of the service by traders was so ubiquitous that there was little if any 'cashing out' of transfers, rather that were used in their entirety as electronic money<sup>83</sup>. In rural areas households are beginning to use the phone and mobile money as a communication channel for accessing immediate support from relatives further afield - a new channel of assistance that cuts across time and distance.

There was a general feeling that young people moving to the city or overseas does not mean that financial support will be received by the family left behind. In many cases people said that girls were more likely to send remittances back, and as one respondent commented, 'for a woman to go away it is better than ten men to go away'.

**Begging:** This is a predominantly urban strategy, as in rural areas it continues to remain a taboo. In the North, this was employed by vulnerable groups who cannot support themselves or do not have relatives that have the means to help them. It was considered that these people have no other means to survive and that begging is increasing as a livelihood strategy in urban centres, especially amongst the elderly but also children and women. In Mogadishu, this livelihood strategy had a very organised approach with numerous begging groups, and it was reported that family members would be sent to work in these groups.

**Taking children out of school:** Children are pulled out of school for a number of reasons. In pastoral communities the traditional means of coping with water scarcity in the dry season is to migrate to more remote areas. Similarly in the rainy season, children may be taken out of school to support the household to manage the increased burden of seasonal labour that is required. During times of food shortage children are also taken out of school, and young girls in particular are taken out to help sell produce in the market as well as to care for siblings and to support household duties if mothers are seeking work. What is more, early marriage for girls aged 13-14 remains common in rural areas and has significant impacts upon their education. Child labour, including begging, was more prevalent in South Central Somalia.

**Informal social protection:** In Somali society there exists a range of informal mechanisms of sharing support to households during times of shock. These are based on kinship and family, and are primarily for household level shocks (see Section Four).

### 3.5 Characteristics of Vulnerability

*"nin fadhigaaga arkaya, looma sara joogsado"*  
*"You don't stand up for a person who can see you in sitting"*

Meaning: when a person can vividly see your sufferings, there is no need to tell him in words.

<sup>83</sup> O'Brien et al 2014



In every community and study group, there were very clear ideas defining vulnerability and agreement on who is considered 'most vulnerable' to shocks in the community. The poor were defined as those households who cannot eat, or who have limited assets. Poverty was considered to be pervasive in all the communities visited, with key informants considering that up to 70% of the population could be considered vulnerable on account of poverty. However despite this being a defining characteristic of the population, there was a clear differentiation between the 'community' as a whole and those considered to be most vulnerable to shock, for example:

- The very poorest/destitute;
- Those people who cannot get help from other means (e.g. relatives); and
- Those who cannot help themselves or are suffering most in almost all aspects of life, particularly health.


Communities identified a number of vulnerable groups who are considered to be particularly vulnerable and deserving of assistance. This was the same in all communities, and for all groups interviewed. Ranking of vulnerability saw communities prioritise the needs of various people in their community. The specific vulnerabilities facing these groups are detailed below and show that vulnerability, as conceived by communities themselves, relates to social *and* economic factors. The following people were identified as those in need of assistance:

- Children, especially orphans;
- People living with disabilities (including the chronically ill) and especially those without family support (including those with mental illnesses);
- The elderly, especially those without family support; and
- Female headed households (especially widows without family support).

Other groups in society were also acknowledged by communities to be vulnerable since they face particular social challenges. However these groups were not prioritised for assistance in the ranking of vulnerability as they were regarded as being able to support themselves financially. These include unemployed young people and minority clans.

These groups fit clear demographic categories of vulnerability and many correlate to the risks felt at particular stages of the lifecycle as depicted in Figure 3.5 The issues relating to these particular vulnerable groups are considered below, which shows that these groups are more pre-disposed to particular idiosyncratic shocks. Vulnerability can compound across the lifecycle, such that if specific vulnerabilities felt early in life are not addressed, these can determine and exacerbate vulnerabilities faced in later life. Exposure to these risks is also likely to mean that households and individuals will be disproportionately affected by covariate shocks.

**Figure 3.5 Risks and Shocks Experienced throughout the Lifecycle**



**Women:** Women are increasingly taking on more economic activities in the household in rural and urban areas on account of poverty, the stagnation and erosion of traditional livelihoods, economic migration of men and the impact of conflict. Whilst the emergence of women as economic agents can be considered a positive thing for building household resilience, the reality of the continued socio-cultural marginalisation of women in household decision-making and political spheres (and continued stereotyping of gender roles) could also have the opposite effect.

Women are increasing their productive role but continue to shoulder the burden of labour for household chores (e.g. collecting firewood, searching for water, cooking food, caring for children, washing clothes, and caring for livestock). This puts them at risk of greater health problems, which has a knock-on effect on the lives of children<sup>84</sup>. Men continue to make most household decisions concerning expenditure.

Women continue to face multiple reproductive health risks including anaemia, malnutrition, eclampsia, urinary tract infections and pregnancy/childbirth related risks due to the lack of access to health care and facilities. Maternal mortality is prevalent especially in rural areas and most commonly in nomadic communities – many young women die during the delivery due to lack of medical facilities. Additionally, women do not trust health care system and prefer traditional midwives. In urban areas and especially Mogadishu, violence against women is a growing issue on account of the lack of law enforcement and the reduced clan protection.

Women in polygamous households experienced numerous challenges including difficulties in accessing sufficient resources, inter-household conflict over resources and abandonment (usually of the older wife). An interesting trend reported everywhere (except Garowe) was that the extent of polygamy was decreasing, which correlates to increasing poverty, as fewer households were reported to be able to afford to keep multiple wives. In cases where it is continuing, divorce of the first wife is common. In South Central Somalia it was common for the first wife, or sometimes both wives, to work.

<sup>84</sup> When a mother is sick this may take children out of school for eight days or more

Whilst women in female-headed households in urban areas had opportunity for economic activities, female-headed households in pastoral communities found it more difficult to engage effectively in the livestock-based production systems since men are needed to access clan resources and ensure protection and herding of large livestock assets. Engagement in economic activity can also reduce care for small children or lead to girls being pulled out of school<sup>85</sup>.

**Children:** Children were acknowledged to be among the most vulnerable due to their dependence on others for their basic needs, being disproportionately exposed to health related shocks, and facing difficulties in accessing their rights to education and a childhood. There were particular groups of children who were acknowledged to be more at risk on account of, for example, having lost one or more parents, or children living without their family and dependent on others for support.

Education of children was a primary aspiration of communities in two recent studies<sup>86</sup> and a major barrier to school attendance is the cost associated with schooling, both in terms of the direct costs and opportunity costs to household income derived from child labour. In the last five years, there has been an increase in access to education for girls, as it is generally understood that girls' education is important to the community as well as to the family. However they continue to be more susceptible to being removed from school than boys and in rural areas especially it remains common for girls to enter into early marriage due to limited options. Within the general chronic constraints to accessing education outlined above, the children in agro-pastoral communities were considered to have greater access to education than pastoral communities.

Child labour is commonplace and children also have to undertake household chores such as fetching water and firewood, and rearing small stock. In Puntland child labourers reported that they would be beaten or mistreated and would have their wages stolen.

Besides the common childhood illnesses, children's health especially for those under five was considered to also be contingent on the income of parents, seasonal changes and economic shocks like conflict. A high proportion of children, particularly in Somaliland, were considered to be malnourished on account of poor access to food and poor child care practices since both men and women are out at work. Stunting is a huge problem, and diarrhoea and waterborne diseases are also very common.

Children in South Central Somalia face particular challenges on account of the long-running conflict and insecurity. Child soldiers exist and it was reported that children are being stolen from families in areas under Al Shabaab control and recruited into the militant groups. The conflict has contributed to a high proportion of orphans (4/5 children in one focus group had lost one or more parents). These children are generally in the care of relatives or the surviving parent, however there are also a high number of street children in Mogadishu. These children are vulnerable to a number of social risks including violence and sniffing glue.

**People living with disabilities:** A recent study by CESVI and HANDICAP International on Children with Disabilities in Somaliland indicates that 42% of the survey sample contained at least one family member with a disability. This indicates a high incidence of disability. These people face major constraints to pursuing a quality livelihood. For those with physical disabilities (the number of whom has increased in South Central Somalia on account of the conflict) and/or chronic illnesses, mobility is a huge challenge with a chronic shortage of equipment to support their needs. In rural areas the distance to services and livelihood opportunities presents a critical barrier, whilst in both rural and urban areas there are almost zero facilities equipped for disabled access. In Hargeisa there are no specialized programmes or agencies assisting any of the disabled in the IDP camps. In Mogadishu city there is a school for the blind and the deaf and an organisation focusing on the needs and rights of the disabled, however transportation is not provided.

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<sup>85</sup> This is also a finding of the FSNAU study

<sup>86</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014; SOMREP 2014

People living with disabilities face widespread marginalisation and discrimination. One person described them as being 'invisible' to others. Whilst they are a group identified as most vulnerable and as a priority for assistance in every focus group, the reality is that assistance is generally only forthcoming from relatives rather than the wider community. Disabled children lack access to education on account of the access barriers above and because there is a tendency not to prioritise education for disabled children. The Handicap International Somaliland study indicates that the barriers to education for children with disabilities are much more serious in areas outside of Hargeisa due to a lack of resources, services and access issues. In general, community attitudes towards children with disabilities was considered negative; for example in some towns 80% of respondents believed that children with disabilities should not play with other children, 50% of households considered that children with disabilities cannot contribute to household affairs, and 34% have discriminatory views towards children with disabilities<sup>87</sup>.

Likewise disabled adults cannot easily access employment opportunities, yet with the right technical training or support there is potential for disabled people to access economic opportunities. Although this was highlighted as a priority amongst disabled groups, such support has not been provided to date. An interesting finding was the decision of local authorities in Bosaso to provide the job of managing water access for residents to the disabled, providing an accessible livelihood opportunity for these groups.

Whilst some disabled people do work, many are dependent on relatives or wider society for their survival, however those in rural areas are most neglected. There were many abandoned disabled people in Burco and they had no other option but to take up begging as a way of survival. Disabled people in Mogadishu commented that they have better lives because they are able to seek out assistance from strangers by begging. Some disabled people have received a Zakat, but the Zakat is given once a year and doesn't fit their constant need for help.

**Elderly:** Older people were acknowledged to be highly vulnerable to falling into poverty. Age increases susceptibility to small yet debilitating shocks such as age-related and chronic illnesses, and the growing frailty of older people reduces their ability to work, which can throw households into poverty. Older men who marry late or for a second time may have young children that they still must provide for. This increases the vulnerability for these children, as well as increasing the chances that these wives become early widows. With no formal support or specialised services, and with many living in chronic poverty, older people were forced to continue to look for what work they can do and there were examples of elderly people doing physically demanding manual labour. Older people who cannot work any more then become dependent on others in the household or community for their basic needs. In the event of food shortages, it was acknowledged that the elderly are the most affected. Similarly the elderly in South Central Somalia find it difficult to deal with conflict when populations are displaced. Older women in particular were considered most vulnerable since they have a lower status than men in the community and are often not economically independent. Despite this, older people were respected in the communities and not discriminated against.

***Other vulnerable groups:***

**Youth:** Unemployment was repeatedly mentioned as a major problem affecting the youth in all communities. This is contributing to mass migration of young people, which can lead to different vulnerabilities in urban areas where they lack services and where young women can be exposed to violence. There was a lack of hope expressed by young people interviewed, especially when they see well educated people returning to their area having been unable to find work<sup>88</sup>. What is more, the youth are unable to participate in the political process due to age discrimination. There is the concern that such disaffected youth could cause future conflict in the region.

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<sup>87</sup> Handicap International study in 2013

<sup>88</sup> In Burco all young males had been to school and two young people interviewed had been to university, however they still lack access to opportunities.

Generally, vulnerability was seen by communities to correlate closely with a person's ability to work, and people with jobs or livestock were considered the least vulnerable. This is interesting from the perspective of youth; whilst communities voiced the many issues facing youth with unemployment, at the same time they are seen as having the capacity to work and so are not considered 'vulnerable' in the same way as other groups. They thus cannot access informal social protection as easily.

**Clan:** There are two distinct forms of discrimination along clan lines: one concerns the discrimination of historically marginalised groups such as the Gabooye<sup>89</sup> in Somaliland and Jareerweyn (Somali Bantu) in South Central Somalia and Puntland, and the other form of discrimination, especially in South Central Somalia, concerns clans that are a minority in a particular geographic location.

The political situation in Somaliland is changing and is headed in the right direction, as far as the Gabooye people are concerned<sup>90</sup>. However unfortunately nothing has changed in clan relations between the Gabooye and other clans, and as one respondent said, "we are still looked down upon by the majority clans". Another emerging social problem in Hargeisa was the 'ghettoising' of their neighbourhood, which has no law enforcement services, leading to high rates of crime and exposure of young people to illegal drugs. This is considered to have increased the number of school dropouts (particularly amongst boys), and also the prevalence of mental and physical illnesses. Again within this group, the disabled, children and elderly are the most vulnerable groups in Gabooye Society.

Certain Gabooye livelihoods are relatively insulated from climatic shocks since they enjoy a monopoly on certain trades that are not related to climatic factors including blacksmithing, barbershops and shoe making. However, they are still exposed to inflation of commodities and in a bad drought they would be affected by reduced purchasing power of the community.

The Rahenweyne meanwhile are a majority clan in Somalia however on account of migration and displacement they are a minority clan in Mogadishu. They are, generally speaking, confined to the IDP camps whereas the urban poor from the majority clans in Mogadishu live in urban areas. Whilst not politically marginalised, they are isolated from decision-making concerning resources in camps and lack the social networks to access better conditions. It is difficult to integrate them into the city and they suffer discrimination in accessing housing, services and employment opportunities and loans.

**Livelihood:** Of the four principle livelihood strategies within Somalia<sup>91</sup>, it is not possible to say concretely that one livelihood group will always be more or less vulnerable than another. Each particular livelihood can be heterogeneous<sup>92</sup>, whilst vulnerability of a particular livelihood to shock or ability to cope is intimately linked to other contextual factors. It is also often the case that a household undertakes a variety of livelihood activities, especially during different seasons. However, based on the findings of community meetings and wider studies<sup>93</sup> some general statements on vulnerability of particular livelihood strategies can be made:

- There is high vulnerability to shock in all of the livelihood systems.
- Rural areas generally suffer from reduced physical access to services, whereas in urban areas the cost of living and dependence on the market for basic needs increases the financial barriers to accessing such necessities. In IDP areas, the availability of services continues to present a challenge.
- Incomes in rural areas are largely seasonal, with many poorer households relying on casual labour to supplement their income. Therefore, there is more seasonal variation in food security and peaks of

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<sup>89</sup> A number of small marginal clans in Somaliland are concentrated in particular areas and all come under the umbrella of Gabooye and in Puntland, these clans still exist as separate dispersed groups. They were considered to be perhaps less visible and therefore less prone to day-to-day discrimination, however they still cannot marry into other clans.

<sup>90</sup> The Gabooye are now represented in the political sphere.

<sup>91</sup> Pastoralism, Agro-pastoralism, Riverine and Urban

<sup>92</sup> For example in the case of pastoralists much will depend on herd size, and stock

<sup>93</sup> UN 2014; FSNAU 2012

acute need in rural areas. Urban livelihoods are less directly dependent on the climate however the rural-urban linkages are such that they continue to have some seasonal impacts.

- In urban areas there is high heterogeneity between IDP areas and especially those more recently established settlements. Settlements far from the city are considered more vulnerable on account of lack of social networks or employment opportunities.
- Historically nomadic households were considered some of the most wealthy and resilient since they had large herds, could migrate at times of water scarcity and had plentiful food products and social support structures. Pastoral areas suffered less in the 2011 famine from food deprivation and had less negative coping than farmers with similar characteristics and conditions. Vulnerability of pastoralist communities has been exacerbated by the increasing frequency of environmental shocks, remoteness and marginalisation of communities and curtailments to nomadism. Whilst pastoralism continues to be the dominant livelihood, for communities where herd depletion has occurred and grazing areas have diminished, this has seriously undermined the economic stability and coping strategies of pastoralist households especially in the Northwest. Dependence on livestock for nutrition means shocks affecting livestock also tend to have a rapid and acute impact on nutrition (though recovery is also rapid). They are generally farther from services so can experience greater health problems. Pastoral households also face greater barriers (e.g. economic, skill-related and cultural) to diversifying livelihoods than agricultural or urban households. There is a tendency to destock only as a last resort, contributing to increasing and permanent urban drift since their traditional way of life cannot be recovered.
- Farming livelihoods are dependent on climate and are being affected by both water scarcity and heavy rainfall and flooding, contributing to erosion of the productive capacity of land, reduced harvests and even loss of livelihood. Being sedentary, they can be considered more vulnerable than pastoralists to such covariate shocks like drought and conflict since they must leave their assets behind. On the other hand skills are potentially more directly transferable to urban employment and households were considered to be 'reactive' to early warning signs of water scarcity than pastoral households who do not destock until the last moment. IDP households from agricultural backgrounds are more likely to be able to retain links with their traditional livelihood and to consider returning to this in the future<sup>94</sup>. Nutrition is generally chronically poor on account of poor diet and sanitation.
- Agro-pastoral households are diverse by nature but both livelihood strategies are potentially equally vulnerable to climatic shocks. As they are sedentary, they are particularly vulnerable to conflict. Diets can be considered to be more diverse than either of the above.
- In rural areas some of the most vulnerable were considered to be households without livestock who have 'dropped out' of their livelihood, and in urban areas it included recent IDPs without social networks or family ties. They called them "dadka jilicsan" and they are defined as the poor people that have no livestock, agriculture or business activity.

These risks and vulnerabilities are summarised in Table 3.5b. This illustrates that most of these vulnerabilities would chart onto a life cycle approach, clearly showing the potential for compounding vulnerabilities through the life course; whilst many of the disability and clan-related vulnerabilities related to lack of access to work opportunities.

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<sup>94</sup> However this will depend on the length of time households have been displaced.

**Table 3.5b Summary of the risks and vulnerabilities facing the vulnerable groups identified by communities**

Children	Elderly	Disabled <sup>95</sup>	Gabooye	Women	Youth
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chronic and also seasonally acute malnutrition.</li> <li>• Many economic barriers to education; and cultural barriers for girls</li> <li>• In rainy season agro-pastoral children pulled out of school to assist with livelihoods; herd migration affects pastoral children. Children are falling behind at school.</li> <li>• Burden of labour to assist with household chores – getting water is a big task; including in the middle of the day and during the night.</li> <li>• Manual labour from 8-10 years old; injuries from carrying heavy loads.</li> <li>• Access to food.</li> <li>• Children pulled out of school if no meals for the household.</li> <li>• Cannot afford books/uniforms.</li> <li>• Distance to school.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing health problems and difficulty accessing health services.</li> <li>• Frailty/weakness.</li> <li>• Non-communicable diseases.</li> <li>• Poor nutrition.</li> <li>• Lack of mobility and difficulty with transport especially in rural areas.</li> <li>• May still have dependents especially if married when older - forced to continue to struggle to earn a living despite frailty.</li> <li>• Dependence on others (family or community) for livelihood and care; resort to begging especially those without children.</li> <li>• Lack of decision-making power in community (women).</li> <li>• Reduced decision-making power in the household (men) versus increased power for women<sup>96</sup>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everyone including NGOs overlooks them, widespread social discrimination – ‘almost invisible’.</li> <li>• Marginalisation in terms of access to job opportunities and education.</li> <li>• Mobility challenges and lack of disabled access restricts access to services.</li> <li>• Barrier to marriage and thus children, which provide a safety net in old age, especially for women.</li> <li>• Lack of social rights.</li> <li>• Those who can start a business, others exist through relative support and neighbours.</li> <li>• Blind children are kept at home.</li> <li>• No say whatsoever in household decision-making.</li> <li>• The same challenges exist in urban and rural areas however the extent is more in rural.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members of Gabooye clans are socially marginalised in many ways.</li> <li>• Lack of opportunities and discrimination for formal employment; marriage; social interaction.</li> <li>• Cannot integrate with others.</li> <li>• Risk of abuse of drugs, which are sold in their district.</li> <li>• Live in a ‘ghetto’ area with high crime rates and lack of services or security.</li> <li>• More female-headed households, who have less options for marriage.</li> <li>• Discrimination in school leading to high dropout.</li> <li>• Economically perhaps livelihoods are less vulnerable as they learn particular semi-skilled trades which are ring-fenced for them and which are not exposed to climatic variance (e.g. barbers; shoemaking; metal work; women FGM<sup>97</sup>) as well as daily wage labour.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Burden of labour is growing – economic activities but also household activities including care for children, cooking and fetching wood. Leads to weakness, poor health and injuries.</li> <li>• Pregnant women expected to work.</li> <li>• Widows and female-headed households in rural areas are dependent on family and social networks - dumal very common in rural areas - a survival strategy; no choice</li> <li>• Many female-headed households in urban areas - divorce more common in urban areas – partly due to family breakdown but also women are economically more independent</li> <li>• Reproductive health problems and difficulty in getting to medical services</li> <li>• Challenge of ensuring health and education of children</li> <li>• Child illness and mortality</li> <li>• High maternal mortality; anaemia; malnutrition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Youth more likely to migrate and take more risks, than adults who already have commitments.</li> <li>• Lack of hope – poor or no schooling followed by no employment or livelihood opportunities or prospects.</li> <li>• Unemployment, and ‘Underemployment’ in traditional livelihoods - families in rural areas supporting the young men, as they do not have camels.</li> <li>• Contributing to Khat uptake in young men.</li> <li>• Lack of capital to start businesses.</li> <li>• School is not valued as they have not seen others benefit from it; unemployment is high.</li> <li>• Cannot access community social assistance – not seen as in need.</li> <li>• Cases of teen pregnancy in urban areas.</li> </ul>

<sup>95</sup> Includes physical and mental disability some of which are relating to the conflict (primarily older people), as well as blindness; chronic conditions and arthritis

<sup>96</sup> This is because in the HH there is an age difference so the woman is younger than the man so takes on more power as they get older

<sup>97</sup> FGM – all Gabooye women are trained in the practice but it is mostly older women who do it, for economic reasons



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural barriers to girls education (in Geitaly no girls in school; sat at the back; cannot eat lunch with boys).</li> <li>• Girls drop out aged 13-14 to get married.</li> <li>• No voice or decision-making; they do what parents tell them.</li> <li>• Those sent away to relatives may enjoy life less, work as domestic servants and miss their family.</li> <li>• Lack of girl-friendly facilities and female teachers.</li> <li>• Girl children pulled out of school to assist with housework and siblings.</li> <li>• No secondary school in rural areas and lack of financial access in urban areas.</li> <li>• Urban children pulled out of school to work in paid jobs.</li> <li>• Female genital cutting is still hugely prevalent though officially illegal.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emotional distress of children migrating away.</li> <li>• Caregivers for children of extended families who cannot afford to keep them (pastoral).</li> <li>• Same in urban and rural, though those in rural areas face greater constraints.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beginning to get more voice and also political representation so increased quotas for the education and employment sectors. They have politicians and groups representing them.</li> <li>• Clans that are a minority geographically are not socially excluded (marriage; jobs) but excluded from local political decision-making and access to resources.</li> <li>• Nepotism is seen in which local NGOs get contracts; and who the NGO then supports (their own kind).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalised from household decision-making on expenditure especially in rural areas - unless husband is elderly or female-headed households.</li> <li>• Lack of literacy and poor education.</li> <li>• Early marriage</li> <li>• Female-headed households in pastoral areas lack opportunity to move to better pasture</li> <li>• Rate of polygamy in study areas was reducing as only the wealthy can afford it</li> <li>• Where it happens – insufficient resources and rivalry for resources; divorce and abandonment of the older wife is common especially in urban areas; insufficient resources; children become rivals.</li> <li>• Urban IDP camps women attacked – the social network isn't there.</li> <li>• Khat epidemic is reducing economic support of men for the household and increasing the burden of labour on women.</li> </ul>	
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#### **MAPPING VULNERABILITY: KEY CONCLUSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK**

- Given the high and chronic levels of poverty, exposure of large portions of the population to recurrent and cyclical shocks such as droughts and floods, seasonal and chronic shortages of water, food and employment as well as prolonged periods of stress due to conflict, the erosion of people's capacities to cope through traditional means and the vulnerability of large parts of the population to particular life cycle risks, there is a strong rationale for establishing some kind of formal, long-term and predictable social protection in Somalia. This would address chronic poverty and vulnerability, but also be 'topped up' in the event of a crisis.
- There is a need to address both lifecycle and covariate shocks and to consider the linkages between these as well as to address compounding vulnerabilities.
- There is a need to include programmes that address both the needs of urban and rural areas and to ensure that programmes do not contribute to continued urban drift, whilst addressing the needs of those 'left behind' in villages or informal settlements or homesteads when able bodied members out migrate.
- Whilst the nature of covariate risks can vary between Zones and between livelihood groups, the idiosyncratic risks are common to all and consistency in programming across Zones could be feasible – though taking into account that some risks are likely to be greater in rural areas where service access is reduced.
- Social protection cannot do everything. It cannot address all the risk factors above, or the structural causes of vulnerability, however it is an essential component but many other things are needed to address the immediate and underlying causes of vulnerability.
- There is a need to address the needs of those who cannot work in addition to those who have labour capacity but still face a number of risks.
- Social protection systems must seek to address the social as well as economic vulnerabilities (e.g. assets and income; social networks and marginalisation). This includes being aware of the inequalities in society and the marginalisation, lack of autonomy and burden of labour of particular groups and as a minimum should do no harm.
- Communities understand vulnerability as it relates to particular and clearly identifiable groups in the population, rather than by poverty since such a large percentage of the community can be considered poor. This is a lesson for targeting.
- At the same time it is important not to by-pass the needs of young people who have labour capacity but suffer from chronic lack of opportunity – particularly given the risk that disaffected youth can be recruited by armed groups and contribute to future insecurity.
- Social protection interventions that support positive coping or access to positive coping (e.g. improvements to the creditworthiness of marginalised groups) should be investigated.

## 4. MAPPING SOCIAL PROTECTION

*“fari kaqodna faanoole”*  
*“Fanoole is yet to start” - indicating that the support that they getting now is a drop in the ocean*

### 4.1 Formal Social Protection

Through key informant interviews (KII) with government and development partners at national level and an analysis of the wider literature review, the study reviewed the availability of social protection or safety net programmes and schemes implemented by the authorities and by development partners. Through community-based research the team also considered any relevant interventions of agencies and NGOs within the study locations. It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive study of all existing interventions across the country. Whilst certain schemes provided by development partners, NGOs or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) may have therefore been missed out, the evidence clearly shows a picture of the huge gaps in social protection. The system that exists now is grossly inadequate to address the needs identified in Section Three.

Besides some extremely limited and fairly ad hoc government support for small numbers of vulnerable and/or destitute people, the bulk of assistance identified is provided through UN agency and NGO projects and is therefore unsustainable. The coverage of these interventions is extremely low compared to the level of need and in general, the communities included in this study were not benefiting from them. There is very little long-term and predictable support focusing on the chronically vulnerable. The majority retain a humanitarian focus of consumption support rather than wider livelihoods support. Some programmes are seeking to go beyond this but are still transitioning to a developmental approach. Nevertheless there are best practices to build upon in developing a social protection framework.

#### 4.1.1 State-provided social assistance and social insurance

Government-supported social protection remains practically non-existent in Somalia.

**Social insurance:** Even formal and public sector workers lack access to such systems. The authorities in Somaliland have plans to introduce a pension for civil servants and this is likely to be something supported by DFID and World Bank as part of their work on civil service reform and public financial management. In terms of health insurance there is not yet any mechanism for accreditation for health facilities (which is important in the process of setting up health insurance schemes), nor is there a regulatory and quality assurance mechanism for private clinics. These are all issues that the Ministry in Puntland would like to work on in the future.

**Access to services:** In Somaliland the government and UNICEF are working to increase the supply and demand for basic services. The recent introduction of policies for universal access to primary education and abolition of fees for primary health care for mothers and children can be considered a starting point.

The central government budget envelope for health increased by 248% for the period of 2010 to 2014, resulting in a proportionate increase of health sector allocations during the same period by 393%. The increase is partly used to fund additional health workers as well as a 100% salary increase for the Ministry staff. Somaliland also developed a Health Sector Strategic Plan (2013-2016) with six broad strategies. UNICEF and other health partners support the government to run 105 health centres (MCHs) in Somaliland which provides well-baby clinics, immunisations, child and maternal nutrition screenings, and delivery, antenatal and postnatal care services. In addition, there are 160 health posts that provide treatment of common diseases and preventive and promotive health care services. Finally, the Essential Package for Health Services (EPHS) led by UNICEF and the government was rolled out in four (of a possible six) regions of Somaliland. The EPHS provides support in the improvement and expansion of health care services.

The Government of Somaliland has increased education budget allocations considerably from \$2,268,824.12 in 2010 to \$11,761,049.07 in 2014. The increased funding is partly used to cover the additional expenses from the abolishment of school fees in 2011, as well as for recruitment of 1460 additional teachers and salary increases for the Ministry staff. Therefore, there have been considerable efforts to support the supply side. However on-going supply side issues remain, including the distance to school, teaching infrastructure and supplies, and the lack of qualified teachers, which limits the effectiveness of this policy. Under their education programme UNICEF very recently began activities to complement this government policy through support to teacher training and provision of top-ups to teachers' salaries. Another barrier is the hidden costs to education, for which parents continue to foot the bill. Services for children with disabilities are extremely limited. Through the collective support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Somaliland government there is a programme supporting deaf people to access education in Burco.

In Puntland the Ministry of Education in its draft policy is committed to the principle of universal provision of education, which states the government has the responsibility to ensure universal access to primary education. However most schools are privately owned. The constitution of Puntland provides for the right to health for all. The Ministry is currently working on a right to healthcare policy, which states that everyone has the right to access free primary healthcare services. Consultations on the right to health have just begun. This envisions free primary health care services for all. At the moment there are only exceptions/waivers for certain groups e.g. pregnant mothers and children under five. There are almost no services or facilities for the disabled.

**Social Transfers:** In Somaliland under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA), there is some state-provided support to ex-military who are living with disabilities, but this is not a well-defined or coordinated programme.

In Puntland the PASWE operates a small-scale cash transfer for households with orphans and vulnerable children (OVC)<sup>98</sup>. The coverage of this programme is very low and transfers are not provided regularly. The programme has an annual budget of \$36,000 and is reaching 1200 families.

The gender unit of the Ministry of Education in Puntland has been focusing on retention and completion specifically for vulnerable girls. The unit has a scholarship programme for most vulnerable girls where it not only provides fees but also scholastic materials, breakfast in school and transport to and from school. This programme is in its fourth year and was supported by the EU. The coverage is very low and only 186 girls benefit. The programme will enter its second phase this year with support from the Girls' Education Challenge, reaching 2000 families.

Other government-supported initiatives are ad hoc, very small scale and lack regularity or predictability. Those identified include:

- **Mogadishu:** MLSA has an ad hoc food distribution programme for people living with disabilities.
- **Hargeisa:** MLSA provides ad hoc support to the destitute and urban poor.
- **Hargeisa:** MLSA recently supported a programme that distributed small grants for income generation activities, targeting young people in the urban centre, however the programme is no longer in operation. It was not clear who were targeted or why. The Ministry submitted a proposal to the National Development Committee for a similar programme but it was not put forward for funding.

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<sup>98</sup> Defined as any child whose mother and/or father have died and/or are currently at high risk of lacking adequate care and protection (PASWE 2013)

#### 4.1.2 Programmes of development partners

**Conditional Transfers:** The main type of social assistance currently provided through external parties in Somalia is cash and/or food in return for work, and there are a number of initiatives underway in the rural areas. Of particular importance are the cash and food for assets activities of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) that are operating under the UN Joint Resilience Strategy, as well as those activities operating under the NGO resilience consortium, SOMREP. The team did not come across similar initiatives in urban centres.

**Cash for Work:** In the FAO this programme is coming under the Social Safety Nets pillar of the UN Joint Resilience Strategy. The programme has a dual objective of ensuring food security of vulnerable households through access to temporary paid employment opportunities, whilst also rehabilitating infrastructure in order to improve communities' wider resilience to climatic shocks, in particular water scarcity. To date this has involved low skilled rehabilitation of four simple infrastructures related to water catchment and irrigation in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas.

Phase One began as a response to the 2011 famine and continued through recovery, operating each year in the two dry seasons. Households received \$120 per fortnight for approximately three months. In the early phases, the FAO had capacity to implement around USD \$7-8million of transfers per season and it has reached 220,000 rural households over the 2.5 years, across all Zones. The headlines of the recent independent evaluation of the FAO programme are highlighted in Box 4.1.2a.

Overall it can be considered that the programme could provide a fairly solid foundation on which to build a safety net function. However going forward the evaluators had various recommendations:

- A programme based on the condition of work needs to provide parallel support for households who are vulnerable but who cannot fulfil this condition<sup>99</sup>.
- A safety net programme needs to identify the right geographical areas and ensure that targeting is based on need rather than clan, which requires an agency presence to oversee the process.
- The 'work' component needs some further thought if the objective is to increase future resilience to shock rather than just create short-term employment. Some of the assets that would be most useful and most sustainable are likely to require investment in skills and machinery. It was considered that more thought needs to be given to what the FAO want to achieve from the public works and whether all objectives can be met in one programme. At the present time the programme is a mixture of a safety net for the vulnerable, as well as being a productive programme creating assets and employment. It can be difficult to meet both objectives in one programme. The evaluator also felt that the instrument (cash for work) had been pre-determined and mandate-driven rather than needs driven.
- The approach would benefit from a more in-depth understanding of livelihoods and vulnerability.

**Box 4.1.2a The Main Findings from an Independent Evaluation of the FAO Cash for Work Programme**

- Successful in terms of temporary, short-term consumption smoothing among recipients.
- The cash element of the programme has potential to improve household resilience to future shocks to a certain extent, through investment in productive assets such as livestock.

<sup>99</sup> The plan of UNICEF and FAO from 2014 onwards is to pilot an unconditional transfer (administered by UNICEF) in the same geographic area as the FAO cash for work programme, under the Joint Resilience Strategy.

- The work component is providing employment to beneficiary households at a time when traditional livelihoods face seasonal downturn and where there is a chronic lack of alternative livelihood opportunities.
- The work component did not encroach too much on day-to-day livelihood activities and households were free to send different household members to carry out the work on different days. Some teenage workers were observed – it was not possible to tell if the work condition is taking children away from school.
- Whilst in general it was not the better off who were working, given that beneficiaries need to be able-bodied it was found that arguably the most vulnerable households that lack labour capacity are missing out. In some cases it was difficult to engage women and female-headed households since communities considered this inappropriate activity.
- Lack of access and entrenched cultural norms along clan lines meant powerful local interests were able to manipulate targeting and led to resource allocation based on clan affiliation and also meant resources were not being directed towards the most vulnerable areas. At the level of the sub-clan, resources were considered to be targeted appropriately according to the criteria for vulnerability.
- No great issues with diversion were highlighted though there were examples of soldiers and government officials claiming a "management fee". It was thought that this may be because the transfers were understood as wages, rather than external assistance. It is also likely that the areas targeted contributed to this difference to some degree (the programme made a decision not to engage in riverine areas and areas under militant control).
- The management control and oversight procedures put in place including call centres and satellite imagery were credited with ensuring a high degree of accountability.
- Community pressure to share resources meant that different households were supported in each season, which can prevent a household falling (further) into poverty but is not sufficient to address the underlying chronic problems that households are facing.
- Evidence suggests that the quality of the infrastructure being constructed was of poor quality and not well thought out. For example, communities said that water catchments and tertiary canals would wash away in the rains, weeds cleared from the road would grow back quickly, and that focusing on tertiary canals is not the solution when the bottleneck for irrigation is primary canals. This places a big question mark on the quality and durability of the infrastructures and potential of the work component to achieve the second objective of reducing community vulnerability to climatic shocks.

A time-bound project providing support for a single dry season is addressing the immediate issue of underemployment but not the underlying factors contributing to livelihood vulnerability. Now the programme is seeking to transform into a more long-term seasonal 'safety net'. Going forward the FAO aims to register the same households for multiple seasons, with the intention of providing more surety to households and addressing some of the more chronic problems. The plan for the coming dry season in 2014 is to implement \$9million, excluding implementation costs.

A cash transfer over a longer period could allow households to make investments in their future in order to reduce their vulnerability. This depends on the starting condition of the households and a design of the programme based on a firm understanding of livelihoods and vulnerability.

The programme is implemented under significant operational constraints, largely relating to security, which inhibit adequate contextual analysis, programme design adaption to suit local needs, as well as on-going management and monitoring activities. This results in major unknowns regarding programme performance in key areas relating to targeting, participation, implementation, quality and selection of

assets, and distribution of asset impacts<sup>100</sup>. Appraisal of the experience of the programme to date<sup>101</sup>, suggests that social protection programming would potentially be an appropriate response to the objective of supporting poor populations and enhancing food security. However it is not clear that PWP is the most appropriate instrument to meet identified needs in a timely, efficient and effective manner. It is not possible to comment on the cost effectiveness of such an approach, given the absence of i) targeting or outcome data, or ii) cost data (FAO, 2014), but this is an area for further consideration.

It is not clear whether the necessary preconditions for PWP programming, as set out in the FAO guidelines<sup>102</sup>, currently prevail, in terms of functioning markets, non-interference with existing livelihoods, the creation of assets which meet basic needs of the targeted population and the need to avoid potential conflict.

**Food for Work:** A similar approach is seen in the 'Food for Assets' programme of the WFP. This falls under the productive assets pillar of the UN Joint Resilience Strategy but as with the FAO it has the dual objective of creating community assets to enhance resilience to climatic shock whilst also preventing vulnerable households falling (further) into poverty.

The theory of change of the WFP programme remains rather unclear. The strategy cited by stakeholders in the WFP regional office was to support households during the lean seasons with temporary food assistance so that households did not need to sell their livestock. However from discussions with the programme managers in Somaliland it seems that beneficiaries were enrolled for 15 months and that assistance was provided throughout this period. Either type of approach has the potential to reduce household vulnerability but the way in which this happens and the longevity of the outcomes will of course be different.

The value of the assistance provided (even in good months) is 100% of the family food basket and does not differentiate by household size. This seems excessive given that it is not an emergency programme at a time of acute need and that these households do have other livelihood strategies.

The rationale for improving resilience is that the livestock holding of the household will be protected and will have increased by 30% by the end of the enrolment. Dwindling herd size is certainly a major challenge facing pastoral households in the North. The extent, to which an increase in herd size of 30% will improve longer-term resilience, will depend on the starting size of herds of beneficiaries. For the households most in need and close to dropping out of pastoralism, with only 8-10 shoats (sheep and goats) per household, this is unlikely to be sufficient.

Whilst there was no evaluation available of the Food for Work programme, the infrastructure being created is very similar and the skill level of beneficiaries is the same as those enrolled on the FAO programme. Therefore it is possible to infer there may be similar problems with the durability and contribution to climatic resilience of the work outputs.

***Other examples of public works programmes include:***

- **Somali Community Relief and Economic Support project:** This is funded by USAID and implemented by African Development Solutions (ADESO) in Sanaag and Mudug regions. It is a livelihood recovery project that includes cash for work, provision of agricultural inputs and rehabilitation of water facilities.

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<sup>100</sup> FAO 2014

<sup>101</sup> FAO 2013; FAO 2014; Kardan et al 2014

<sup>102</sup> FAO 2013

- **Natural resource management support programme:** This is funded by the EU and implemented by ADESO. It is directly linked to people's livelihoods for both pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. It includes a cash-for-work component though this is short-term. The programme looks into the provision of alternative livelihoods through skills development and provision of grants. It is linked to the ADESO/Save the Children social safety net programme, which is mentioned below.
- **Food for Peace:** World Vision is implementing a USAID 'Food for Peace' programme as a small component of its work within the SOMREP consortium. In the consortium, there is approximately \$5million allocated for food assistance.

**Alternatives to 'public works':** It is still not entirely clear how the employment creation component of these public works programmes will address underlying causes of vulnerability, for example the constraints to traditional livelihoods and lack of sustainable economic strategies. As a result, commentators cited the need to think outside of the box with regards to alternative options. So far no programme or strategy was seen that could support the economically active in a way other than public works. This includes investing time in their own livelihood strategy to make it more productive or resilient to shock, or building skills/links to longer-term livelihood opportunities that reduce the underlying vulnerability<sup>103</sup>.

Concern Worldwide is planning to embark on a pilot programme in Hargeisa, which will take a different approach to providing conditional social assistance to the poor of working age. This takes the BRAC approach to 'graduation' and will provide regular and predictable income support for a time-bound period, which will be linked to investments in training, financial management, psycho-social support and one-off grants for investing in income generating activities.

**School Feeding:** Of those social assistance programmes being implemented by development partners, the WFP school feeding programme is the most widespread and established. WFP began this operation in 2003 and now operates school feeding in over 20% of primary schools across the country. In the North at least, this is in partnership with the Ministry of Education. The programme aims to provide meals to all children as well as a take home ration on a monthly basis (a can of oil) as an incentive to families to keep girls in school. The food is procured outside of Somalia. Cooks are sourced from the community and paid in kind. This is in partnership with the Ministry of Education<sup>104</sup>, and expansion of the programme is in the National Development Strategy of Somaliland.

WFP considered that this programme has improved school attendance<sup>105</sup>, however there is no data to substantiate whether the programme has impacted on education outcomes. WFP were unable to provide information concerning the annual budget for the programme, but commented that the programme can be expensive to implement due to the transportation costs involved in food procurement.

In the study locations visited, school feeding is implemented in one district in Somaliland (Odweyne) and one district in Puntland (Garowe). Interviews identified two issues with the school-feeding programme:

1. Communities in Somaliland faced with chronic water shortages discussed the challenges of implementing the programme. It can be impossible for the schools to cook the food provided given the water shortages and at the time of visiting the food sat unused in the store. Teachers explained they are pulled out of teaching time to try to manage solutions to the water issue.

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<sup>103</sup> The ADESO/Save the Children programme was doing this to a limited degree, however there was no crossover between those who were provided with income support and those receiving training.

<sup>104</sup> Interview WFP Somaliland

<sup>105</sup> No reports were provided to the consultants by the time of writing



Children also need to collect water for their families during the lunch hour and this can mean they miss out on the meals.

2. In Odweyne there were cultural barriers to girl children eating with boys. Girl children were not given a school meal but rather were given their ration to take home.

Whilst these could be isolated cases and cannot be extrapolated to the programme as a whole, it highlights possible challenges to be aware of with the programme design in this context and the importance of monitoring and oversight.

**Unconditional transfers:**

**The Cash Voucher Monitoring Group in South Central Somalia:** The first experience of unconditional cash transfers (UCT) at significant scale came during the 2011 famine response and early recovery. Coordinated by UNICEF, international and local NGOs came together to form the Somalia Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG), distributing some \$90million-worth of cash and vouchers to over 1.3million households across nine regions of South Central Somalia. Distribution took place over a period of fourteen months. Whilst no longer in operation the intervention showed that it was feasible to undertake cash transfer programming quickly, and at scale, to achieve humanitarian objectives in the complex environment of Somalia. People interviewed in South Central Somalia who had been enrolled on the programme were very favourable towards it. The programme generated a number of lessons – both positive findings and challenges – to inform future cash programming in the region. These are summarised in Box 4.1.2b.

<b>Box 4.1.2b Findings from the CVMG Evaluations</b>	
<b>Positive findings</b>	<b>Lessons/challenges identified</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Showed that cash and vouchers were feasible in this context</li> <li>• Didn't contribute to market failures, rather it stimulated market response</li> <li>• Scaled up much more rapidly than food aid could have and reached a greater number of people than cash for work</li> <li>• Far cheaper than food aid to deliver (85% of budget on the cash programme transferred to beneficiary v only 35% food)</li> <li>• Positive impacts on household food security and reinforced coping mechanisms (e.g. debt repayment)</li> <li>• Cash could be delivered safely even to beneficiaries located in parts of the country under control of militias</li> <li>• Households could remit funds to relatives in inaccessible and worst affected areas of Bay and Bakool</li> <li>• Private sector played a vital role as delivery partners, reaching households rapidly</li> <li>• Risks of money laundering can be substantially mitigated through careful monitoring</li> <li>• Majority of the presumed risks were not realized in practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Start of the programme was delayed by up to 5 months due to collective failings of UN and donor governments to (a) commit funds based on forecasts, at first signs of crisis (b) prioritise humanitarian need for action over political risk of intervening in this context</li> <li>• Lack of response analysis meant interventions were shaped by each agency's mandates or previous ways of working</li> <li>• Consistent reports of payments being made to local authorities; and systematic taxes in IDP camps in which NGO partners were sometimes implicated</li> <li>• Access challenges and lack of sufficiently robust accountability mechanisms of INGOs, leading to lack of oversight of activities on the ground and cases of diversion, some of which were going undetected</li> <li>• Donors' reaction to cases of potential diversion – despite evidence that far more aid was being diverted in kind<sup>106</sup></li> <li>• Reliance on community based targeting judged to be inappropriate in this context (lack of access meaning no oversight of targeting; clan affiliations of NGO partners; and lack of knowledge of local power</li> </ul>

<sup>106</sup>For example, counter-terrorism regulations of the Office of Foreign Asset Control of US Government.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People preferred cash to food aid and vouchers, including women</li> <li>• Funds provided in the place of origin allowed households to remain in situ of their livelihood, rather than migrate to IDP camps</li> <li>• Women kept control of cash provide to them and was perceived to improve women’s position and voice within the household and community</li> <li>• Women could spend more time on caring for children</li> <li>• Where NGOs built upon pre-existing programmes this led to greater efficiency in time and in cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• dynamics; quick turnaround required), leading to exclusion and inclusion errors</li> <li>• Limitations of nutrition-based targeting method employed in some areas</li> <li>• Lack of re-targeting/ lack of flexibility in value of the transfer despite the change in vulnerability over the duration of the programme and knowledge that some of those in need were being excluded</li> <li>• Didn't reach the most affected areas</li> <li>• Some recipients were threatened with violence</li> <li>• Hawala offices were overwhelmed – long queuing</li> <li>• UNICEF’s financial systems and human resources were not sufficient or flexible for partners to deal with all the requirements of a humanitarian response at this scale</li> </ul>
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The report had the following recommendations that should be borne in mind for the establishment of any safety net programme in South Central Somalia:

- A more open dialogue acknowledging the reality of issues such as ‘taxation’ and how to deal with them.
- The need to consider protection concerns as part of the programme design especially for vulnerable groups.
- Donors’ reaction to the cases of suspected fraud was considered by NGOs and the evaluation team to go against the ethic of risk sharing that was entered into. Donors need to develop a position on risk and agree in advance on ‘appropriate and proportionate response’ for investigating and responding to cases of alleged fraud.
- It is necessary to engage local partners actively based on capacity assessment, and build the capacity and put in place the monitoring and systems to back this up.
- The need to establish and train on accountability mechanisms and controls in the down time before an emergency.
- Building on existing programmes led to greater efficiencies (e.g. time and cost).
- Blanket targeting within a geographical location could have been better than community-based targeting in the first stages of the emergency (i.e. 3-6 months).

There were a couple of on-going UCT programmes of development partners or NGOs identified, details of which are below:

**Puntland - Social Safety Net programme:** This 30 month pilot programme has been funded by the EU and implemented by ADESO and Save the Children International in Sanaag and Karkar regions. The programme has several components, including cash transfers for 1200 vulnerable households (84% women) over 18 months; skills development (for alternative livelihoods and improving pastoral livelihoods, literacy, numeracy) and business grants for an additional 1000 households; and a community fund for the implementation of disaster risk reduction (DRR) priorities and a contingency plan, where each community receives \$15,000 of which \$5000 will fund the contingency plan as part of early action. Action plans are developed based on a risk analysis using the DRR approach and actions taken to date as part of preparedness include rehabilitation of roads, gullies and transit centres. The NGOs aimed to work collaboratively with the Puntland Administration.

The cash grant was \$85 per month and was designed to cover the full Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), however due to inflation it only covers 50%. The evaluation reported that grants contributed to

improving the food security of the household<sup>107</sup>, which is unsurprising given the size of the grant. Other impacts from the cash transfer include repayment of large debts incurred during previous poor seasons which re-established access to credit, as well as enabling beneficiary households to make contributions to informal social assistance (e.g. Zakat and Sadaaqa). Both these impacts can be said to reinforce coping mechanisms and resilience to shock and are reducing the burden of supporting these households felt by the wider community. More children were going to school, and 44 of the 1200 households that received regular cash relief also reported starting new income generating activities.

Selection criteria for the cash grants and livelihoods support components included a variety of both vulnerability (e.g. households chronically without labour capacity and/or with many dependents) and poverty related indicators, and it is not clear how easy it would be to verify these (e.g. number of shoats, size of land, access to remittance). There was no monitoring or evaluation of the livelihoods support component (e.g. lack of evidence of training being put into practice; use of income generating activity; or success of any businesses) so it is not clear how successful the programme was in establishing alternative livelihoods, which would have been interesting to see since households were often suffering from chronic labour shortages.

The programme generated a number of lessons and challenges for a social protection framework to consider:

- Such a programme can act as a safety net for those enrolled, but given the single round of targeting it is not able to catch anyone who is falling into poverty during programme implementation or support new households when a crisis comes.
- This has implications for the size of grants, which are considerably larger than grants provided to a comparable target group on the Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programmes (HSNP). Is it better to cover more people with smaller amounts?
- Inflation reduced the value of assistance, as did the local exchange rate fluctuation against the dollar; both of which need to be considered in the design of a social protection programme.
- It is not yet clear the extent to which a household's underlying situation has improved after 18 months and questions on which people it is possible to 'graduate' off the need for assistance, and how. It may be better for programmes with a plan for 'graduation' to focus on those households or individuals with the appropriate labour capacity.
- It is feasible for such programmes to begin to be linked to government in the North of Somalia but low governance capacity means a good deal of support will be needed.
- It is very difficult to target in a context where it is hard to distinguish between people's level of poverty and vulnerability, when the whole community is exposed to climatic shocks and conflict and when it can be hard for agencies to engage directly with communities for security reasons. The criteria were considered fair and in line with assistance provided through traditional mechanisms.
- It is important to consider how to deal with seasonal needs/gaps and what the appropriate levels of support are to address such problems.

#### **Other cash transfers that were identified:**

- **BRiCS Consortium:** The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRiCS) consortium<sup>108</sup> programme design is multi-sectoral and is aimed at responding to community priorities. The

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<sup>107</sup> This was during the *Gu* season, which is usually the best season of the year. Even so, 25% of households at baseline reported that they had faced food shortage in the previous three months. By November 2011 this figure had decreased to 18%, and continued to decrease until the end of the project. Even in February/March 2012 during the dry (and typically harshest) *Jilaal* season, the numbers had reduced significantly to 10%.

<sup>108</sup>A four year integrated programme that brings together key NGO actors to implement resilient building programmes. The consortium of NGOs was formed last year and comprises NGOs such as NRC, Concern, Save the

programme seeks to address both community and household level vulnerability. So far the consortium has been undertaking the community consultation processes, which were to be finalised by early July 2014. This will then see the implementation of community projects across different sectors. The programme includes a component of safety nets as an early response mechanism but the modality of delivery has not been decided on yet. It may be that this will be revised to allow for these funds to be channelled through the community, which will then decide how they are to be allocated based on the actions included in their contingency plans as part of the early response. The programme seeks to cover 102 villages in 27 districts across 7 regions in Central and Southern Somalia. With this programme, it is apparent that covariate shocks are once again being prioritised.

- **SOMREP Consortium:** The SOMREP resilience consortium has a small fund (couple of hundred thousand dollars) for immediate response, as well as funds to undertake social transfers at the community level within its initial phase. The cash component includes cash for work and cash relief (\$80 per month for 6 months). These are yet to start. It is intended that the response funds can allow communities to take certain actions independent of humanitarian organisations to respond to small-scale emergencies or to take steps to reduce the intensity of the crisis once certain thresholds have been met. This is a small component of the \$54million available over the next four years. Advocacy would therefore be required towards donors to build a larger contingency element into their grants, to allow for flexibility. It was commented that it is likely that there will also be rigidity on the part of the community inhibiting adjustment of agreed-upon activities (e.g. if funds are being allocated to support community preparedness actions) in order to respond to a crisis. Educating communities would therefore also be necessary.
- **DFID cash transfers for health outcomes:** DFID is undertaking a feasibility study to consider the introduction of cash or voucher-based assistance to improve health outcomes for children in Somaliland, which could be conditional or unconditional. However this is still very much at the inception stage and if it progresses to implementation, it is likely to be implemented on a purely small scale and pilot basis and focused on achieving health outcomes as a priority.
- **NGO programmes:** There were reports of small-scale NGO programmes with the objective of supporting investment in livelihoods. This included a programme of cash assistance for relief support to vulnerable households, which was funded by USAID and implemented in Lower Juba, Bay, Bari, Mudug and Sanaag regions by ADESO. The project provides cash transfers to vulnerable households for 18 months combined with livelihood support. Others mentioned were a programme of SOS Children's Village in Hargeisa providing cash grants for enterprise to youth and women, and a similar programme aimed at small business owners in Odweyne run by DRC.

**Food distribution:** Generally, in the context of Somalia markets function well and cash distribution channels have good penetration, meaning that cash can be delivered more effectively than food and without impacting on inflation. Food aid continues to have relevance only in contexts where markets are weak or to protect the food consumption of particular vulnerable groups. Despite this, food distribution is continuing in various areas in Somalia through NGOs, most often in partnership with the WFP. This includes food rations and high-energy biscuits for malnourished children. Whilst it was not possible in

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Children, IRC. The consortium is led by NRC. The strategy of the consortium is to build resilience through a community led approach and involves a long process of community consultations and analysis around risks, hazards, vulnerabilities and measures for addressing them. Communities then prioritise actions to be taken to address the issues identified. These actions will involve a range of sectors for which the various organisations have expertise or capacities. This process is aimed to help beneficiaries take early measures to enable them to better cope with shocks by reducing the intensity and impact of the said shocks.

the time available to go into further detail with agencies delivering food aid, it must be pointed out that a large number of both community respondents and key informants inside government as well as in donor agencies and NGOs, cited a good deal of antipathy and frustration toward the continued provision of food aid in this context. The issues raised repeatedly were that food was provided inappropriately and was depressing local production. Everything was imported and there was no local purchasing of food evident. There were reported cases of seasonal food aid not being distributed by NGOs until the harvest season. Communities also expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and type of food provided by WFP<sup>109</sup>. Food, and high-energy biscuits, were reported by all to end up on the open market, further depressing prices, or given to animals. Limiting inappropriate food aid provision is a priority in the Togdheer regional development plan.

**Access to services:** Programmes that seek to address welfare and complementary services can be crucial in realising the full potential impact from social transfers. In the study locations, there were various reports from communities and leaders of local and international NGOs (INGOs) providing assistance to improve access to services, particularly health related. This included provision of subsidised medicines, healthcare for pregnant women, water subsidies in the first months of arrival of IDPs in one camp in Hargeisa, programmes assisting with children in IDP camps to access school and affordable shelter in IDP camps. In Puntland the Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) led by DRC looks at basic service infrastructure at the community level<sup>110</sup>.

### Lessons from the study locations

- There is a general lack of information regarding performance of the FAO public works programme in key areas, which inhibits informed decision making regarding the suitability of extending the programme as a component of a social protection framework. While there is a need to be pragmatic and accept suboptimal programme implementation in some contexts, there is however a need for systematic monitoring of programme implementation and evaluation, such that programme performance can be credibly assessed, as well as sufficient analysis of the local context to ensure that design is adapted to suit local socio-economic specificities.
- Assistance provided by aid agencies does not have the coverage or consistency relative to the level of need, nor is it well understood by the wider community<sup>111</sup>.
- In some cases, people do not trust the government to provide such assistance and associate it with bribery from government staff and other injustices.
- People, particularly minorities do not trust local NGOs because they consider them to be gatekeepers and to bias distributions along clan lines.
- People repeatedly asked that assistance be provided more directly to them rather than through government or NGO intermediaries, as they were believed to be corrupt. This is indicative of the fear of diversion. In Bossaso the people said that they do not trust any other means of cash transfer than mobile payments.
- Those in urban areas in Puntland commented that poverty targeting and community based targeting approaches created conflict, since those who are the most established, who have the advocacy skills and who 'shout the loudest' get the support.

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<sup>109</sup> This was in contrast to the commodities provided by Turkish aid agencies, which were considered to be locally appropriate.

<sup>110</sup> This also has a social assistance fund to address the demand side for the basic services. It also provides grants to women groups as part of livelihoods development.

<sup>111</sup> In the study locations in Burco and Odweyne (districts for the UN Joint Resilience Strategy) there were no examples of cash for work found. There was knowledge of the existence of food for work in the area but no one interviewed was enrolled and community awareness of the agencies or programme objectives were limited, suggesting coverage in the study locations was low. Assistance in South Central Somalia appears very concentrated in particular geographical locations.

- The general population in South Central Somalia seem to have a good opinion of Arab NGOs and Turkish development organisations because they are considered to implement sustainable development projects. They were also seen to provide more immediate assistance and higher quality foods than WFP.
- Generally the population had greater awareness of and appreciation for the work of UNICEF (considering it ‘tangible support to children’) than other UN agencies, however this could be due to the areas visited in the study since a number in Mogadishu had directly benefited from the cash transfers during the famine response. The population in Mogadishu was also satisfied with the shelter provisions provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
- People were clear on how assistance could support them to improve wellbeing, including through investment in basic needs, investing in health and education of children and investment in livelihood activities. Small businesses were the most common investment mentioned. IDPs from farming areas had aspirations to return to their previous way of life, whilst farmers and agro-pastoralists highlighted investments in land and seeds as well as canal rehabilitation.

## 4.2 ‘Informal Social Protection’ - Sharing and Social Capital

*“lab qaawani isma qaado”*

*Bossaso IDP, meaning “two naked people are not carried on each other” – to express the reduction in communities’ ability to provide mutual assistance*

Extensive literature shows the vital role that social solidarity and reciprocal support based on trust has played in the resilience of Somali households in the face of so many shocks. Somalia has a number of informal community based systems for providing for the most vulnerable at times of need, which is a vital system for this risk prone part of the world. The various types of traditional community assistance are shown in Table 4.1.3. Some are based on reciprocal support between neighbours, others on circulation of animals and other assets.

Of these mechanisms, only Dhortwo was not prevalent and was considered by communities to be something from the past and not commonly today. Some were rural or urban-specific such as Imaraansi and Baaho respectively. There was little variation between Zones. There were several lessons of relevance:

- Social assistance tends to be given along kinship and clan lines meaning those new to the area, minorities and the marginalized can fall through the net. This is particularly true for the Gabooye and Somali Bantu who receive little in the way of support from other clans. This includes Zakaatul Maal<sup>112</sup>, which although officially should be distributed through the mosque, in reality is given on individual grounds and at the individual’s discretion. It was acknowledged to put family first, followed by the needs of disabled, orphans and the elderly. There is no accountability or an overseeing authority that controls whether those who should be paying it to the poor are doing so<sup>113</sup>. In the majority of communities and KIIs it was reported that many of those in need do not benefit from Zakaatul Mal.
- Urban areas were seen to be more individualist, with more heterogeneity and reduced family ties and commensurate reduction in the extent of informal support. However there remained examples of strong social support, with the system of Baaho that the research team had not heard of before operating in IDP settlements. This depended on the length of time that settlements had been in existence and thus the strength of social bonds. For example in the well-established Stadium camp in Hargeisa a council had been set up to formally distribute assistance, every month.

<sup>112</sup> The form of Zakat based on individual giving to another individual, as opposed to Zakatul Fitr which is the public food distribution to mark the end of Ramadan given to all the poor.

<sup>113</sup> In Al Shabaab controlled areas the Zakat is taken from people by force and distributed by their own choice.

- Youth and working aged men cannot access community mechanisms. The definition of ‘working age’ is very flexible, such that if an elderly man continues to work he is unlikely to be considered in need of community assistance.
- There was general agreement from communities that systems are becoming overwhelmed and the current level of assistance is insufficient to prevent asset depletion and poverty. This corresponds with findings of other recent research<sup>114</sup>. Many women in the IDP camps said that previously they used to ‘help each other with open hands’, but now every single person has had a crisis/shock. Similar things were found in pastoral communities.
- Whilst it is generally considered to support the poor and vulnerable (as per the categories of vulnerability seen in Section Three<sup>115</sup>) it is also not predictable and regular enough to meet the needs of those who are chronically poor or vulnerable.
- Dumat (known as Levirate elsewhere) and Xigsilsan were seen in rural communities and were viewed by communities as a social assistance mechanism to deal with loss of a breadwinner or caregiver. The practice of marrying a person close to the lost husband or wife (the brother or sister of the deceased) was considered the best option for the children of the deceased since these people would be more likely to be known to and wish to support the children. Whilst not compulsory for women to submit to Dumat, it was also acknowledged that it was a strategy for survival in rural areas and it is uncommon or indeed prohibited for women to marry outside of the clan. Indeed it was considered shameful if the woman does not get offered Dumat. While these practices do, of course, address particular life-cycle shocks, they raise many issues regarding gender relations and power dynamics and would not be recommended as a foundation for formal social protection. Cases were not seen in urban areas (where female headed households were far more prevalent), suggesting that where women had the opportunity for economic independence this was preferable.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Type</b>
<b>Zakat</b>	Religious obligation: every adult and able Muslim whose wealth exceeds a certain threshold (equivalent to 85g of gold) for a specific period of the year is to pay a mandatory contribution to eight categories including the poor and needy, those who are indebted and unable to pay their debt and wayfarers who do not have anyone to support them.	Compulsory in Islam
<b>Sadaqah</b>	Voluntary charity	Encouraged
<b>Quaraan</b>	Community donations: wealthier households provide money into a pooled fund that is shared between poor households in the community. Also when business people save money for times when large sums of money are needed to deal with a community problem, such as arrests, deaths or health emergencies.	Customary Commitment
<b>Irmaansi</b>	Sharing of milk (rural areas only): poor households request assistance from wealthier households who are not their relatives or friends. They receive a loan of a milking animal and use the milk. They then return the animal to the owner.	
<b>Dhowrto / Xersi</b>	Sharing of milk (rural areas): surplus milk and butter are distributed among poor households with no milking animals, especially during dry seasons.	
<b>Afur</b>	Food provisions: wealthier households provide food to the poorest households in the communities.	

<sup>114</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014

<sup>115</sup> The Mercy Corps study 2013 analysing factors influencing resilience found that those receiving informal social assistance and Zakat were less resilient, which tallies with those receiving assistances being amongst the vulnerable

<b>Dumaal</b>	When a woman is widowed, the brother or cousin of the husband marries the widow in order to support her and her family.	
<b>Xigiisan</b>	When a husband is widowed he is given a wife from her family to ensure the home and the children are well taken care of.	
<b>Axan</b>	When a family member dies, the community provides food for a period of time to the household (around 1 week).	
<b>Talci</b>	Funeral support when someone dies.	
<b>Affarta-bax</b>	Assistance provided to a woman for 40 days after the birth of a child.	
<b>Mag</b>	'Blood money': if a person from another community is killed, the community contributes camels to the dead person's village (50 for a woman; 100 for a man).	
<b>Kaalmo</b>	When a household loses their livestock in a seasonal shock, other households each gather livestock and provide it to the affected household to restore their herd.	
<b>Gadiid ceeshi</b>	Pastoralists/agro-pastoralists will borrow animals for transport when migrating.	
<b>Baaho</b>	Door-to-door collections for the urban 'poorest of the poor'.	

#### **MAPPING SOCIAL PROTECTION: MAIN CONCLUSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK**

- There are major gaps to fill in the formal social protection system relative to the level of need.
- There are some best practices to build upon and also programmes that could form the foundation of a social protection or safety net programme. These are however only some of the possible options and others will need to be considered.
- Programmes will need to go beyond agency mandates to design the best programme for the needs.
- Food aid is a huge challenge and should only be considered where markets are not functioning.
- Programmes should seek to complement and not interfere with community social assistance, which forms a vital coping strategy. Programmes that align with the values and premises of traditional assistance (in terms of classification of vulnerability) are likely to be well understood by communities. Formal social transfers to these vulnerable groups are likely to reinforce traditional support systems since these households who usually require such assistance will instead be able to contribute to the system<sup>116</sup>. However formal social protection programmes must obviously go beyond the confines of clan and family that presently limit the value of community mechanisms for some of the most vulnerable.
- Administration of social protection will need to be in such a way that minimises the risk of co-option of assistance by powerful interests. Building on good community mobilisation and development initiatives, such as community education committees, community self-help initiatives, community health/WASH committees, and village development committees could be considered as a platform for ensuring marginalised and minority groups are included in the decision making process.

<sup>116</sup> There is evidence that those who receive transfers from agencies often share these with others.



## 5. FEASIBILITY AND ENTRY POINTS FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION

The recent experiences of providing cash transfers to vulnerable populations in South Central Somalia and Puntland have showed that they are feasible to implement, despite access challenges. The majority of concerns proved to be unfounded and there were demonstrable benefits of cash and vouchers offered in kind assistance<sup>117</sup>. It will be important to learn from the lessons from these experiences going forward.

There was agreement from all key informants that a long-term social protection style programme or system based on social transfers is needed in Somalia, not only in the North but also in the South given the chronic nature of the problems being faced and the need to begin addressing these (even in this complex environment), as developmental issues. Given previous experiences, this should be feasible.

This section summarises the findings from the KIIs and considers the enabling environment and programme and policy linkages, keeping in mind that formal social protection is a government-owned social service and will have some implications for the context of Somalia.

### 5.1 Potential for Government-owned Social Protection

A number of key informants acknowledged that one of the main challenges in addressing vulnerability and resilience at scale and in a sustainable way in Somalia, centres on governance. Beyond consumption and survival needs, delivery of basic services was considered essential to the broader resilience agenda and working with government to build systems will be crucial in any long-term initiative that seeks to contribute to resilience. This is no different for social protection, which generally speaking should be understood as a government-owned system that complements other state provided social services. Therefore it is essential that any social protection framework is not simply designed and perceived as a UN project and that collaboration with government is established from the outset and that the UN strategy supports the government to build and implement a nationally-owned system.

A national social protection programme across all Zones may be unlikely in the short to medium-term since there are a number of political difficulties and differences between the various Zones. However it was generally agreed that in the North conditions are favourable for planning towards a formal government-owned system and the importance of this. A key objective for UNICEF and other stakeholders going forward therefore must be to build the capacity of government, whilst any proposed framework should take into account government's own thinking on social protection where this exists.

This will be more challenging and perhaps unrealistic in the South where the administration is very new and understandably considerably weaker. However this should not mean that progress towards establishing long-term and predictable social transfers in this Zone cannot be made in the meantime or that these systems should bypass the Federal Government of Somalia. Rather it is likely that different degrees of involvement and ownership are appropriate in each case.

#### 5.1.1 Somaliland

For Somaliland it was considered that there was real space emerging to make engaging with government on social protection a feasible proposition over the next three years. Somaliland has experienced a remarkable process of state building, including demobilisation, development of institutions, establishment of a security force, printing of a new currency and commencement of basic services. The

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<sup>117</sup>The CVMG evaluations (Hedlund et al 2012) proved that beneficiaries preferred cash to food aid (and requested 'no more food aid') whilst cash and vouchers appear more cost-efficient and cost-effective at reducing negative coping mechanisms and achieving a minimum dietary diversity. The FAO evaluation and the evaluation of the Save the Children-ADESO social safety net programme have similar findings concerning the feasibility of, utility of and preference for cash.

Administration has articulated its national economic recovery and development priorities in a National Development Strategy and social protection is highlighted under Pillar Five (basic services). The Strategy falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA).

There was interest in social protection from a number of Ministries that were engaged with during the study. Meetings highlighted the obvious potential synergies of social protection and other strategies of the government including those of the Ministries of Education and Health and the Disaster Management Authority, as well as the priorities of the government for youth employment and improvements in the livestock and agriculture sectors. It also aligns with the peace building objective since it has potential, if well designed, to contribute to a social contract between the state and its citizen.

What came across very strongly was real desire on the part of the government for more national ownership and involvement in programmes and that rather than bypassing government structures, there is at a minimum, coordination of agency projects with national development priorities and ideally a role for government to deliver these.

There is an administrative framework developing through which support for social protection across government and the concept could be further developed and through which a programme could be operationalised in the future. This includes the establishment of the Budget Policy Committee (BPC) and the inter-ministerial National Planning Commission. The Somaliland Development Fund (\$70million) was established by DFID and DANIDA to support the implementation of Somaliland's development and economic recovery plan in accordance with national priorities. The fund cannot be considered as budget support since it does not go through the government's financial system, but it does use the government's planning mechanism to identify and prioritise projects. The projects supported through this fund are reflected in the government's annual plans and budgets.

Under the Ministry of National Planning and Development, development planning has been decentralised, with establishment of Regional Development Plans covering the next three years. The regional plans are based on the pillars articulated in the National Development Strategy. The Togdheer Regional Development Plan includes social protection under social development as a sector of social services, with a vision of 'an effective social protection system that cares for vulnerable and marginalised groups'.

Phase II of the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG) capacity development project of UNICEF and the Ministry of Interior<sup>118</sup> is beginning to provide certain health and education programme funds. These funds are provided through central government for delivery of social services and are building capacity of district administrations in six districts<sup>119</sup> to take an active role in service delivery, including fund management. This includes support for the design of District Development Frameworks.

The World Bank and DFID meanwhile are providing support to the Ministries of Planning and Finance to improve public financial management over the next two and a half years. This includes strengthening budgeting and planning, enhancing revenue, investing more and coordinating external resources. There has been a steady increase in the Central Government budget year on year since 2010, from \$51,710,000 in 2010 to \$152,000 in 2014<sup>120</sup>.

### **5.1.2 Puntland**

Puntland can be considered a similar context to Somaliland, beginning to make steady progress in similar areas of governance. Although there is a new government in place with a lot of enthusiasm for change,

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<sup>118</sup> Also in partnership with the UNDP and ILO

<sup>119</sup> Hargeisa, Odweyne, Burco, Borama, Berbera, Sheikh

<sup>120</sup> Ministry of Finance Budgetary Analysis 2013-14

there is perhaps more still to do to bring capacity to the level of Somaliland. Puntland has prioritized six key sectors in its strategic development plan: governance, justice, security, livelihoods, social services and infrastructure. Social protection is a priority under the social services sector including meeting the needs of disabled and vulnerable groups, creating employment opportunities and promoting gender equity and women's development. The Vice President mentioned that social welfare is a key priority of the current government and the government is ready and willing to cooperate with actors who seek to make this a reality. Engaging the government at this point is necessary to ensure they buy in to the process of designing the initiatives to be implemented and to identify the level of engagement that is realistic for the administration and support that will be required in the planning, design, piloting, monitoring of social protection. There was interest in such a system, as well a strong understanding of social transfers from a number of ministries met, including the Ministries of Finance and Planning.

The Administration has a history of engaging on social welfare issues, which falls under the Mandate of the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs. In 2009 the government established an authority to focus on social protection – the Puntland Agency for Social Welfare (PASWE) with the aim of ensuring that orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) receive appropriate care, support and specialised services. PASWE has engaged with ADESO and Save the Children in its pilot social safety net programme, with the Ministry providing inputs into the identification of vulnerable communities for support and monitoring of programme activities. It also operates the small cash transfer fund for 1115 poor families with OVC, which are mostly from ex-service families. Meetings highlighted potential synergies of social protection with other strategies of the government including those of the Ministries of Education (of which gender is included), Health and Women, Development and Family Affairs.

DFID and other donors such as World Bank are beginning to engage with the Puntland Administration on governance and public finance management issues. The Ministry of Finance has been working towards increasing revenue collection. In the past it has been heavily dependent on the port of Bossaso, however over the last four years, revenue has been declining due to piracy and the opening up of ports in Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayu. In order to restructure, identify and address key capacity gaps, the Ministry of Planning is undertaking a functional capacity assessment exercise (supported by UNDP), which will define the capacities required and how these will be built or developed. The JPLG is also intervening here to build capacity of local government in key areas of service delivery.

### 5.1.3 Issues to consider

In the North there are a number of issues that should be highlighted:

- Establishing government-owned social protection frameworks will bring with it the obvious challenges of working with a fragile state, including on-going security concerns, the slow development of state capacity for policy and planning and low revenues.
- Whilst named in the national strategies and with ministries sounding their interest, there remains no draft policy or strategy on social protection nor is there a clear understanding of what social protection can cover<sup>121</sup>. There is a lack of a common understanding on the issues that affect vulnerable populations and no consensus on interventions to be prioritised. In Somaliland, MLSA is planning to draft a social protection policy in the next twelve months. It will be important to engage with MLSA and to use this framework as the basis for discussion and development of the policy to avoid two parallel initiatives.
- The Ministries of Social Affairs in both Administrations have a small budget relative to others and a smaller say in setting national development priorities<sup>122</sup>. In countries where social

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<sup>121</sup> There was some confusion of social protection with 'Protection' in cases, though government Key Informants in Puntland (Ministry of Planning) generally had a clear understanding.

<sup>122</sup> As stated in 2014 Somaliland budget, share for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the total national budget envelope was 0.3% (\$378,351) and 0.36% (\$553,115) in 2013 and 2014 respectively.

protection has moved forward quickest it has been championed by powerful ministries such as Planning or Finance and it will be important to bring these on board. In fact these Ministries appear to be engaging in the North. In Somaliland the Ministry of Finance highlighted that they would be willing to discuss the entry points for a social protection framework including a commitment to incremental scale up of government funds, if this would engage development partners. In Puntland the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation said it should provide leadership on the side of the government.

- The above governance initiatives are in their early stages and a good deal of further technical, administrative and financial management capacity will be required at both national and local levels. DFID reported that there is no data on levels of corruption in government. There is a great level of trust between development partners such as DFID and the government but systems are weak.
- In Puntland there is weak coordination among agencies with duplication of efforts as opposed to ministries complimenting each other to deliver a coherent package of services. For example the mandate for social welfare programming is with the Ministry of Women, Development and Family Affairs but this is parallel to the objectives and activities of PASWE. In fact because of this the future existence of PASWE may be in question. The priorities of this Ministry are currently also too broad including provision of basic services<sup>123</sup>. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for religious affairs however it was neither involved nor aware of PASWE's objective of establishing a Zakat Commission.
- Government members expressed frustration that often they are not engaged by agencies in discussions on programme or strategy design, or that any engagement is often tokenistic. Indeed some ministers raised concerns about the operation of international agencies being 'neither based on the priorities of the communities nor the realities on the ground'. There seems a real desire to shift towards longer-term programming and with government in the driver's seat. To build the necessary buy in, key informants from the government cited a need to be involved from the beginning of the process and not to be simply presented with a programme for endorsement. Finally a number of commentators expressed frustration at the humanitarian focus of certain agency programmes, and particularly of food aid. It was the perception of some ministries that the focus of a number of NGOs and agencies is short-term in nature and not geared towards necessary long-term change and development. To engage government this framework will need to be seen as a developmental strategy and focus on assistance other than 'more of the same', hence the need to involve and support the government through the framework from the beginning.
- Government's role in any programme, including social protection (within the current realities), will need to be a coordination role and their capacity to perform this function will need to be developed. Potential for financing and technical support from development partners is considered further in Section 5.3 below.

#### **5.1.4 South Central Somalia**

The FGS has only recently been established (August 20<sup>th</sup> 2012) and since inception there have already been three Prime Ministers. The region remains highly unstable and confidence in the government on the part of citizens is yet to be established. The FGS has published the country's Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) 2014-2015, a six-pillar policy with the strategy of delivering quick, tangible benefits to communities to alleviate poverty, recover household incomes, build trust in government and encourage social cohesion<sup>124</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup> For example, the minister is very passionate about early childhood education but this should be led through the Ministry of Education that has also committed to it.

<sup>124</sup> This is focusing on stabilisation through the rule of law and good governance; economic recovery; peace building and reconciliation; public service delivery; improved international relations; and national unity.

Priorities of the government under the ERP are:

- Productive infrastructure (crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries);
- Rapid rehabilitation of infrastructure (ports, urban water and waste);
- Basic health services for all regions; and
- One million children Go-2-School (500,000 children in South Central Somalia).

Social protection is nevertheless an explicit objective under 'economic recovery' and it was reported by government key informants that social protection is a priority of the government. It is also possible to conceive of linkages between the government priority programmes above and social protection frameworks so as to leverage win-wins and political will.

Whilst originally conceived under the mandate of the Ministry of Women, Human Rights and Development (along with health, education, youth, labour/employment and gender), there are on-going discussions within the government as to whether social protection should fall here or under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs<sup>125</sup>. The mandate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is actually for the whole country and therefore linked to the Administrative bodies in Puntland. The MLSA has developed a National Disabled Policy and a Policy for Orphans and Street Children and has established a care centre for the disabled that feeds 300 disabled people.

However whilst recognising social protection as a '*critical policy tool contributing to economic recovery, equity and resilience*' the ERP states that the government is still in its initial stages of development and thus lacks adequate human, financial and institutional capacity to develop and manage social protection systems. A recent study<sup>126</sup> confirmed that whilst regional government officials are aware of the policy and drafting of an implementation strategy, they are still awaiting authority, instructions and funding from the central government.

Recent research to assess the likely feasibility of safety nets in South Central Somalia confirmed a consensus within the donor and NGO community that change and more predictable and regular support are required<sup>127</sup>. Nevertheless the same study highlighted concerns within the donor community regarding the capacity of government, the quality and availability of data on poverty and vulnerability and issues of access. Rather the goal should be to work towards some sort of 'transition programming' in the interim while these issues are addressed.

In terms of implementation, there is little, if any, decentralised capacity in South Central Somalia; however stakeholders from NGOs and donors underlined the importance of moving to deliver longer-term safety nets even though government is not able to provide these directly for the foreseeable future. Though this is likely to be more complex than in the North, some type of safety net mechanism can be set up, building on what has been done in the humanitarian sector and beginning with areas considered to be relatively stable, with a strong agency presence and an acceptable (to the community) district or regional authority<sup>128</sup>. It was considered that in the absence of the state some agency would need to take on the role of leading and coordinating the process and UNICEF was mentioned as a feasible actor given their track record in the South. Key informants acknowledged that there are still structures of governance that development and humanitarian partners have previously worked with successfully at the community level. This is considered further below.

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<sup>125</sup>The mandate includes: working on reducing youth unemployment; overseeing needs of disabled groups, organisations and agencies; promoting and implementing skills training and education for disabled; raising awareness of and providing support for orphans and street children; protecting rights of the disabled; overseeing care and organisation of needs of orphans, street children and the elderly.

<sup>126</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014

<sup>127</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014

<sup>128</sup> Jubbas, Galmudug and parts of Gedoh

Even in this context it was considered by many stakeholders that any agency-supported and implemented programme should nevertheless engage with the FGS from an early stage in order to build understanding and engagement, since this will be essential for any transition to formal social protection in the future. This was emphasised by the government key informants who saw the continual bypassing of government structures by international agencies and INGOs as contributing to challenges such as food dumping. It was also highlighted that the FGS needs a policy framework for social protection.

## **5.2 Accountability, Security and Implementing Partners**

Given the capacity shortfalls identified in national and local governance above, it is likely that in all Zones some support to implementation will be required to varying degrees in the North and South. This will be necessary for all administrative stages of the programme operations cycle. It is recognised good practice for a payment service provider to manage the delivery of transfers to recipients on national social protection schemes for transparency and accountability. This should be a requirement whether on a formal nationally owned social protection programme or an agency-implemented safety net.

### **5.2.1 Administration Partners**

Administrative processes required on the programme side include communicating the programme to communities; administering the processes of identification, registration and enrolment of beneficiaries; establishing and maintaining the database; preparing monthly payment requests for authorisation; providing oversight and monitoring; and managing a grievance process.

In the North, depending on the location it could be possible for district and local authorities to be directly involved in certain elements of the administration cycle, subject to a capacity assessment. A civil society partner could potentially provide added value and support in terms of community mobilisation, supporting accurate, transparent and accountable targeting and monitoring, as well as management of grievances. This was the approach taken on the Kenya HSNP, with INGOs implementing particular components of the programme in the first instance with a gradual process of engagement and handover to local authorities as capacities developed. There are a number of INGOs that would have expertise and interest to provide such a role, though it will be important for the programme to nevertheless be understood and designed as something government-owned. In Somaliland, where capacity of local government has been supported through the JPLG, local government (specifically the Social Affairs Department of the District Council) could potentially have a role in certain administrative activities from the beginning. Such activities include an oversight role in registration, a role in preparing monthly payment lists, and even monitoring.

In South Central Somalia, whilst security will continue to be a challenge for INGOs and where there is little decentralisation, it was considered that access challenges could be overcome through partnerships with whatever administration exists at the local level and is acceptable to people, such as civil society organisations (CSOs). However it is necessary to bear in mind the collective concerns of communities included in this study. In North and South there was near universal distrust of the involvement of CSOs in previous assistance programmes, with people convinced that assistance is provided along clan lines. This is borne out also from certain findings in both the FAO cash for work and CVMG evaluations. Similar concerns were also sometimes raised in respect to national staff of INGOs. People expressed frustration at the lack of accountability of aid projects generally (not only cash transfers) and there were numerous examples given where communities said they were not consulted on projects and had no mechanism for raising grievances with agencies or their sub-contractors. Whichever approach is taken, it will be necessary to scrutinise the partners selected and to invest in capacity building and systems to ensure vigorous monitoring and accountability. There will need to be parallel efforts to build capacity of local government to engage (further) in the process over time.

The clear message from key informants was that the UN should not be involved directly in implementation. Rather their focus should be on high-level coordination, including adequately supporting those CSOs who are selected as administrative partners to set up robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms, along with advocacy around governance, fundraising for implementation of the framework, and capacity development of government in establishing technical capacity, resources, guidelines, policies and systems. CSOs on the other hand should be involved in the implementation of specific interventions in the framework. Security seems to be and may always be a hindrance to the physical presence of international organisations in the country. This needs to be acknowledged and measures put in place to build capacities of CSOs. Key to this arrangement is having in place strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

### 5.2.2 Payment service providers

Both the Hawala money transfer system and mobile money transfer services are well established in Somalia and have been used to successfully deliver cash transfers on aid programmes. Mobile money transfer is relatively new, however coverage is rapidly expanding and is already penetrating rural areas<sup>129</sup>. In the areas visited for this study, penetration of the mobile money product (ZAAD) appeared greater than Hawala agents and almost all businesses are now accepting e-money, but it is difficult to extrapolate this up to national level. The relative benefits of these systems are outlined in Table 5.2.2.

<b>Service</b>	<b>Benefits</b>	<b>Limitations</b>
<b>Mobile money transfer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pay out can be at any ZAAD agent or transfers can be spent as e-money in stores, meaning it has potential to support households in the event of migration or displacement.</li> <li>• Reduced opportunity cost for recipients in areas with adequate penetration of agents - system is convenient with no need to queue up or even to cash out</li> <li>• The system is totally automated and offers potential for efficiency gains when applied at scale or to make changes to the transfer values of beneficiaries in accordance with a change in their circumstances.</li> <li>• Improves security for staff and recipients since no need to travel with or handle cash.</li> <li>• Offers opportunity for communication with beneficiaries, through the phone.</li> <li>• Robust and reliable technology.</li> <li>• People are becoming familiar with it and like it.</li> <li>• Automation and controls increases accountability and reduces opportunity for fraud and diversion (a number of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires network coverage, electricity and coverage of mobile money agents, which is increasing rapidly but is not national yet.</li> <li>• High set up (equipment) costs.</li> <li>• Limited cash flow of agents can increase opportunity costs for recipients – though not seen as a challenge in Somalia since storekeepers are now accepting e-money, reducing the need to cash out at all.</li> <li>• Requires individual to meet the due diligence ‘Know Your Customer’ requirements of the provider (though not onerous in case of ZAAD and NGO/agency ID will suffice)</li> <li>• There can be difficulties for illiterate people or those new to the technology - investment in training is needed.</li> <li>• Still some potential for deception/ coercion and loss of income since international evidence shows recipients share their PIN.</li> <li>• Potential for technical errors</li> <li>• In Somalia there have been issues with restrictions of the technology in areas controlled by Al Shabaab</li> <li>• A possible barrier will be the concerns of certain donors over the use of particular financial service providers in Somalia. A majority shareholder of ZAAD/Hormuud was recently removed from the ‘banned’ list for UN partnerships but remains on the banned list of the US government.</li> </ul>

<sup>129</sup> Mobile money transfer market in Somalia is one of the most rapidly expanding markets globally (GSMA)

	<p>communities requested mobile money to deliver aid for this reason).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides audit trail</li> </ul>	
<b>Service</b>	<b>Benefits</b>	<b>Limitations</b>
<b>Hawala remittance system</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved security for staff and recipients relative to manual distributions</li> <li>• Low set up costs</li> <li>• Can be set up relatively quickly</li> <li>• Familiarity and trust in the system by recipients</li> <li>• Convenient for recipients in urban contexts</li> <li>• Allows for an audit trail</li> <li>• A simple process for those unfamiliar with phones or mobile money systems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In areas not well served by outlets, this presents high opportunity cost for recipients.</li> <li>• Beneficiaries must physically collect cash, and at particular branches. This can lead to queuing at branches which is an opportunity cost and also presents some security risks for recipients. This system is less well equipped to deal with the mobility of Somali households.</li> <li>• Liquidity issues, especially with large numbers of beneficiaries and when dealing with smaller denominations</li> <li>• Not automated, meaning the system doesn't present a great deal of flexibility to scale up or change transfer values at short notice.</li> <li>• Not likely to be insured</li> <li>• May charge a significant service charge</li> <li>• Chances of recipients being coerced and defrauded if not monitored well. One case Hawala partner was implicated in fraud in the famine response<sup>130</sup>.</li> <li>• A possible barrier will be the concerns of certain donors over the use of particular financial service providers in Somalia.</li> </ul>

It would be good practice to invite both partners for discussion and assess the relative merits through a tender. Selection would need to include feasibility analysis, mapping of coverage, cost-benefit analysis etc. Depending on the geographical location of the programmes to be implemented under the framework, it may be that there is a case for establishing a partnership with both providers at least in the first instance.

### 5.3 Opportunity for Financial and Technical Support

Clearly any move to establish such a system – whether government-owned or agency-driven – will require long-term commitments for both financial and technical support on the part of the donor community and their partners, both humanitarian and development. If agencies are serious about moving forward with support for social protection or safety nets as a crucial component of developmental strategies to reduce poverty and vulnerability and build resilience to shock, commitments must go beyond the standard three-to-five years of programmatic and election cycles. In Ethiopia, the EU applied the concept of resilience to social protection in a context where the government has some level of capacity, and the process has taken over ten years to see any tangible results<sup>131</sup>. The absolute minimum is ten years, however the reality is more likely a 20-year approach. Of course results and impacts will be seen far earlier, but commitment for support must be sustained in order to develop the system to the extent required.

#### 5.3.1 Donor Support

A major challenge of addressing vulnerability in Somalia (especially South Central Somalia) has been the limited availability of long-term funding and separation of longer term and humanitarian approaches.

<sup>130</sup> Hedlund et al 2012

<sup>131</sup> Key informant – Productive Safety Nets Programme



An outcome of the 2011 famine response was acknowledged among donors and others of the need for longer-term funding and strategies that go beyond emergency response, to ensure continuity in addressing complex issues related to poverty and vulnerability to shock<sup>132</sup>, whilst at the same time pre-empting and responding appropriately to early signs of crises that will undoubtedly occur.

This requires a coming together of development and humanitarian objectives and funding into single cohesive and long-term programmes, to address the underlying vulnerabilities (chronic factors) and with flexible funding arrangements to respond to covariate shocks as and when they occur.

In Puntland and Somaliland especially (and to some extent South Central Somalia), there are therefore opportunities to look at a system where donors work together on programmes that simultaneously address governance issues, systems building, accountability and linkages to other services, as well as the long-term financing of social transfers, with predictable rapid response to early signs of crisis. It will be equally, if not more, important for donors to be willing to fund not only the transfers but also the development of the social protection system itself.

It will be necessary to take into account the risk aversion and responses of certain donors in the face of evidence of diversion and taxation on previous cash transfers in Somalia<sup>133</sup>. There continue to be concerns on the part of certain donors over diversion of aid and breaches of anti-terrorism legislation, with a scrutiny of aid provided in the form of cash despite evidence as to the extent of diversion of other 'in kind' resources. According to key informants, aid agencies are dealing with this threat by (i) avoiding working in areas where diversion is a risk despite the fact that these areas are some of the most in need; (ii) developing programmes which are considered lower risk but not the most effective to deal with people's real needs; or (iii) down-playing or remaining silent on the reality of these issues for fear of the consequences, which can play further into the hands of those creating diversion. There is a need for an open dialogue on the reality of some diversion and on the need for humanitarian space, with discussions around the development of sensible solutions.

### **5.3.2 Resilience Programming**

Currently, there are a range of UN and INGO resilience strategies and programming being designed or implemented in Somalia with the aim of helping communities, households and individuals protect themselves against shocks in the longer term and cope more effectively with crises that occur. Common features of these approaches, on paper at least, are to mainstream risk reduction and risk management as a central objective of programmes, bring together complementary interventions, and move towards longer-term approaches to development problems. The UN Joint Resilience Strategy<sup>134</sup> or NGO programmes<sup>135</sup> could align with and provide potential entry points for longer-term social transfers, and

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<sup>132</sup> Hedlund et al 2012, UN 2012; Dunn and Brewin 2014

<sup>133</sup> The final evaluation of the cash and voucher interventions in South Central Somalia estimated diversion at approximately 15-20%. Mogadishu in particular had a high level of systematic taxation (5-10% of the transfer value).

<sup>134</sup> Objectives are to strengthen productive sectors; improve basic social services; establish predictive safety nets to meet basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfers of food or cash for the destitute or seasonally at risk populations

<sup>135</sup> The Somalia Resilience Program (SOMREP) is run by an NGO consortium of World Vision International, DRC, Oxfam, Care, COOPI, ACF and ADRA, targeting 70,000 households in eight priority regions in three livelihood sectors: pastoral, agro-pastoral, and peri-urban. It aims to build household and community resilience to drought and related risks in Somalia. Baseline analysis led to recommendations for safety net style programmes for the most vulnerable. The Building Resilience to Crisis in Somalia (BRCIS) programme is a £21million programme funded by DFID and implemented by NRC, Concern, Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee and CESVI, targeting 30,000 households. The DRC Community Driven Recovery and Development programme is another example.

may provide starting points for changes in the way humanitarian assistance is provided in South Central Somalia, for example:

- All NGOs and UN agencies have been involved in the provision of social assistance in Somalia and especially cash transfers.
- Consortium NGO actors are large INGOs that (in theory) can all mobilise rapidly and engage collaboration at the local level, which is important for any strategy or programme to be accepted by local communities and leadership.
- It provides an opportunity for joint monitoring as the resilience consortiums have been in discussions on developing common indicators for resilience measurement.
- Opportunities exist for establishing links and referrals between programmes, such that beneficiaries on these programmes could benefit from cash transfers provided under a social protection/safety net framework, whilst those enrolled in a social protection programme have opportunity to access basic complementary services.
- The UN Joint Resilience Strategy has a fifteen-year plan; for which an initial three-year programme has been designed, providing a window of opportunity to develop the necessary long-term engagement.
- All strategies have a 'safety net' objective or component.

However a number of limitations must be acknowledged in the design of a framework that seeks to use these programmes as entry points:

- **Limitations in humanitarian reform in Somalia:** Despite the lessons from 2011, and compared to other countries in the Horn of Africa, the humanitarian system in Somalia (with the exception of the donor changes above) has not undergone the same necessary reforms<sup>136</sup>. This was considered to be partly due to the rapid turnaround of staff in the Somalia context, meaning institutional knowledge is regularly lost. Another major issue mentioned is continued formulaic responses proposed to crises, which are generally not based on response analysis of the best options for communities but are instead in line with either agency mandate or prior experience.
- **Limited conceptualisation of social protection:** There needs to be a common understanding amongst stakeholders of what social protection is as different organisations have different understandings of it, as well as of its place within the resilience agenda. In general, there has been little discussion within the resilience consortiums and UN agencies on what constitutes social protection in this context. Whilst UN and NGO stakeholders mentioned the need for longer-term and predictable safety nets, the understanding of what can constitute a safety net within the framework of resilience was generally quite narrowly defined. Understandings tended to focus on the mechanisms for early responses to seasonal and other covariate shocks (e.g. drought and conflict), rather than longer-term predictable tools for addressing chronic vulnerabilities and easing consumption for vulnerable populations beyond times of stress. Furthermore, little thought has yet to be given to the types of interventions that could be developed.
- **Limitations of the UN Joint Resilience Strategy:** Whilst it is a commendable and critical effort of the UN agencies to have a joint understanding and joint strategy to move forward with building resilience to shock in Somalia, stakeholders commented on a number of implementation challenges. Issues included severe delays to programme activities, a lack of funding, a lack of coordination between agencies, continuation of projects fitting agency mandates and previous

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<sup>136</sup> This is a conclusion of on going research by Dan Maxwell of Tufts University and others and was also reported by two stakeholders in key informant interviews.

experiences and a lack of resources on the ground. For tangible benefits it was considered that agencies had to revisit implementation modalities, consider new approaches rather than a continuation of existing programmes<sup>137</sup>, and where possible establish a physical presence. This was considered a critical success factor for implementing a new concept and building the capacity of stakeholders and partners. There was reported to be a disconnect within UNICEF between senior management (in Nairobi) and mid-level management (especially at the field level), meaning that sometimes activities do not reflect commitments or that commitments made to donors do not reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore whilst UNICEF was considered best placed as an agency to lead the process of setting up systems necessary for building resilience (compared to other UN agencies), there has to be better communication and coordination within the system.

- **Lack of coordination of resilience activities:** The NGO resilience consortiums both said that engagement with the UN Joint Resilience Strategy to date has been primarily around avoiding the duplication of efforts in programme locations rather than trying to establish complementarities at the district level. Establishing mechanisms for cross programme referrals has reportedly been very difficult. There has been no discussion on joined up approaches to safety net provision. It is hoped engagement will be further defined in an upcoming workshop for partners in Nairobi.

### 5.3.3 Potential funding mechanisms for social transfers

Historically low levels of domestic revenue mean that even in the North the administrations have been able to do little beyond expenditure to sustain core Government functions and maintain peace and stability<sup>138</sup>.

Social services in Somaliland (including allocations for the Ministries of Health, Education, Water, Justice, Youth, and Labour and Social Affairs) receive only 14.4% of the national budget. Out of this allocation, MLSA receives a small percentage. A directive from the Ministry of Finance to 'significantly increase budget allocations for social services from 2015' was published this year. The Ministry of Finance expressed interest to discuss with development partners the potential to increase budget allocation to MLSA for use on social protection, provided there was a well-articulated plan with commitment of leveraging development finance for the purpose. However the size of the national budget means any increase will be limited in the short to medium term.

Similarly in Puntland, the size of the national budget and security concerns means that the majority of the national budget goes to recurrent expenditures and very little money is available for development programmes. The health sector for example receives only 6% of the national annual budget, which is approximately \$3.4million.

#### **Somaliland: Somaliland Development Fund**

If Somaliland were to prioritise social protection under Pillar Five of the National Development Strategy (NDS) within two years' time, financing could potentially be done through existing mechanisms. An avenue to explore will be the potential of the Somaliland Development Fund (SDF), which is the first example of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) supporting national development priorities<sup>139</sup>. A MDTF approach was used to establish funding for the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia. The project funding cycle is currently very ad hoc, with \$70million available for the first phase from DFID

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<sup>137</sup> The principle focus to date on public works and even in kind assistance suggests a limited vision of what can constitute safety nets in this context and the definite pull of agency mandates.

<sup>138</sup> 63% of the 2014 budget for Somaliland is allocated for the security pillar and only 14.4% for all social services.

<sup>139</sup> This year the fund is projected to make up 6% of the national budget

and DANIDA, although Norway has committed to put in funds next year and the Netherlands is considering coming on board. The project funds are reflected in the government's annual budget.

The only challenge with this will be to ensure that the government prioritises safety nets for funding through the SDF. DFID and DANIDA explained that there have been several consultations with government held over the past six months to prioritise key projects for funding through the SDF. However, the sectors prioritised at present (see Box 5.3.3) do not relate to social development, although there is potential for this to change during future consultations. This would require a social protection project to be put forward (and approved) to the NDC, and advocacy around building government support for social protection or safety nets funding through the SDF. With the forthcoming elections in Somaliland, this may result in increased investment in infrastructure projects in the current year.

The World Bank is also setting up a MDTF (estimated value £100million) for use on infrastructure projects. Though it is not clear how much of this will be earmarked for Somaliland, it could be possible to release SDF financing for safety net mechanisms in the future once this MDTF is up and running. DFID hope that a second phase of the SDF will be looking at basic services in Sool and Sanaag. This is at concept note stage and will be funded in 2015-2016. There is the opportunity of using this mechanism for funding safety net programmes.

**Box 5.3.3 Current Priority Sectors under the Somaliland Development Fund**

- **Roads:** the focus here is mostly on maintenance of existing road as construction of new roads is quite expensive (approx. \$1million per kilometre).
- **Water:** improvement of the Hargeisa water company and the Burao water company facilities. A lot of work has already gone into setting up basic systems for the two companies.
- **Livestock:** looking at constructing 2 large livestock holding grounds for purposes of fattening up the animals and providing veterinary services before shipment to the Middle East.
- **Agriculture:** catchment conservation project including construction of mini dams to generate youth employment. This is seen as a long-term strategy for agricultural production.
- **Environment:** the fund is looking at setting up regional hubs for the Ministry of Environment and provision of technical assistance to the ministry.

**Puntland: New Deal Meeting and proposed Social Fund**

Donors such as DFID are beginning to engage with authorities in Puntland on development financing. Being part of the FGS federal structure means that the donor financing mechanisms have to be worked out first. There is a New Deal meeting scheduled for later in the year, which is an important milestone for the international community and regional authorities on what the resource commitments for the coming years will be. Certainly any engagement with Puntland authorities around financing is expected to link to their participation in negotiations at the federal level.

There are talks of the Ministry of Education developing a social fund that would respond to issues around increasing access to education for vulnerable children. This fund would be a good source of funding for some social protection initiatives and given that it is still at inception stage, the design can be influenced to cover the priorities set out in the framework, keeping in mind the link to education.

**Somalia-wide**

**Stability fund:** A stability fund for Somalia is to be set up by DFID, which will focus on bottom-up approaches that act as a peace dividend, however there has been no focus yet on basic services. There could be opportunities to provide financial support to the implementation of the framework through the fund in the future.

**SOMREP:** The SOMREP consortium is bidding for a \$40million resilience grant from Africa Development Bank, which will cover all three Zones and will have a large capacity building component at community

and government administration levels. In the Northern Zones, links could be made here with the requisite capacity building required by government to administer social protection programmes, since safety nets are a priority activity within the SOMREP resilience programming.

**Private sector:** There is already a significant involvement of the private sector in terms of funding or subsidising humanitarian initiatives<sup>140</sup> and development projects, and this involvement is set to increase in the future. The private sector contributes millions of dollars to social welfare and humanitarian response annually in the form of Zakat, however this is neither well organised nor consolidated in a way that creates the desired impact at the community level. It was considered important by several stakeholders to engage them in the delivery of services and financing of safety net products as a way to leverage finance if the private sector is provided with a tangible programme to support. A future financing source could link social protection schemes to a more formalised system for consolidating and directing Zakat contributions, under a Zakat commission (assuming that one is set up)<sup>141</sup>.

<b>FEASIBILITY AND ENTRY POINTS: CONCLUSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are political entry points to establishing social protection as a government-owned service in the North, though extensive and long-term engagement would be needed to build technical and financial capacity and their engagement should be sought from the beginning. Although capacity has to be further developed amongst the relatively new government in South Central Somalia, the administration must be involved from the outset.</li> <li>• In the short to medium-term, implementation support will be required in all Zones, and to varying degrees. NGOs are an appropriate partner providing there is trust of communities and rigorous monitoring and accountability mechanisms.</li> <li>• Capacity issues and access constraints mean the framework should focus on a small number of clear interventions.</li> <li>• There is a need for a private sector service provider to handle payments based on a tender process.</li> <li>• The UN's optimum role is one of overall coordination, capacity building, advocacy and fundraising rather than direct implementation.</li> <li>• There are entry points for establishing the requisite long-term technical and financial support, although attempts to build on existing programmes must take into account a number of limitations.</li> </ul>

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<sup>140</sup> When communities in Puntland were affected by a typhoon in 2013, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was the first to respond to this crisis, and was able to raise millions of dollars through its religious leaders' networks in country and in the diaspora. These funds were used to restore people's livelihoods through the restocking of goats and camels as well as small grants to re-establish businesses.

<sup>141</sup> Both authorities in Somaliland and Puntland have the establishment of such a commission listed as an activity in their NDPs, however little if any progress has been made.

## 6. DEVELOPING A SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR SOMALIA: DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Experience from national social protection programmes in the region, as well as globally, have shown the important contribution to reducing poverty, protecting against risk, and cutting across all areas of human wellbeing. In addition, social protection programmes can have a positive impact on household economic development and productivity and social cohesion. However, these impacts and benefits are dependent on effective design. Therefore, it is essential that social protection schemes are well designed and ultimately, well-funded.

This section summarises some of the key design issues that define social protection systems. Summarising international evidence, key arguments will be illustrated that will help to guide the direction and form the basis of a social protection framework in Somalia.

### 6.1 Designing Social Transfer Programmes

As discussed in Section 1, this framework is focusing on social transfers as the core of an emerging social protection system, with the aim to progressively move towards a more comprehensive system over time.

#### 6.1.1 Modality of Social Transfers

As social protection moves away from small-scale, short-term, and often donor-driven interventions towards more comprehensive government-owned national programmes based around the lifecycle, cash inevitably becomes the transfer of choice. By enabling better management of risks and the generation of a wide range of positive economic and social impacts, cash transfers have the potential to help the extreme poor and vulnerable build resilience to shock and break the inter-generational transmission of deprivation. International evidence is summarised in Box 6.1.1.

#### **Box 6.1.1: The Impact of Social Protection through Long-term Cash Transfers**

**Equity:** Cash transfers are proven to reduce inequality and depth of poverty<sup>142</sup>, and can keep girls in school longer by delaying early marriage and childbirth. Cash transfers targeted towards women can increase their control over family resources and help them gain more decision-making power within the household. Nationally-owned and entitlement-based social protection programmes aiming to address risk throughout the lifecycle are ways to improve realisation of rights for vulnerable and marginalised groups, including children and the elderly. Finally, a study by Development Pathways indicates that the pension in Karamoja in Uganda has helped bring about a reduction in Female Genital Mutilation<sup>143</sup>.

**Food and Nutrition Security:** Poor households tend to allocate a significant proportion of cash transfer expenditure to food, improving food security and nutritional outcomes<sup>144</sup>. In the longer term, additional food consumption and increased use of health services due to unconditional cash transfers have reduced prevalence of stunting and wasting, which has long-lasting effects on cognitive development of new generations<sup>145</sup>.

**Human Capital Development:** Cash transfers reduce the barrier to accessing essential social services for poor households. Evaluations of social cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Malawi indicate that households spend transfers on health and education, leading to reduced incidence of reported illnesses, increased school enrolment and drop of school absenteeism. In South Africa, cash transfers to children on the Child Support Grant have increased secondary school enrolment by 8%.

**Risk Management and Fostering Resilience:** Regular and predictable cash transfers enable the poor to protect assets against shock and prevent negative coping strategies, thus protecting longer term income potential. UNICEF research in South Africa found the percentage increase in the poverty

<sup>142</sup> ILO 2010; DFID 2011

<sup>143</sup> Calder 2012;2013

<sup>144</sup> DFID 2011

<sup>145</sup> Aguëro, M. et al 2007

headcount, which occurred as a result of the international financial crisis, would have doubled without the Child Support Grant. In situations of cyclical emergencies and protracted crises, efforts to move towards institutionalised, predictable cash transfers in Kenya and Ethiopia are proving to constitute a timelier, more flexible and cost effective alternative to emergency aid. The PSNP in Ethiopia supports 7.8 million people at risk of food insecurity and has helped break the need for emergency food programmes (although, as noted below, there remain concerns about its impact on children and household productivity<sup>146</sup>). A new risk financing mechanism is allowing the programme to expand in times of shock, providing flexible assistance appropriate to the scale and duration of the crisis. By helping to protect people from having to sell their assets, it is allowing people to recover much more rapidly and to build some resilience to shocks. In Northern Kenya, DFID is supporting the Government to provide a more integrated package of support to drought affected regions through alignment of social protection services with support for other social services, market strengthening and embedding DRR.

**Livelihood Promotion:** Well-designed cash transfers in developing countries do not create disincentives to work and save. Cash transfers assure the poorest households a consistent level of consumption, which allows for greater investment in livelihoods and future production or income. Recipients are able to increase engagement in the labour market by reducing loss of work due to ill health and covering opportunity costs of job seeking. Farmers with a guaranteed level of income on the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India are proven to invest in higher yield varieties. Beneficiaries of social cash transfer programmes invested in productive inputs and hired more farm labour in Malawi and increased cultivation of cash crops in Zambia. Households that were in receipt of the pension and disability grant in South Africa had labour force participation rates 11-12% higher and employment rates 8-15% higher than comparable non-participants<sup>147</sup>

**Building the social contract and state legitimacy:** Social protection has potential to strengthen the legitimacy of fragile states by demonstrating that the government is re-shouldering its responsibilities for ensuring the basic survival of its citizens. Evidence from countries emerging from conflict such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Nepal shows that social transfers can contribute to fostering lasting peace and security and rebuild the social contract between state and socially and economically marginalised citizens<sup>148</sup>. Pensions, disability and child welfare grants in South Africa have been key elements in citizenship and state building since the end of Apartheid.

There is wide international acceptance that where markets are functioning well, and are the primary source of food, the default transfer for national social protection systems (in particular those addressing lifecycle risks) should be cash. This is the case for the majority of OECD countries. Other benefits of cash over food (or other hybrid forms of transfer, such as vouchers or coupons) include:

- **Cheaper to administer and logistically easier to manage than food aid:** the cost of delivering cash is often less than 50% of the cost of delivering the equivalent value in food. A DFID-sponsored study of the comparative delivery costs of cash, food and public works programmes in Malawi and Zambia found that delivering US\$1 in the form of cash, cost in the range of US\$0.09 to US\$0.65; while the cost of delivering US\$1 in the form of food cost anything between US\$0.79 and US\$1.91<sup>149</sup>. Setting up and running a voucher scheme is more administratively demanding and presents less potential to be expanded nationally.
- **Reduced risk of dependency and disincentives:** In the context of chronic food insecurity, in-kind food aid should be restricted to situations where markets are not functioning properly, and should be linked to local production, where quantity, quality and supply chains allow for this. There are concerns globally and particularly in Somalia that massive food aid shipments disrupt local markets and undermine the resilience of local food systems, affecting producers and future resilience. In contrast, cash transfers and vouchers can stimulate local production, strengthen local food systems and empower recipients in ways that food aid cannot.

<sup>146</sup> See also Berhane et al 2011

<sup>147</sup> Vincent and Cull, 2009; Figazzolo, L and Weedon, E. 2011

<sup>148</sup> Holmes, 2009

<sup>149</sup> White (2005)

- **Allow individual choice:** Cash transfers leave the choice on how to use the transfer to the recipients. Not only is this important for their self-respect, but the reality is that families know their real needs, and cash provides the only way to guarantee them the flexibility to meet these needs. Because of this, people often sell their food, voucher or input transfers cheaply in order to get cash, representing a very inefficient way of providing a cash transfer; there is evidence of this in Somalia. There is little empirical evidence from cash transfer evaluations to suggest misuse.
- **Stimulate markets by increasing purchasing power:** In general, cash transfers are more effective at stimulating consumption and generating economic growth, whereas food transfers may depress local markets.

However, this analysis does not suggest that cash transfers will always work effectively and poorly designed programmes can present challenges. For example the recent world price hike showed that some cash transfer schemes had been poorly designed to respond to short-term inflation. In Ethiopia's PSNP and the UNRWA's Special Hardship Assistance Programme in Palestine, food transfers were better able to shield beneficiaries from inflation since the value of cash transfers was eroded by rising market prices, whilst on the HSNP in Kenya the real (unindexed) value of the cash transfers fell during this period<sup>150</sup>. The fall in value of the cash transfer affected beneficiary preference on PSNP between 2006 and 2008<sup>151</sup>. Therefore, it is essential to establish a clear objective of a social protection programme in order to accurately determine benefit levels, and to consider how the programme will respond in the event that inflation critically reduces the effective value of the transfer.

### 6.1.2 Duration of social transfers

Income and food transfers can be provided on a temporary (often seasonal) basis or as regular and predictable, long-term programmes. It is internationally recognised that social protection is not provided for a limited period then suddenly withdrawn, or provided in a single one-off event. As well as poverty, social protection is designed to address risk and vulnerability. People constantly move in and out of poverty throughout their life-course, however they are always faced with vulnerability and risk. The aim of social protection therefore, is to support people when it is needed. It is social protection in the form of regular and predictable transfers<sup>152</sup> that is increasingly acknowledged as a crucial component of strategies to tackle poverty and vulnerability<sup>153</sup>.

Large one-off transfers, and short-term cash transfer programmes may be very relevant interventions in the context of Somalia but they are not social protection. However linkages between these complementary interventions can be important and the Bangladesh Chars Livelihood Programme for example has done this with some success. The monthly cash transfer provided on the programme functions as a form of social protection which enables consumption needs to be met, so that a single lump-sum transfer can be used to purchase and make use of a productive asset (usually livestock).

### 6.1.3 Establishing objectives for social transfer programmes

The core objective of social protection, in the form of social transfers is to increase the incomes of individuals and families, and therefore, directly reduce income poverty. As well as successfully achieving

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<sup>150</sup> It should be emphasized that the cash transfers in these three contexts of Ethiopia, Palestine and Kenya are effectively acting as a more efficient alternative to ad hoc humanitarian programmes, rather than core lifecycle social protection schemes.

<sup>151</sup> Whereas before the food price crisis beneficiaries preferred cash transfers, during the crisis, food transfers were more favourable as they had a higher value.


<sup>152</sup> Social assistance also includes in-kind transfers and waivers supporting access to services.

<sup>153</sup> At least thirty countries now have a significant long-term cash transfer scheme; in sub-Saharan Africa this includes South Africa, Liberia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Niger, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zambia and Malawi.



this, social transfers can also have a range of additional impacts, including tackling under-nutrition, increasing school attendance, helping families access health services, promoting income generation and access to the labour market, reducing social exclusion and strengthening the social contract and building the nation-state (see Table 6.1.3 for a detailed list). A wealth of international evidence highlights the significance of regular and predictable income support in providing breathing space to families and households, and relief from the day-to-day worry of meeting family needs, thus providing an opportunity for more longer term development priorities as opposed to basic survival needs. It is well noted that after immediate needs are taken care of, people begin to prioritise longer-term investments and make higher risk and higher return economic decisions that have potential to change their situation (see Figure 6.1.3a). Therefore, regular and predictable income support has potential to lift people, step by step, on a continuum of improved well-being. There is some evidence of this from the FAO cash for work intervention in Somalia, as well as from the Save the Children-ADESO social safety net pilot<sup>154</sup>.

**Figure 6.1.3a: Social Protection: from Consumption to Investment**



To establish a theory of change for a social protection framework in Somalia it is important to consider the potential benefits that social transfers can confer on beneficiaries, to enable them to enhance capacity and thus overcome the risks and challenges raised in Section Three. It is equally important to consider the limitations of achieving these within the context of Somalia.

Figure 6.1.3a outlines what social protection in the form of regular and predictable income transfers can potentially contribute to in terms of addressing the risks and vulnerabilities identified. Based on international evidence and experience on cash transfer programmes in Somalia to date, a star rating is provided, with i) 3 stars being strong evidence for potential, ii) 2 stars being some evidence for potential and iii) 1 star being limited evidence for potential. These benefits are presented within the recognised 'Productive, Preventative, Promotive, Transformative' (PPPT) framework for social protection of Devereux and Wheeler and shows that well designed social transfers can contribute to achieving each of these four objectives:

<sup>154</sup> <http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en>

- **Protective capacity:** to protect the consumption and attainment of other basic needs of those who cannot meet them through other means;
- Preventative capacity: to enable better mitigation of risks and preventing a fall/fall further into poverty;
- **Promotive capacity:** to support the realisation of productive potential; and
- **Transformative capacity:** to transform and reduce structural inequalities in society that contribute to vulnerability.

This indicates how each benefit has the potential to contribute to fostering greater resilience for beneficiary households as well as for communities. This is informed by the variety of recent research to conceptualise 'resilient communities' and critical factors contributing to resilience in Somalia<sup>155</sup>.

As the table highlights, social protection in the form of regular predictable cash transfers can help address a number of vulnerabilities related to shocks, food insecurity and chronic poverty, contribute to development of livelihoods, stimulate markets and enhance access to basic services. However the potential to contribute to these different objectives will vary depending on the design of the programme including such things as the duration, frequency and value of the transfer. Different designs of the programme will be better suited to meeting different objectives and it will not be possible to meet all the above goals within one programme.

The table also highlights factors in the context of Somalia that can limit the potential impact of social transfers, at least in the short to medium term. Social protection is clearly not a silver bullet as poverty is multidimensional with many structural and social drivers. Therefore, an increase in income will not compensate for poor or absent services, social exclusion or an unresponsive state. For example:

- Transfers cannot address the supply side issues in health, education and other key social services, though they can facilitate access to such services, in the form of household transfers. They can also complement fee waivers, in coordination with other sector policies.
- Although transfers alone will not address the social marginalisation of particular groups, including clans and women, inclusive social protection approaches would privilege design features in social transfers that would favour the inclusion of such groups. Other social protection instruments<sup>156</sup>, or social transfers provided as part of a broader strategy to address specific exclusion issues, would be required.
- To realise productive potential young people require access to inputs, skills training, credit and access to markets.
- Transfers will not be able to prevent loss of livelihood in the event of severe conflict and forced displacement and will not be able to prevent loss of harvest or deterioration of livestock in the event of severe water scarcity. In such events, they will help to support consumption and minimise negative coping mechanisms like selling livestock or assets, thus encouraging increased rapid recovery. It should be noted however that additional interventions may be needed. For example, pastoral households in such contexts must begin to undertake livestock off-take, whilst initiatives to tackle vulnerability of livelihoods to climate must be central to any approach to resilience. In almost all cases it is likely that provision of a larger 'lump sum' transfer may be more effective to meet a livelihood recovery objective than regular smaller transfers, given the capital investment required. Certainly this would be the case for restocking camels. The question is about whether such a transfer can be considered as social protection, as understood in the above definition, or rather a livelihoods/rural development intervention. As mentioned earlier it is very important that social protection is understood as a pillar of social services,

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<sup>155</sup> Mercy Corps 2013, SOMREP 2014, UN 2014

<sup>156</sup> For example, family care services

providing clearly defined interventions. Such one-off grants for restocking are perhaps more appropriately considered as livelihoods interventions and are therefore not considered part of this social protection framework.




Table 6.1.3 Impacts of Long term and Predictable Income Transfers				
Theme	Benefit of transfer	Long-term cash	Link to resilience building	Limitation in the context of Somalia
<b>Protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recipient meets basic consumption needs (food).</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Healthy well-nourished population is the basis of resilient communities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contingent on supply side barriers for commodities though markets are functioning well in Somalia.</li> <li>Need to bear in mind wider barriers to good nutrition (e.g. care practices; hygiene).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recipient meets basic consumption needs (clean water).</li> </ul>	***		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supply side barriers to water access exist.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recipient meets basic consumption needs (health/education).</li> </ul>	***		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supply side barriers to services exist, as well as other demand side barriers (e.g. trust).</li> </ul>
<b>Prevention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide economic means to deal with lifecycle shocks such as illness, incapacity of a breadwinner or un/underemployment.</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preventing erosion of assets or loss of livelihoods and resort to other negative coping strategies, which increase vulnerability to future shocks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Needs to be provided in a sure way throughout the period of the lifecycle to have a true impact.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide economic means to deal with the impacts of covariate shocks such as water scarcity, poor weather, livestock disease and conflict.</li> </ul>	**		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Additional seasonal/short-term transfers may still be needed depending on scale and severity of the shock (this will need to kick in quickly enough, which will require prior availability and quick release of funding – something that has not yet happened).</li> <li>Need to bear in mind the wider barriers to ensuring good nutrition (e.g. care practices; hygiene), and how nutrition pathways differ according to livelihood group.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public works outputs enable communities to prevent future crises.</li> </ul>	*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact of future climatic shocks on livelihoods is mitigated.</li> <li>Improves access to critical coping strategies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Need to acknowledge the limitations of outputs provided to date in Somalia, with low skilled labour and lack of equipment, for longer-term resilience of the community.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Households can repay debts.</li> <li>Households have collateral for accessing credit (food/loans).</li> </ul>	***		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cultural barriers to accessing credit remain for particular groups, for example marginalised groups and women.</li> </ul>
<b>Promotion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contribute to future household livelihood or income through making</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved access to capital assets.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chronic lack of alternative livelihood opportunities in rural areas due to structural barriers; some barriers</li> </ul>

	productive investments and being able to access the labour market.			to entry into alternative livelihoods in urban areas on account of lack of skills and culture.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livelihood recovery/restoration including relocation or movement out of IDP camps.</li> </ul>	**		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If livelihood is still dependent on the same climatic factors it continues to be vulnerable to future shocks.</li> <li>Feasibility of social transfers to contribute to this will depend on the livelihood in question and the cost of restoration.</li> <li>A lump-sum transfer may be more appropriate than social protection.</li> <li>Transfers cannot impact on wider constraints to livelihoods (security context/inputs/rangeland) and are likely to require simultaneous investment in other factors supporting climate-resilient livelihoods.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Realise development potential of children through investments in their health and education and ability to spend more time giving care.</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Healthy and educated children are more likely to earn more in adulthood and follow appropriate care practices for children, breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supply side barriers to services exist, as well as other demand side barriers (e.g. trust).</li> <li>.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stimulate markets and provide multiplier effects to the rest of the community.</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Markets support the movement of goods and people.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Whilst strong and well-functioning markets are a feature of Somalia, they can nevertheless be disrupted by conflict and poor weather.</li> </ul>
<b>Transformation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restoring dignity and hope for the future.</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Positive psychological impact critical for dealing with shocks and breaking the cycle of poverty.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's socio-economic empowerment.</li> </ul>	**	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Release women's potential as 'agents of resilience'.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Entrenched cultural norms mean that provision of a cash transfer alone is unlikely to address the social marginalisation of women and there is a risk that it may impact negatively on women (and thus children)</li> </ul>

				if the programme further increases their burden of labour.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential to contribute to social cohesion, peace dividend and build social contract between states.</li> </ul>	**	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace building is a central tenet of resilience building since it reduces shocks at source.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mistrust of government means approaches will take time to build a social contract.</li> <li>• Care not to create tensions within or between communities, which is possible through inappropriate targeting.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Those who are normally dependent on others become independent, can live with dignity and can contribute to society including supporting others.</li> </ul>	***	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduces burden on wider community, builds credit system and reinforces informal social assistance system which are critical coping strategies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>

It is recognised that social protection programmes add most value when they are delivered as part of a holistic set of policies and programmes contributing to broader access to services, credit and savings and employment creation<sup>157</sup> (see Figure 6.1.3b). This highlights the importance of a social protection framework taking into account existence of and linkages to complementary initiatives addressing the failures in the wider production, trade and labour markets and service provision, within a resilience framework.

**Figure 6.1.3b Social protection as part of a package of broader public service delivery**



**DEFINING SOCIAL PROTECTION: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK**

- Focus on simplicity, with a clearly defined framework of what constitutes social protection, and one that prioritises social transfers.
- Where markets function, income transfers are generally understood to be preferable to food transfers, and this is particularly true in the Somalia context.
- The framework will be based on long term predictable income transfers as the recognised foundation of social protection systems worldwide and the most feasible and appropriate social protection interventions for Somalia at this time.
- It will be important to build linkages with wider complementary services to leverage most benefit from social protection.

**6.2 Reaching the Poor and Vulnerable: Targeting Approaches**

Across developing countries, the topic of targeting on social transfer programmes generates significant debate. Targeting refers to the methods and approaches used to establish criteria of eligibility for social transfer schemes and to identify those who fit the criteria.

Of course social protection, in its broadest sense including contributory social insurance, includes the non-poor and helps them to respond to lifecycle risks. However most *social assistance* schemes have, as their priority, the inclusion of people living in poverty or who are considered particularly vulnerable. Targeting approaches can derive from political and ethical notions of ‘fairness,’ from economic considerations of cost-effectiveness, or from a combination of the two. In the first case, societies judge existing levels of poverty, vulnerability or inequality as unacceptable, while in the second case societies aim to maximise welfare under existing budget constraints.

<sup>157</sup> It is said that, the PSNP coupled with other complimentary basic services prevented the situation in Ethiopia from being as severe as it was in Somalia.



It is useful to make a distinction between *targeting approaches*, as a feature of programme and policy design, which establish a rationale and criteria of eligibility for those who should receive a particular benefit; and *targeting mechanisms*, which accompany programme implementation in terms of how to identify and reach the targeted beneficiaries<sup>158</sup>. From this perspective, targeting design is concerned with who is to be reached and why, and includes approaches which rely on poverty assessment, social categorization, and vulnerability criteria. Targeting implementation is concerned with questions of how they are identified and reached.

A basic distinction might be seen to exist between a *poverty-focused targeting* approach and programmes based on the premise of universal entitlement through the lifecycle. The rationale of universal lifecycle approaches is that programmes should be accessible to everyone within an eligible category of the population that is considered vulnerable, directing resources to tackling the main lifecycle risks<sup>159</sup>; whereas the rationale for poverty targeted approaches is to target scarce resources at those living in poverty. The former tends to focus on the individual whilst the latter attempts to direct social protection schemes at household units, usually those that are “poor”.

The two approaches to social protection are essentially based on a key difference in thinking on how poverty should be tackled. A poverty targeting approach seeks to tackle the *symptom* (i.e. poverty); in other words, all those who are suffering from the symptom should receive similar treatment. In contrast, a lifecycle approach tries to tackle the *causes* of poverty, recognising that people face a range of risks and challenges that vary across the lifecycle and that the challenges people face at different stages in the lifecycle contribute to making them more vulnerable to falling into poverty. As such it attempts to capture more diffuse notions of vulnerability or social exclusion<sup>160</sup>.

Targeting mechanisms are used to operationalise these approaches. Poverty targeting relies on *means testing* (targeting based on an assessment of income or wealth) or *proxy means testing* (based on a weighted combination of characteristics believed to be highly correlated with wellbeing or deprivation).

Universal categorical approaches on the other hand use other ‘*proxy indicators*’ to identify the most vulnerable based on particular demographic characteristics of the individual or household (e.g. age, disability and widowhood are commonly used). These indicators can be applied singularly or multiply (where several criteria must be met simultaneously in order to secure eligibility)<sup>161</sup>.

Other targeting mechanisms also exist and can be characterised by the actors involved in identification of beneficiaries. *Community-based targeting*, for example, includes eligibility assessed by local communities, while *self-targeting* is based on voluntary participation, such as in many cash-for-work programmes. These mechanisms are more likely to be applied on poverty targeted than entitlement-based approaches.

Finally geographical targeting can be used as a means of focusing or rationing the targeting of any of the above mechanisms (e.g. focusing on households living in arid zones) or regions of high food-insecurity.

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<sup>158</sup> Slater and Farrington 2009

<sup>159</sup> Poor Relief (through poverty targeted social transfers) was the dominant approach when formal social protection systems were first developed in Northern Europe, North America and Australasia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In effect, one national programme was established to provide cash benefits to poor households irrespective of their stage in the lifecycle. The largest programme in the world was the Poor Laws in England, with overall expenditure at more than 2.5% of GDP in 1820. It has since been mirrored in various donor-led social protection pilots and programmes in low-income countries.

<sup>160</sup> Slater and Farrington 2009

<sup>161</sup> Watson et al 2014

To be effective, targeting approaches and mechanisms need to adequately capture those most in need without generation of significant exclusion errors<sup>162</sup>; be easy to operationalize, be well understood and accepted by citizens; and effectively enrol newly vulnerable individuals or families as they become poor, whilst also taking into account the dynamic nature of poverty vulnerability. A summary of some of the advantages and disadvantages of different targeting methods can be found in Table 6.2.

<b>Table 6.2 Comparative advantages and disadvantages of different targeting types</b>		
<b>Type</b>	<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Disadvantages</b>
<b>Means -tested (income)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rigorous indication of eligibility where data exists.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Costly and high data requirements.</li> <li>• Excludes informal sector/subsistence.</li> <li>• Stigma may be attached.</li> </ul>
<b>Proxy means tested (score card based on range of other asset indicators, with cut off for eligibility)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides an alternative means to estimate poverty where income data is lacking.</li> <li>• Can involve communities.</li> <li>• Does not require highly specialized technical skills at the lower level – score card.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Costly to implement.</li> <li>• Proven to generate significant inclusion and exclusion errors in contexts where a large percentage of the population is poor.</li> <li>• Especially poor at including social vulnerability.</li> <li>• Not well understood by communities, which can result in tension.</li> <li>• Requires highly developed indicators that correlate well to poverty and that change with a family's circumstances (unlikely).</li> <li>• Needs constant updating to stay relevant and catch those who fall into poverty (impractical).</li> </ul>
<b>Categorical targeting (Age/other characteristic)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Little capacity required.</li> <li>• Transparent, easily understood, accepted by communities.</li> <li>• Cheaper to administer.</li> <li>• Politically acceptable.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May not completely address structural vulnerabilities if categories do not correlate well with poverty/vulnerability.</li> <li>• Possible stigma of targeting particular groups (OVC and individuals affected by HIV/AIDS).</li> </ul>
<b>Community based targeting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involves community and generates local ownership.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong risk of bias resulting from uneven local power relations.</li> <li>• Difficult to apply in urban settings.</li> <li>• Can increase tensions between selected and un-selected groups.</li> <li>• Time-consuming to do well and requires considerable oversight and facilitation.</li> </ul>
<b>Geographical targeting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concentrates resources on spatially focused needs.</li> <li>• Relatively cheap.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May require dedicated survey.</li> <li>• Can lead to errors of inclusion and exclusion if politically rather than needs driven.</li> <li>• May not be politically supported.</li> </ul>
<b>Self-Selection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited technical capacity required.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can create high exclusion and inclusion errors.</li> <li>• Requires low benefit levels, which may not provide meaningful protection.</li> </ul>

As outlined in Box 6.2, which synthesizes a number of principles for approaches to targeting based on experience from social transfers in Africa, there is no perfect targeting mechanism and there are trade-offs to be made. The key should be to minimize errors whilst being simple and cost effective to administer and generating acceptance. The targeting approach and mechanism selected should take into account not only policy and programme aims but also the country characteristics such as poverty profile; degree of formalisation of the labour force; degree of social solidarity; and government and administrative capacity<sup>163</sup>.

<sup>162</sup> Exclusion errors are where a programme's targeting approach erroneously excludes those households or individuals who would be eligible for assistance accordingly to the eligibility criteria of the programme. Inclusion errors on the other hand are where a programme erroneously includes those who do not fit the eligibility criteria.

<sup>163</sup> Samson et al, 2010

#### Box 6.2 Lessons learned from targeting on social transfers - experience in Africa

- There is no single best approach to targeting. Every mechanism has its strengths and weaknesses and there are trade-offs to be made (e.g. between targeting costs versus accuracy and complex but accurate individual assessments versus simpler but less accurate proxy indicators).
- It is important to minimise both inclusion errors (leakages) and exclusion errors (under coverage). The latter may in fact be more important in efforts to build social consensus and political support.
- Complex concepts like 'vulnerability' and multiple eligibility criteria create challenges. While they may aim to sharpen targeting accuracy, they also create opportunities for diverse interpretation and manipulation.
- Poverty targeting approaches in contexts where the vast majority of the population are poor are fraught with difficulty. People do not understand why some are selected and some are not when there is very little separating their circumstances and this risks generating social tensions.
- Simple, single criteria that are not easy to falsify facilitate transparency, community understanding and acceptance. They may also help minimise inclusion errors and keep administrative costs low (for both identification and verification). However, broad categorical targeting (such as citizens over 65) may overlook other populations who also need social assistance, so complementary programmes targeting other vulnerable groups are also needed.
- Politicisation can distort the allocation of social assistance if 'patronage bias', rather than indicators of need determines eligibility. The support of local and community leaders is needed in programme implementation, but mechanisms are necessary to curb their influence and ensure that programme objectives are not compromised
- Grievance procedures should be implemented as standard procedure for all social grant programmes, to allow those who feel unfairly excluded an opportunity to complain formally. These can help address concerns about targeting errors and politicization that might occur.

Source: Ellis et al 2009

In decisions on which targeting approach to adopt for the framework it is worth drawing on some of the international experience here.

As countries have established tax-financed social protection systems, they have followed either a poverty targeted or a lifecycle approach. To a large extent, this has been influenced by the underlying ideology within which the social protection system was developed in any particular country. More neoliberal political environments have prioritised poverty targeting while more progressive political environments have been more likely to follow a lifecycle approach.

However as countries advance with development of national social protection systems, there is an increased tendency to move towards a lifecycle approach. This was first seen in developed countries, where 19<sup>th</sup> century poor relief was gradually replaced by schemes directed at different stages of the lifecycle. Over time, developed countries gradually invested in a wide range of lifecycle schemes, beginning with the ageing population and then addressing other contingencies such as childhood vulnerabilities, disability, unemployment and widowhood. Nowadays almost all social protection spending in developed countries is directed to these main lifecycle contingencies. Countries with the most comprehensive inclusive lifecycle approach provide universal access to many social protection schemes. Spending on generalised poor relief for poor households or families still exists but is, in many developed countries, minimal and functioning as a residual programme for those who fall through the cracks in the system.

Most developing countries are somewhere on a continuum between poverty targeted and lifecycle approaches. There are developing countries with well-known poor relief programmes that also have other schemes directly related to lifecycle risks. Other countries adopt a lifecycle approach but aim to direct these programmes only at those living in poverty, thereby maintaining poverty targeting as the ideological basis of their system. However, as social protection systems evolve over time, there is a tendency to move towards more inclusive and individual schemes over time. Countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Philippines

and Pakistan all began with ‘poor relief’ approaches to social protection and all now show signs of a move towards a lifecycle approach. All also provide disability, old age and survivor pensions either to privileged sectors – such as the civil service or military – or via contributory schemes benefiting the formal sector. Mexico has recently introduced an almost universal old age pension for everyone over the age of 70; Colombia began a means-tested old age pension in 2003; in Ecuador, an old age pension is rapidly expanding (currently reaching 65% of older people) and the Philippines commenced a means-tested old age pension in 2011<sup>164</sup>.


There are a number of reasons for why, overall, a lifecycle approach should be considered more appropriate than a poverty-targeted approach in the context of Somalia.

### 6.2.1 Challenges of accurately poverty targeting in low-income countries

Whilst targeting scarce resources towards those ‘most in need’ is appealing for obvious reasons, the reality is that poverty targeting in contexts where the vast majority of the population works in the informal sector and where the majority of the population are poor or vulnerable to falling into poverty is fraught with difficulty and is both costly and demanding to implement. Although significant effort has been invested in developing the proxy means test to identify families with low incomes (described in Annex E) there is inherent inaccuracy of methodologies for selecting the poor in developing countries.

Figure 6.2.1 indicates that the proxy means testing is very likely to generate high exclusion errors particularly at low coverage. It indicates that the exclusion errors for programmes using this approach with 10% coverage are around 60%, although this drops to around 40% when coverage is 30%. At very low coverage, therefore, errors increase. Unless the programme aims for high coverage comparable to the proportion of the poor in the population (many only aim for 10-20% of the population) this essentially creates arbitrary cut-offs between households with nothing separating their circumstances.

**Figure 6.2.1 Theoretical statistical exclusion errors of the proxy means test, when assessed against different levels of coverage<sup>165</sup>**



The errors associated with the proxy means test, once implemented, tend to be higher than those predicted by using the household survey. For example, Mexico’s *Oportunidades* programme has an exclusion error of

<sup>164</sup>Pension Watch

<http://www.pension-watch.net/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/social-pensions-database/>

<sup>165</sup> Kidd and Wylde (2011)

70% with coverage of 20%.<sup>166</sup> Even, Georgia's Targeted Social Assistance programme – which is described by the World Bank as “among the best-performing similar programmes in the world”, still excludes around 60% of eligible beneficiaries, against coverage of 7%<sup>167</sup>. It is best to consider proxy means testing as a rationing mechanism, taking a selection of the poor from different deciles, rather than something that can accurately identify the poorest.

There are alternative methodologies used in developing countries for selecting people living in poverty, but all have similarly high errors. Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* programme uses an unverified means test and has an exclusion error of 59%<sup>168</sup>.

These challenges mean poverty targeting in low-income countries generates errors of exclusion and as a result, some of the poorest do not benefit<sup>169</sup>. When coverage is restricted to a relatively small proportion of those living in poverty, as it usually is on such schemes (10-20% of the population is the usual cut-off) “poverty targeting” tends to function like a rationing mechanism, choosing a small proportion of people from among a much larger group who are “deserving.”

In contrast, life cycle programmes for those belonging to the eligible category of the population can potentially guarantee the inclusion of all those who are living in or vulnerable to poverty. This will depend on whether the categorical indicators used correlate well with poverty. Generally this is found to be the case since children, the elderly and the disabled commonly have higher rates of poverty than the general population, although there are likely to be some inclusion errors this will ensure that there are no exclusion errors from within this category of the population. However whilst no mechanism is perfect in terms of their success in including families living in poverty in social protection schemes, selection on the basis of poverty performs significantly worse than universal categorical selection used in life cycle approaches. There may, of course, be some errors of inclusion or exclusion on universal programmes but international experience would indicate that this is usually minimal (see Box 6.2.1). A bigger challenge on universal programmes is that the broad coverage creates challenges in contexts of limited budgets.

**Box 6.2.1 Potential errors with universal schemes**

No selection mechanism is perfect. On a universal scheme there may be some errors of inclusion, for example where old people who are not poor and vulnerable also receive assistance. However by including a minority of older people who are wealthier the programme manages to capture all those older people who *are* vulnerable. Meanwhile, some eligible older people may be excluded because they do not have the right documentation while some younger people may be included – as currently happens in Bangladesh's Old Age Allowance – if they are able to falsify their age.

However, in developing countries the exclusion of eligible older people is usually minimal and is much easier to control in a simple universal programme than in a pension using “poverty targeting.” An appeals process should therefore be established to deal with these exclusion errors. The inclusion of younger people into old age pensions varies across countries, depending on the coverage and accuracy of birth certificates and identity cards. However, many low-income countries have had good success in excluding younger people even when identity card coverage is low; some use mechanisms such as age calendars and community verification.<sup>170</sup>

**6.2.2 Political economy analysis suggests greater national support for lifecycle approaches**

International evidence suggests that it is not necessarily best to target the poor exclusively; rather that the poor may benefit much more from popular, universal programmes than from tightly poverty targeted schemes.

<sup>166</sup> Veras *et al.* 2007

<sup>167</sup> UNICEF 2012

<sup>168</sup> Veras *et al.* 2007


<sup>169</sup> DFID 2009; Stewart and Handa 2008; Ellis 2011; Miller *et al.* 2008

<sup>170</sup> McPherson 2011

This is firstly because the best way to benefit the poorest from social protection is with programmes of high coverage. Figure 6.2.2 shows the relationship between coverage and effectiveness (in terms of percentage of the poorest quintile who are excluded), for a range of programmes that follow poverty targeted and more universal lifecycle approaches. It is evident that coverage is more important in determining the inclusion of people living in poverty than any particular targeting mechanism. On the right hand side of the scale, 0 indicates zero coverage of the poorest 20% while, on the left, 100 indicates universal coverage of the poorest 20% of the selected demographic group. The number within the boxes indicates the proportion of the poorest 20% of the selected category who are excluded from the scheme.

The diagram demonstrates that the higher the coverage of the programme, the lower the exclusion of people living in poverty from a scheme (for the selected category of the population). So, for example, the universal Old Age Pension in Mauritius covers 100% of the intended recipients – i.e. all those over 60 years – and, logically, all older people with the lowest incomes. In contrast, Brazil’s *Bolsa Familia* programme covers just over 20% of the population but excludes nearly two-thirds of those living in extreme poverty.

**Figure 6.22: Relationship between coverage and effectiveness of a sample of social security schemes, measured as a percentage of the poorest 20% of the selected category of recipients who are excluded<sup>171</sup>**



Secondly, it is crucial to take into account political economy factors in the development of these programmes, which is highlighted in Box 6.2.2a. International experience suggests that, on account of political economy factors, poverty targeted schemes do not tend to achieve the necessary coverage to be effective at providing an income floor for the poorest, as opposed to schemes adopting a lifecycle approach.

**Box 6.2.2a Political Economy of Targeting in Social Protection Programmes**  
 The political economy of social protection has been recognised for many years:  
 Fiszbein and Schady (2009:5f) in their World Bank publication on conditional transfers note that standard economic theory argues that:  
*“Transfer schemes narrowly targeted at the poor would tend to have limited support because a small share of the population benefit, whereas the costs are dispersed across all tax-payers.”*

<sup>171</sup> Data on coverage and the exclusion of the poorest are taken from the following sources: Fiszbein and Schady (2009), Jitsuchon *et al* (2012), Kidd and Khondker (2013), Kidd and Abu-el-Haj (2013), Lucio Romero (2011), Mete (2011), Roca (2011), Samson *et al* (2007), SASSA (2012), UNICEF (2012), Veras *et al* (2007), Willmore (2003; 2007), and World Bank (2009). A few of the examples given - such as the Namibian Old Age Pension, South African Child Support Grant and Argentina’s child grants – provide the author’s estimates of the exclusion of the poorest 20% and should be regarded as a ballpark figures.

In the 1990 World Development Report, the World Bank highlighted the danger that poverty targeting could undermine political support for schemes, leading to inferior outcomes for the poor:

*“In practice, success of public interventions involves more than cost-effectiveness. The demands made by different sections of the population, and their ability to exert pressure on the authorities, are often more influential than government’s economic calculations. Fine targeting based on a single-minded concern for cost-effectiveness can reduce public interest in the vigorous implementation of government programs to help the poor. In the late 1970s Sri Lanka replaced a universal food subsidy with a less costly, targeted food stamp program. In time, the benefits delivered by the new program declined. The middle classes no longer gained from the scheme, and although the new program was more cost-effective, it lost crucial political support. A food subsidy directed to the poor in Colombia was so tightly targeted that it lacked an effective political constituency, and was dropped at a change of administration. The analysis of public policy has to be alive to considerations of political economy.”*

Poverty targeted schemes in developing countries have a maximum cost of around 0.4% of GDP; once they have reached a certain size, spending does not appear to increase and may even fall. Such schemes usually stay small and, as a result, are relatively ineffective since investment of 0.4% of GDP is well below the minimum required to provide a basic social protection floor for poor citizens<sup>172</sup>. These programmes thus have such low coverage that it is impossible for them to reach the poorest of the population.

A lifecycle approach to social protection on the other hand necessitates, but also results in, a much greater investment by the state. By investing in schemes that have higher coverage (often universal within a category of the population) and which are directed towards categories of the population regarded as “deserving” due to their vulnerabilities, political support for social protection is much higher. Those in the middle deciles (i.e. those who are very often also highly vulnerable) know that they will also benefit<sup>173</sup>. Popular support generates increased national budget support, thus over time, coverage of such schemes tends to grow so that ultimately, an effective social protection floor can be established which is highly effective in tackling poverty and inequality. Tax-financed investment in social protection in countries that have adopted a lifecycle approach is much higher, reaching around 3% of GDP in middle income countries such as South Africa, Brazil and Mauritius. The extent of national budget support in Africa and elsewhere to categorical programmes of broad coverage is because these benefit the majority and are therefore more popular with citizens, gain more political traction and ultimately attract much more of the national budget than narrow poverty-targeted programmes. This should be a consideration for any programme that is seeking to transition to become nationally owned and financed, even in the context of Somalia where this transition will take a number of years.

Nepal is a low-income country that has substantially moved towards an inclusive lifecycle approach. This is an excellent example of what a low-income country can achieve with commitment over 15-20 years. It is likely that a lifecycle approach is the only path through which investment in social protection will grow.

**Box 6.2.2b An example of a Low Income Country investing in a Life Cycle Approach in Nepal**

- In 1997 a Senior Citizens’ Allowance for everyone over the age of 75 and a Single Women’s Allowance for all single women over the age of 60 was established, complementing an existing

<sup>172</sup> While there has been many studies showing the impacts from poor relief programmes on recipient families, in reality the impacts are small compared to those from larger more universal schemes (and, of course, most intended recipients miss out). Evidence of this can be seen in Brazil where the *Bolsa Familia* poor relief scheme – which is frequently claimed to have significant impacts – in reality has very small impacts compared to the much larger system of minimum wage pensions. See Kidd and Huda (2013) for a more in-depth discussion.

<sup>173</sup> The unconditional Child Support Grant in South Africa has achieved a budget of 0.9% of GDP. It has a high-income eligibility threshold, which enables those in the middle deciles to enter the scheme, thereby building an alliance between those living in poverty and those in the middle, who are the main voting block of the ruling African National Congress Party.



pension for government employees. Two Disability Allowances were set up, for severe and less severe disabilities.

- In 2009 after the end of the civil war there was substantial increase in coverage.
- Age of eligibility for the Senior Citizens' Allowance was then dropped to 70 years – and 60 years for Dalits and those in the poorest area of the country.
- A child grant for children aged 0-4 years was introduced in 2010. This is universal in the poorest areas and is provided to all Dalit children in the rest of the country, reaching 409,000 children, which is around 13% of all children 0-4 years.
- In 2011 the age of eligibility for the Single Women's Allowance was reduced to 18.

### 6.2.3 Risk of creating conflict and instability with poverty targeting

There is evidence that selecting people for programmes on the basis of their poverty can undermine community cohesion. There are many examples of poverty-based selection causing social conflict in communities, in particular with proxy means tests<sup>174</sup>. There is significant global experience that efforts to combine multiple proxy indicators into a computed assessment of vulnerability is complex and difficult to explain to both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The process is often not well understood and can create conflicts in communities since it is not clear why certain households have benefited and others have not. This can reduce social capital, which is one of the main resources of vulnerable families in this context<sup>175</sup>. In Mexico and Nicaragua, non-recipients living in poverty have remonstrated about their feelings of despair, frustration, envy, resentment and jealousy. In Mexico, Nicaragua and Indonesia, non-recipients have withdrawn their labour from voluntary community activities<sup>176</sup>. There is evidence of direct conflict, for example in some communities in Mexico, when *Progresa* recipients were cleaning the streets, the non-recipients threw rubbish whilst fences of recipients were subsequently knocked down by non-recipients<sup>177</sup>. In Indonesia there were significant challenges when the BLT programme was rolled out, with protests about the selection process took place in around 30% of villages<sup>178</sup> and the crime increased by 5.8% as a result of the poverty based selection process<sup>179</sup>. Similar problems were found in Lebanon where the introduction of proxy means testing led to riots in some refugee camps<sup>180</sup>. In Lesotho, the houses of village chiefs have been burnt down (which has not happened with the country's universal pension).<sup>181</sup> Kenya's CT-OVC programme, discord in communities following the selection of recipients using a proxy means test was only avoided through programme administrators deceiving those excluded by telling them that they would be incorporated into the programme in the near future<sup>182</sup>.

There is good evidence of communities across developing countries opposing selection on the basis of poverty. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, communities often claim: "We are all poor here."<sup>183</sup> In Malawi, for example, a community argued: "We are one group of people therefore targeting some and leaving out others is not right"<sup>184</sup>. There are many instances of communities subverting selection processes by redistributing benefits to everyone.

<sup>174</sup> Adato 2000, Adato and Roopnaraine 2004, Widjaja 2009, Ellis 2008, Hobley and Paudyal 2008, Mgemezulu 2008, Huber *et al* 2009, Hannigan 2010, Kidd and Wylde 2011, Cameron and Shah 2011 and Hossain 2012

<sup>175</sup> An evaluation of the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment cash transfer programme in Uganda showed that the poverty-based targeting approach, which computed multiple indicators of vulnerability derived from a survey through a formula and applied a cut off for eligibility, caused social problems. Vulnerable households who appear eligible were not included in the programme. It led to feelings of exclusion; divisive sentiments in the community; perceived gender discrimination in the household; crowding out community support; stigma and tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; as well as some perceptions by the community that local leaders are unfairly involved in selection processes.

<sup>176</sup> Adato 2000, Adato and Roopnaraine 2004 and Hannigan 2010

<sup>177</sup> Adato 2000

<sup>178</sup> Widjaja 2009

<sup>179</sup> Cameron and Shah 2011

<sup>180</sup> Kidd *et al* 2011

<sup>181</sup> Sharlene Ramkissoon (pers. communication)

<sup>182</sup> Calder *et al.* 2011

<sup>183</sup> Adato 2000, Adato and Roopnaraine 2004, Mgemezulu 2008, Huber *et al.* 2009, Ellis 2008 and Hannigan 2010

<sup>184</sup> Mgemezulu 2008



On the other hand, communities generally consider programmes targeting particular vulnerable categories of the population to be fair. In a context where the majority can be said to be poor, communities nevertheless appreciate that there are certain people within their society who are 'more vulnerable'. This often includes such groups as the elderly, the disabled and children. Such categorical targeting is based on characteristics that are fairly easy to observe, hard to falsify and generally correlate well with poverty and food insecurity distribution in the population, whilst also taking into account social vulnerabilities. This research highlighted consistency in the opinions of communities in all Zones and across all demographic groups concerning the need to support particular categories of the population<sup>185</sup>.

#### **6.2.4 Complexity and cost of administration**

By enabling everyone of an eligible category, which is relatively easy to verify, such as everyone over or under a certain age to access a scheme, administration processes on universal programmes can be significantly simplified, which is important in countries with emerging administrative systems. The complexity of poverty-based selection leads to higher administrative costs than with simple universal schemes. They require more steps to be taken, more information to be captured and transferred, and many more people involved. As a comparison, the proxy means test requires a large amount of information to be captured, some of which is difficult to obtain, and large numbers of enumerators while a universal pension essentially requires only one piece of information - a person's age. Therefore, administrative costs are, necessarily, significantly higher with poverty targeting when compared to simple universal schemes.

Poverty-targeted programmes should be re-targeted regularly in order to maintain a focus on those who are currently poor (and thus the aim of the programmes). In reality this implies re-visiting all families of the eligible category in the country on a regular basis, however it is prohibitively expensive to do this as often as is needed. For example, Mexico's *Oportunidades* programme has, in many areas, only undertaken re-selection every ten years, and is only now planning to reduce it to every 5 years<sup>186</sup>. This infrequent re-selection comes at the cost of increasing inaccuracy over time, since families move in and out of poverty. A recommendation of the feasibility study of social protection in South Central Somalia was to invest in information systems to track changes in poverty to sub-district level to inform targeting, however this is a huge investment and it is questionable how feasible such a recommendation is. Such a system would only be of value if re-targeting happened on a regular and timely basis, however evidence from programmes around the world suggest it is unlikely a system is going to be this reactive in Somalia with even more operational obstacles.

Re-certification is much less complex with universal schemes and this can reduce administrative costs. Once people register for a scheme it is clear from the outset when they will no longer be eligible for a benefit and they can be automatically deleted from the scheme's payment system at virtually no cost. For example, with a child grant, as soon as children reach the maximum age of eligibility, the system can automatically remove them from the benefit. Similarly, with a senior citizens grant, people should exit the programme when they die. Of course, to make this re-certification function in practice still requires feedback and monitoring mechanisms, for example a Management Information System (MIS) that flags when a child reaches a particular age, or monitoring to establish that an elderly person is alive and it is not others in the community claiming benefits after their death. However these are far less onerous than regular mass re-certification through household surveys under a poverty-targeted programme and with the appropriate MIS and administration some of them can be automated within the system.

The simple eligibility criteria also make it easier for others in the community to support accountability of the system, providing a grievance mechanism is in place, since it will be clear to others in the community that a household is receiving a benefit in error. In comparison, in contexts where exclusion errors using poverty-

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<sup>185</sup> Interestingly the CVMG evaluation highlighted that in Al Shabaab-controlled areas where they influenced the targeting of assistance in communities, it was provided to these groups.

<sup>186</sup> Escobedo 2011

based selection methods generally amount to over 50% of the eligible population the costs of operating an effective grievance system are significantly increased. As a result, most schemes reduce costs by not establishing effective grievance systems. So, in Mexico, despite exclusion errors of 70%, only 0.1% of selection decisions on the *Progresa* programme were contested<sup>187</sup>. The grievance mechanism on the HSNP in Kenya has been inundated with complaints from communities, a number of which relate to the huge delays caused by the lengthy targeting process.

Universal categorical transfers have very simple selection processes and, therefore, minimize the potential for corruption. For example, many select everyone over or under a specific age. Therefore, the only proof of eligibility required is proof of age. While this may provide challenges these are not insurmountable and many low-income countries have developed relatively reliable means of verifying age. Lessons can be learned from the Uganda government's old age grant in the region of Karamoja, and the HSNP phase one, which can be considered similar operating environments with similar challenges of lack of birth certification.

Poverty-based selection processes are complex, thereby permitting many more opportunities for corruption. Programme staff responsible for selection have been known to abuse their position and manipulate the selection of recipients. In some cases staff have received bribes, as was the case in Bangladesh and India.<sup>188</sup> This is not to say that such risks do not exist with lifecycle programmes using categorical indicators, rather that the simplicity of the scheme and eligibility makes such frauds harder to hide.

Community-based selection is particularly prone to abuse and, given that there is never an effective audit trail with community selection – which would imply adequately documenting the rationale for the selection of individual beneficiaries – it is very difficult to monitor whether corruption has happened with community based targeting<sup>189</sup>. The proxy means test methodology is less susceptible to corruption but it can happen, in particular when enumerators are from local communities<sup>190</sup>.

Inevitably communities can 'get wise' to the selection criteria and attempt to manipulate the selection process. This is human nature and is the case on any programme. With poverty-targeted programmes, given the rewards for deceit, cheating is more common in poverty-based selection processes. In Malawi's Social Cash Transfer programme, for example, 9% of households created "ghost" members, presumably to increase their chances of being selected for the programme<sup>191</sup>. A key reason for Mauritius's move from poverty based selection to universal access for its old age pension in 1958 was because of complaints from those honestly declaring their income that they were losing out while those cheating the system were being rewarded<sup>192</sup>. However programmes based on a couple of easy to verify indicators such as age can keep this to a minimum. Another advantage of a universal scheme is that it can provide an effective mechanism of citizen monitoring as mentioned above. People can easily understand the criteria for inclusion – which is not the case with poverty-based methodologies – and can determine whether an ineligible person has received a benefit. This can act as a strong deterrent to officials who may wish to abuse the selection process.

### **6.2.5 Poverty targeted programmes can create difficult choices for households**

Well-designed social protection schemes are proven to encourage families with labour capacity to engage in the labour market and invest in income-generating activities. However it is worth pointing out that the targeting approach used on social protection programmes can have a bearing on how effective social protection programmes can be at encouraging this engagement.

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<sup>187</sup> Skoufias et al 1999

<sup>188</sup> HelpAge International 2003, Kumar 2008, Hossain 2007 and BRAC 2008

<sup>189</sup> Abraham and Platteau 2000, Chinsinga 2005, Miller et al 2008 and Kidd et al 2011

<sup>190</sup> A study in a South-East Asian country has shown extensive manipulation of results by community leaders in the proxy means test, but the evaluation has not been publicly released. See also Calder et al. 2011.

<sup>191</sup> Miller et al 2008.

<sup>192</sup> Willmore 2006

If benefits are provided through a Lifecycle Approach a family is not penalized for making such investments since the individual (whether child, elderly person or disabled household member) will continue to be eligible to receive the allowance. If we look at evidence from OECD countries, we see that the more universal the approach to social protection (in this case child benefit plus childcare), the higher the engagement of mothers in the labour market. Women are supported, through social protection, to be more productive – with benefits to the whole economy (and thus the financing of social protection).

However, there remains a concern with poverty-based selection processes, where effectively people only receive benefits if they remain sufficiently “poor”. Yet many poor families often face challenges – certainly in low income countries – to access regular, predictable employment or sustainable livelihoods. There is evidence emerging that poverty-based selection can create disincentives for young mothers to work - a recent World Bank study in Georgia confirms that the use of the proxy means test to target social assistance has created disincentives for mothers to engage in the labour market.<sup>193</sup> This is understandable in contexts where regular predictable income through the labour market or through constrained traditional livelihoods is difficult.

Social protection can and should support poor and vulnerable households to invest in their productive potential without penalizing them for doing so.

#### **6.2.6 Reduced ability of poverty targeted schemes to act as a safety net for the vulnerable**

Figure 3.4 illustrated the type of shocks and challenges that individuals face across the lifecycle in Somalia, from early childhood to old age, with disability and covariate shocks a major threat throughout the lifecycle. The important thing to recognise is that the main risks faced by individuals across the lifecycle are similar in all countries. These are exacerbated for poor people as they have fewer resources available to enable them to cope. However the particular challenges and frequency of shocks facing a large proportion of the non-poor at certain lifecycle stage means these people are nonetheless vulnerable to falling in to poverty. The Lifecycle Approach recognises this and provides protection to these groups too. A Lifecycle Approach, therefore, is not just protective but is preventive, providing social protection not only to those living in poverty but also to those at risk of falling into poverty. Of course establishing such an inclusive system of multiple interventions will take time and it will not be possible to address all lifecycle stages at the same time.

A major weakness of a poverty-targeted approach is the concept of a fixed group of “poor people”. Poverty is a dynamic concept, with family incomes highly variable. As a result, a large proportion of the population can move in and out of poverty or is in danger of falling into poverty. Therefore, the proportion of the population that should be considered as living in poverty – and, therefore, regarded as potential priority candidates for social protection schemes – is always higher than the poverty rate. Indeed, poverty lines are not objective constructs but are relatively political or arbitrary concepts: governments decide where to place a poverty line. Even when a consistent poverty line is employed, very different poverty rates can be generated, depending on the assumptions used.

#### **6.2.8 A Lifecycle Approach has been endorsed in the Social Protection Floor**

In 2009, the UN endorsed the concept of a Social Protection Floor for all countries. The Social Protection Floor was designed around the concept of a Lifecycle Approach to social protection. It envisages that countries establish a set of tax-financed guarantees that are directed towards tackling lifecycle risks. Priority is given to schemes that provide income security for: children; those of working age to protect them against the risks of sickness, disability, maternity and unemployment; and the elderly.<sup>194</sup>

The Social Protection Floor envisages that, if this set of lifecycle schemes is established, then a minimum level of protection will be provided to the vast majority of families in a country, in particular reaching those in greatest need of support. An additional small safety net could also be established to pick up those who fall through the cracks in the floor, but it would only need to be small in size. As in developed countries, the vast

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<sup>193</sup> Kits et al 2013

<sup>194</sup> ILO 2012 [http://www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org/files/SPF\\_recommendation\\_June\\_2012\(1\).pdf](http://www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org/files/SPF_recommendation_June_2012(1).pdf)

majority of investment would be directed towards lifecycle schemes. A basic principle of the Social Protection Floor is the “universality of protection, based on social solidarity”<sup>195</sup>. This was recently endorsed by all countries that are signatory to ILO Convention 102/1952.

### **6.2.9 Building a lifecycle system takes time**

An important point to note is that a Lifecycle Approach is built over decades. Investing in a variety of programmes allows governments to simultaneously address multiple risks and vulnerabilities, however this must be built up over time and as capacity and financial resources allow.

Experience shows that countries initially prioritise one lifecycle scheme and then, as political support for social protection grows (which is more likely to be generated by an inclusive scheme) extend provision to other lifecycle risks. Over time, comprehensive coverage of the families living in poverty – and, in many countries, the majority of the population – is achieved. This approach also means that households may gain access to multiple schemes if they are subjected to multiple lifecycle risks: for example, a household with an older person and children are able to access an old age pension and a child benefit. As a result, those households facing the greatest risks can receive the most support.

The systems established in South Africa and Brazil have taken decades. Overall, the vast majority of households in South Africa are in receipt of a social grant, with many receiving multiple grants. A very significant proportion of households in Brazil – almost certainly more than half – receive some form of social protection benefit, ensuring that a minimum floor is well on the way to being established.

### **6.2.10 Challenges with community based targeting**

Whilst ‘community based targeting’, in which community members (or elites) choose beneficiaries, is often used as a means to identify the poor and vulnerable on aid programmes and has many advocates, a good understanding of the context and a good deal of time and resources are needed to ensure that local power dynamics do not create inclusion and exclusion errors. There is extensive evidence that targeting through local authorities, unless rigorously facilitated and monitored, can be open to distortion and capture of assistance by powerful local interests. This is seen on both national social protection programmes as well as other emergency assistance programmes implemented in the humanitarian sector. The only country that systematically uses community-based targeting at national scale is Rwanda and, as Figure 6.12 indicates, there are very significant inclusion errors when it is applied in the VUP programme, which is targeted at the poorest 5% or so of the population. Certainly there is extensive evidence of elite capture of resources on transfer programmes in the context of Somalia, where assistance has ended up being targeted according to the interests of dominant clans in South Central Somalia in 2011 and 2012 at the expense of minorities and marginalised groups. When coupled with the difficulties in access in SCS and the scale of programming it was considered not to be a transparent process and has impacted on the view of NGOs by excluded groups<sup>196</sup>.


**Figure 6.12 Proportion of all beneficiaries of Rwanda’s VUP scheme in each wealth quintile<sup>197</sup>**

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<sup>195</sup> ILO 2012

<sup>196</sup> Hedlund et al 2012, Brewin and Dunn 2014

<sup>197</sup> DFID 2013



#### APPROACH TO TARGETING: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK

- Taking into account this comprehensive assessment of targeting mechanisms and approaches and the context of Somalia, on objective grounds the provision of universal categorical access through a lifecycle approach has many advantages over poverty-based selection. Categorical targeting takes into account broad definitions of vulnerability (and not just poverty). Meanwhile the inclusion of the poor is likely to be higher, administrative costs lower, political support more likely to be built, fiduciary risk is less and social cohesion is more likely to be strengthened.
- The nature of informal social protection systems in Somali and Islamic culture<sup>198</sup> is very much in line with a Lifecycle Approach.
- A lifecycle approach is the most appropriate to achieve not only protection but also prevention of falling into poverty for the vulnerable and promotion of economic activity for poor families. A focus on individuals rather than households will also deal with the challenge of determining what constitutes a 'household' in reaching polygamous families and households split across locations. It would encourage equity across clans and wealth groups, building social cohesion which will be critical in fragile state contexts such as Somalia.
- It necessarily requires greater investment but is more effective and generates political support.
- It is not possible for countries to offer universal access for all, or all at the same time. Access will need to be staggered, and hard decisions made about which to prioritise, increasing coverage and adding more programmes over time. Geographic targeting could be combined with universal approaches to further ration coverage in the short to medium term. As a first step to building a comprehensive system, the framework will focus on a small number of programmes, to protect against risks at critical stages of the lifecycle plus covariate shocks. This will be a step towards the United Nations Social Protection Floor<sup>199</sup>.

### 6.3 Building the Social Contract: Entitlements v Discretionary Government Charity

The concept of social protection is based on the notion of a 'social contract' between the state and its citizens. Government legitimacy is based to a significant extent on their ability to ensure that the conditions are in place to enable people to maintain an acceptable standard of living and to protect citizens when autonomous

<sup>198</sup> In Somali tradition there are a number of disadvantaged groups who must not be attacked during conflicts and should be actively protected. These include women, children, sick, elderly, disabled, clergy, and unarmed and neutral groups such as prisoners and travellers.

<sup>199</sup> A Social Protection Floor (SPF) is the first level of a comprehensive national social protection system. It is comprised of: Universal access to essential services (such as health, education, housing, water and sanitation and other services, as nationally defined); Social transfers in cash or in kind, to ensure income security, food security, adequate nutrition and access to these essential services. The UN-SPF incorporates nationally-defined measures to ensure income security during childhood and old age and during times affected by unemployment and disability, alongside measures ensuring access to essential services.

systems fail. A further important macro-impact of social protection is therefore on social cohesion and the strengthening of the national social contract between citizens and government.

In Somalia, as in other fragile states, social protection can hold potential to support state building and realise a peace dividend. Indeed provision of cash transfers can be a relatively straightforward means of building profile of nascent government in the area of service provision. This provides potential for government authorities to make a quick and visible difference to the wellbeing of poor and vulnerable citizens - when compared to the promise of delivering quality health and education services which are very important but which can take a huge amount of time and effort to achieve.

In order to realise these benefits it is essential that the support is identified by citizens as coming from government. The way in which the programme is designed, and communicated to people, will also have a bearing on the effectiveness in this respect. It is vital to have a strong communication strategy, particularly in terms of empowering beneficiaries to monitor the programme and claim their entitlement, and to make them understand that the programme is a national programme when it is likely face-to-face contact of people will be with implementing partners (CSOs and staff of the payment provider).

Social protection can be provided as assistance to the 'deserving' at the discretion of governments, which can be ad hoc, insecure and open to abuse. Or it can be established and understood as an Entitlement, often backed up by Constitutional dispositions (such as the right to Social Security) – meaning that all citizens, including the better-off, have a right to access the benefit.

As entitlements, universal schemes are believed to strengthen the social contract between government and citizens. The same is not said of poverty-targeted programmes. The significant increase in investment in Europe in a universal social protection system based on entitlements following the Second World War has almost certainly contributed to the stability of the region. South Africa used the expansion of its social protection system based on entitlements to help the country overcome divisions caused by apartheid while the IMF has suggested that the introduction of Mauritius's universal pension played a key role in enabling the country to overcome its racial divisions and accept structural reforms as it moved from a mono-crop economy to become Africa's most successful economy<sup>200</sup>. The old age pension in Nepal is believed to have contributed to the country overcoming its civil war, since it was one of the few services that could reach conflict areas and demonstrate a commitment from central government. Following the fall of the former Yugoslavia, the residents of Kosovo were left without access to pensions, with pension funds remaining in Serbia. A universal old age pension was established – under the mandate of the United Nations – which is likely to have helped the residents overcome the scars of civil war<sup>201</sup>.

#### **Entitlements: Conclusions for the framework**

- Developing a system based on entitlements holds real potential to leverage a 'peace dividend' and build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens. From a state-building objective such an approach is preferable.
- The implication is that such an approach requires government engagement from the outset, along with development of policies and strategies such as for communication and accountability.

## **6.4 Achieving Human Development: Conditional versus Unconditional Transfers**

A common means of building political support for poverty-targeted schemes is to make them conditional<sup>202</sup>. Traditionally, conditions have been in the form of labour. In the past ten years there has also been an increase in conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in which families are obliged to send their children to school or attend health clinics; if they do not comply with a minimum level of attendance, they can have their benefits withdrawn. These conditions are imposed despite the absence of robust evidence that they increase

<sup>200</sup> Subramanian and Roy 2001

<sup>201</sup> Gubbels et al 2007

<sup>202</sup> Fiszbein and Schady 2009

school attendance or improve child health and nutrition – indeed the evidence suggests conditionality is not necessary for fulfilling human development goals - see Box 6.13<sup>203</sup>. Most African cash transfers have not verified conditionality, yet evaluations in Kenya and Malawi show effects on human development indicators are still large and significant.

In low income country contexts such as Somalia, it is also important to note the very high costs of monitoring conditionality, and the challenges posed by the huge supply side barriers in accessing government services. Imposing conditions where such barriers to accessing services exist risk penalising households, overstretching services that exist and risk reducing the quality of services provided.

An alternative for Somalia could be to focus not on sanctions but rather on incentivising families to send their children to school where these exist, either via messaging or additional support.

#### **Box 6.13 Do conditions impact on human development?**

There is considerable international debate on the value of imposing conditions that oblige recipients of social protection schemes to send their children to school or attend health clinics. There are some studies that have examined this issue. There remains a lack of conclusive evidence that implementing conditions has any added value in terms of impact on human development over and above what would have been achieved through the provision of a transfer and, indeed, it would seem that the strongest evidence suggests they have no impacts. The results are summarized below:

- In Morocco, Benhassine et al (2013) found no added value of enforcing conditions: unconditional cash transfers were as effective as conditional transfers.
- In Burkina Faso, the best interpretation of the results is that the use of conditions had an impact on enrolment of young children aged 7-8 years who were not enrolled in school prior to the study (Akresh et al 2013). However, among children enrolled at school – including older children – the unconditional transfer seems to have been just as effective.
- In Kenya, no additional value of conditions was found (Ward et al 2009).
- A systematic review was also undertaken by Manley et al (2012) to ascertain whether conditional schemes had an impact on child nutrition. They found that there was no evidence that there was any additional impact.
- A comprehensive review of the evidence for World Bank also found no conclusive evidence on the impacts of conditions over cash (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

#### **Attaching Conditions: Conclusions for the framework**

- Based on current coverage and capacity of education and health services in the country and the challenges with administering and monitoring conditions attached to social protection programmes, CCT are not considered further here.
- The framework should consider incorporating broader messaging into the communication strategy to incentivise families to access services where these exist.

## **6.5 Approaches for Reaching the ‘Working Age’**

The objective of social protection programmes directed towards those of working age should, aside from providing support for consumption needs, be to support them to improve their livelihood or employment situation and thus address the root cause of why they are vulnerable to income shocks. Often – for ideological reasons – governments and donors provide social protection benefits to working age families on condition that they engage in public works employment, so called ‘Labour Intensive Public Works’. However these are not the only policy options for reaching and benefiting families of working age.

<sup>203</sup> Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Kidd *et al* 2011, Manley *et al* 2012, and Kidd and Calder 2012

### 6.5.1 Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW) and social protection

Labour intensive public works programmes can be attractive to governments and donors in low income countries for the supposed ‘win-win’ they present to policy makers by addressing both household poverty and food insecurity as well as contributing to development of sustainable livelihoods for the wider community. Their attraction in Somalia is understandable given the high levels of poverty and unemployment, seasonal livelihood shocks and demand for infrastructure rehabilitation. LIPW is a policy option promoted in a number of studies in Somalia<sup>204</sup> and the main ‘safety net’ being considered by WFP and FAO in the UN Joint Resilience Strategy.

There is also increasing emphasis in developing countries to put in place “graduation” strategies for such schemes, with the aim of changing the household’s circumstances such that they no longer rely on social protection.

This section takes into consideration the evidence and relevant lessons from international experience of LIPW programmes with social protection objectives, especially in neighbouring countries in the region, notably recent WFP cash for work programming in Kenya, the PSNP in Ethiopia and the NUSAF 2 public works component in Northern Uganda<sup>205</sup>. These are similar to recent evaluation findings in Somalia<sup>206</sup>.

International experience<sup>207</sup> has demonstrated that the effectiveness of LIPW programmes as social protection instruments in contexts of chronic poverty is dependent on a number of critical design and implementation factors, notably:

- The adequacy of the value of the wage in relation to the household consumption gap, and the indexing of the transfer to ensure value is not lost due to inflation
- The duration of employment in relation to the duration of the hunger period
- The timing of employment in relation to needs and labour availability
- Repeated support on a multi-annual basis to avoid asset depletion
- The scale of provision in relation to the number of those eligible
- Works condition should not impact negatively on the household
- Regular and predictable payment
- The adoption of appropriate targeting mechanisms to reach those eligible
- The adequacy of administrative and technical personnel – a prerequisite for attaining the previous outcomes

Failure in relation to any of these factors has been found to undermine the effectiveness of interventions in terms of providing social protection benefits or to address chronic poverty, which are required to be regular and predictable and available when needed. International evidence highlights that often these preconditions are not achieved and thus caution should be exercised before going down the road of establishing a LIPW programme in the context of a social protection framework in Somalia:

**Difficulties in dealing with inflation:** Setting and maintaining an adequate wage is a challenge in many programmes, particularly when wages are deliberately set low by donors in order to limit demand for programme participation<sup>208</sup> and when inflation results in a deterioration in the value of a fixed cash wage over time, as documented in Malawi<sup>209</sup> and Ethiopia, where between April and July 2008 the purchasing

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<sup>204</sup> Brewin and Dunn 2014; Gabrielle and Nori 2007

<sup>205</sup> This is based on an analytical report compiled for this purpose by public works expert Dr. Anna McCord. The full report is available from Development Pathways

<sup>206</sup> FAO Evaluation 2013, and a verbal summary of OPM qualitative evaluation of the FAO’s Cash for Work programme in Somalia, the report for which is not yet available. This source is cited as (OPM, personal communication) throughout.

<sup>207</sup> See for example McCord et al, 2013; McCord, 2012; Devereux and Solomon, 2006

<sup>208</sup> Subbarao et al, 2013

<sup>209</sup> Chirwa et al, 2004



power of PSNP wages (and therefore the effective value of the wage rate) fell at nearly 20% a month (Hobson, 2008). The negative implications of low wages for achieving social protection objectives are noted in various studies<sup>210</sup>. Of course a social protection programme provided as unconditional payments would face similar challenges, however it is administratively far easier to index social protection payments to inflation than it is wage rates, which are pegged to the minimum wage in country.

**Limited utility of LIPW infrastructure:** The technical quality, durability and appropriateness of the assets created is a key precondition for potential longer-term livelihoods gains. There is little evidence to indicate that the assets created through LIPW programmes directly promote productivity and livelihoods gains among target groups, or the population more generally, over time. The key constraining factors are;

- Poor choice of assets resulting from limited implementation capacity to analyse community livelihoods strategies and preferences and a limited menu of externally defined options;
- Ad hoc or village level asset selection rather than strategic selection related to livelihoods development planning;
- Poor quality of assets, often constrained by inadequate technical inputs and limited capital budgets; and
- Failure to clarify asset ownership and responsibility and budgets for maintenance over time.

The adoption of predefined menus can undermine perceptions of local ownership and accountability, as well as livelihoods impacts, as was observed in the case of Somalia (FAO, 2013). The adoption of a predetermined list may be a greater risk where there is pressure to conform with agency mandates, and was recognised as a challenge to be addressed in the next phase of the FAO Somalia programme (FAO, 2013).

Indeed there are cases where poor planning of infrastructure has led to negative impacts for pastoral communities and households. A concentration of water points in the wrong place can have serious negative impacts on rangeland. On a recent programme in Uganda the selection of water points was done on a piecemeal basis at village level, to meet the labour demands of the transfer programme rather than by reference to any overall plan to develop the rangeland<sup>211</sup>. There is evidence from Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia that such assets can have an adverse effect on pastoralist livelihoods for example causing depletion of pastures by incoming herders attracted by the rehabilitated water catchment<sup>212</sup>. There is a risk that assets may deliberately be selected to promote particular livelihoods strategies over others, in line with donor or governmental policy preferences, as in the case of the NUSAF programme in Karamoja, Uganda. In the region, LIPW have been used to promote settled agriculture and contribute to the removal of grazing areas from the pastoral system. While this may result in the successful promotion of agricultural productivity, it may at the same time reduce rangeland available to support livestock in the dry season and thereby undermine resilience of pastoralist communities<sup>213</sup>.

**Limited impact on livelihoods:** Public works have been repeatedly introduced to address chronic and cyclical poverty yet programmes are generally not addressing the underlying causes of this vulnerability which are ability to access long-term, productive livelihood opportunities.

Partly this is due to lack of opportunity for households to access repeated employment. A quantitative panel study of the PSNP has found that significant effects on household food security are only discernible after multiple years of programme participation<sup>214</sup>. However a study of 167 programmes identified in 29 sub-Saharan African countries in 2009, found that only 4% offered repeated or ongoing employment to participants, despite the fact that two thirds of the programmes had social protection objectives and were

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<sup>210</sup> Devereux 2002

<sup>211</sup> Bhuvanendra et al, 2013

<sup>212</sup> FAO, 2013

<sup>213</sup> Bhuvanendra et al, 2013

<sup>214</sup> Berhane et al, 2011

intended to support the chronically poor, indicating the limited social protection impact of much programming<sup>215</sup>. Programmes offering only temporary support through a single episode of employment cannot be considered to provide social protection, which is, by definition, characterised by ongoing or seasonal support.

However wage income tends to be directly consumed, particularly where programmes are effectively targeted at the poor, and there is little evidence of programmes resulting in significant accumulation of productive assets, although they can prevent annual distress asset sales and hence reduce disinvestment if implemented in a timely way and on a repeated cyclical basis. Even in the PSNP which provides repeated support to households, and which has been operational since 2005, only 5% of participants have 'graduated' and it is not clear the extent to which this represents sustained movement out of poverty, rather than administrative removal from the programme. Evidence from the PSNP has shown that the provision of complementary inputs, including agricultural extension and microfinance is needed alongside repeated employment over a number of years, for the achievement attainment of any identifiable improvements in livelihoods<sup>216</sup>. This is similar on programmes providing income support without works conditions.

In a few cases, such as India's National Employment Guarantee Scheme, there is evidence of positive impact on sustainable livelihoods where there are real synergies in terms of the work undertaken and resilience. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that the Indian scheme is an entitlement available to all rural residents, rather than only targeted at the poor. The combination of asset creation and employment has however not in most instances been sufficient to have a sustained impact on livelihoods.

**Impact of fulfilling the 'works' condition:** Unlike cash transfer provision, participation in the works component has an opportunity cost to the household, in terms of domestic or other activities foregone, which may have significant adverse implications in terms of withdrawal from pre-existing livelihoods and domestic activities, and also significantly reduce the overall benefit of programme participation<sup>217</sup>. Analysis of income foregone data in two programmes in South Africa suggested that for workers who had given up alternative income, the net values of the wage provided was only 30% to 60% of the gross transfer<sup>218</sup>. As a result, the cost-effectiveness of workfare programmes is significantly reduced. On PSNP the work component timing meant in some cases productivity as a result of enrolment on the programme went down, creating an increased need for food purchases and risk of dependency<sup>219</sup>.

There is worrying evidence that participation in public works can harm women and child nutrition resulting from the calorific expenditure of the work requirement, and reduction in time for care of children<sup>220</sup>. There is emerging evidence that such programmes can cause broader damage to children, including causing them to withdraw from school and engage in labour<sup>221</sup>, or to carry out domestic care activities previously performed by adult labour, reallocated<sup>222</sup>.

The seasonality of provision is also key, in terms of both when support is required, and when labour is available. In Somalia the works condition on LIPW programmes has previously entailed calling pastoralists back for registration and employment, disrupting migration patterns when whole households are obliged to remain in a particular location in order to work, and also requiring labour inputs at the time of minimum physical strength<sup>223</sup>. Programme participation has been found to result in families dividing for the duration

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<sup>215</sup> McCord and Slater, 2009

<sup>216</sup> Berhane et al, 2011

<sup>217</sup> van de Valle, 1998, Devereux and Solomon, op cit

<sup>218</sup> Ahmed et al 2007; McCord 2012

<sup>219</sup> Berhane et al 2011

<sup>220</sup> Although there is little empirical evidence exploring this question (McCord, 2012), this concern was raised by participants in relation to the FAO programme in Somalia (OPM, op cit).

<sup>221</sup> Tafere and Woldehanna 2012

<sup>222</sup> McCord 2012

<sup>223</sup> FAO 2013

of programme employment in some cases, with male pastoralists continuing traditional migration patterns and leaving women and children in fixed locations to participate in the programme, which can impact negatively on nutrition<sup>224</sup>.

It is likely that India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) may have less negative impacts since, as an entitlement, people can access the programme whenever they desire. This is likely to reduce the opportunity costs of engaging on the scheme and may make the programme a better complement to a strategy aimed at increasing employment and income-generating opportunities for participants.

**High propensity for exclusion errors:** These programmes by definition exclude households without working age labour, and those with high dependency ratios, highlighted in this study and in many similar studies worldwide as being some of the poorest and most vulnerable in society.

There are numerous cases of benefits being captured by powerful interests. This can be both in terms of registering as a beneficiary on the programme, and decision making concerning the type and location of infrastructure to be completed, meaning the most vulnerable may not benefit. There is often elite determination of asset selection to their own benefit. This has been seen in Somalia in the CVMG evaluation, where outputs were co-opted by majority clans.

Where employment is rationed and allocated autonomously, allocation may go to dominant social or ethnic groups, reinforcing patterns of exclusion and undermining the social protection function of the wage. Targeting challenges are particularly acute where access to LIPW employment is subject to significant rationing, due to limited programme size, rather than available to all, or a majority of those who seek it. This was found in the recent evaluation of the FAO Somalia programme, where dominant clan groups were registered for work and ethnic minority Bantu population were excluded<sup>225</sup>.

### 6.5.2 Alternatives to LIPW for those of working age

There are however alternatives to such 'workfare' programmes for social protection systems aiming to support families of working age to improve employment, including direct income support with links to incentives and training to work<sup>226</sup>, and other social transfers not tied to labour provision.

#### 'Graduation' programmes:

These programmes, such as the BRAC's TUP programme and Chile Solidario provide additional and often-intensive livelihoods support to working age recipients alongside regular predictable income support. The type of support provided, which includes psychosocial support and livelihoods advice, training and assets for income generation, can be very helpful to those unable to participate and can lead to some increase in incomes as well as building the skills and resilience of recipients. Increasingly, other Poor Relief programmes are providing similar assistance, such as Brazil's Bolsa Familia scheme and Ethiopia's Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP).

However there are two main lessons here, which may limit the applicability of such programmes in Somalia in the short-term:

- The impacts, despite the intensive support, can be very modest. An evaluation of the BRAC TUP programme indicates that, using 2007 values, the average increase in earnings from the participants' income generating activities was only Tk.1,755 per year, with annual per capita expenditure increasing by Tk.806.<sup>227</sup> This was a mere 4.5% of the poverty line. This increase in income is nowhere near sufficient to enable participants to escape even extreme poverty. Participants are not

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<sup>224</sup> Tefera, pers com

<sup>225</sup> FAO 2014

<sup>226</sup> For example young people interviewed want to buy equipment, tools and seeds to increase agricultural yield, or invest in alternative livelihoods.

<sup>227</sup> Bandiera et al 2012

homogeneous and some participants will do very well however others will struggle. Certain factors including a supportive partner, small number of dependents and previous business experience are all factors, which can impact upon success. Evidence shows that sustainability of gains is not assured for all participants, and those who struggle may drop down once the transfer is removed<sup>228</sup>. This is because participants still experienced shocks and stresses, including illness, unemployment, continued costs of childrearing or even the birth of another child. Without access to the security of a social protection transfer, their only option would have been to draw down on their assets.<sup>229</sup>

- It is also extremely difficult – and expensive – to provide complementary support to social security recipients at a national scale. BRAC’s TUP and *Chile Solidario* are small-scale schemes reaching relatively few families and, as a result, are affordable. There is no evidence that Ethiopia has yet managed to provide large-scale additional support to the recipients of PSNP despite its strong commitment to “graduation.”

In reality, the best approach may be to help recipients of social protection schemes to access other mainstream labour market programmes where they can receive training, loans and other support.

### **Unconditional Cash Transfers:**

Well-designed unconditional cash transfers can enable families to engage more actively in the labour market, through various means:

**Social protection provides households with investment capital:** Social protection is often used to invest in a household’s own income generating activities. In Mexico’s *Oportunidades* programme, 14% of transfers were invested in productive assets, including animals and land;<sup>230</sup> in Nicaragua, recipients increased their investments in agricultural equipment;<sup>231</sup> and, in Brazil, the *Bolsa Familia* scheme has increased the probability of beneficiaries investing in small businesses<sup>232</sup>. This can be further enhanced by beneficiaries having greater access to credit since the scheme acts as collateral<sup>233</sup>.

**Social protection provides breathing space:** The guarantee of a regular transfer also changes the worldview of recipients. It provides them with a minimum income platform that infuses their lives with predictability. No longer do they need to worry about whether they will be able to feed their children the next day or week. Instead, the guaranteed receipt of a social transfer offers people security and the knowledge that they can provide their children with the basic essentials of life for the foreseeable future, as well as keep them in school. As a result, families can plan ahead, invest in income generating activities or look for employment. Indeed, there is evidence of families receiving social transfers showing enhanced entrepreneurial behaviour by being more willing to invest in riskier but higher return activities<sup>234</sup>. Indeed, even schemes directed at old people, people with disabilities and other particularly vulnerable people have led to recipients investing in small enterprises, with examples found in countries such as South Africa, Nepal, Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda<sup>235</sup>.

**Social protection can support job seeking:** Households receiving South Africa’s Child Support Grant are 18% more likely to be searching for jobs than non-recipients<sup>236</sup>. In both Mexico and South Africa, it was found that recipients were more likely to look for work because they were better able to afford bus fares and

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<sup>228</sup> Krishna et al 2010

<sup>229</sup> C.f. Huda 2012

<sup>230</sup> Gertler et al 2007

<sup>231</sup> Maluccio 2007

<sup>232</sup> Lichand 2010

<sup>233</sup> Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina 2007, Neves et al 2009 and IEG 2011

<sup>234</sup> Devereux 2002

<sup>235</sup> Ardington and Lund 1995, Devereux *et al* 2005, Neves *et al* 2009, Uprety 2010, Covarrubias *et al* 2011, and Bukuluki and Watson 2012

<sup>236</sup> Samson 2009

presentable clothes<sup>237</sup>.

When formulating social protection policy for the working age families in developing countries, a better focus would be on helping families access work, whether this represents employment or income-generating activities. Those families of working age can be helped in other ways to enter the labour market through the establishment of a Lifecycle Approach to Social protection, since all individuals are part of a household unit. There is evidence that providing income support to older people, for example, can contribute to childcare for grandchildren, freeing up mothers' time. Governments do not want to provide long-term transfers to adults who they believe should be actively engaged in the labour market; they fear creating dependency. Yet, the difference between this and a child benefit is minimal. Both are transfers to working-age families. Yet, child benefits do not generate similar calls for "graduation" and there are no concerns with children being "dependent." Therefore, if countries want to provide working-age families with a long-term platform from which they can engage more effectively in the labour market, including their own income-generating activities, they could provide child benefits rather than Poor Relief, to prevent people being removed from programmes even when they are still living in or vulnerable to poverty.

#### **Reaching the poor and vulnerable of working age: Conclusions for the framework**

- The dominant issue influencing the effectiveness of PWP in the region is that of adequate investment in contextual appraisal, and flexibility of programme design to accommodate specific local social relations, labour market conditions and livelihoods. This is necessary in order to ensure in the first instance that the programme does not have adverse implications or exacerbate existing social or economic problems, and in the second, that it has the potential to confer meaningful social protection benefits and food security gains to the intended target group. To achieve this programme design needs to ensure the provision of employment of the requisite duration and seasonality, which may vary from location to location, together with timely payment, and this needs to reach the intended beneficiary group. Only if these basic challenges of relevant design based on livelihoods analysis, provision of appropriately timed employment and payment, and effective targeting can be met, is a PWP providing social protection benefits. Localised socio-economic analysis, programme design flexibility and targeting all represent significant challenges in the Somali context. This represents a major obstacle to programme quality and accountability and it is unlikely that significant livelihoods benefits will accrue.
- Benefits conferred by a simpler cash transfer programming approach in the Somali context are likely to be greater and more cost effective.
- A better policy focus would be to help working age individuals engage in the labour market, which, in many cases, is best achieved by poor families having consistent access to a social security benefit. Participation on a social security scheme and active engagement in the labour force should not be seen as incompatible; rather, they are mutually supportive.

## **6.6 Dealing with Covariate Risk: Long-term Social Protection and Crisis Modifiers**

### **6.6.1 A lifecycle approach to addressing covariate risks**

Given the frequency of covariate shocks in Somalia it is important that a social protection framework supports households to manage these risks. The research highlighted that a number of stakeholders are considering time bound safety nets to enable households to deal with the covariate shocks mentioned.

As outlined above long-term, regular and predictable income support programmes are essential to enable management of a number of the risks of vulnerable groups identified - the repeated idiosyncratic shocks, enabling households and individuals to better cope with and '*absorb*' shocks and stresses.

However long-term cash transfers provided to vulnerable households and individuals through an Inclusive Lifecycle Approach to enable management of idiosyncratic shocks will also support these households to better manage and mitigate impact of climatic shocks and seasonal stresses. Firstly, such a programme provides a guaranteed source of income to households, which is not climate or season dependent and which

<sup>237</sup> Marcus 2007; Ardington et al 2009

contributes to consumption in these lean periods, mitigating impact. Secondly, providing this every month, not only in the lean months, should give households ability to plan ahead and make provision for such cyclical risks. In Kenya and Ethiopia programmes have shown the potential for regular cash transfers to contribute to resilience of households affected by both covariate and household level shocks<sup>238</sup>. Evidence at the household level is stronger for the HSNP (providing unconditional transfers) than for the PSNP (where some assistance is provided as public works). Similarly in terms of conflict, the source of income would continue for households regardless of whether they became displaced, enabling them to better adapt to conflict and insecurity.

It is therefore likely that a long-term cash transfer to vulnerable groups would have a similar effect to a 'seasonal 'safety net' in this respect in that for those enrolled in the programme it will provide an income floor protecting a minimum level of consumption for affected households and reducing the need to resort to negative coping.

Of course the effectiveness will depend on the coverage of the population by the social protection system, the size of the transfer and the scale of the shock. Additional, short-term, seasonal safety nets would be necessary in the event of a severe crisis, both to 'top up' benefits of existing recipients and to reach a wider coverage of the population who are vulnerable to climatic shocks than afforded through the long-term social protection programmes. In particular such a scheme could be important to prevent peaks in acute malnutrition. But it is the long-term FLOOR that will address the fundamental underlying issues.

#### **6.6.2 Emerging Interest in Crisis Modifiers**

In terms of provision of additional support during crisis periods, this will require that resources are prior committed and available immediately. There is growing interest in this idea of 'crisis modifiers', though limited international experience or evidence to date.

**Contingency funds:** The PSNP has within it a risk financing mechanism which is not part of the PSNP budget and can only be activated twice within the 5 year cycle. The triggers for the risk financing mechanism are linked to the early warning systems in the country. 2011 was the first time for this facility to be activated and meant that significant numbers of people were added onto the programme for support through the risk financing mechanism. There have been several challenges identified. The early warning systems in country don't always work together and can contradict each other, which can cause delays in the triggering of the financing mechanism. Overall the process was complicated and lengthy partly due to the fact that it is funded partly through World Bank loans, which requires international purchasing. There were also several ministries involved - the coordination/management structure for the programme will be revised in the second phase where the programme will sit under the office of the Prime Minister.

**Effective systems:** There is also a school of thought growing that considers that the most efficient and effective means of scaling up humanitarian/preventative assistance at times of crisis may be to link these safety nets to existing programmes, to take advantage of the underlying systems and capacities. Thus the long-term social protection system is also essential for this. In Northern Kenya on phase 2 of the HSNP, the idea is to sign everyone in drought prone counties up to a bank account, although only 20% will receive regular cash payments on the long-term programme. The idea is that others can receive payments quickly in an emergency. But, they've still to prove it can work.

**Targeting:** It is important to bear in mind targeting strategies that allow for scale up of this additional 'safety net' based on early indications of need. Thought will need to be given to criteria that are sensitive to increasing vulnerability and that are easy to verify. In previous emergencies in Somalia nutrition targeting has been used to some effect, however it is limited by the presence of services and doesn't provide a timely indicator of approaching crisis. The evaluation of the cash and voucher programming in 2011-12 questioned whether a geographically targeted blanket distribution would have been better at reaching the most

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<sup>238</sup> Merttens et al 2013

vulnerable, at least in the initial months, to include the excluded minorities, in this context and this will need to be considered. The targeting process in the PSNP emergency response in 2011 was also equally lengthy - the HSNPII process in Kenya maybe looked into for the second phase.

**Addressing Covariate Risk: Conclusions for the framework**

- Need to address both covariate and lifecycle risks; and consider design of programmes which could address both, as well as the need for additional safety net programmes during times of food security shock and humanitarian need.
- Long-term programmes are likely to be effective at addressing a variety of idiosyncratic shocks as well as reducing vulnerability to covariate shocks and contributing to building resilience. Short-term 'safety net' programmes are likely to be needed in addition to this, to deal wide the wider needs within these households and others in the community that are created by covariate shocks.

## 7. FRAMEWORK & RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the proposed social protection framework comprising programme options for each of the three Zones along with recommendations. In Somaliland and Puntland the emphasis is on government engagement whilst in SCS the aim will be to move away from recurrent, short-term humanitarian programmes to something more predictable and long-term. The framework will provide a systematic approach to addressing the issues affecting the poor and vulnerable groups.

The main things to bear in mind are that i) it will take decades to establish a comprehensive framework in any context and particularly in this context and ii) this means that it is impossible to address all of the constraints and vulnerabilities identified, adequately or simultaneously. It will require hard choices to be made. **A national policy and strategy, should one be developed, can of course go beyond this to set a broader vision for social protection, however in the short to medium term the options that should be prioritised are a small number of simple social transfer programmes.** The Principles on which the proposed framework is based are listed in Box 7.1.

### Box 7.1 – Principles of the Framework

- Based on the principles of protection, prevention, promotion and transformation
- Simplicity over complexity
- Based on social transfers and mostly cash transfers
- Long-term income support through an Inclusive Life Cycle Approach, addressing structural vulnerabilities with capacity to provide an additional and predictable safety net for rapid scale up and preventative action during covariate shocks
- Establishing a minimum income floor and responding to different dimensions of exclusion and deprivation, addressing both economic and social vulnerabilities and Prioritising unconditional transfers with incentives not conditions
- Considering alternatives to 'workfare' for families of working age

The important thing in establishing a framework is therefore to agree upon the vision of the sector for 15-20 years' time, in order to set the path for future interventions as funds and capacities develop. In the short-term it will be important to accept that the framework needs to prioritise those interventions which are (relatively) easy to design and implement, generate success stories and political buy-in and thus greater resources over time, and that don't cause social conflict.

It will be important that the framework is rolled out in phases with the initial phase being more of a pilot phase that allows for successes to be generated to build political and citizen support, lessons learning for adjustments, for capacity to be built and for funds to be made available. It is vital that those intending to invest in the framework, which in the first instance will be donors and UN agencies, are committed to a long-term vision, and to a framework and interventions that go beyond agency mandates and pet projects. This has to be the starting point, otherwise the framework will never move forward as it needs to address people's real needs.

The programme options presented therefore include:

**Phase One** - considered the immediate priorities based on what can be considered feasible in the short to medium term (three - five years); and

**Phase Two** - the longer-term requirements for building a more inclusive framework (10-15 years). It includes recommended next steps for consideration by UNICEF and other stakeholders in order to move forward with developing options set out in the frameworks.

These are in line with the national vision for social protection thus far developed.

**Proposed Vision for the Framework:** By 2030, Somalia will have in place the foundations of an inclusive social protection system of income transfers for families, that protects consumption of the most vulnerable citizens,



prevents a fall further into poverty caused by shocks, promotes human development and productive livelihoods and which complements and adds value to other socio-economic development policy.

## 7.1 Framework Options through an Inclusive Lifecycle Approach

An Inclusive lifecycle approach to Social Protection will protect against the risks and shocks facing particular core groups identified as vulnerable. These groups are common to all societies and to many social protection systems around the world.

Covariate shocks are a particular concern in Somalia and need to be factored into the framework. However this should not lead us to consider Somalia as fundamentally different to other countries or lose sight of the fact that the day-to-day lifecycle risks and vulnerabilities are similar in all contexts and all societies. Sooner or later, all national systems begin to evolve towards a lifecycle approach.

**Whilst the intensity and nature of covariate shocks differs between locations and between livelihood groups, these lifecycle risks are common to all Zones and all communities.** This means that a common and overarching framework can be designed for Somaliland, Puntland and SCS. It has the huge benefit of standardising design features and systems to simplify processes whilst still being owned and implemented relatively independently by authorities in autonomous regions. It also provides the operational structures upon which a safety net to better deal with covariate (climatic) shocks can begin to be tested.

**For the same reason the framework doesn't develop different programmes for particular livelihood groups such as IDPs.** In the first instance it is important to get the basics right, and to build the foundations of a lifecycle system, for all groups since all suffer the same lifecycle risks. It is also important not to pit livelihood groups against each other in this context. It will be possible to direct these programmes to serve the needs of particular livelihood groups according to the geographic areas selected in Phase One, with rigorous monitoring to determine similarities and differential impacts to inform Phase Two. ***Therefore it is vital to get away from agency mandates and target groups.***

A lifecycle approach has to start somewhere and as mentioned above, it will be impossible to begin all programmes or meet all needs at once. Rather these will need to be prioritised, and some form of further targeting/rationing of these programmes will need to be considered.

Implementing these programmes will establish and operationalise basic systems for identification, registration, record keeping, payments, monitoring and grievance processes whilst serving to address some of the most urgent needs for social protection. These systems will serve as a platform for delivery of new and progressive programmes over time.

This framework has embedded the principles of child protection at its centre. There are multiple social protection mechanisms that can counteract child poverty – as children are part of and are cared for by families and kinship networks. As well as programmes benefiting children directly there is extensive evidence that programmes targeting other groups can confer a variety of benefits for children. The aim should be to develop all programmes to be child sensitive, in other words that are designed in such a way as to confer benefits to children where possible, and as a minimum seek to do no harm. The importance of indirect as well as the direct pathways for income support to contribute to health and education outcomes must be considered<sup>239</sup>.

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<sup>239</sup>In Kenya the positive impacts of HSNP on school performance are not driven by increased educational expenditure or school attendance but by improved psycho- social experience. Arriving at school better fed, presentable, and adequately equipped is reported to be improving children's confidence and capacity to concentrate.

#### Box 7.2 UNICEF Principles of Child Sensitive Social Protection

**Children at the core** (very vulnerable and the key to reducing intergenerational transmission of poverty)

- **Direct and indirect impacts** (since part of a household)
- **Avoid adverse impacts** on children and reduce or mitigate direct social and economic risks
- **Intervene as early as possible** in order to prevent irreversible impairment or harm to children
- **Consider age and gender specific risks** and vulnerabilities
- Mitigate the effects of shocks, exclusion and poverty on **families**
- Make special provision to reach children who are particularly **vulnerable and excluded**
- Include the **voices and opinions** of children, their caregivers and youth in programme design

#### 7.1.1 Option 1: Child Grant

Childhood is associated with multiple vulnerabilities – social and economic dependence; a lack of voice; and health vulnerabilities. Indicators of child health and wellbeing across the globe consistently demonstrate the disproportionate impact of poverty and shocks on the wellbeing of children. Impacts of poverty felt in childhood, particularly stunting and lack of education, are critical to future development and contribute to poverty traps.

Children are therefore a key target group to benefit from social protection programmes. There are particular groups of children who are acknowledged to be more at risk on account of, for example, having lost one or more parents, those living in poverty, or living on the street. However it could be argued that given the extent of chronic and extreme poverty, lack of services and multiple, repeating and overlapping shocks including the impact of the long-term conflict on children, that in Somalia all children can be considered vulnerable<sup>240</sup>.

**Phase One:** A Child Grant should be rolled out as a pilot programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration upon launch of the programme. On this programme child age is likely to be the defining criteria for entry to and exit from the programme. Whilst lack of formal birth registration or identification documents will create a challenge this is not insurmountable.

Children face different risks between conception to two years, during infancy, during primary school and during adolescence. Whilst the needs of all children are important, given capacity and resources it will be important to start somewhere and decisions will need to be made on which age-group to prioritise:

- **Children 0 – 2 years or 0 – 4 years:** a Child Grant reaching caregivers of infants and very young children has potential to support families to manage the impact of the birth on family income whilst supporting improved caregiving practices, early childhood nutrition and cognitive development.
- **Children 6 - 11 years:** for children over the age of five there is potential for a Child Grant to contribute to food security, nutrition and schooling. If there is a desire to compare impacts to those on a school feeding programme (Option Two) then this pilot may be preferable.

The proportion of families fitting these criteria will be high and it may be necessary to ration eligibility further. Rather than linking the Child Grant eligibility to low incomes given the difficulties mentioned with poverty targeting, the following additional criteria could be applied:

- **Orphans and Vulnerable Children:** the research highlighted that the rate of orphanhood (single or double) is likely to be quite high in Somalia. One way of rationing coverage of the programme would be to focus in the first instance on children in particularly vulnerable family circumstances – i.e.

<sup>240</sup> Indeed the definition for 'OVC' provided by PASWE (2013) includes 'those orphaned or abandoned, living in extreme poverty, living with disability, affected by conflict, abused by parents or care givers, malnourished due to poverty, parents who are HIV-positive, and those who are marginalized or discriminated against'

‘Orphans and Vulnerable Children’. Care would need to be taken in developing criteria for OVC which are easy to identify and do not create stigma.

- **Affluence testing:** instead of a focus on finding the poorest, it could be easier to remove the small percentage that can easily be considered wealthiest. One way achieve this could be to remove those families where the head(s) of the household work in the formal sector – though this will not narrow down the scale of coverage by very much.
- **Benefit capping:** the value of the grant can be capped to a maximum number of children per family. Given large household sizes and potential for non-traditional family units this may be considered appropriate for Somalia. However it should be pointed out that there is no evidence of systems providing a benefit per child to create ‘perverse incentives’ to have more children. Rather the benefit would be financial.
- **Geographical targeting:** The programme could be rolled out in a sufficiently restricted geographical area so as to ensure sufficient coverage of eligible families within the targeted zone.

**Phase Two:** Assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, the Child Grant should be progressively rolled out over several years in a phased implementation from district to district. Once coverage has been achieved for one age group, the programme could be progressively expanded to account for needs of other age groups.

The programme would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally delivering payments every month but considering logistical challenges this could be arranged bi-monthly or even quarterly. Going forward this programme could work through on-demand registration or periodic community-based rounds of registration. In the future registration could be linked to a formal birth registration process should one be introduced, to health centres (in the case of pregnant women) or to school enrolment (in areas where services exist)<sup>241</sup>. This would build complementarities between the objectives of social protection and wider social policies.

The Child Grant should not be made conditional on health seeking behaviour or on school attendance. However complementary messaging could be developed to promote these outcomes amongst beneficiaries, as an integral part of a programme’s communication strategy.

### 7.1.2 Option Two: Old Age Grant

Older people globally are acknowledged to be highly vulnerable to falling into poverty. Small shocks such as illness, and the growing frailty of older people themselves, reduces their ability to work and can throw households into poverty. Old people then become dependent on others in the household or community for their basic needs.

Based on international evidence an income support programme for older people will generate strong citizen support and political buy in, whilst being financially manageable. Somalia has a youth bulge and as other countries will experience an aging population in the future, the proportion of the population who is older is projected to increase<sup>242</sup>. Besides enabling older people to support themselves with dignity, it is well recognised that such transfers are invested in the household, with benefits for working age families. The state taking on the role of duty bearer for older people removes their dependence on others in the community and is proven to support households to improve economic potential<sup>243</sup>.

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<sup>241</sup> This wouldn't mean that grants would be conditional upon school attendance- rather that services become more joined up so that the school registration process could be one channel by which families also register their child for the child grant.

<sup>242</sup> People over 50 made up 7.9% of the population in 2010, by 2030 this is projected to be over 10% (UN population data)

<sup>243</sup> In South Africa households in receipt of a pension had higher labour force participation

Of particular interest is the extensive evidence that programmes targeting older people can bring multiple benefits to children in their care, given the extent of orphan hood in Somalia and likelihood that a large number of children are cared for by grandparents<sup>244</sup> and can also enable parents to enter into the labour market. Evidence from PASWE indicates the extent to which OVC are often cared for by family members including grandparents<sup>245</sup>.

**Phase One:** An Old Age Grant should be rolled out as a pilot programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration upon the launch. It is a relatively straightforward programme to implement, having clear eligibility criteria that cannot be easily falsified and clear exit criteria. Whilst lack of formal birth registration or identification documents will create a challenge this is not insurmountable and experience with pastoral populations in Uganda have shown that proxies for age can be developed straightforwardly.

Normal practice is to have age as the defining criteria. Fifty five years and above seems reasonable in the short-term, given the life expectancy in Somalia and comparability with other old age grants in similar contexts. On a similar programme in Uganda, the age threshold for eligibility on the national programme was set at 60 but was reduced to 55 in Karamoja region. Age was also set at 55 on Phase One of the HSNP. If setting the age threshold higher it will be important to acknowledge that the proportion of those benefiting could be the better off older people, since they are perhaps more likely to live for longer. If the aim is inclusivity, this age limit shouldn't be increased.

There are further ways to ration coverage, which can be considered:

- **Limit coverage geographically in the first instance:** In selecting the pilot locations it should also be possible to select an area of intervention that is expected to correlate with high poverty levels. Whilst no thorough household survey exists for Somalia it can be expected that rural locations, and IDP informal settlements in urban areas will be some of the most deprived. This is considered the preferred option.
- **Vary eligibility thresholds for men and women:** The programme could set the age threshold lower for women than for men, taking into account the increased vulnerabilities facing women. This was the case in Nepal, for example, for a number of years before programmes were made comparable. It adds a further layer of complexity to the programme but should not be insurmountable.
- **Make eligibility further contingent on low incomes:** This approach has been followed by some countries, in the early stages of rolling out senior citizens' grants. However given the difficulties mentioned with poverty targeting especially in this context and the need to focus on simplicity and reducing tensions, it is considered that this should be avoided if possible. By making the programme eligible to all above the age threshold in the community this will include community leaders and will generate more support.

**Phase Two:** Assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, this programme should be rolled out over several years in a phased implementation from district to district. In the long-term the age criteria should continue to reflect the reality of living conditions and average lifespan in Somalia. As with the Child Grant, this would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally once per month though perhaps less frequently taking into account logistical challenges. Going forward this programme could work through self-registration or periodic community-based rounds of registration.

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<sup>244</sup> In South Africa, children living with an older person receiving the pension will be 3-5 cm taller

<sup>245</sup> PASWE 2013 (the report recommends social protection for caregivers of OVC)

### 7.1.3 Option Three: Disability Grant

There is a real need to support this demographic group in Somalia and this will be an important component of the framework to develop as capacity grows. Providing people living with disabilities a predictable income will relieve the burden on families and the wider community and is likely to also free up time of working adults, particularly women, to pursue other livelihood tasks.

Nevertheless such a programme can be challenging to implement because it can be difficult to identify eligible individuals without national definitions of what constitutes a disability, different levels of disability, and how this is verified.

**Phase One:** No implementation is proposed, rather this time should be used to establish efficient and effective operating systems under the Child Grant and Old Age Grant. During this time the government can also further define national policy on disability. However it is proposed that a disability study be conducted – to ascertain the magnitude of disability and types of needs.

**Phase Two:** Introduce a cash transfer for people living with disabilities, once the operational infrastructure for delivering social transfers is in place and this can be done with the same organisation structures. As above this would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally once per month. This would work through self-registration, perhaps with an initial phase of mass registration upon the launch.

### 7.1.4 Option Four: Safety net addressing covariate risk

The programme options implemented through the inclusive Lifecycle Approach will not only deal with the chronic issues **but should also act as an income floor to prevent some of the more acute issues brought about by covariate shocks such as drought**. It is envisaged that the support provided on these programmes will reduce the need to sell assets and potentially also enabling households to replace certain lost assets, so as to recover more quickly from shocks.

Nevertheless it is highly likely that further short-term assistance will be needed during times of acute crisis, both to 'top up' grants provided to existing social protection recipients as well as to scale up coverage to include others in the community who are not enrolled on a social protection programme and also vulnerable to the effects of the shock. It is envisaged that the long-term social protection programme(s) will provide the delivery and administrative systems to make this a reality. **This is a very new and innovative approach, just recently being trialled in neighbouring countries and with limited experience of success to draw from.**

**Phase One:** A pilot temporary safety net programme or fund, that is linked to the long-term social protection system and that aims to address covariate risk, should be designed and funds committed from humanitarian and development partners:

- The focus should be on climatic shocks (ideally drought) since this is of greater predictability than conflict or disease, easier to develop recognisable triggers and because it is more appropriate to try and test this for the first time in a secure environment.
- A taskforce should be set up of all those involved in the delivery including the private sector service provider.
- Funds will need to be pre-committed to and/or ring-fenced by those involved – development partners and agencies – so they can be drawn down upon in an emergency. In this first instance the value of the fund can be calculated taking into account the size of the population in the pilot project zone, the likely scale of future food insecurity based on FSNAU trends data and an assumption that (in the worst case scenario) the safety net will need to make up 100% of the household food basket.

- The safety net will make use of the same administrative processes as the long-term lifecycle cash transfers and therefore should be implemented in the same location as the pilot long-term programmes. **It is recommended that this initial pilot be linked to the long-term programmes in the North rather than in SCS since the south is unpredictable and with the real new radical nature of this it is important to have as smooth a process as possible.** A district or districts should therefore be selected for piloting of the long-term lifecycle transfers that are relatively certain to experience water shortage within the next three-to-five years.
- If piloting in SCS is a priority for agencies, care should be taken to establish the longer-term programme in those areas, which are most stable (which it is recognised may not correlate with areas considered to be in greatest need) and where access and oversight are more likely.
- For rapid mobilisation, as much as possible should be done ahead of the emergency. It is envisaged that the pilot will follow the approach taken recently on the HSNP Phase Two, registering the details of all households in the targeted districts into the social protection system MIS. An MOU should be established with the payment service provider to provide the necessary surge capacity. It may be possible to go one step further and register them for the payment mechanism also.
- The processes for scale up and the roles and responsibilities of all to be involved should be mapped out ahead of time. Early warning systems will need to be agreed upon along with the thresholds for drawing down up on the funds. This should follow the principle of no regrets. For speed and simplicity, the well-established food and nutrition security data collection and projections available through FSNAU will be most appropriate. If there is a requirement to be more careful with the use of funds, further indicators could be considered (e.g., herd migration, rainfall data) however such data will need to be collected and interpreted.
- A strategy for targeting resources in the event of a crisis will also need to be agreed upon. As mentioned in Section Six the ideal could be blanket targeting of all households registered in the affected zone but this will depend on resources and the size of the transfer to be provided.

### **Considering Programmes for Livelihood Recovery**

There is a limit to what any such social protection or safety net can achieve in the context of severe climatic shocks and the likelihood of large-scale asset depletion. For dealing with the loss of assets on such a large scale, the best approach could be compensation payments and the best product for this is likely to be insurance.

Weather indexed insurance is perhaps the most exciting contender for supporting livelihoods recovery from climatic shock. This is private insurance funded by individual contributions and underwritten by insurance houses. As such it doesn't qualify as social insurance and this, the emerging nature of the product, and the need for simplicity and focus means it has not been included in the social protection framework.

However In future, if such a system was a national initiative, underwritten by government and supported by tax contributions and with the poorest being subsidised, there is no reason why such insurance couldn't be considered a social insurance mechanism in line with contributory pensions and life insurance. This is given further consideration in the recommendations below.

### **7.1.5 Potential Option Five: Support for youth and those of working age – social protection linked to labour market interventions**

Given the youth bulge and worries about the impact of a generation of disaffected young people on the security situation, dealing with the issues of lack of opportunity and employment for young people are becoming and are likely to continue to be politically of interest.

However it is important to inject some realism here – **these problems facing young people are much bigger than social transfers can address alone**. What is crucial for those of working age is access to labour market interventions. This could be through things such as appropriate training and inputs to improve viability of traditional rural livelihoods; or appropriate training, skill development and access to investments to develop an enterprise. At present the labour opportunities are in cities and it is inevitable that people will migrate, so one intervention could be to develop programmes that equip young people with the skills for successful economic migration and to find jobs<sup>246</sup>. **However these needs are more appropriately dealt with under employment and labour policy than through social protection interventions**. As highlighted in Section Six, a social protection programme can complement such interventions so as to help young people to access these opportunities. It is important to clearly separate out the financial support provided through a social protection sector from these broader labour market interventions.

**Phase One:** Linking social protection to complementary labour market interventions, similar to what is seen in the ‘graduation’ projects of BRAC and other organisations, is a nice idea and can and should be looked into when capacity has been built. However it will be important not to underestimate either the costs or the challenges of these approaches.

Should UNICEF choose to promote this as an Option under the framework it will be important to start small, and to begin in a location conducive to success – i.e. an urban environment where the complementary services (financial services, access to markets, training) are more likely to exist. Partnerships would also need to be built with complementary services and organisations. A market assessment and full understanding of labour market opportunities for low skilled young men and women would be essential. It should also be expected that a number of those enrolled in the programme may not succeed and are likely to require long-term support through social transfers.

**Phase Two:** Depending on the outcomes from the pilot study further decisions can be made about the costs and benefits of investing separately and specifically in a system of social transfers targeting young people, linked to wider government and NGO labour market interventions.

#### **Other ways to benefit young people through a Lifecycle Approach**

In fact, it may be better in the short-term to invest in other transfers in the Lifecycle Framework, which will reach a lot more people and have potential to benefit youth and adults of working age indirectly:

- The establishment of social protection pumping cash into communities will increase disposable income of households for purchasing goods and services. Providing young people in these communities with the wherewithal – through skills, access to finance and/or a livelihood grant – could enable them to take advantage of these opportunities.
- Many young people in Somalia are also parents, thus their households are also benefiting. With this in mind it may be that the best use of funds in the short to medium term is to consider the problems that the ‘next generation’ of young people will face in 5-15 years’ time and to focus on social transfers to meet the needs of children.

#### **Labour Intensive Public Works Supporting People of Working Age**

Given the extensive international evidence and from LIPW programmes in Somalia it is considered that neither the rationale nor the evidence of success for such a programme in Somalia are particularly strong or that such a programme can be designed to adequately achieve both infrastructure development and social protection objectives, cost effectively or at the scale required. There are also risks of unintentional negative impacts of the works condition on livelihoods. **This is not a preferred option for inclusion in the framework.**

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<sup>246</sup> Such a policy focus has been established by the Government of Fiji, for example, where urban migration is a recognized and growing reality in small island states

It is understood that FAO have funds available and plan to forge ahead with a LIPW pilot programme in Somalia under the JRS. A LIPW programme with objective of temporary employment and infrastructure creation fits within the mandate of FAO and could be useful in this context. However it is strongly recommended that **these are the limits of the programme objectives and that the programme doesn't also try to combine social protection objectives**, which really requires a fundamentally different model. In the former the focus is on quality infrastructure and provision of temporary income support. These programmes should be tendered, to the private sector with the relevant skills, with maximising employment creation as key criteria for selection. In contrast a programme that also aims to achieve social protection of the poorest ends up seeking to develop infrastructure through employment of low skills and low wages, at the expense of the quality of the infrastructure.

LIPW are thus a valid programme under the JRS but not under the social protection pillar and not for inclusion in the framework.

In the event that JRS agencies decide to proceed with LIPW as a programme option within the social protection framework in Phase One, such a pilot programme must be implemented taking into account the following:

- Test something radical through piloting alternative works to manual labour, including consideration of remunerated social work. This could establish much needed complementary social care services such as childcare centres and is likely to be better for women too. Childcare centres could free up time for parents to undertake livelihood activities and seek employment.
- Flexible, shorter hours and childcare services to reduce the burden of participation on women.
- Alongside the LIPW it is essential that there is support provided for those households who cannot fulfil the work requirement. The ideal therefore will be to implement this in the same locations as the pilots of the Child Grant and the Pension - rather than simply providing short term UCT to households in FAO's target areas that don't meet the work requirement for enrolment in the public works programme, which is the current plan.
- Any long-term focus on promoting a LIPW programme as a component of the social protection framework should be as an entitlement programme, an employment guarantee.

However as mentioned above, a better way to get income into these families will be through establishing a well-funded Child Grant.

### **Income support to meet the needs of vulnerable women**

Female headed households including widows and abandoned women were identified as being particularly vulnerable in Somalia. However in this context, where seasonal household splitting and polygamy are prevalent it is likely to be quite difficult to identify who can be classed as a female headed household. It is considered that in the short-term it will be better to meet their needs in other ways, through establishing other components of the Lifecycle social protection framework such as a Child Grant. It can be designed such that the Child Grant is delivered to the female caregiver where she exists, thus placing cash into the hands of women. Recent experiences of targeting women with cash transfers in Somalia have been positive. Cash transferred directly to women was owned and controlled by women, with positive impact on their involvement in household decision-making and relationships with their husband, positive scores on the women's 'empowerment' index, and increased spending on family welfare<sup>247</sup>.

Women in particularly difficult circumstances, for example those suffering domestic violence in urban areas, could be an ideal small target group within the broader category of youth for testing the graduation programme approach. Such cases could potentially be hard to identify, however on the basis of the findings

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<sup>247</sup> There is also extensive evidence from across the world that targeting women leads to longer term investments in the health and education of children.



of this research in urban areas, it is happening. This is a tentative area to explore further, if cases could be identified through child protection or other CBO partners.

### **7.1.6 Potential Option Six: School Feeding Programme for Primary Children**

School feeding is the only food transfer included as an option in this framework. There is potential value in the rollout of a school feeding programme given that it already has some good coverage in Somalia, is likely to generate political support. There is some evidence internationally that well designed programmes in low income countries have had a positive impact on school attendance, in nutritional status of children attending school<sup>248</sup> and potentially educational achievement<sup>249</sup>.

That said there is little clear information available concerning the objectives of school feeding in Somalia to date or rigorous evidence on its impact. There is extensive evidence, summarised in this paper, of numerous supply-side barriers to education outcomes for children, especially in rural areas. Such a programme can therefore only be expected to have an impact on education attendance in areas where services exist, whilst an impact on education outcomes cannot be guaranteed. There is also extensive evidence that broader financial barriers, beyond access to food, are preventing children from accessing education services where they exist. Thus it is likely that whilst school feeding may bring more children to school it will not bring all children and is likely going to be more beneficial for those who are “better off”. This research found that some children were missing out on the scheme as they went home during lunch time to help out their families. Moreover, one of the constraints identified in this field research was a lack of water to cook meals at school in areas affected by water scarcity and management of the programme was drawing teachers away from their teaching responsibilities.

It is also important to bear in mind the international evidence on the challenges of school feeding programmes such as evidence that meals at school can simply substitute meals for children that would have been provided at home.

**Phase One:** The design of the on-going school feeding programme implemented by WFP should be reviewed taking into account the above. As a starting point this should include an analysis of the causes of why children are not (a) in school and (b) performing well in school and the potential of school feeding (including take home rations) to address these needs. It should include rigorous evaluation of the benefits of the programme on school attendance, nutrition and education outcomes for poor families, taking into account the cost, in order to assess the longer-term relative merits of school feeding versus other instruments.

It is now widely recognised that, rather than sourcing food in international (or even national markets) it is better to procure nutritious food locally from producers and thus help the local economy. **This change should be implemented by WFP as soon as possible.** One way is to give funds to schools to begin to manage this process. Schools can also tender for local people to provide school meals, supporting local employment.

**Phase Two:** Subject to results of the review and of the child grant pilot, and taking into account budgetary constraints (below), the progressive expansion of a revised school feeding programme as a national programme with national budgetary allocation, designed so as to incorporate measures to improve education and nutritional outcomes especially for low income households, could be considered:

- Improving use of locally produced food stocks, ideally putting decision making power and management in the hands of the school.
- Taking into account challenges of schools to implement the programme and of children to access the programme in areas prone to water scarcity.
- Ensuring complementary actions such as de-worming and micronutrient fortification to improve nutritional gains.

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<sup>248</sup> Kristjansson B. et al (2009)

<sup>249</sup> Bundy et al (2009)

- Creating conditions for improving education outcomes.
- Building in mechanisms to reduce substitution effects.
- Establishing controls to minimise leakage of stock.

Whilst little is currently known about budget allocations for implementation of this social protection framework, it may be unlikely that funding will be available to support a rollout of both extensive school feeding and a Child Grant. In this event a choice may have to be made between supporting school meals for those school-aged children who can access school, versus supporting consumption for all families with school aged children and/or for cognitive development of young children.

For the reasons outlined above, in the context of scarce resources it is recommended that if a choice has to be made between income support to children and school feeding then income support may be most beneficial to families in greatest need.

### 7.1.7 Costing the Framework

A costing model was developed in Excel to illustrate the financial implications of moving forward with establishing some of the programme options outlined above at various levels of coverage – specifically child grants, old age grant and disability grant. It should be noted that this is extremely difficult in the context of Somalia given the sparse national data available. The data limitations and assumptions used in the model are shown in Box 7.1.7.

#### Box 7.1.7 Data Limitations and Assumptions used in developing the Costing Model

- Model is based on the 2015 population figures and subsequent five-year projections from the UN Population Division. There is **no population data available for the different Zones** from the UN Population Division, so the model can only estimate costing for Somalia as a whole.
- A big challenge is the **lack of economic outlook data** for Somalia, with no data available through the IMF World Economic Outlook database or the World Bank data site (where last GDP data is from 1990!). The model uses the UN database for GDP 2012<sup>250</sup>, which is then compared to the 2015 UN population figure to get GDP per capita. This assumes the GDP of Somalia is the same in 2014 as it was in 2012.
- A consequence of the lack of economic data is that it **isn't possible to do as sophisticate projections**. A usual assumption is that benefits would be indexed to inflation, so would decrease relative to GDP per capita as the economy grows. This model uses an assumption of 3% inflation although this cannot be backed up with data. An alternative given the lack of growth figures, would be to set this at 0%, in which case projections would assume that benefits are indexed to average income (i.e. wages).
- Under the Old age Grant, eligibility is set at 55 years and above and transfer values set at 20% of GDP per capita.
- Under the Disability Grant the model is set at the assumption of 0.6% of the population living with a disability, which is comparable to coverage of the South Africa disability grant. It is likely that this is an underestimate in the context of Somalia however there is a lack of national data to define further. Transfer values are set at 20% of GDP per capita.
- Under the Child Benefit eligibility thresholds are set at 0-2 years; 0-4 years and 6-11 years. Transfer values are set at 4% of GDP per capita.
- The model assumes an average household size of six, which is comparable to findings of the MICS surveys for Somaliland and Puntland.
- The scenarios here assume a 10% administration costs for each programme option, though this can be changed.

In order to develop costing scenarios it is necessary to consider both programme coverage and benefit levels. There is no right or wrong value for the size of benefit transfer – however in setting the value it is important

<sup>250</sup> See reference in the model. The UN figure is very similar to that estimated in a recent World Bank-funded assessment in Somaliland


<http://slministryofplanning.org/images/HHSurvey/GDP-and-Unemployment%202014.pdf>

to bear in mind the following:

1. The objectives of the programme will have a bearing on the value at which the transfer is set. Some programmes have calculated transfer values according to a percentage of the cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket.
2. There is likely to be a tradeoff between transfer value and coverage – it will need to be decided whether to aim to cover a greater proportion of the poor and vulnerable but with a smaller transfer or a smaller portion of the population with larger transfers that make a bigger difference to those who are enrolled. The smaller the transfer, the less impact at the level of the household but the greater number of households the programme budget can support.
3. Over time, whilst the absolute cost of providing transfers will go up, the cost as a percentage of GDP will reduce.

Some comparisons of the values of these transfers in other countries as a percentage of GDP per capita are provided in Figure 7.1.7. Internationally, it seems that it is common for Child Grants to be set at around 0.4% of GDP per capita and for Old Age Grants and Disability Grants to be set at around 20% of GDP. One challenge with this in the context of Somalia is that GDP/capita is so low this produces extremely low transfer values in practice.

**Figure 7.1.7 (a) Comparing transfer values on Child Grant schemes (as percentage of GDP)**



**Figure 7.1.7 (b) Comparing transfer values on Old Age Grant schemes (as percentage of GDP)**





Figure 7.1.7 (c) Comparing transfer values on Disability Grant schemes (as percentage of GDP)



An alternative benchmark to consider in the setting of benefit levels could be the total cost of the programme(s) as a percentage of GDP. When considering the value of other lifecycle systems internationally, 3% of GDP would seem reasonable. As noted above, over time this cost would be expected to reduce as the economy grows.

It is worthwhile looking at what benefit levels have been set on schemes in neighbouring countries in recent years. Some examples are provided in Box 7.1.7b.

**Box 7.1.7b Comparing transfer values in neighbouring countries**

Kenya: The HSNP originally provided KES 2,150 to each beneficiary household every two months. This was calculated as 75% of the value of the World Food Programme (WFP) food aid ration in 2006. This equated to \$11 per month. Assuming a household size of 5 this is \$2.2 per person. This has been increases since to KES 3150.

Kenya: The social pension for older people was originally set at KES 1,500 per person per month, around \$18. This was increased in 2011 to KES 2,000.

Ethiopia: Payments on the PSNP were set at 6 Birr/day per household in 2005, or roughly \$9 per month. This equated to the cost of purchasing 3kg of staples.

Uganda: The Senior Citizen’s Grant provides a monthly transfer of about \$8.7, which a quarter of the international poverty line.

Using the costing model, Table 7.1.7 illustrates some examples of the cost for three programme options set out in Section 7.1. This includes a Child Grant (3 different age ranges); an Old Age Grant (over 55 years); and

a Disability Grant under different coverage and transfer value scenarios.

Scenario 1 illustrates costs if programmes were at 100% coverage and transfer values were set at comparable levels to what is seen internationally. For this reason the Disability Grant and Old Age grant have been set at around 20% of GDP. This illustrates the challenge of using GDP/capita to set benefit levels in Somalia, and the monthly transfer sizes are extremely small here. For this reason it wasn't possible for Child Grant to be set at 0.4% of GDP per capita since the transfer values. Instead in this case the value was increased but the total cost as a percentage of GDP was kept within 3%. Transfer values are still small however. If we consider that at present the cost of a Minimum Expenditure Basket for an average household for food items only in Somalia is \$108<sup>251</sup> it is unlikely that transfer set according to these criteria will be effective.

Scenario 2 illustrates costs if programme coverage was expanded incrementally, so assuming just 20% coverage in 2015. Transfer values were set at comparable levels (though towards the lower end) of what is seen in neighboring countries. These transfer values can be considered more effective though still low compared to cost of living. It illustrates that on account of the reduced coverage, the overall cost of the programmes even, though they are providing a higher level of support, remains the same and could be considered manageable levels.

Table 7.1.7 Illustrating the cost (in 2015) of implementing transfer programmes of different values and coverage									
Target category	Target group as % of total population (2012)	% of group targeted	Monthly transfer size in 2015 (2012 current prices)			Admin costs	Total cost in 2015 (2012 current prices)		
			% of GDP per capita	SOS	USD		% of GDP	SOS (billions)	USD (millions)
SCENARIO 1 (100% COVERAGE; VALUES AS % OF GDP ALIGNED WITH INTERNATIONAL TRENDS)									
0-2 years	11.31%	100% coverage	14.7%	1,200	1.4	10%	1.83%	19.9	23.9
0-6 years	24.80%		9.8%	800	1.0	10%	2.68%	29.1	35.0
6-11 years	17.60%		9.8%	800	1.0	10%	1.90%	20.7	24.8
55+	6.54%		20.9%	1,700	2.0	10%	1.50%	16.3	19.6
Disability	0.60%		20.9%	1,700	2.0	10%	0.14%	1.5	1.8
SCENARIO 2 (20% COVERAGE; VALUES HIGHER SO AS TO BE COMPARABLE TO THOSE IN THE REGION)									
0-2	11.31%	20% coverage (i.e. through geographic targeting)	73.6%	6,000	7.2	10%	1.83%	19.9	23.9
0-6	24.80%		49.1%	4,000	4.8	10%	2.68%	29.1	35.0
6-11	17.60%		49.1%	4,000	4.8	10%	1.90%	20.7	24.8
55+	6.54%		110.4%	9,000	10.8	10%	1.59%	17.3	20.7
Disability	0.60%		110.4%	9,000	10.8	10%	0.73%	7.9	9.5

As mentioned above, on account of economic growth it is generally assumed that the cost of funding transfer programmes as a percentage of GDP will go down over time. This in turn will mean that it should be possible to incrementally scale up programme coverage over time without significantly increasing the cost as a percentage of GDP. Table 7.1.7b takes the above analysis a stage further, by providing detail of the cost projections for each programme with incremental scale up in coverage between 2015 and 2040.

Scenario A assumes low benefit levels for Child Grants and Old Age Grants while Scenario B assumes medium level benefit levels for these, which can be considered in line with other transfers in the region and more effective at meeting household consumption needs. Scenario C aims to estimate the cost of delivering a

<sup>251</sup> FSNAU data August 2014


programme that provides a transfer value to meet 30% of a household's minimum expenditure basked for food.

What this analysis illustrates, more clearly pictured in the graphs in Figure 7.1.7d-f, is that:


- The cost of providing these two lifecycle programmes at a benefit level comparable to other programmes in the region, and scaling up to universal coverage incrementally, is not unfeasible but is higher than in other countries as a percentage of GDP and will require significant donor investment over a long period.
- Programmes covering a greater percentage of the minimum expenditure basket for these groups will be commendable and will certainly be more effective in reducing poverty and vulnerability and increasing resilience, however the cost of providing such programmes at similar coverage is likely to be unsustainable. If transfers are to be increased, expectations of scaling up programme coverage will need to be scaled down.

<b>Table 7.1.7b Costs for Incremental Scale Up of Transfer Programmes, Assuming Low, Medium and High Benefit Levels</b>								
<b>SCENARIOS</b>	<b>Cost projections (assuming 3% growth annually)</b>							
	<b>Cost USD (millions)</b>	<b>% GDP</b>	<b>Cost USD (millions)</b>	<b>% GDP</b>	<b>Cost USD (millions)</b>	<b>% GDP</b>	<b>Cost USD (millions)</b>	<b>% GDP</b>
<b>A: LOW LEVEL BENEFITS</b>								
<b>PROJECTIONS (Year and % coverage)</b>	<b>2015 (20%)</b>		<b>2020 (30%)</b>		<b>2025 (40%)</b>		<b>2040 (100%)</b>	
Child Benefit 0-6 years old \$4 per child per month 20% coverage 2015 Progressive expansion to universal coverage	28.8	2.21	48.4	2.77	72%	3.10	231.3	4.34
Old Age Grant 55+ years \$5 per person per month 20% coverage 2015 Progressive expansion to universal coverage	9.7	0.74	16.7	0.95	25.6	1.10	100.5	1.89
<b>MEDIUM LEVEL BENEFITS</b>								
<b>PROJECTIONS (Year and % coverage)</b>	<b>2015 (20%)</b>		<b>2020 (30%)</b>		<b>2025 (40%)</b>		<b>2040 (100%)</b>	
Child Benefit 0-6 years old \$8 per child per month 20% coverage 2015 Progressive expansion to universal coverage	58.1	4.45	97.5	5.59	145.2	6.24	466.1	8.74
Old Age Grant 55+ years \$14 per person per month 20% coverage 2015 Progressive expansion to universal coverage	26.9	2.06	46.2	2.65	71.0	3.05	278.8	5.23
<b>C: A BENEFIT COMPARABLE TO 30% OF THE MINIMUM EXPENDITURE BASKET (Food Only)</b>								
<b>PROJECTIONS (Year and % coverage)</b>	<b>2015 (10%)</b>		<b>2020 (15%)</b>		<b>2025 (20%)</b>		<b>2040 (30%)</b>	
A household level grant of \$32 per month beginning with 10% of the population and incrementally expanding to cover roughly same proportion as the above Child Grant + Old Age Grant	81.8	6.26	141.3	8.10	216.7	9.32	478.3	8.97


**Figure 7.1.7d Cost of Implementing Scenario A 2015-2040 as Percentage of GDP**



**Figure 7.1.7e Cost of Implementing Scenario B 2015-2040 as Percentage of GDP**



**Figure 7.1.7f Cost of Implementing Scenario C 2015-2040 as Percentage of GDP**



## 7.2 Recommendations

Of course, a move to an inclusive system cannot happen overnight. In the short-term, it will be prudent to invest in first establishing and then increasing the coverage of just one or two schemes (the Child Grant and Old Age Grant outlined above), while, in the long-term, planning a gradual expansion of these and other priority schemes. The following are the recommended actions for UNICEF and other agencies to prioritise during Phase One in order to take the framework forward.

### 7.2.1 Government Engagement and Capacity Building

In the North, authorities are keen to move towards a long-term development approach and want more government involvement and ownership of national development processes. Social transfers coming from government have the potential to build government profile and the social contract with citizens. Whilst there are large capacity issues (technical, financial, institutional) to acknowledge, a foundation governance structure exists in the North on which to build and these are not insurmountable provided there is appetite for long-term engagement on the part of agencies. Even in SCS although implementation will continue to be through external organisations, the FGS should be engaged from the outset. To build national understanding, support for and capacity to implement social transfer programmes the following should be prioritised:

**UNICEF should use this proposed framework to engage with Administrations to inform the design of national social protection policy and strategy in each Zone** - This should include finalisation with government administrations on the Department with the mandate to lead on social protection (most likely to be MLSA). As a guide, policies should clearly define social protection in the context of Somalia/the Zone in question; set the rationale for social protection and specifically social transfers with reference to both the nature of poverty and vulnerability in Somalia/the Zone and national development priorities; set out policy commitments to incrementally rolling out and increasing coverage of well-defined social transfer programmes which are in line with a Lifecycle Approach; and set out policy commitments to building the capacities, systems and processes needed to make social transfers a reality as well as to ensuring adequate monitoring and evaluation.

**Training and capacity building of national government** – this is necessary in order to build understanding within government at all levels on the importance of social protection and social transfers and to build national capacity to lead implementation of social protection programmes under the framework. This could include country visits to learn from programmes in other contexts and should include not only MLSA but also champion ministries including those responsible for Finance and Planning.

**In the North district capacity in programme operations should be developed, in collaboration with JPLG** – this will be necessary from the outset of any pilot phase, though CSOs are likely to play a role in implementation in the short to medium term.

There will therefore need to be considerable investment in building capacity to govern and administer social protection at all levels across government, along with a plan to systematically hand over responsibility to government as capacity is built over time. The scope and nature of training and support should be informed by a capacity building assessment of all relevant institutions. Capacity assessments will identify gaps in technical skills, institutions and systems and financial management. From this a capacity building action plan can be developed, outlining the necessary actions to improve capacity to deliver social protection. The likely constraints and possible actions to address these are detailed in Figure 7.9. There should be a plan to regularly assess needs and deliver supplementary guidance as programs evolve.

**Table 7.2.1 Building capacity for administering social protection**



	Likely Constraints	Capacity strengthening
Technical capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited understanding of social protection, conceptual frameworks, key design considerations</li> <li>Lack of skills relating to engaging with vulnerable households/community mobilisation, partner assessment, design of grievance mechanisms, M&amp;E or data analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular short training courses and guidance tools on things such as market assessment, targeting and grievance procedures, delivery procedures, running the MIS, and systems for data collection and analysis.</li> <li>Study visits to other LICs administering social protection programmes.</li> <li>Technical assistance expertise established within departments responsible for coordinating and implementing the transfer programmes, coupling national and district staff with skilled UNICEF (or other) expertise.</li> </ul>
Institutional capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of resources – staff and equipment including vehicles and ICT - to undertake the necessary administrative tasks especially at sub-national level or maintain oversight</li> <li>Lack of processes and systems to implement a formal social transfer effectively and efficiently with minimum risks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure programme budgets include provision for adequate resourcing of key departments responsible for administration.</li> <li>Development of standard operating procedures and institutional arrangements and provide full training in these.</li> </ul>
Financial capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of capacity in public financial management and economic analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage with development partners working in the area of PFM (DFID and World Bank) to develop a multi-year action plan for building capacity to manage a national social protection programme portfolio.</li> </ul>

### 7.2.2 Develop a Long-term Vision and Commitments

Moving forward with social protection in Somalia, on paper and in practice, requires a fundamental shift in donor and agency mind-set and programme designs. This shift is beginning to be recognised and articulated though more needs to be done. The following will be important to consider:

- Moving beyond projects and mandates:** The UN JRS provides a vehicle for getting pilot social protection and safety net programme(s) up and running since the strategy is or is going to be implemented over a period of 15 years in all three Zones, includes a ‘social safety net’ pillar and there are funds committed in the short-term which can support mobilisation. However if this is to be useful it is crucial that the different mandates of agencies are used to comparative advantage. Since the framework is to follow a lifecycle approach, beneficiaries should not simply exit the programme upon completion of a two or three year project cycle, but rather when they reach the end of this particular lifecycle stage. In other words it must be acknowledged from the outset that such a project, whilst time bound, is the first stage of transforming to something nationally owned and encapsulates this as defined objectives of the project (i.e. to generate evidence, and build political support and capacity).
- Long-term technical and financial commitments:** It is going to be an expensive undertaking without a doubt but one that is necessary. In the medium term this will require support from development and humanitarian partners, which will require advocacy on the part of UNICEF. It would be helpful to establish within the next twelve months which partners have or could have a genuine interest in taking this forward, as part of a coherent country strategy backed up with funds. Within Somaliland, the potential of either the SDF or of establishing a separate and specific MDTF should be explored seriously. In terms of testing a predictable safety net to scale up during climatic shocks, this will be more complex since funds should be pre-committed and will necessarily involve a combination of emergency and development finance instruments. Again an MDTF could be a sensible option here. The instruments being used in Ethiopia are a starting point but other innovations should also be brought to the table. This is not something that is going to take shape overnight, the reality may be

months to years, staff or consultants with the requisite expertise in financing instruments will be needed and a realistic plan and milestones should be drawn up. Finances must also be committed not only for the transfers but for the costs of establishing and running the operational processes including capacity building.

### 7.2.3 Achieving increasing coverage through progressive implementation

The framework is built on the principle of progressive realization'. In Phase One, the Lifecycle programmes should be piloted in a small number of defined geographical areas. To select those areas the following should be taken into account:

- **Maximising success** - Implement where it's easiest first and where it will be possible to demonstrate impact, don't choose the more difficult area to pilot systems for the first time. This should take into account security and access concerns; coverage of mobile network; distance and accessibility by road; and local governance.
- **Complementary services** – As mentioned a social transfer programme is not a silver bullet and therefore ensuring linkages to wider complementary services and programmes are important for transfers to achieve their full potential. The programmes should be implemented in those sites where such linkages have greater chance of being assured.
- **Overlap of multiple livelihood zones** – So as to firstly avoid risk of conflict between pastoral, agro-pastoral and riverine clans in rural areas whilst also providing opportunity to monitor similar and differential impacts.
- **Vulnerability** – Despite there being no comprehensive household survey it may be possible to select those sites where a high proportion of the poor and vulnerable can be expected to reside. In urban locations this could focus on those living in IDP settlements. In rural areas it should aim to include areas with chronic problems of water scarcity, and food insecurity, if the objective is to pilot the safety net for dealing with covariate shocks.
- **Population density** – Selecting provinces with a high proportion of the population can be useful since a pilot can be undertaken in a relatively contained geographic area and progressive expansion in these districts over time will generate high coverage.

Taking this into account the above, the districts that have potential to fulfil much of the above are those to be covered under the UN JRS. Some of these such as in Toghdeer region of Somaliland also overlap with the UN JPLG programme and are likely to be where local government capacity is greatest. To this could perhaps be added a site for the urban poor in the larger cities (e.g., Hargeisa, Mogadishu) although the districts under the JRS do include urban centres of significant size such as Burco.

The same process and systems for progressive implementation can be followed in each Zone. UNICEF could consider simultaneous programming across all three Zones or a phased approach. Given capacity, a phased approach may be preferable – with pilots during Phase One beginning first in Somaliland, then in Puntland, and implementation beginning lastly in SCS.

In order not to encourage immigration into programme areas on account of the programme, additional criteria of proof of residence for a minimum time may need to be imposed during targeting.

Depending on capacity and budgets, perhaps two study sites with different conditions (e.g. urban v rural; pastoral v riverine) could be included per Zone, so as to maximise lesson learning.

For the safety net pilot, it is recommended that implementation is tested in Somaliland only in the first instance.

The aim during Phase Two, subject to the findings of the pilot phase, would then be for progressive roll out of these schemes across the country. Similarly this should follow a phased approach, with geographical coverage being systematically expanded as implementation capacity and budgets increase.

#### **7.2.4 Developing efficient and effective systems for operations**

The importance of investing in the wider systems and operational capacities cannot be emphasised enough. UNICEF should not be involved directly in the implementation but the focus should be around setting up of operational systems and administrative processes at national and sub-national level, which may be implemented in the short to medium term by third parties but with the aim of transferring over to government as capacity grows. This will include systems for targeting/registration; payments; management information systems and monitoring; and grievance. These should ideally be standardised across Zones.

**Building an effective payment system:** Engaging a financial service provider to manage the cash delivery operations is standard practice on national social protection programmes and is feasible in Somalia. This should be made available to a variety of service providers through an invitation to tender process, with objective assessment of the various contenders. However based on international experiences it is recommended that moving to an electronic payment process be prioritised. Mobile money transfer should be considered a serious contender on the basis of coverage, accessibility, accountability, potential for flexibility and potential for cost-effectiveness with scale.

**Building systems for coordination and capacity strengthening:** to go to scale, it will be necessary to establish clear institutional arrangements to coordinate the inputs of the various stakeholders at all levels (development partners/national and local government/implementing partners) whilst also ensuring progressive capacity strengthening of national stakeholders. Some suggestions for consideration, based on experiences in other low income countries are as follows:

- It is likely that in implementing the social protection framework the national authorities will devolve some administrative responsibility down to district council level (in the North only) whilst making extensive use of partnerships, subcontracting certain functions to service providers with a comparative advantage. Different organisations including CSOs and private sector firms will bring different expertise to the table – and perhaps a combination of services will be the most appropriate. It would be helpful to establish a Programme Management Unit, under a management contractor, to develop the various processes and systems; undertake capacity assessments; contract implementing partners for those administrative tasks that the district council doesn't have capacity to take on; build understanding and capacity in the various processes; and coordinate the administrative inputs of local government and implementing partners. Ideally such services should be tendered.
- In the Northern Zones where national capacity is more advanced, a national Social Protection Secretariat could be established. This should be hosted within MLSA with the natural mandate for social protection. A National Social Protection Coordinator should be appointed, responsible for the management of the Secretariat. In the short to medium term and subject to the results of the capacity assessment, the ideal would be to have this position accompanied by a social protection adviser as part of the PMU described above, to build understanding and operational capacity.
- To coordinate activities between development partners and potentially complementary activities of other ministries, a Social Protection Steering Committee could be established in each Zone. This could comprise of MLSA, senior officers from key line ministries and heads of missions for development partners committing to moving social protection forward in Somalia. The aim would be for this to be chaired by MLSA with support from UNICEF however it may be considered that the Ministry of Planning or Finance could take this role in Phase One if this is likely to generate more buy in across government. Long-term staff of the PMU would be involved in and would advise the

committee. The committee would guide the development of sound and appropriate social protection policies and action plans to implement the programmes. Similarly a Sub-Committee could be established at district level, headed by the District Council (in Somaliland this would be the Social Affairs Department) and including CSO implementing partners and representation from the PMU. This sub-committee could be responsible for coordinating and implementing all activities at the district and community level.

- **Building processes for ensuring accountability and reducing exclusion:** it will be important to ensure through rigorous operational processes and systems that the risk of exclusion of eligible individuals and households (including socially excluded groups such as minority clans and women as well as those whose mobility may create barriers to access such as nomadic households, families with young children, the elderly and those with physical disabilities. There are a number of elements that will be crucial in this respect: The best way will be to involve the target population themselves in the design of these processes.
- **Design and implementation of a communications strategy** - a good communications strategy is essential to i) ensure that eligible beneficiaries are made aware of and fully understand who is providing the programme, its objectives, the criteria for eligibility, the proof of eligibility required, how to enroll, how to receive payments and the value of transfer they can expect; ii) ensure that others in the community also fully understand the criteria for eligibility and why they are ineligible; iii) ensure beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are aware of the mechanism for providing feedback to the programme implementers in the event they wish to raise a grievance; and iv) to inform beneficiaries of any future changes to the programme's design or operations. It can also be a means of providing additional sensitization and messaging to households enrolled in the programme. Best practice for communications strategies are presented in Box 7.2.3.

**Box 7.2.3 Good Practices to Follow when Designing a Communication Strategy**

- Present messages in the local language (s).
- Use media and communication channels accessible to, familiar to and trusted by the population to be targeted, including written information but also other media and communication channels for those with low literacy. It is likely this will include pictorial tools and word of mouth channels.
- Make messages simple and clear as possible.

- **Investing in training for operations staff** – whether governmental or CSO partner staff it will be important to provide training to those implementing the programmes on the importance of reducing discrimination of socially excluded groups and of ways to monitor and address this.
- **Design of appropriate registration and enrollment procedures** – it is important to make programmes as straightforward as possible for poor and vulnerable groups to access. Registration and enrollment procedures should seek to minimize the responsibilities expected of applicants as well as the number of steps in the process that applicants must go through. Ideally registration should be a one-step process, with all the requisite information being collected from the applicant during a single registration meeting. This means setting eligibility criteria that are easy to verify. In the case of programmes based on geographical location and age, criteria are minimal, but proof must still be obtained. In the case of Somalia, where there are little formal ID, it will be important to consider how this proof will be obtained in practice. The involvement of local elders is likely to be one possible mechanism. Another consideration will be whether to have pull or push registration processes, i.e. will it be an 'on demand' process that is up to the individual to access and requires travel to the administrative offices, or will it be a mass registration process that goes into communities on particular days. Similarly to enroll the beneficiary onto the payment system it will be important to make sure beneficiaries are able to present the proofs of identity required by the payment service provider.

- **Investing in accessible payment processes** – It must be ensured that the process for accessing the transfer is appropriate for beneficiaries and doesn't present opportunity costs (be these of time or financial costs). Pay out points must be sufficiently close to communities and queuing time should be kept to a minimum. Payment cycles may need to be modified between rural and urban areas or between Zones to take into account the livelihood patterns in the targeted area – for example, payments on a three-month cycle may be more appropriate for nomadic pastoralists. It is likely that special provision will need to be made for those with mobility issues – perhaps by making a third party eligible to collect transfers on their behalf. In areas where the system has good penetration, mobile money transfer can offer significant advantages to deal with some of these issues.
- **Investing in an accessible grievance mechanism** – those people who consider that they have been wrongly excluded from the programme or who are facing difficulties in accessing the programme should be able to feedback their grievances to the programme implementers and to have these assessed and addressed. Good practice indicates that channels of communication for registering a complaint should be accessible to the programme's target group. This means consideration of the distance people must travel, the cost to access it and the channel through which the grievance is communicated. For populations with low literacy a face-to-face channel or a voice call facility can both be appropriate. The stakeholder selected for a face-to-face channel should be trusted by the beneficiaries and should be someone they feel comfortable addressing (taking into account challenges for socially excluded groups). Phone lines are an option where households have access (not necessarily ownership) to a phone and if the number provided is free to call. Other options are complaints boxes in communities.
- **Invest in monitoring and oversight** – it will be important for senior staff to have sufficient oversight of the way programme processes are being implemented in practice on the ground. This is discussed further in section 7.2.5.
- **Processes for local food procurement:** In the event that any long-term food-based transfer is adopted in the framework, developing an operational strategy to procure at least some food locally from producers and thus help the local economy must be an urgent priority.

### 7.2.5 Invest in rigorous Monitoring and Evaluation

This will be crucial to build support for social protection and to improve programme design and processes. Whatever the primary objective of the programme it will be important to look beyond this to assess the broader contribution and impact of the programme to family wellbeing and resilience, including potential and unintentional negative impacts. A core focus of any evaluation will be to determine how well it helps people weather crises and stresses that might otherwise have resulted in outright destitution. Examples include:

- Impact on food security, nutrition, access to services
- Impact on productive asset holding, household income and/or engagement in the labour market
- Extent to which social protection reinforces traditional social assistance and social networks
- Ability of long-term cash transfers to enable HH to better deal with climatic shocks (and conflict should this become a factor during implementation) including CSI.

Table 7.2.5 Summary of Recommended Actions Phase 1 (2014-19)	
1. National Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use SPF to inform the design of national SP policy and strategy.</li> <li>• Capacity assessment of relevant institutions =&gt; gaps in technical skills, institutions, systems, financial management.</li> <li>• Training of national government staff (could include country visits).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building of district staff in programme operations (JPLG).</li> </ul>
2. Develop a Long-term Vision and Commitments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If UN JRS provides a vehicle to pilot social transfers, must be understood from beginning as 'stage 1' of a long-term nationally owned initiative, not a time-bound project.</li> <li>• Establish concrete long-term funding and TA commitments from donors, for systems building, transfers, and for 'crisis modifier'.</li> </ul>
3. Pilot 2x Programmes and the 'Crisis Modifier' for Shocks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Design two x lifecycle programmes (children; elderly).</li> <li>• Select implementing partners.</li> <li>• Pilot in a small number of defined geographical areas.</li> <li>• Locations could be selected where there is (e.g.) i) maximum chance of success; ii) complementary services exist; iii) indicators of vulnerability are high; iv) overlap of livelihood zones; v) high population density.</li> </ul>
4. Building Systems and Processes (Project Management Unit through a management contractor)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a Management Information System.</li> <li>• Tender for appropriate payment service provider(s).</li> <li>• Establish clear institutional arrangements (national secretariat MLSA; steering committee of government and partners; district level implementation).</li> <li>• Design and train in operational procedures.</li> </ul>
5. Invest in Rigorous M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process monitoring/oversight, and impact evaluation.</li> </ul>

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## Annex A: Summary of Targeted Communities

Zone	Region / Province	District	Study Location	Livelihoods
Somaliland	Togdheer	Burco	Beer	Pastoral, Agro pastoral
			Burco	Pastoral, Agro pastoral, Urban
		Odweyne	Getitaly	Pastoral, Agro pastoral
			Odweyne	Pastoral, Agro pastoral
	Woqooyi Galbeed	Hargeisa	Dami	Urban
			Stadium settlement	Urban (IDP)

			Digaale settlement	Urban (IDP)
<b>SCS</b>	Mogadishu	Dharkenley	Midnimo	Urban (IDP), Riverine (seasonal)
		Waaberi	'UNICEF camp'	Urban (IDP), Riverine (seasonal)
	Lower Shabelle	Afgoye	Afgoye town	Urban, urban (IDP), Riverine,
			Rural settlements	Riverine, Agro pastoral, Pastoral
<b>Puntland</b>	Bari	Bosaso	Biyokulule camp	Urban (IDP)
			Mingis camp	Urban (IDP)
			Ajuuraan camp	Urban (IDP)
	Nugal	Garowe	Garowe	Urban
			Jowle	Urban (IDP)
		Sin <a href="#">U+</a> Jiif	Pastoral (sedentary)	

## Annex B: Study Instruments

Instrument type + number	With whom	Purpose In order to find out the following:	Methodological comments
<p>Community mapping (CM) and timeline <i>1 per district</i> <i>Time to allot for each: 1-2 hours</i></p>	<p>Community leaders, clan heads, religious leaders, local officials, service providers</p>	<p>Detail on the size of village/community,; natural resources, main sources of livelihoods and constraints to development; presence or absence of clinics, schools and other services, including markets and traders Presence of any CBOs and NGOs and the types of projects delivered in the area Identification and ranking of particularly vulnerable groups Whether the community receives any formal aid, who benefits, and how this is organised Existence/operation of informal social protection mechanisms Current governance and security situation Significant historical and recent events in the village (both positive and negative)</p>	<p>Most of the information will be obtained through a focus group-type discussion of key themes Complementary information will be obtained on significant historical events and classification of vulnerabilities through a community timeline and vulnerability/coping matrix developed for this purpose (provided in the toolkit) Some participants could be identified for later KIIs</p>
<p>Focus Group Discussions (FGD) <i>Time to allot for each: 1-2 hours</i> <i>Expectation – 2-3 per day</i></p>	<p>In each district, complete FGD with: Older women 50+ Older men 50+ Women of working age (25-50) Men of working age (25-50) Female youth (18-25) Male youth (18-25)  Then one of either Adults with disabilities (mixed) School age children 10-15 (can be mixed) Minority group</p>	<p>To identify and understand key risks, vulnerabilities and coping strategies across the life course, by gender, and by category of population To identify and understand experiences (and expectations) of participation in either formal or informal social protection mechanisms To identify and understand views on local accountability mechanisms linked to social protection mechanisms and understand potential sources of exclusion To identify and understand issues around access to and use of social services (health, education) and markets for themselves, for the community in general and for most vulnerable groups</p>	<p>It is assumed that each locality will feature a predominant livelihood (pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, riverine/coastal, urban/per-urban – including pastoralists who have abandoned pastoralism). FGDs should ideally capture individuals of this profile FGD in urban areas should aim to capture views of drop out pastoralists where this is known to be a feature We want to hear the opinions of minority groups, but do not want to stigmatize or single them out. If the study location is a village hosting significant minorities in the particular study locality, presumably all FGDs will reflect their views so there is no need to seek separate FGDs with minorities. Among adults and older people; a mix of monogamous and polygamous marriages should be represented if possible.</p>

			<p>Age cut-offs are indicative and do not need to be exact</p> <p>Visual exercises to accompany FGDs with adults (aged 20-50) include a seasonal livelihood mapping (in the toolkit)</p> <p>Two specific visual exercises (also set out in the toolkit) will be used to help elicit the views of children</p>
<p>Life histories (LH)</p> <p>To be selected from the categories in column two</p> <p><i>Time to allot for each: 1-2 hours</i></p>	<p>In each district, complete LH with</p> <p>One working age adult</p> <p>One older person</p> <p>One child who is out-of-school/orphan/child labourer</p> <p>Person with disability</p>	<p>To better understand vulnerabilities through the life course for specific vulnerable individuals;</p> <p>To understand yearly cycles and trends over the years;</p> <p>To understand how access to informal social protection and ability to cope changes over the life cycle.</p> <p>To identify and understand experiences with participation in formal social protection programmes.</p>	<p>Some of the respondents for LHs might be selected from among the most articulate participants in the FGDs</p> <p>Representatively of gender should be sought across the interviews (i.e. if you select an older man, select a working age woman)</p> <p>If a FGD with disabled people isn't possible in a particular location, the team might consider a life history of a person with disability</p> <p>In Minority areas the LH with adult males and females should if possible be with an adult from a minority</p> <p>Specific visual exercises to accompany life history interviews include 1) individual timeline (recommended for all); and 2) daily time schedule (optional – perhaps most relevant for women and children)</p>
<p>Key informant interviews (KII)*</p> <p><i>district HQ and some at community study site</i></p> <p><i>Time to allot for each: 1 hour</i></p>	<p>District level</p> <p>District representative relevant ministries and local authorities</p> <p>Local and international NGOs, CBOs</p> <p>Community (locality) level</p> <p>Community leader(s)/elders; religious authorities, teachers, health workers</p> <p>Local CBOs and NGOs</p>	<p>To better understand the overall context</p> <p>To map existing institutions, policies and programmes related to social protection</p> <p>To identify and understand strengths and weakness in existing informal social protection systems</p> <p>To identify constraints and opportunities for social protection programming including synergies with other interventions (include previous experiences as well as recommendations)</p>	<p>Each KII will be different, depending on the nature of the KI, their roles/functions and areas of expertise. It is NOT necessary to discuss all of the questions provided in the KII tool in the same detail with all KIIs; rather to focus in on particular details with each.</p> <p>KIIs with local authorities/government at district level can be held as a group fashion if you prefer</p>

## Annex C: List of key informants

### District

No	District	Study Location	Participant
1	Odweyne	Odweyne	Local councillor
2		Gaititaley	Governor
3			MCH Director
4			Principal of Primary School
5			Mayor
6			Teacher Primary School
7	Burco	Burco	Deputy governor
8			Deputy mayor
9		Beer	Primary School Teacher
10	Community Leader		
11	Religious Leader		
12	Hargeisa	Stadium	Teacher
13			Council member
14		Digaale	Community Leader
15			Teacher
16		Dami	Teacher
17			Midwife
18	Mogadishu	Waaberi	District Director of Social Services
19			UNICEF Camp Director
20			UNICEF Camp Deputy Director
21		Darkenley	Wadajir District Council Member
22			Wadajir Director of Women Affairs
23			Afgoye
24	Midwife		
25	Head teacher in private school		
26	Local authority member		
27	Garowe	Garowe	District Director of Villages, Gender Unit
28		Garowe	Puntland State University Professor
29		Jowle	Camp Jowle Council Member
30			Deputy Chair of Camp Jowle/Teacher
31		Sin <a href="#">U+</a> Jiif	Head Auxiliary Nurse, MCH
32			Principal of School
33	Village Council Member		
34	Bosaso	Bosaso	Mayor of Bosaso
35			Religious leader
36			Primary teacher
37			Local Authority Member

### National

No	Organisation	Participant
<b>HARGEISA</b>		
1	UNICEF	Head of Education Sector
3	UNICEF	Head of Health Sector; Nutrition Programme Manager
4	UNICEF	Social Development Specialist
5	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	Minister; Director Social Affairs; Director General; Deputy Director, Child Protection
6	National Authority for Disaster Management and Preparedness	Director

7	Ministry of Health	Director General
8	Ministry of Finance	Advisor; Director of Planning
9	Ministry of Endowment and Islamic affairs	Minister
10	Ministry of National Development and Planning	Vice Minister
11	JPLG	Officer for health; education consultant; Officer for the president's office
12	DANIDA	Country representative
13	CCBRS Child Protection NGO	Executive Director
14	WVI	Resilience programme manager
15	WFP	Resilience programme manager
16	FAO	Field programme manager
17	Dahabshil	Corporate client service manager
18	ZAAD	ZAAD Service Manager
<b>PUNTLAND</b>		
19	Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation	Vice Minister
20	Ministry of Finance	Fiscal Decentralisation Consultant
21	Ministry of Education	Gender Advisor
22	Ministry of Health	Director of Planning
23	Ministry of Women, Development and Family Affairs	Minister; Director General
24	Vice Presidents Office	Vice President
25	Ministry of Justice and Rehabilitation	Minister of Planning; Director of Planning
26	Save the Children International	Programme Manager, Social Safety Nets project; Deputy Head of Office
27	Care International	Programme Manager, Rural women's Programme; Deputy Area Manager
<b>SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA</b>		
28	Ministry of Labour	Deputy Director

## Nairobi

<b>NO</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Participant</b>
29	UNICEF Somalia	Social Protection Specialist	Olivia Collins
30	UNICEF	Senior social policy specialist	Natalia Winder Rossi
31	FAO	Cash Based Interventions, Programme Manager	Giuseppe Simeon
32	WFP	Resilience Focal Point	Adam Bernstein
33	DFID	Health Advisors	Kate Bigmore, Karen Stephenson
34	ECHO	Technical Assistant, Somalia	Morten Petersen
35	UNICEF	Senior Nutrition Advisor	Peter Hayley
36	ECHO	Regional humanitarian food assistance expert	Massimo Larosa
37	Concern Worldwide	South Central programme manager	Sarah King
38	BRICs / NRC	BRICs resilience consortium head	Gianmaria Pinto

39	ECHO Ethiopia	Ethiopia adviser	Johan Heffink
40	EU	Resilience programme manager Somalia	Paulo Tosseli
41	ADESO	Programme manger	Ibrahim Hussein
42	WVI / SOMREP	Operations Director, SOMREP resilience consortium	Kevin Mackey
43	DFID	Governance adviser Somaliland/Puntland	Angus Miller
44	NRC	FSL Adviser	Quentin Legallo
45	Oxford Policy Management	Consultant (lead author of cash for work programme evaluation 2013 for FAO)	Andrew Kardan
46	DFID Somalia	Head of Health, Wealth and Humanitarian team	Pauline Seenan